State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0878

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Johnny Frank Logan, III,
Appellant.

Filed June 18, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-7861

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
During a pretrial hearing for first -degree assault and domestic -abuse charges,
appellant Johnny Logan expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel and requested
substitute counsel. The district court provided Logan with an opportunity to explain why
he was entitled to substitute counsel, but Logan only assert ed vague allegations. Logan
again requested substitute counsel at a later pretrial hearing, coupled with more vague
allegations. This time, however, the district court did not permit an explanation and denied
the request for substitute counsel. Logan then opted to terminate his counsel and proceed
pro se. Following his conviction, Logan appeals and argues the district court erred by not
fully consider ing his request for substitute counsel, in addition to numerou s pro se
arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Johnny Logan and J.F., the victim, were in a tumultuous on-and-off again
relationship for approximately 15 years . During the relationship, Logan physically and
verbally abused J.F., but the specific events leading to this case start ed on June 17, 2015.
While much is unclear about what exactly occurred on this date , it is clear that J.F. and
Logan had an argument. J.F. told Logan that she did not feel well and that she may have
to leave work early. But Logan argued that J.F. needed to stay at work and continue earning
money. J.F. was unable to do so, and she was sent home by her supervisor due to a bad
cough and raspy voice.
3
J.F.’s mother called her that afternoon and became concerned when she heard J.F.
speak—her words were “garbled” and difficult to understand. Additionally, J.F. failed to
call her mother back, which was unusual. Around this time, one of J.F.’s friends came to
her house, but was greeted at the door by Logan. The friend attempted t o see J.F., but
Logan explained that she was not feeling well. The next morning, June 18, the friend again
tried to see J.F., but Logan stated she was still sick. J.F. did not show up for work that day
or personally notify her supervisor that she would miss work. During these few days, J.F.
was at home and Logan observed her health deteriorate.
On June 19, Logan took J.F. to the hospital. When they arrived, Logan informed
medical staff that he believed J.F. took “p ills” following a “really big argument” between
them. When J.F. was evaluated at the hospital , the medical staff discovered that the left
side of her brain was deprived of blood flow. They determined that J.F. had suffered a
stroke, and expert testimony would later establish that the stroke occurred within 48 hours
before admission to the hospital. Doctors ordered special tests on J.F. to determine its
cause because a stroke for someone of J.F.’s age is very uncommon. Doctors learned that
J.F.’s carotid artery1 had blood clots in it and that trauma to the neck —such as
strangulation—was the most likely cause. Medical personal at the hospital noticed
numerous injuries on J.F.’s body, including scratches and bruises on her neck and bruises
on the rest of her body. With this combination of possible trauma to the neck and bruises

1 The carotid artery is located on the left side of the neck.
4
throughout J.F.’s body, doctors believed domestic abuse was a possible cause for the blood
clot, which ultimately caused the stroke.
Similar to the medical staff, J.F.’s mother believed that her daughter was a possible
victim of domestic abuse. She notified law enforcement that J.F. was in the hospital
following a stroke and that she suspected Logan was the cause. After consulting with
doctors at the hospital and examining J.F.’s injuries, officers determined the injuries were
consistent with domestic abuse. Officers attempted to interview J.F., but she was unable
to communicate coherently. After a month, officer’s again talked to J.F., who provided
Logan’s name when asked who hurt her.
In October 2015, officers charged Logan with first -degree assault 2 and felony
domestic assault.3 During a pretrial hearing in December 2015, Logan asked the district
court for substitute counsel, stating that he did not believe he was “ getting represented
right” by his court-appointed counsel. The district court explained that his counsel was
highly experienced and competent, and then gave Logan th e opportunity to explain why
new counsel should be appointed. Logan stated it was “[b]ecause of m y, because of the
circumstances, excuse my tongue, because of the things that have happened up to this point.
She has told me she was going to do things that she didn’t do.”
The district court then stated there were no grounds for substitute counsel and asked
Logan if he wished to terminate his counsel, but cautioned that this would result in Logan
representing himself or needing to obtain new counsel on his own. Logan agreed to

