In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. N., Parent

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0850

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. N., Parent

Filed November 6, 2017
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-16-883

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kathryn M. Eilers, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Nicole S. Gronneberg, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant C.J.)

John Jerabek, St. Paul, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal, appellant-father challenges the district court’s termination of parental
rights. Appellant argues the district court abused its discretion in determining that clear and
convincing evidence establishes the respondent-county made reasonable efforts to
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rehabilitate father and reunite the family , a statutory basis for termination exists, and
termination is in the best interests of the child. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-father, C.J., and mother, L.N., 1 are the biological parents of S.O., who
was born in January 2010. For the first five years of S.O.’s life, she was in mother’s care
and had very little contact with father until the fall of 2014 when father started visiting S.O.
At the time, father lived with his girlfriend, S.A., and d uring visits, S.O. stayed at S.A.’s
house and shared a bed with father and S.A. Father and S.A. lived with S.A.’s two children,
one of whom was approximately 13 years old (Child 2).
In November 2014, respondent Ramsey County Community Human Services
Department (the county) initiated a child-protection investigation after mother reported to
police that S.O. had been sexually abused. Mother reported that S.O. had told her that father
had laid on top of, next to, or underneath S.O ., and father had pulled his pants down and
put his private parts in front of S.O.’s face. The county interviewed father, who denied any
sexual abuse.
In December 2014, S.O. went to Midwest Children’s Resource Center (Midwest)
for a sexual abuse consultation. Mother reported to Midwest that since S.O.’s last visit with
father in October 2014, S.O. “had been acting differently.” Mother stated that f ather told
her that his girlfriend’s son, Child 2, and S.O. had been involved in “inappropriate
touching.” Mother also stated that f ather said he spanked S.O. and put her in timeout

1 Before the termination trial, mother voluntarily consented to termination of her parental
rights and her parental termination is not at issue in this appeal.
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because she touched Child 2’s private parts. Additionally, mother repeated S.O.’s other
statements as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Midwest interviewed S.O., who denied
any inappropriate touching and said that she had never seen any boys without their clothes
on.
In January 2015, the county concluded there was not a preponderance of the
evidence to support a maltreatment finding against f ather. Still, the county had concerns
about allowing unsupervised contact between S.O. and father. Mother signed an agreement
that stated she would not allow unsupervised contact between father and S.O. and that
mother would obtain therapy for S.O.
In April 2015, the county learned that mother had given birth. Both mother and the
baby tested positive for methamphetamine and oxycodone; later, test results came back
positive for cocaine. The county filed a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
petition for mother’s three children, including S.O. In June 2015, mother admitted the
CHIPS petition and S.O. was adjudicated to be a child in need of protection or services.
Ultimately, S.O. was placed with her maternal aunt.
In spring 2015, S.O. told her aunt that Child 2 had touched her “birdie.” S.O. made
similar statements to a school social worker in September 2015. S.O. “looked ashamed
and concerned she was going to get in trouble when she made these disclosures.”
Midwest conducted another sexual abuse consultation with S.O. in November 2015.
S.O. stated that Child 2 invited her into the bathroom, asked her to touch and suck his
private parts, which she did. S.O. also explained that the incident occurred while father and
his girlfriend were watching television. Midwest found that S.O.’s account was detailed.
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Midwest recommended that S.O. not have any contact with Child 2 and that child
protection should decide whether she should have contact with father while he lived in the
same home as Child 2. The county had stopped visits between father and S.O. in summer
2015, based on S.O.’s statements, and after receiving Midwest’s reco mmendation, the
county recommended that f ather have no contact with S.O. until her therapist determined
that contact was in her best interests.
Around this time, father moved to intervene in the CHIPS proceeding. The county
provided services to S.O. and her parents in 2015. Additionally, the county prepared a case
plan in the fall of 2015, which father received, but the plan referred to mother, not father.
In January 2016, the county assigned child protection worker Chantel Houg to
provide services to mother, her children, and all three of her children’s fathers. Father
informed Houg that he lived between S.A.’s home (including Child 2) and his mother’s
home. Father also told Houg that he did not believe that Child 2 had sexually abused S.O.
They discussed father’s mental health issues, and f ather informed Houg that he had been
diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and post- traumatic stress disorder and was receiving
individual therapy and dialectical behavioral (DBT) group therapy.
In February 2016, f ather and Houg drafted an updated case plan, specifically
addressing father and his needs. The plan identified areas including housing, mental-health
therapy, chemical health, and parenting. This plan determined that f ather had already
received anger management, parenting, and chemical-dependency treatment programs.
The updated case plan required father to complete random UAs, DBT groups, and
individual therapy.
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The plan also stated that S.O. could not reside in a home with Child 2 or have any
contact with Child 2. The plan provided that whether father would have contact with S.O.
would be based primarily on the advice of S.O.’s therapist. The plan also stated that, if
father were to have regular contact with S.O., he would have to commit to making his
mother’s home his primary residence or find his own housing and a reliable means of
supporting himself. The plan specifically stated that the county would not recommend that
S.O. reside in the home of father’s girlfriend, S.A. Father signed the plan in March 2016.
After the case plan was updated, Houg and f ather had regular contact and, during
their discussions, Houg reminded father that S.O. was not to have contact with Child 2 or
S.A. and the county would not recommend that S.O. reside in S.A.’s home.
In spring 2016, S.O.’s foster placement was disrupted because of physical abuse and
S.O. was moved. In summer 2016, S.O. demonstrated extreme emotional and behavioral
issues, including threats to harm herself and aggression toward others. S.O. was
hospitalized for 10 days in June 2016 and was eventually placed on psychotropic
medication. She was diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and attention deficit disorder.
Sometime in mid -2016, Houg recommended that f ather contact S.O.’s care
providers.2 Also about this time, Houg discontinued father’s UA requirement because his
UAs were continuously clean.

