In the Matter of the Estate of: Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0880

In the Matter of the Estate of:
Prince Rogers Nelson, Decedent.

Filed January 22, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-PR-16-46

Thomas P. Kane, Steven H. Silton, Cozen O’Connor, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant Cozen O’Connor)

Justin A. Bruntjen, JAB Legal, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Nicholas Granath, Seham, Seham, Meltz & Petersen, L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant Justin A. Bruntjen)

Frank K. Wheaton (pro hac vice), Indianapolis, Indiana (attorney pro se)

Mark W. Greiner, Joseph J. Cassioppi, Frederickson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent personal representative Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A.)

Randall W. Sayers, Nathaniel A. Dahl, Hansen, Dordell, Bradt, Odlaug & Bradt, P.L.L.P.,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents Norrine Nelson, Sharon Nelson, and John R. Nelson)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge
The district court in this matter has recognized six persons as the heirs of Prince
Rogers Nelson. Attorneys representing two of the heirs asked the district court to approve
compensation, using funds of the estate, for services they performed on behalf of their
respective clients. The district court approved in part by approving total compensation of
approximately $400,000, which is roughly one -sixth of the amount s requested. The
attorneys appeal , arguing that the district court erred by not a pproving additional
compensation and by not making sufficient findings of fact. We conclude that the district
court did not err by applying different standa rds to appellants’ motions than the district
court previously applied to the special administrator’s motion for attorney fees. But we
conclude that the district court erred by not making findings of fact or stating reasons for
its decision that are sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Therefore, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand for further consideration.
FACTS
The decedent, commonly known as Prince, died on April 21, 2016, at the age of 57,
in the midst of a widely celebrated career as a singer, songwriter, composer,
instrumentalist, and music producer. He left no will. Four days after his death, a probate
proceeding was commenced in the Carver County District Court. On April 27, 2016, the
district court appointed Bremer Trust, N.A., to be the special administrator of the estate.
Shortly thereafter, numerous persons claimed to be Prince ’s heirs. In May 2017,
the district court determined that the lawful heirs are Prince’s six siblings: Omarr Baker,
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Alfred Jackson, Sharon Nelson, Norrine Nelson, John Nelson, and Tyka Nelson. This court
has affirmed the district court’s heirship determinations to the extent that they have been
appealed. See In re Estate of Nelson , 901 N.W.2d 234 (Minn. App. 2017) (affirming
district court’s denial as a matter of law of certain persons’ motion for genetic testing ),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017); In re Estate of Nelson, A16-2042, 2017 WL 3974316
(Minn. App. Sept. 11, 2017) (affirming district court’s denial as a matter of law of certain
persons’ motion for heirship despite lack of genetic relationship), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 28, 2017).
The record for this appeal is limited in scope, but it is apparent that Prince’s estate
is atypical because his commercial pursuits were relatively comp lex and he died with
considerable financial assets. Accordingly, the responsibilities of the special administrator
and the personal representative are greater than usual. For example, the record reveals that
the special administrator has spent time on the following tasks, among others : finalizing
and implementing certain entertainment deals, inventorying the estate’s assets, working on
licensing and merchandising issues associated with Paisley Park, reviewing other licensing
and merchandising requests, and enforcing intellectual-property rights.
The record also reveals that t he heirs have taken a keen interest in the work of the
special administrator and have actively participated in the probate proceedings , with the
assistance of their counsel. For example, the record reveals that attorneys representing
heirs have spent time on the following tasks, among others: conducting briefing, discovery,
and arguments on heirship claims; vetting candidates for appointment as personal
representative; monitoring a bill that was pending in the state legislature ; developing a
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proposal for an official tribute concert; negotiating entertainment deals; and working on
agreements concerning the Paisley Park Museum.
In February and March of 2017, attorneys representing two of the six heirs filed
separate motions in the district court to request compensation for the services they have
provided to their respective clients. First, the law firm Cozen O’Connor, P.C., which
represents Baker, requested $867,762 in attorney fees and costs for services its attorneys
performed between June 23, 2016, and January 31, 2017. Second, Justin A. Bruntjen, who
represents Jackson, requested $510,317 in attorney fees and costs for services he performed
between April 26, 2016, and January 31, 2017. Third, Frank K. Wheaton, who previously
represented Jackson, requested $1,051,636 in attorney fees and costs for services he
performed between April 23, 2016, and January 31, 2017. The total amount requested was
$2,429,715.
Baker’s and Jackson ’s attorneys argued to the district court that the ir services
benefitted the estate . Three other heirs ( Norrine Nelson, Sharon Nelson, and John R.
Nelson) opposed the motions, arguing that the compensation sought is excessive given the
amount of work completed, that the attorneys’ services were duplicative of work performed
by Bremer Trust, that the request was ambiguous, and that the attorneys’ services did not
benefit the estate. The special administrator did not take a position on the motions.
In April and May 2017 , the district court ruled on the attorneys’ motions in two
orders. The district court granted the motions in part and denied them in part. In a
memorandum attached to each order, the district court cited section 524.3 -720 of the
Minnesota Statutes and expressed the following reasons for its decisions:
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In considering the requests for attorney fees, the Court
has reviewed each firm’s detailed invoices and approved only
those fees and expenses which the Court deems to have
contributed to the Estate as a whole, and not solely benefited
any particular heir. Specifically, the Court has allowed fees
for review of the long -form entertainment deals where
counsel’s ongoing involvement was court-ordered and clearly
benefited the Estate. The Court has disallowed those fees
associated with challenge s to the Advisor Agreement, short -
form entertainment deals recommended by the advisors, fees
relating to proposed deals not included in the Court’s Order
filed October 6, 2016, and fees relating to Roc Nation
litigation which the Court deems duplicative of the Special
Administrator’s and Personal Representative’s efforts. Other
fees, including fees relating to challenges to protocols,
challenges to the Special Administrator’s authority to initia te
or continue litigation on behalf of the Estate, changes in
representation, consultant fees directly benefiting heirs but not
the Estate, and other matters not brought collectively by all
non-excluded heirs, have been also denied.