2 In violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2014).
3 In violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2014).
5
proceed with his current counsel. Logan’s counsel explained that she believed the friction
between her and Logan was due to Logan wanting the case dismissed for a lack of probable
cause, despite the fact that the issue of probable cause had already been determined in favor
of the state.
Logan was persistent with his probable-cause argument —that the charging
complaint was based on lies—throughout the next pretrial hearing in January 2016. At this
hearing, Logan’s counsel again expressed Logan’s frustration with the probable-cause
finding. The district court then explained to Logan that the probable-cause determination
in this case was “not a close call” and that it would not grant a request for a Florence
hearing to determine probable cause.4
At the next pretrial hearing in February 2016, Logan’s unhappiness with his counsel
peaked. At the start of this hearing, Logan stated “I don’t want her to represent me,” in
reference to his counsel. After a short recess where defense counsel consulted with Logan,
he again requested substitute counsel and stated, “I have some really serious allegations
and I have proof here of—it’s—it’s clear proof of shoddy police work and lies on the part
of [my attorney] and on the part of the state and as far as my paperwork and the pictures.”
The district court explained that it would not consider the evidence and stated that Logan
would not get substitute counsel. Then, des pite the district court cautioning against it ,
Logan discharged his counsel and proceeded pro se. The court explained the difficulty and
challenges of pro se representation and the serious nature of the charges, but Logan signed

4 A Florence hearing is held “to determine whether there [is] sufficient probable cause to
support the charges.” State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn. 2003).
6
a waiver indicating he wanted to represent himself and proceed pro se. Logan requested,
and the judge agreed to appoint, advisory counsel to assist him.
On the morning the case was to proceed to a bench trial, the district court explicitly
raised the issue of Logan wearing his orange jumpsuit during the bench trial. The court
explained that it would not make any adverse inferences regarding Logan wearing the jail
clothes, and Logan stated that he did not have any concerns about the jail clothes affecting
the judge’s ability to decide the case. After this explanation, Logan still asked to change
out of his jail clothes and noted that the clothes may impact how witnesses view him. The
court replied that it did not believe witnesses would be affected. The court asked if it was
all right to proceed with the jail clothes and Logan stated “okay.”
During this same time, Logan informed the district court that he was having
problems accessing evidence on computers. He explained that at first he did not have the
disk containing the evidence, and then when he received it, he had difficulties locating a
working computer. The court heard arguments about Logan’s access to evidence and found
credible the state’s testimony that Logan had access to the evidence for a long period of
time.
The case then proceeded to a one-week bench trial where Logan represented himself
with the assistance of advisory counsel. Throughout the trial, Logan often consulted with
his advisory counsel, and the advisory counsel assisted Logan with exhibits and
communicating with the court. The state’s evidence showed that the injuries J.F. suffered
were consistent with abuse and that these injuries led to the dissection of her carotid
artery—which caused her stroke. Logan argued that he did not assault J.F., and that he r
7
health issues were the result of drugs , while the bruises were caused by her falling down
stairs. During trial, Logan attempted to introduce the medical records from the first seven
days of J.F.’s stay at the hospital. However, the district court did not admit the evidence
because of a lack of foundation and because there was no available expert testimony to
help interpret the records.
Testimony of the seriousness of J.F.’s injuries was prevalent throughout trial.
Medical experts testified that J.F.’s injuries would likely have a lasting impact on her body
for the rest of her life. Experts believed J.F. would experience permanent cognitive
deficiencies in regards to her written and oral communication. And testimony established
that J.F. would likely continue to have difficulty moving the right side of her body,
resulting in trouble walking and completing daily activities.
After the trial concluded, the district court found Logan guilty of first-degree assault
and felony domestic assault. The court found that Logan assaulted J.F., which caused her
stroke. The court rejected Logan’s alternative explanati ons for the sources of J.F.’s
injuries: drugs; a fall down the stairs; or surgical procedures. The court then held a Blakely
trial with a jury. See State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. 2016). (“[A]
Blakely trial considers whether aggrava ting sentencing factors exist.”). Logan opted to
have an attorney appointed to him for the Blakely trial. The jury determined aggravating
factors existed, and the court sentenced Logan to 240 months of incarceration on the first-
degree assault, finding the victim was subject to particular cruelty.
Logan appeals.
8
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Logan contends that the district court erred by failing to determine if
exceptional circumstances existed to justify appointment of substitute counsel.
Additionally, in a supplemental pro se brief, Logan raises three separate issues: (1) there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree assault; (2) the district
court admitted hearsay statements in violation of his right to confrontation; (3) and a catch-
all argument listing numerous errors he alleges the district court made.5 We address each
issue in turn.
I. The district court did not err by failing to determine whether exceptional
circumstances existed to justify appointing substitute counsel.