2 The record is not entirely clear when Houg made this suggestion to f ather, but it appears
to have happened as early as spring 2016 and no later than September 2016.
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In August and September 2016, Houg prepared an updated case plan for f ather
which continued earlier requirements, including that S.O. no t have any contact with
Child 2, and father continue individual and DBT group therapy services. The updated case
plan added that father should contact S.O.’s care providers regularly, take an active role in
S.O.’s treatment, and attend S.O.’s treatment meetings.
Also in August 2016, the court authorized the county to begin supervised visits
between father and S.O. to attempt reunification. The foster care provider and f ather’s
mother initially supervised these visits. Houg and father had many conversations about the
parameters for these visits. For example, before visits began, f ather showed Houg a photo
album of his family members that he wanted to show S.O. The album contained pictures
of Child 2 and S.A., and Houg reminded father that S.O. was to have no contact with S.A.
and Child 2. Houg directed f ather to remove these pictures before showing the album to
S.O. After visits began, father pressed Houg to allow visitation with S.A. Houg responded
that S.O. was not to have any contact with S.A. or her family. After several requests by
father to allow contact with S.A., Houg told father that he would have to make a choice
between S.A. and S.O. Father became upset and complained.
In October 2016, the county approved unsupervised visits between father and S.O.
On October 13, 2016, S.O. told her foster care provider that she had seen Child 2 during a
visit with her father. The foster care provider testified that S.O. “became distressed and
began to shake” when she recounted what happened. The foster care provider informed
Houg, who met with S.O. S.O. told Houg that she and Child 2 played zombie video games
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on a cell phone. S.O. appeared scared and also told Houg for the first time about the incident
in 2014 involving Child 2.
Houg suspended father’s visits with S.O., and the county began investigating
whether maltreatment had occurred. When the county interviewed father, he initially
indicated that S.O. did not have any contact with S.A. or Child 2. Father also told the county
investigator that Child 2 did not sexually abuse S.O. and that, when the child protection
case was over, he would live with S.A. S.A. told the county investigator that father brought
S.O. to her home and that she had contact with S.O., but Child 2 was not present. The
county concluded that neglect had occurred because f ather allowed S.O. to have contact
with Child 2 and S.A.
Father’s termination trial took place on November 1, 3 and 10, 2016, March 30,
2017, and April 14, 2017.3 The court heard testimony from father, his mother, Houg, S.O.’s
foster care provider, guardian ad litem, and several other care providers, including S.O.’s
teacher, school social worker, and psychiatrist. S.O.’s foster care provider and other care
providers testified about S.O.’s special needs, emotional and behavioral problems, and the
care and services that S.O. needs. The district court also heard testimony about f ather’s
mental health history . Notably, the county social worker testified at trial that she was
confident that father had not sexually abused S.O.