Attached to the district court’s orders were annotated copies of 159 pages of attorney
invoices (68 pages submitted by Cozen O’Connor, 47 pages by Bruntjen, and 44 pages by
Wheaton). In the margins, hand -written letter codes appear alongside time entries for
which the court approved compensation. As the district court explained in its memoranda,
the letter codes correspond to six issues for which heirs’ attorneys provided services : “E”
for services relating to entertainment deals, “PP” for services relating to Paisley Park, “H”
for services relating to the determination of heirs, “PR” for services relating to the selection
of a Personal Representative, “PA” for services relating to legislation, and “T” for services
relating to a tribute concert. In its orders, the district court specified a sub-total of the fees
allowed for each of the six categories of services for each law firm or attorney. The district
court concluded that Cozen O’Connor is entitled to $159,241 in compensation , that
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Bruntjen is entitled to $54,926 in compensation, and that Wheaton is entitled to $188,820
in compensation. The district court ordered the special administrator to make payments to
the attorneys from funds in the estate.1
Cozen O’Connor, Bruntjen, and Wheaton appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Appellants argue that the district court erred to the extent that it denied their motions
for compensation. Their arguments, which have been presented to this court in one joint
brief, have three parts. First, appellants argue that the district court erred by misapplying
the applicable statute. Second, they argue that the district court erred by not making
findings of fact that are sufficient to justify its decision . And third, they argue that the
district court erred by not treating their motions in the same manner that the district court
treated a prior request of the special administrator for attorney fees. We will consider each
of appellants’ three arguments, after reviewing the applicable law.
A district court’s authority to award compensation to attorneys from a decedent’s
estate springs from the following statute, which governs compensation both for attorneys

