State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0859

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Vollie Andre Brown, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 30, 2018
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-6660

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for first -degree assault, arguing
that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court failed to give a limiting instruction,
sua sponte, on the proper use of relationship evidence. Because the error in not instructing
the jury did not affect appellant’s substantial rights, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Vollie Andre Brown, Jr. , and the victim, V.M., are cousins. Appellant
lived in a house owned by his grandmother, who rented out roo ms. Appellant shared one
room with his girlfriend, and his aunt, V.M.’s mother, rented another room.
On the night of March 5, 2016, V.M. went to the house to borrow money from his
mother, who was not at home. V.M. and his friend, T.S., waited for V.M.’s mother in the
basement, drinking, smoking marijuana, and “having a good time.” Appellant and his
girlfriend were upstairs sleeping.
Later in the evening, appellant came downstairs with a plate of cocaine, which upset
V.M. Appellant and V.M. began arguing when appellant put the cocaine near V.M.’s
marijuana. V.M. asked appellant to step into the bathroom with him so they could talk
“[l]ike civilized men,” but in the bathroom they continued arguing. Appellant pulled out a
knife and stabbed V.M. several times. They then came out of the bathroom and continued
fighting. V.M. attempted to disarm appellant, who was still holding the knife, and shouted
that appellant had just stabbed him. After appellant was disarmed, V.M. began punching
him.
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V.M. and T.S. left the house , and T.S. called 911. Responding police officers
administered first aid to V.M. while waiting for the ambulance. V.M. was taken to North
Memorial Medical Center in critical condition with life -threatening injuries that required
emergency surgery.
Appellant was charged with first - and second-degree assault and felony domestic
assault. Prior to the jury trial, appellant petitioned to proceed pro se. His petition was
granted and advisory counsel was appointe d. Appellant chose to have a jury trial and
proceeded on a claim of self -defense. During the trial, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20
(2014), the state introduced two instances of relationship evidence th rough witness
testimony.
First, V.M. testified that, on January 26, 2016, he received a call from his mother,
who said that appellant was verbally abusing her and physically threatening her . V.M.
went to the house, where he witnessed both appellant’s verbal abuse and his physical
threats to V.M.’s mother and sister. A fight began between appellant and V.M. Appellant
pulled out a knife, which V.M.’s sister kicked out of his hand before she called the police.
Second, G.H., another resident of the house, testified that, between December 2015
and March 5, 2016, he witnessed appellant “cussing out” V.M.’s mother, “[t]elling her he
would do this, he would do that. He hoped she got hit by a bus . . . .” During this time
period, appellant threatened V.M.’s mother and sister with a nightstick, and a week before
the March 5, 2016 incident, appellant threatened G.H. with a nightstick after G.H. asked
him to be quiet.
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Appellant never requested, nor did the district court give, any cautionary instruction
to the jurors limiting their use of the relationship evidence, and appellant never objected to
the failure to give a cautionary instruction. Appellant was found guilty on all counts and
sentenced to 135 months in prison.
Appellant now challenges the district co urt’s admission of relationship evidence
without providing a cautionary instruction as to its proper use.1
D E C I S I O N
Where a defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence, we review for plain
error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; see also State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998) (holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an error not objected to if
such error is plain and affects substantial rights). Under the plain -error standard, a
defendant must show: (1) erro r; (2) that was plain; and (3) that affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002). The third prong
is satisfied if “there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had
a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). “If those three prongs are met, we may correct the error only if it

1 Appellant also makes two arguments in his pro se supplemental brief: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct.
Appellant provides no citation to the record and fails to make any coherent legal arguments.
Appellate courts decline to consider pro se claims that are unsupported by legal analysis or
citation. State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). Because appellant failed to
support his arguments with citations to the record or legal authority, appellant’s claims are
waived.

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seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proc eedings.”
Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted).
In cases involving domestic violence, Minn. Stat. § 634.20 governs the admissibility
of relationship evidence. It provides in relevant part:
Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against t he
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
. . . or misleading the jury . . . . “Domestic conduct” includes,
but is n ot limited to, evidence of domestic abuse . . . .
“Domestic abuse” and “family or household members” have
the meanings given under section 518B.01, subdivision 2.

Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Evidence presented pursuant to section 634.20 is offered to
demonstrate the history of the relationship between the accused and the victim of domestic
abuse. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2009).
During trial, relationship evidence was presented by two individuals —V.M. and
G.H. As defined by Minn. Sta t. § 518B.01, subd. 2 (2014), “‘ Family or household
members’ means . . . persons related by blood; [and] persons who are presently residing
together or who have resided together in the past . . . .” Appellant and V.M. are related by
blood; appellant and G.H. resided together at the time of the alleged offenses. Because
V.M. and G.H. were considered “family or household members” as defined by Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, they were permitted to offer relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting relationship evidence
without providing a cautionary instruction to the jury about its proper use. A district court
should offer a cautionary instruction to the jury reg arding the proper use of relationship
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evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 both when the evidence is received and in the final
jury instructions. State v. Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d 15, 21-22 (Minn. App. 2006) (observing
that the danger of using this evidence for an improper purpose is “so significant that the
precaution of p roviding a limiting instruction . . . should be appli ed to relationship
evidence.”). However, the failure to supply a limiting instruction on relationship evidence
does not automatically cons titute plain error, particularly when other evidence
demonstrates that the probative value of the relationship evidence is not outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice. Id. at 22.
Appellant argues, and respondent admits, that the district court’s failure to give the
jury any limiting instruction regarding the proper use of relationship evidence constitutes
an error that was plain. We agree. See State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646, 654 (Minn.
App. 2010) (deeming that the district court’s error in failing to instruct the jury regarding
the proper use of the relationship evidence was plain). Therefore, appellant satisfies prongs
one and two of the plain-error test.
The third prong of the plain-error test is whether the plain error affected appellant’s
substantial rights. Plain error affects an appellant’s substantial rights if it was prejudicial
and affected the outcome of the case. Id. at 653. This court must look “at the entire record
to determine if there is a significant likelihood that the jury misused the evidence, resulting
in the evidence improperly affecting the verdict.” Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d at 21-22.
Appellant argues that the district court’s plain error affected his substantial rights
because the relationship evidence was particularl y susceptible to misuse and the jury
instructions as a whole did not reduce the likelihood that the jury would misuse the
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relationship evidence.2 Failure to offer a limiting instruction when there is overwhelming
evidence and the prosecution does not sugg est any improper use is not an error affecting
substantial rights. Id. at 22. Contrary to appellant’s argument that the jury instructions did
not reduce the likelihood that the jury would misuse the evidence, the jury was otherwise
properly instructed. As in Meldrum, the record here indicates “that all other jury
instructions were properly given, including the presumption of appellant’s innocence, the
state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and defining the elements of each
charge.” Id.
Moreover, overwhelming evidence offered during the trial negates the view that the
probative value of the relationship evidence was outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice. Several witnesses saw appellant emerge from the bathroom holding a knife; the
police recovered a sheath for the knife from appellant; appellant and his girlfriend
discussed the incident in the back of a police car; and appellant admitted in a post-Miranda
interview that he stabbed V.M. after a disagreement about a plate of cocaine. Appellant’s
substantial rights were not affected by the district court’s failure to issue a cautionary
instruction.
Affirmed.

2 Appellant also argues that the prosecutor’s focus on the relationship evidence during
closing arguments increased the likelihood that the jury misused the evidence. But only
two pages of respondent’s 26-page closing argument referenced the relationship evidence.