3 Houg and father met in February 2017 to prepare an updated case plan. Father informed
Houg that he was no longer receiving mental health services, and refused to sign a waiver
for Houg to verify with his providers that he no longer needed services.
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Father testified that he did not believe that S.O. was sexually abused by Child 2 or
anyone else while she was in his care in 2014. Regarding unsupervised visits in October
2016, father testified he and S.O. fished, spent time with relatives, and that S.O. was a
“normal child” when they were together. Father denied that he allowed contact between
S.O. and Child 2 in 2016, but admitted that he and S.O. had stopped at S.A.’s home, adding
that Child 2 was not present and S.A. did not talk to S.O. Father also testified, as of March
2017, that he no longer lived with S.A. and was “in the process” of breaking up with her.
On May 12, 2017, the district court terminated father’s parental rights. The district
court found the county’s witnesses to be credible and did not find f ather’s testimony
credible. For example, father testified that he had reported to the county in 2014 that S.O.
had told him that a babysitter and neighbor had sexually abused her. But the district court
found that the county records do not reflect this report. The district court also found “no
evidence that [S.O.] was confused about who sexually abused her. [S.O.’s] statements
about the sexual abuse by Child 2 have been clear and consistent.” The court also
determined that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; f ather failed to
satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship; f ather is palpably unfit, had failed to
correct the conditions leading to S.O.’s out of home placement, and S.O. is neglected and
in foster care. Finally, the district court determined that it is in S.O.’s best interests to
terminate father’s parental rights. Father appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A natural parent is generally presumed to be fit and suitable to care for his or her
child. In re P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15,
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2003). We presume that it is in a child’s best interests to remain in the natural parent’s care.
Id. Nevertheless, “parental rights are not absolute” and will not be “enforced to the
detriment of the child’s welfare and happiness.” Id.
This court will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights where there is
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family, (2) a statutory ground for termination exists, and (3) termination is in the child’s
best interest. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We
review “whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the
district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Children of
T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “review
the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but [] review its
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining by clear and
convincing evidence that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
father and reunify the family.

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the district court must determine
whether the county has provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite
the child and parent. In re T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664. “Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation
are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.”
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In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations
omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). For efforts to be reasonable, the services
the county offers must be: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate
to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2016). The district court must make “specific findings” that the county made
reasonable efforts. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2016).
Statutory requirements regarding reunification are met if the court determines that
(1) the county made reasonable efforts; or (2) the provision of further services is “futile
and therefore unreasonable under the circumstances”; or (3) reasonable efforts are not
required under one of the circumstances provided by statute. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h).
Here, the district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
father and no other efforts were practical or likely to remedy the underlying problems. The
court concluded that the county provided the necessary services to address father’s
parenting deficits and other issues that made it “unsafe and unhealthy” for S.O. to be in his
care. The district court concluded that services beyond those already provided were
unlikely to “bring about lasting parental adjustment” for father and S.O. Further, the court
concluded additional services would be futile because the trauma experienced by S.O. in
father’s care and the adverse impact of S.O.’s contact with father had made further efforts
to reunify contrary to S.O.’s “health and safety.”
Although father intervened in the CHIPS proceeding in fall 2015, the county admits
he was not given an individualized case plan until January 2016. In January 2016, however,
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Houg provided father with a detailed case plan , which was in effect for more than a year
before his parental rights were terminated . The case plan was updated several times
throughout these proceedings; the plan evaluated services father was already receiving and
required father to complete UAs and participate in mental health therapy. We conclude that
the district court did not err when it determined that clear and convincing evidence
established the county provided father with appropriate services.
Father argues that the county did not provide him with appropriate services because
he did not receive the education he needed to fully understand S.O.’s trauma and needs. To
demonstrate his own efforts to understand S.O.’s needs, father correctly notes that he
testified to having frequent contact with S.O.’s foster parent. But Houg specifically
recommended that father contact S.O.’s mental health care providers and learn more about
her diagnoses. Later, Houg also suggested that f ather attend S.O.’s treatment sessions in
order to learn more about her needs. Father testified that he reached out to S.O.’s providers,
but did not hear anything back from them and that S.O.’s psychiatrist required a release,
which Houg did not provide.
The district court found that father’s follow through on making contact with S.O.’s
care providers was “very minimal.” The district court also found father’s testimony that he
had contacted S.O.’s care providers and had not received a response not credible.
Additionally, the court found that father indicated “for the first time” during trial that S.O.’s
psychiatrist would not speak to him without a release. While the psychiatrist’s testimony
confirmed she required a release to speak with father, the district court found father did not
take the necessary steps to get a release. The record supports the district court’s conclusion
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that the county provided appropriate services, including the county’s efforts to support
contact between father and S.O.’s care providers.
Father’s case plan provided that before father and S.O. would be reunified, father
must make his mother’s home his primary residence or obtain alternative housing and
support himself. The plan also provided that S.O. should not have any contact with father’s
girlfriend, S.A., or Child 2. Father argues that he did not fully understand the importance
of the requirement that S.O. not have any contact with S.A. or Child 2. We are not
persuaded. The record includes clear and convincing evidence, for example, of f ather’s
many discussions with Houg, supporting the district court’s finding that the county had
informed father that S.O. was not to have any contact with Child 2 or his family . Because
father disagreed with the county’s requirement and repeatedly stated his disagreement, the
record also supports the district court’s determination that father understood this
requirement. In short, the record fully supports the district court’s determination that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite father with S.O.
Finally, father argues that if evidence “indicates that within a foreseeable time, the
parent will be able to care for the child, then the district court should decline to terminate
parental rights and should establish a supervised plan to give custody to the parent with
whatever counseling and assistance is appropriate.” Matter of Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d
886, 892 (Minn. 1996). More specifically, f ather argues that the district court should not
have found that further reunification efforts would be futile because the county did not seek
this determination under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a). But, as the county correctly points out,
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the statute allows the court to determine that future efforts would be futile. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h).
The county is required to “continue to provide services” until the court determines
that further reasonable efforts are futile. See In re T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 665-66. In this case,
the county continued to provide services throughout the termination trial. We conclude that
the district court’s finding that future efforts would be futile was not clearly erroneous. The
district court considered father’s disregard for the requirement that S.O. not be exposed to
Child 2, as well as the trauma that S.O. experienced, and found that future efforts would
be contrary to S.O.’s “health and safety.” We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and
reunify the family.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining by clear and
convincing evidence that a statutory basis for terminating father’s parental
rights exists.