1The district court also ruled on a fourth motion by allowing $160,47 2 in
compensation for the Holland & Knight law firm for services performed for Tyka Nelson
between November 16, 2016, and February 28, 2017. No party has appealed from that part
of the district court’s order. We also note that the district court previously issued an order
allowing $341,441 in compensation for Holland & Knight for services performed for Tyka
Nelson between September 26, 2016, and November 15, 2016; allowing $274,600 in
compensation for the Lommen Abdo law firm for services performed for Sharon Nelson,
Norrine Nelson, and John Nelson between April 27, 2016, and November 10, 2016; and
allowing $166,75 4 in compensation for the Gray Plant Mooty law firm for services
performed for Tyka Nelson between April 2016 and September 27, 2016.
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for personal representatives and special administrators and attorneys for other interested
persons:
Any personal representa tive or person nominated as
personal representative who defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, or any
interested person who successfully opposes the allowance of a
will, is entitled to receive from the estate necessa ry expenses
and disbursements including reasonable attorneys ’ fees
incurred. When after demand the personal representative
refuses to prosecute or pursue a claim or asset of the estate or
a claim is made against the personal representative on behalf
of the estate and any interested person shall then by a separate
attorney prosecute or pursue and recover such fund or asset for
the benefit of the estate, or when, and to the extent that, the
services of an attorney for any interested person contribute to
the benefit of the estate, as such, as distinguished from the
personal benefit of such person, such attorney shall be paid
such compensation from the estate as the court shall deem just
and reasonable and commensurate with the benefit to the estate
from the recovery so made or from such services.

Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720 (2016).
Section 524.3-720 is a relatively uncommon statute in that it allows compensation
for attorneys other than attorneys representing the estate. The Uniform Probate Code does
not include such a provision. See Unif. Probate Code § 3-720 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2010).
The Minnesota legislature adopted the Uniform Probate Code in 1974, see 1974 Minn.
Laws ch. 442, at 1022 -78, and amend ed its language the following year to provide for
compensation for attorneys who represent other interested persons , 1975 Minn. Laws ch.
347, § 57, at 1053-54.
The plain language of the amended statute reveals that it allows compensation for
attorneys representing interested persons in four circumstances: (1) if an “interested person
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. . . successfully opposes the allowance of a will ”; (2) if “after demand the personal
representative refuses to prosecute or pursue a claim or asset of the estate . . . and any
interested person . . . by a separate attorney prosecute[s] or pursue[s] and recover[s] such
fund or asset for the benefit of the estate ”; (3) if “ a claim is made against the personal
representative on behalf of the estate and any interested person . . . by a separate attorney
prosecute[s] or pursue[s] and recover[s] such fund or asset for the benefit of the estate ”;
and (4) if “the services of an attorney for any interested person contribute to the benefit of
the estate, as such, as distinguished from the personal benefit of such person .” See Minn.
Stat. § 524.3-720. In the first circumstance, the interested person “ is entitled to receive
from the estate necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred.” Id. In the second, third, and fourth circumstances, the attorney representing an
interested person “shall be paid such compensation from the estate as the court shall deem
just and reasonable and commensurate with the benefit to the estate from the recovery so
made or from such services.”2 Id.
The supreme court never has interpreted or applied section 524.3 -720. This court
has done so in a precedential opinion concerning compensation for an interested person’s