Logan’s primary argument on appeal is that when he requested substitute counsel,
the district court erred by failing to conduct a searching inquiry to determine whether
exceptional circumstances existed to justify appointing substitute counsel . This court
reviews a district court’s decision whether to appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Gilliam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2001).

5 In his pro se brief, Logan also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
However this argument primarily restates his argument regarding substitute counsel. He
argues that that his original counsel constantly told him she was going to do things that she
never did, that she did not produce documents to him, and that she was going to go to trial
without any witnesses. He also argues that his attorney’s failure to promptly investigate
the case resulted in an inability to present a complete defense. But none of these assertions
are supported by the record. Therefore, assuming an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
analysis applies to the limited pretrial conduct in this case, Logan is unable to establish that
his attorney’s conduct fell below an objectiv e standard of reasonableness —a requirement
of the analysis. See Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)).
9
Defendants in criminal trials have a constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I , § 6. But while defendants have this right to counsel, an
indigent defendant does not have an “unbridled right to be represented by counsel of his
own choosing.” State v. Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. 295, 299, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1970).
Instead, requests for substitute counsel are granted only in exceptional circumstances that
call into question counsel’s “ability or competence to represent the client.” Gilliam, 629
N.W.2d at 449. The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel should “be based on
the facts and circumstances surrounding the request.” Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. at 299, 176
N.W.2d at 264.
In State v. Munt, the Minnesota Supreme Court established the district court’s scope
of duties when f aced with a substitute -counsel request. 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn.
2013). In Munt, during a pretrial hearing, the defendant accused the police of committing
crimes against him and complained that his attorney did not represent his interest, did not
pursue his objectives, and was ineffective. Id. at 586-87. The Minnesota Supreme Court
determined the district court’s failure to further investigate these allegations, referred to as
a searching inquiry, was not an error because none of “his statements constituted serious
allegations of inadequate representation that would have triggered the district court ’s duty
to further inquire and determine whether it needed to appoint substitute counsel.” Id. at
587.6 The court explained that a searching inquiry should be conducted when a defendant

6 Similarly, in State v. Benniefield , the defendant terminated his public defend er after a
disagreement over representation. 668 N.W.2d 430, 433-34 (Minn. App. 2003), aff’d, 678
N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2004). Subsequently, the defendant asked for a new attorney, but the
district court declined to provide one . Id. This court determined that there were no
10
“voices serious allegations of inadequate representation.” Id. at 5 86 (quoting State v.
Clark, 722 N.W. 2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006)).
Logan argues that the district court committed reversible error by both failing to
conduct a searching inquiry upon the substitute -counsel request and failing to even allow
Logan to adequately voice his concerns . We disagree. The record shows that Logan was
given the opportunity to voice his concerns regarding his attorney —and why he needed
substitute counsel—but failed to establish that exceptional circumstances were present.
At the first pretrial hearing where Logan first voiced his concerns and requested
substitute counsel, the district court asked, “why would I appoint another attorney?” With
this opportunity, Logan answered, “because of the things that have happened up to this
point. She has told me she was going to do things that she didn’t do.” This vague answer
does not establish exception al circumstances that call into question counsel’s ability to
represent Logan—the threshold that must be met to grant substitute counsel. Gilliam, 629
N.W.2d at 449. And similar to Munt, the district co urt was under no duty to conduct a
searching inquiry as Logan did not state anything that could trigger the need for substitute
counsel. 831 N.W.2d at 586-87. The district court did not abuse its discretion at this
hearing by failing to look further into Logan’s request.
This did not change at subsequent pretrial hearings, where Logan again requested
substitute counsel. There, Logan stated he wanted substitute counsel and explained, “I