A district court may terminate parental rights “when at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence” and the court determines
that “termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853
N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(9). The
district court concluded that the county proved four statutory bases for the termination of
father’s parental rights. Father contends that the district court abused its discretion in each
of these determinations. To affirm, we only need to find one statutory ground supported by
clear and convincing e vidence. In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.
2005) (“Only one ground must be proven for termination to be ordered.”).
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A district court may terminate parental rights if a parent fails to satisfy the duties of
the parent-child relationship by not providing “necessary food, clothing, shelter, education,
and other care and control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development.” Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Under this statute, parents also
have the duty to protect and care for the child. In re J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902.
Father has a duty to provide necessary mental and emotional care to S.O. and to
protect her from future harm. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). The district court’s
finding that f ather failed to comply with his parental duties is supported by clear and
convincing evidence. The district court determined that, for the first five years of S.O.’s
life, father had little contact and no significant relationship with S.O. The court also found
that father disregarded Houg’s directions, and exposed S.O. to Child 2 and further trauma.
Finally, the court determined that S.O. is not safe in f ather’s care because he does not
believe that Child 2 sexually abused S.O., and therefore “does not understand th e need to
protect” S.O. from Child 2. The court also determined that father lacks the skills to provide
S.O. with the necessary care. These determinations are supported by clear and convincing
evidence. For example, Houg testified that father failed to take an active role in S.O.’s
mental health treatment plan, insisted that Child 2 did not abuse S.O., and failed to provide
emotional support to S.O.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a
statutory ground for termination exists. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Because one
statutory ground for te rmination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, we need
not review the district court’s conclusions regarding the other statutory grounds.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination
is in S.O.’s best interest.

Once a district court has determined that there is a statutory basis for termination of
parental rights, it must consider whether termination is in the child’s best interes+ ts. In re
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. The court balances three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” Id. “Competing interests
include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). The district
court can consider such things as “the children’s need for stability and predictability, [and
a parent’s] limited bond with the children.” In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d
656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012).
First, the district court concluded that S.O. does not have an interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship. S.O. has spent most of her life in mother’s care, with minimal
contact with father. The district court found S.O. does not ask about father or request to see
him. Second, the district court determined father has a strong desire to parent S.O ., that
father is opposed to the termination of his parental rights, and that father would like to
develop a relationship with S.O. Third, the district court found termination is in S.O.’s best
interest because of S.O.’s mental and emotional health, her need for stability and a
caretaker that can meet her special needs, and her need for a permanent home as soon as
possible. The district court found that f ather could not meet S.O.’s needs now or in the
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foreseeable future and concluded that S.O.’s needs outweigh father’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship.
The district court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and are
not clearly erroneous. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that it is in S.O.’s best interests to terminate father’s parental rights.
Affirmed.