A17-0845 Precedential Affirmed in part and reversed in part Processed

In re the Marriage of: Robert Joseph Hoolihan, petitioner, Appellant,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed June 18, 2018

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0845

In re the Marriage of:
Robert Joseph Hoolihan, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Jacqueline Ann Hoolihan,
Respondent.

Filed June 18, 2018
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Kirk, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-FA-16-191

Carla C. Kjellberg, Kjellberg Law Office, PLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kay Nord Hunt, Lomen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Pamela J. Waggoner, Waggoner Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
In this spousal -maintenance dispute, appellant -husband challenges the district
court’s grant of permanent spousal maintenance to respondent -wife, arguing (1) that the
district court abused its discretion in awarding maintenance based on an equalization of the

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parties’ incomes and not based on wife’s need or on the parties’ standard of living during
their marriage and (2) that the district court should not have required husband to secure the
maintenance award by naming wife as a beneficiary on his life -insurance policies. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Robert Joseph Hoolihan and respondent -wife Jacqueline Ann
Hoolihan were married in 1971. In March 2016, husband served wife with a summons and
petition for dissolution of marriage. The matter proceeded to a trial on December 21 and
22, 2016, where the only contested issues were the value of a lakehome property purchased
during the marriage and wife’s request for spousal maintenance. The parties submitted
financial-disclosure forms and agreed to a valuation date of April 30, 2016 , for their
property and assets. Both parties hired financial experts who submitted financial
documentation and who testified at trial about the parties’ incomes, budgets, and property
and assets division.
At the time of trial, both parties were retired; husband was 70 and wife had just
turned 65. During their marriage, both parties worked full time. Husband worked full time
as a pharmacist for the Veteran’s Administration (VA) until 2001, in addition to working
part time for Health Partners until 2014. Husband receives monthly pensions from both
positions. When husband retired from the VA in 2001, he elected to take survivorship
benefits for wife on his pension with a partial survivor annuity worth 55% of $28,000 per
year or $15,400. Husband also has two life-insurance policies worth a combined total of
$300,000.

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Wife worked full time for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota until March 2016
and subsequently received severance payments until November 2016. Wife elected to cash
out her pension plan in a lump -sum payment when she retired . Both experts treated the
lump sum as a regular pension so as to give a monthly benefit to wife. During their
marriage, the parties divided their fina nces and both contributed to the parties’ monthly
expenses. Husband paid the mortgage on the parties’ marital home in Burnsville and
covered household-related expenses and other necessities. Wife paid the expenses for the
parties’ two children, including clothing, tuition and college -related costs, and for the
parties’ entertainment, including annual vacations.
In 2006, wife purchased a lakehome on Devil’s Lake in Webster, Wisconsin for
$560,000. Wife contributed over 15% of the purchase price using money from her non-
marital inheritance. Wife holds the title to the lakehome, along with the parties’ now-adult
sons. Husband is not on the title but took out a $60,000 home-equity loan with wife on the
property. The parties’ sons initially helped pay the mortgage until wife refinanced and
could pay it herself. Wife now pays the $2,515 monthly mortgage on the lakehome. While
the parties were still married, marital funds were contributed to the expenses for the
lakehome, and husband performed labor and upkeep at the property. Wife and the extended
family use the lakehome seasonally, and wife does not wish to live there year round. Wife’s
claimed monthly expenditure for the lakehome is $3,164.00, including the mortgage. In
November 2016, the lakehome’s value was appraised at $433,500, significantly lower than
what wife paid in 2006. As such, the mortgage on the lakehome is greater than the current
value of the home.

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As part of the dissolution action, the parties agreed that the ma rital home in
Burnsville would be sold and that they would split the proceeds. In addition to the proceeds
from the sale of the marital home, the parties’ experts testified to the parties’ investment,
retirement, pensions, and social security income, as w ell as their trust and net investment
assets. Both experts submitted cash flow schedules and documentation estimating monthly
expenses and cash flow for the parties with and without the lakehome . Based on wife’s
claimed monthly income and budget, she requested maintenance of $2,328 per month.
In its April 5, 2017 dissolution judgment, the district court ordered husband to pay
wife $1,400 per month in permanent spousal maintenance; ordered that husband continue
the partial survivorship annuity on his VA pension for wife; and ordered that husband name
wife as a beneficiary on his life -insurance policies “in light of the spousal maintenance
award.” An amended judgment correcting typographical errors was entered on May 5,
2017.
Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife permanent
spousal maintenance.
This court reviews a district court’s spousal -maintenance award for an abuse of
discretion. Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 2016); Erlandson v. Erlandson,
318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A district court abuses its discretion when it resolves
the matter in a manner that is “against logic and the facts on record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347
N.W.2d 47
, 50 (Minn. 1984). “Findings of fact c oncerning spousal maintenance must be