2In its orders, the district court also quoted a five -factor test for resolving motions
for attorney fees. See Minn. Stat. § 525.515(b) (2016). That five-factor test guides district
courts in determining a fair and reasonable fee for “an attorney performing services for the
estate at the instance of the personal representative, guardian or conservator.” See Minn.
Stat. § 52 5.515(a) (emphasis added). That five -factor test also applies if an interested
person asks the district court to review the fees of an attorney performing services for the
estate at the instance of the personal representative, guardian or conservator. See id. But
the five-factor test does not apply to a motion for compensation brought by an attorney for
an interested person. See id.
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attorney on only three occasions. First, in In re Estate of Van Den Boom, 590 N.W.2d 350
(Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. May 26, 1999), we reversed the denial of
compensation for the attorney representing an adult child of the decedent, who successfully
prevented the personal representative from selling the decedent’s homestead, in which the
decedent’s widow had been devised a life estate. Id. at 351-52, 354. We reasoned that the
decedent’s child had “acted for the benefit of the estate by keeping a major asset intact.”
Id. at 354. Second, in In re Estate & Trust of Anderson , 654 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. App.
2002), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003), we affirmed the denial of compensation for
the attorney representing an interested person who unsuccessfully brought a lawsuit that
might have benefitted the estate if it had been succes sful. Id. at 684-85, 689. Third, in
Gellert v. Egington , 770 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20,
2009), we affirmed the grant of compensation for an attorney representing two persons
who successfully sued to set aside their mother’s conveyance of real property on the ground
that she lacked capacity. Id. at 193-94, 197-98. We reasoned that the successful lawsuit
benefitted the estate by increasing its value. Id. at 198.
In general, this court applies an a buse-of-discretion standard of review to a district
court’s ruling on compensation for an attorney for an interested person. See Estate & Trust
of Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 688. But we apply a de novo standard of review to the extent
that the district court’s ruling implicates the interpretation of a statute. Gellert, 770 N.W.2d
at 196.
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A.
Appellants first argue that the district court erred “by misapplying the standard for
an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720.” Their argument has three
sub-parts.
In the first sub-part, appellants argue that the district court misapplied the statute by
“finding that the requested attorneys’ fees did not benefit the estate.” More specifically,
appellants contend that that the services they performed in their representation of Baker
and Jackson benefited the estate by “preserv[ing] and increas[ing] the estate’s assets .”
Appellants contend that they performed three types of services that benefitted the estate :
(1) work that increased the valu e of the estate by improving the terms of entertainment
deals; (2) work that prevented the estate from losing money or engaging in unnecessary
spending; and (3) work that the special administrator declined to perform or that the
personal representative believed was best performed by the heirs’ counsel.
In the second sub-part, appellants argue that the district court misapplied the statute
by “denying attorneys’ fees performed related to ‘matters not brought collectively by all
non-excluded heirs ,’” which was language used by the district court in the memoranda
accompanying its orders. Appellants contend that the district court inappropriately denied
compensation for these services solely because such services were “not brought
collectively by all non-excluded heirs.”
In the third sub -part, appellants argue that the district court misapplied the statute
by “denying attorneys’ fees that benefitted [both] appellants and the estate.” Appellants
acknowledge that they may not be compensated if only the heirs benefitted from their
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services and the estate did not benefit . B ut they contend that they are eligible for
compensation if both the heirs and the estate benefit from their services.
We will refrain from discussing these arguments further in light of our resolution of
appellants’ second argument.
B.
Appellants next argue that the district court erred by not making findings of fact that
are sufficient to justify its ultimate decision. Appellants contend that the district court