exceptional circumstances that would warrant the appointment of substitute counsel and
that the defendant’s dissatisfaction with his original attorney was insufficient. Id. at 434-
35.
11
have some really serious allegations and I have . . . clear proof of shoddy police work and
lies on the part of [my attorney].” The district court stated it would not appoint substitute
counsel or consider the evidence. Again, these allegations did not give rise to exceptional
circumstances needed for substitute counsel, nor were they sufficient to warrant the district
court having an obligation to conduct a searching inquiry. See Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 586-
87 (determining that vague allegations of an attorney failing to properly represent a
defendant’s interest and of pol ice misconduct were not sufficient to trigger the district
court’s duty to conduct a searching inquiry).
Furthermore, we note that the district court’s decision whether to appoint substitute
counsel should “be based on the facts and circumstances surroun ding the request.”
Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. at 299, 176 N.W.2d at 264. The facts surrounding the substitute -
counsel requests show that the requests were primarily based on Logan’s unhappiness
regarding the probable-cause determination and his belief that the charging complaint was
based entirely on lies. At the first two pre trial hearings, where Logan expressed
dissatisfaction with his counsel, Logan focused on this issue of probable cause. This was
despite the district court repeate dly explaining that probable cause was not a close issue.
And at the third hearing, Logan again requested substitute counsel and again started to
explain that he had evidence proving the state’s case was based on lie s. With this
understanding of the circ umstances, it was reasonable for the district court to decline to
entertain the evidence or substitute-counsel request—it was a repeat of the probable-cause
argument.
12
Because Logan never coupled his substitute-counsel request with an explanation of
exceptional circumstance s that gave rise to concerns his attorney was inadequately
representing him, despite being provided the opportunity to explain, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a searching inquiry into the matter. T his is
further supported by the persistent backdrop that Logan’s underlying complaint was that
he believed there was a lack of probable cause and that he was unhappy with his counsel
for failing to successfully challenge it.
II. The district court did not err by determining there was sufficient evidence to
support the conviction for first-degree assault.

In a pro se argument, Logan contends that the evidence presented to the trial court
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he assaulted J.F. and caused her stroke. He
instead argues that J.F. fell down the stairs when they moved into their apartment.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court’s review is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether th e evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict
that they did. State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court
must assume “the jury believed the state’s w itnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will
not disturb the verdict if the factfinder, acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of p roof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
13
When the conviction is based on entirely circumstantial evidence, as was the case
here, the circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence
as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt. State v. Jones , 516 N.W.2d 54 5, 549
(Minn. 1994). In applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, the reviewing court uses
a two -step analysis : “[t]he first step is to identify the circumstances proved. . . . In
identifying the circumstances proved, we defer ‘to the [factfinder]’s acceptance of the proof
of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.’” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn.
2013) (citing State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010)). “The second step is
to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotations omitted).
For the first step, we identify the circumstances proved. T he court found, in a
detailed order, that the evidence proved Logan had a history of assaulting J.F. and that he
assaulted her on June 17, 2015 , which ultimately led to J.F.’s stroke. Our analysis of the
record shows that these fin dings are entirely supported. Furthermore, to be charged with
first-degree assault, there must be great bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2014).
Great bodily harm is defined as “ bodily injury which creates a high probability of death,
or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other
serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2014). The district court determined
that J.F. ’s injuries , which caused a stroke with permanent cognitive and physical
14
deficiencies, constituted great bodily harm. This , too, is supported by the record. With
this understanding of what the circumstances proved, we turn to step two.
Under the second step of Silvernail, this court examines whether the facts proved
are consistent with the finding of guilt and inconsistent with any rational explanation but
guilt. 831 N.W.2d at 599. While the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt, Logan
contends the facts proven also give rise to alternative explanations inconsistent with guilt.
We are not persuaded. Logan argues that J.F. fell while they were moving on the weekend
prior to June 17, and injuries from that fall caused the stroke. But this theory is inconsistent
with the expert testimony that the stroke was caused by trauma such as strangulation within
48 hours before the hospital visit. Furthermore, the district court determined that Logan’s
testimony was not credible and was inconsistent with prior statements. In sum, t he
scenarios that could absolve Logan of guilt are not reasonable . Because there is no
reasonable explanation other than that Logan assaulted J.F., the circumstances proven are
consistent with a guilty verdict . T he district court did not err by determining there was
sufficient evidence to support the conviction for first-degree assault.
III. Logan’s evidentiary arguments do not constitute error.
Logan makes an additional pro se argument that the district court erred by making
several evidentiary rulings.7 The district court’s evidentiary rulings will generally not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Flores, 595 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn.