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upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Gessner v. Gessner , 487 N.W.2d 921, 923
(Minn. App. 1992). Appellate courts view the record in the light most favorable to the
district court’s findings. Vangsness v. Vangsn ess, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App.
2000).
“[M]aintenance is awarded to meet need, [and it] depends on a showing of need.”
Lyon v. Lyon , 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989). Under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1
(2016), the district court may order maintena nce for either spouse if it finds that the party
seeking maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of
the spouse considering the standard of living established
during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of
training or education, or
(b) is unable to provide adequate self -support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.
If the district court awards maintenance, it considers eight factors in determining the
duration and amount of the award , including the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, the standard of living during the parties’ marriage, the duration of the
marriage, the contribution of both parties to the preservation of the marital pro perty, and
the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs while
also meeting those of the requesting spouse. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2016). There
is not a preference for temporary maintenance if the statutory f actors justify permanent
maintenance. Id., subd. 3 (2016). “[N]o single statutory factor for determining the type or

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amount of maintenance is dispositive.” Broms v. Broms , 353 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn.
1984). The district court, in essence, balances “the recipient’s need against the obligor’s
ability to pay.” Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. App. 2001).
Here, the district court considered the documentation submitted by both parties, as
well as the testimony of their experts in determining each party’s reasonable monthly cash
flow. Neither party challenges the court’s findings regarding their monthly incomes or
husband’s reasonable monthly expenses . The parties disagree about wife’s reasonable
monthly expenses. The district court found, and the record evidence supports, that husband
has a monthly surplus of over $2,800 given his monthly income and expenses, and that
wife has a monthly income of $5,734. Wife submitted documentation to the court
estimating her monthly expenses to be $7,232, including amounts for the lakehome and for
a new residence in the Twin Cities, and requested $2,328 per month in maintenance. The
district court awarded wife $1,400 per month in permanent spousal maintenance.
On appeal, husband argues that wife failed to show, and the district court failed to
find, that wife has a need for permanen t monthly maintenance, and that the district court
improperly used the maintenance award to equalize the parties’ incomes. A district court
errs by awarding maintenance in order to equalize parties’ incomes. See Lee v. Lee , 749
N.W. 2d 51, 60 n.2 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating that “equalization of the parties’ incomes
by an adjustment of maintenance is without authority or precedent”), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part on other grounds , 775 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 2009); see also Snyder v. Snyder, 298
Minn. 43
, 53
, 212 N.W.2d 869, 875 (1973) (stating that maintenance exists to provide for
the recipient spouse’s needs, not to act as a “lifetime profit-sharing plan”).

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Here, the district court found that husband made more than wife during their
marriage, and that husband’s contributions to the parties’ monthly household and living
expenses allowed wife to live beyond her individual monthly income throughout the
marriage. The court also found that, although the parties “lived a comfortable and secure
standard of living ,” they “lived within their means” and that both parties contributed
significantly to the parties’ monthly expenses and lifes tyle during the marriage. The
district court found that given the marital standard of living, wife had a deficiency in her
ability to meet her monthly expenses going forward, and that both parties were entitled to
enjoy retirement in a lifestyle consistent with their 45-year marriage.
The court determined that the long-term duration of the marriage, the mar ital
standard of living, and wife’s inability to meet her m onthly needs without assistance,
coupled with husband’s ability to meet his monthly needs w hile also paying spousal
maintenance, all weighed in favor of permanent spousal maintenance for wife. The record
shows that the district court thoughtfully considered the relevant statutory factors and that
the court’s findings justifying permanent spousal maintenance for wife are well-reasoned
and supported by the record.
In calculating the amount of spousal maintenance, the district court utilized the
cumulative net monthly average income for the last three years of the parties’ marriage, as
prepared by husband’s expert, which equaled $14,153 total (or $7,077 each). The district
court noted that “an equalization of monthly cash flow between the parties [was]
appropriate.” Despite the use of the word “equalization,” a review of the record and the
court’s order shows that the court used this number as a way to approximate the marital