“merely concluded that appellants’ efforts and expenses” did not benefit the estate.
In light of the relative scarcity of caselaw interpreting section 524.3-720, there is no
precedential authority concerning a district court’s obligation to make findings of fact or
to state reasons when ruling on an interested person’s attorney’s motion for compensation
in a probate case. Nonetheless, caselaw from other contexts suggests that a district court
should make findings that allow for meaningful appellate review. See, e.g. , In re
Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App. 2014); Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Comm’n v. Minnesota Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. App. 2002),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 2002) ; Stinson v. Clark Equip. Co. , 473 N.W.2d 333, 337
(Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1991); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Evanson, 439 N.W.2d 394, 398 -99 (Minn. App. 1989) , review denied (Minn. July 12,
1989). The basic principle is that a district court must express its reasons for granting or
denying a request for attorney fees in a manner that will allow an appellate court both to
understand the district court’s rationale for its decision and to evaluate the correctness or
incorrectness of that rationale.
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For example, in Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Engineering Co. , 401 N.W.2d 655
(Minn. 1987), the supreme court reviewed an award of attorney fees and concluded that
nothing in the record indicated “the court’s rationale” for the award. Id. at 661. Because
the district court gave no reasons for its ruling, the supreme court was unable to determine
whether the district court properly exercised its discretion. Id. The supreme court
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to explain the reasons why attorney
fees were not appropriate. Id. Similarly, this court has issued opinions illustrating that a
district court must make findings or state reasons that are sufficient to show that an award
of attorney fees is justified by the law and by the facts in the re cord. See Geske v.
Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. App. 2001); Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758,
767 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001).
This case is, as stated above, unusual. The attorneys seeking compensation
submitted voluminous materials, which the district court dutifully reviewed, on a line -by-
line basis. Given that the motions were supported by 159 pages of attorney invoices, each
with typically 10 to 20 entries, the district court likely reviewed more than 2,000 individual
time entries. The district court identified hundreds of time entries that it determined to be
deserving of compensation. The district court also summarized th e value of the
compensable time entries by category (corresponding with the six issues identified above
by letter codes) and by law firm or attorney. All of this demonstrates that the district court
gave careful attention and consideration to the substanc e of the attorneys’ motions for
compensation.
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Nonetheless, questions remain concerning why the district court determined that
some services or types of services were compensable and others were not. The district
court’s orders do not reveal why certain ti me entries were deemed compensable while
seemingly similar or identical time entries were deemed not compensable , or why time
entries of certain attorneys were deemed compensable while seemingly similar or identical
time entries of other attorneys were deemed not compensable.
More importantly, this court is unable to discern the district court’s reasons for many
of the portions of its ruling that are being challenged in this appeal. In part A above, we
have summarized appellants’ arguments that the district court misapplied the applicable
statute. See supra at 10-11. Although no error of law may appear on the face of the district
court’s orders, that may be due to a lack of explanation of the district court’s reasons. In
short, we do not know why the district court ruled as it did with respect to certain issues
because the district court did not provide sufficient explanation. Respondents have made
responsive arguments in an attempt to justify the district court’s decision , but we do not
know whether respondents’ explanation is the reason that actually influenced the district
court’s decision.3
Consequently, we believe that the district court erred by not making sufficient
findings of fact where findings are required and by not stating su fficient reasons for its
discretionary decisionmaking. Accordingly, it is appropriate to remand the matter to the