7 Logan frames these arguments as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation. But because none of his arguments implicate the right to confront a witness,
we decline to apply the confrontation-clause analysis to these arguments.
15
1999). Logan makes three distinct contentions : (1) he should have had access to J.F.’s
phone; (2) he was unable to access evidence on computers in the jail; and (3) he should
have been allowed to introduce all of J.F.’s medical records as evidence. We address each
argument in turn.
First, Logan contends he should have had access to J.F.’s cellphone to examine it
for evidence. But the record shows that all the evidence regarding the phone that the state
had in its possession was disclosed to Logan, including a complete forensic examination
of the cell phone. Second, Logan argues that his lack of access to computers while in jail
hindered his ability to provide a complete defense. This, too, is unsupported as the record
shows Logan had access to evidence well before trial started and because he fails to provide
any legal authority that his limited access to computers while incarcerated constitutes an
error. Third, Logan contends that the court erred by not allowing him to enter all of J.F.’s
medical records, which the state disclosed to him at the trial. Here, the district court did
not abuse its discretion, as Logan was unable to establish foundation to admit the records ,
and he did not have an expert to interpret the technical information contained in the medical
reports.
Because the district court acted within its discretion with its evidentiary ruling s,
Logan is not entitled to a new trial.
IV. Logan’s remaining pro se arguments do not constitute prejudicial errors.
Logan asserts a laundry list of issues under a “cumulative error” heading. It
includes: lack of probable cause, lack of evidentiary hearings, failing to stick with the
pretrial order, making the appellant wear his jail clothes at trial, failure to give notice of an
16
aggravated sentence, violation of his right to a speedy trial, admission of hearsay evidence,
and that J.F. was not competent to testify. But each of these arguments, with the exception
of the one regarding jail clothes, fail s to contain legal citations or any legal arguments.
Because these arguments lack any legal substance, we determine they are waived. See
State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (stating that pro se claims that do not
include analysis or legal authority are waived).
The one argument with legal support is the question of whether the district court’s
decision to have Logan appear in jail clothes during the bench trial was an err or.8
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 2(b), requires that during a trial
a defendant “must not appear in court in the distinctive attire of a prisoner.” The law does
not distinguish what clothes are appropriate on the basis of whether the trial is a bench trial
or a jury trial. State v. Hazley , 901 N.W.2d 452 , 455 (Minn. App. 2017) , review denied
(Minn. Nov. 14, 2017). This court has stated that a district court requiring a defendant to
wear jail clothes in open court is a due -process violation. State v. Lehman , 749 N.W.2d
76, 85 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). However a due-process
violation does not require a new trial if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error was harmless. Id. And the state may meet this burden by showing the verdict
was “surely unattributable” to the error. Id.

8 The state contests whether the district court “forced” Logan to wear the jail clothes, as
the record shows that the district court sought permission from Logan to have him wear his
jail clothes. However, because we determine this error was harmless, we do not reach this
argument.
17
Here, the district court’s requirement that Logan wear jail clothes was an error. A
new trial however is not appropriate because the error was harmless. First, there is no
indication that Logan’s garments affected any witness’s testimony or the district court’s
verdict. Furthermore, the state is able to meet its burden that the error was harmless in
light of the substantial amount of evidence it put forth at trial against Logan. See State v.
Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 225-26 (Minn. 1988) (stating that an error was harmless when
the amount of evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming). This included expert
testimony establishing that J.F. suffered a stroke due to trauma resembling domestic abuse
and that Logan was the only individual around J.F. at the time of her injury. Because any
error regarding Logan’s attire was harmless, a new trial is not appropriate.
Affirmed.