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standard of living so as to quantify wife’s need for maintenance going forward, and not
merely to equalize the parties’ incomes. The court explained that $7,077 each per month
would sufficiently allow both parties to spend on the expenses that are important to them—
for wife, the lakehome, and for husband, monthly charitable contributions.
Husband also maintains that the district court err ed by including the costs of the
lakehome in its maintenance calculation for wife because the lakehome was not part of the
parties’ marital standard of living. Husband argues that, without the lakehome, wife would
be able to meet her monthly expenses with out maintenance and would, in fact, have a
surplus. Husband points to the following language in the district court’s order as support
for his argument : “Maintaining two homesteads is not consistent with the lifestyle the
parties enjoyed during the entiret y of their marriage.” But the key word in t he court’s
language is “entirety.”
It is undisputed that the parties did not have two homes for the “entirety” of their
45-year marriage and that wife purchased the lakehome later in the parties’ marriage. The
district court highlighted this point by finding that, “[p]rior to [ the lakehome’s] purchase,
the parties did not historically maintain a second home.” Although husband was not on the
title and did not pay the mortgage, the parties did take out a $60,000 home-equity loan for
the lakehome that was paid with marital funds , and husband contributed to monthly
maintenance costs and provided labor at the lakehome. The record shows that the
lakehome was part of the marital standard of living for the last ten years of the marriage.
Further, in awarding spousal maintenance, the district court did not award wife the
entire amount she requested. Instead, the court utilized the $7,077 monthly figure as a way

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to quantify the marital standard of living. After considering wife’s monthly income of
$5,734, the court determined that $1,400 per month would allow wife to maintain the
lifestyle that both parties enjoyed during their 45 -year marriage. See Peterka v. Peterka,
675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App. 2004) (noting that the purpose of spousal maintenance
“is to allow the recipient and the obligor to have a standard of living that approximates the
marital standard of living, as closely as is equit able under the circums tances”). In so
holding, the district court found that wife’s proposed monthly budget was not “overly
inflated” but questioned its sustainability long term, as well as wife’s ability to maintain
the lakehome as a second home forever, given her static income.
A review of the district court’s findings and the record shows that the maintenance
award was not meant to allow wife to maintain the lakehome as a second home in
perpetuity, nor to merely equalize the parties’ incomes , as husband contends , but to
equitably approximate the marital standard of living . The court’s calculations are well-
reasoned and supported by the financial documentation , as well as the testimony of the
parties’ experts. When a district court’s spousal-maintenance award “has a reasonable and
acceptable basis in fact and principle, this court will and must affirm.” DuBois v. DuBois,
335 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. 1983). But see Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn.
App. 1992) (remanding spousal -maintenance calculation to the district court where the
court failed to “perform[] the analyses and modifications necessary to reach a figure that it
deemed reasonable”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its broad discretion
in awarding wife $1,400 per month in permanent spousal maintenance after considering

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the relevant statutory factors and making reasonable findings to support its decision . We
affirm the spousal-maintenance award.
II. The district court abused its discretion in ordering husband to secure the
maintenance award for wife with his life-insurance policies.
It is in the district court’s discretion to require life insurance as security for a
spousal-maintenance award. See K ampf v. Kampf , 732 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Minn. App.
2007), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007); Laumann v. Laumann, 400 N.W.2d 355, 360
(Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987).
Here, the district court ordered that husband name wife as a beneficiary on his life -
insurance policies “in light of the spousal maintenance award.” The district court did not
elaborate on its rationale for requiring this security for the maintenance award. In addition,
the record shows that husband previously elected a survivorship benefit for wife on his VA
pension when he retired from the VA in 2001 that would give wife 55% of $28,000 per
year or $15,400. Husband did not object at trial to continuing this survivorship annuity for
wife, and the district court ordered that husband continue it. Husband argues that the VA
survivorship annuity for wife is sufficient to secure the spousal -maintenance award and
that the district court erred in ordering husband to further secure maintenance by naming
wife as a beneficiary on his $300,000 life-insurance policies.
The statutory basis for awarding spousal maintenance is need. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d
at 22. In this case, as discussed, the district court found that wife was unable to support
herself in accordance with the marital standard of living that the parties enjoyed during
their 45-year marriage, thus making a showing of need. The district court calculated wife’s

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need to be $1,400 per month or $16,800 per year. If husband predeceases wife, husband’s
VA pension survivorship annuity for wife would give her $15,400 per year (or $1,283.33
per month) slightly less than the maintenance awarded. Although wife’s spousal-
maintenance payments would cease, wife would begin receiving $1,283.33 per month from
the survivorship annuity. Thus, wife’s monthly need for maintenance of $1,400 would be
met by the annuity payments less $116.67 per month.
The district court failed to explain why requiring husband to name wife as a
beneficiary of an additional $300,000 in life -insurance policies was reasonable or
necessary to secure payment of about $117 per month or about $1,400 per year . Because
requiring husband to name wife as a beneficiary on his life -insurance policies was not
supported by wife’s actual need for maintenance, the district court abused its discretion in
so ordering, and we reverse this requirement.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.