3The district court’s orders sufficiently explain why it approved compensation with
respect to long -form entertainment dea ls. But the orders do not explain why the district
court disapproved compensation with respect to other services.
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district court for further findings of fact and additional statements of reasons that are
responsive to the arguments summarized above in part A. We acknowledge that the statute
and the existing caselaw provide relatively little guidance concerning the structure of an
appropriate analysis and the factors that should be considered. Nonetheless, for purposes
of this opinion, we make some sugges tions below to guide the district court’s
reconsideration of appellants’ motions.
First, the district court should consider the particular statutory basis of the services
performed by an attorney for an interested person. As stated above, section 524.3 -720
allows compensation for an interested person’s attorney in four circumstances. See supra
at 8-9. In three of those circumstances, the services of an interested person’s attorney are
not necessarily solicited by the estate. But in the second circumstan ce, an interested
person’s attorney performs services in lieu of an attorney for the estate. The distinction is
significant because compensation for an interested person’s attorney is more likely to be
just and reasonable in the second circumstance than in the other three circumstances.
Second, to the extent that the heirs’ attorneys have provided services in the second
circumstance identified above, 4 the district court should measure benefits in terms of the
reasonable amount of attorney fees for the assumed tasks. Although section 525.515 does

4Appellants assert that they performed services of this type after the special
administrator declined to oppose certain persons’ heirship pet itions and declined to take
other actions to determine the heirs. It appears that such services are not within the plain
language of the statute where it states, “if after demand the personal representative refuses
to prosecute or pursue a claim or asset of the estate . . . . ” See Minn. Stat. § 524.3 -720.
Nonetheless, appellants may argue that such services are of the fourth type and that they
provided a direct benefit to the estate by reducing the fees incurred by counsel for the
special administrator.
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not govern, some of the factors listed there may be helpful to the district court’s
determination of compensation under section 524.3-720. See Minn. Stat. § 525.515(b)(1),
(2), (3).
Third, to the extent that the heirs’ attorneys have provided services in the first, third,
and fourth circumstances identified above, the district court should make findings
concerning the extent to which the estate benefitted from the services of all heirs’ attorneys
with respect to each of the six pre -existing categories of services that the district court
identified by letter codes. Benefits should be quantified in monetary terms, with whatever
level of specificity the district court deems appropriate. Be nefits may be measured, for
example, in terms of an increase in the estate’s assets or income or a decrease in the estate’s
liabilities or expenses. The district court also should make findings concerning the relative
proportions of th e quantified benefits for which each law firm or attorney is responsible .
Cf. Minn. Stat. § 525.515(b)(4). For these purposes, the district court need not employ a
line-by-line method of determining compensation unless the district court, in its discretion,
deems such a method to be helpful or appropriate.
Fourth, the district court should consider whether any benefit to the estate also is a
personal benefit to the heir whose law firm or attorney is responsible for the benefit and, if
so, should quantify the heir’s personal benefit. In determining whether an heir has received
a personal benefit, the district court should not consider benefits to the heir that are
derivative of benefits to the estate. Rather, the district court should consider personal
benefits to the heir only if the heir has received a benefit directly and in a manner or amount
that is not shared by all other heirs. If any such personal benefit exist s, it should be
16
accounted for separately so that its proper effect on appellants’ compensation may be
ascertained.
Fifth, the district court should consider the big picture. The district court should
consider the estimated value of the estate. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 525.515(b)(5). With that in
mind, the district court should consider whether compensation paid to the heirs’ attorneys
for benefits to the estate is appropriate in light of the assets that are likely to be available
to be distributed to the heirs . Likewise, the district court should consider whe ther
compensation paid to the heirs’ attorneys for benefits to the estate is appropriate in light of
the fees paid to the special administrator and the personal representative and their attorneys
and other agents.
We trust that the above -described analysis will allow the district court to focus on
key concepts and thereby facilitate the process of providing appellants and respondents
with reasons for its decision. We believe that the above -described analysis will promote
judicial economy by allowing the di strict court to resolve the significant issues in a
complex case with somewhat broader strokes, rather than with a more granular analysis.
Cf. In re Estate of Bush, 304 Minn. 105, 230 N.W.2d 33 (1975). We leave to the district
court’s discretion questions concerning the means by which it considers these issues, such
as whether to request supplemental submissions from the parties and whether to conduct
any additional hearings.
C.
Appellants last argue that the district court erred by applying different cri teria to
their motions than the district court applied to prior motions of Bremer Trust for its attorney
17
fees. Appellants assert that the same standard should apply, and should be applied in like
manner, on the ground that Bremer Trust’s attorneys may be compensated only to the
extent that their work benefits the estate. For that principle of law, appellants rely primarily
on two opinions of this court. See In re Estate of Evenson, 505 N.W.2d 90, 91-92 (Minn.
App. 1993); In re Estate of Opsahl, 448 N.W.2d 96, 102-03 (Minn. App. 1989) (discussing
In re Estate of Balafas, 302 Minn. 512, 225 N.W.2d 539 (1975) (interpreting Minn. Stat.
§ 525.49 (1971), repealed 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 442, art. 8)).
In response, Comerica Bank & Trust argues primarily that the district court’s ruling
on the special administrator’s prior motion is not within the scope of the appeal. Comerica
Bank & Trust also argues that the special administrator’s prior motion and appellants’
motions were based on different statutes. Compare Minn. Stat. § 525.515 (authorizing
compensation for “an attorney performing services for the estate at the instance of the
personal representative”), with Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720 (authorizing compensation for
attorneys for personal representative or other interested persons). Comerica Bank & Trust
cites an opinion of this court that applied section 525.515 to an attorney for the personal
representative and section 524.3-720 to an attorney for an interested person. See Estate &
Trust of Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 688-89. Comerica Bank & Trust argues further that the
special administrator’s attorney generally is entitled to compensation to an extent that is
“just and reasonable,” see Minn. Stat. § 525.515(a), and that, in some circumstances, the
personal representative “is entitled to . . . necessary expenses and disbursements including
reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred,” see Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720. The Nelson respondents
make a similar responsive argument.
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The district court issued order s on Bremer Trust’ s attorney-fee motions on
October 28, 2016, November 4, 2016, and April 5, 2017. In the district court, some of the
heirs opposed Bremer Trust’s motion s. Yet the heirs did not file a notice of appeal from
the district court’s order s. Consequently, the d istrict court’s ruling s on Bremer Trust’s
motions are final. We agree with respondents that, because the district court’s order s
granting Bremer Trust’s motion s are not before the court in this appeal, we may not
consider the district court’s rulings on those motions when considering whether the district
court erred in ruling on appellants’ motions.
Thus, the district court did not err in its ruling on appellants’ motions on the ground
that it applied different criteria to their motions than the district court previously applied to
Bremer Trust’s attorney-fee motions.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.