In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: N. L. and C. S., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0899

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
N. L. and C. S., Parents

Filed December 4, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-16-2362

Mary F. Moriarty, Fourth Dist rict Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant-mother N.L.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michelle A. Hatcher, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

C.S., Redwood Falls, Minnesota (pro se respondent-father)

Michael J. Biglow, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Jean Hariman)

Mary F. Moriarty, Fourth District Public Defender, Courtney J. Kozel, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for child A.J.L.)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pr esiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district cour t’s termination of her parental rights
to her child, arguing that reas onable efforts were not made to reunify her family, that a

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statutory ground for termination was not established by clear and convincing evidence, and
that termination is not in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant N.L. is the mother of A.J.L. and has been his sole custodian and caregiver
since birth. A.J.L. has attention-deficit/hyp eractivity disorder and a sensory-processing
disorder. Throughout the years, appellant en rolled A.J.L. in a variety of therapies and
extracurricular activities. No one contests th at appellant loves her son and has done an
admirable job working to address his special need s. At the time of trial, A.J.L. was ten
years old.
Appellant first came to the attention of Ch ild Protection Services (the department)
in December 2014, after a call was made to the Hopkins Police Department by appellant’s
oldest child, her daughter, who reported that appellant was intoxi cated and had been
“dragging her 8 year old son ar ound the house.” The children were eventually taken to a
friend’s house for the night, and the respondi ng officers contacted the department. In
January 2015, the department opened an out-of-court case and offered appellant a case plan
aimed at keeping the children in her care. As part of this plan, appellant was to undergo a
chemical-dependency assessment, follow its recommendations, and demonstrate sobriety
with urinalysis testing (UAs). Appellant’s case with the department was open for roughly
five months before it was brought to court.
In April 2015, A.J.L. called his school to report that he would be absent because he
missed the bus and his mother was “drunk.” Officers were directed to appellant’s house to
help A.J.L. get ready for school, and appella nt was transported to the hospital and placed

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on a health-and-safety ho ld due to her high alcohol conc entration. Shortly after this
incident, the department filed a petition in the district court alleging that A.J.L. was a child
in need of protection or services (CHIPS), and A.J.L. was placed in foster care.
In July, appellant admitted that she was ha ving issues with alcohol that negatively
impacted her ability to parent, and the district court adjudicated A.J.L. a child in need of
protection or services. Appellant was subsequently ordered to follow a case plan requiring
her to demonstrate sobriety by submitting to UAs as requested by the department, engage
in inpatient treatment and follow the afterc are recommendations, and cooperate with the
department and a guardian ad litem (GAL). Th e court also ordered appellant to maintain
suitable housing, abstain from all mood-altering substances, and complete a mental-health
assessment and follow the resulting recommendations.
Appellant completed her initial inpatient al cohol treatment in July and moved to
outpatient treatment. That fall, appellant began missing treatment classes and was
discharged from outpatient treatment after continually submitting positive UA samples. In
December, appellant relapsed an d paramedics were called in response to her excessive
alcohol consumption.
In February 2016, appellant was arrested for her second DWI within two years. In
early March, a neighbor requested that polic e perform a safety check and the responding
officer observed appellant fill her glass with wine three times within the two minutes he
was at the door. Several days later, during another requested safety check, appellant was
found unresponsive and transported to the hos pital. The responding officer described
appellant’s house as “completely filthy and uninhabitable.” Although appellant denies that

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this incident was due to alcohol use, the responding officer noted that multiple empty wine
boxes had been found at appella nt’s residence and that she had been unabl e to form a
coherent sentence.
In late April, the department filed a TP R petition, seeking to terminate appellant’s
parental rights to A.J.L. Appellant comp leted another chemical-d ependency assessment
and returned to outpatient tr eatment in July, but was again negatively discharged. From
late summer to winter of 2016, appellant mi ssed numerous required breath tests. In
October, appellant’s supervised visit with A.J. L. was cancelled after the visit supervisor
noted appellant’s slurred speech during a phone call. In November, appellant did not attend
A.J.L.’s school conference. In early December, appellant’s supervised visit was cancelled
after A.J.L. arrived at appellant’s home because appellant again appeared to be intoxicated.
The next day, appellant had another relapse and was transported to the hospital and
placed on a suicide hold. Appellant again denied drinking, but hospital staff reported that
appellant admitted to taking a mixture of al cohol and prescribed me dications. Appellant
would not allow staff to test her alcohol concentration.
Appellant completed a new chemical-dep endency assessment in mid-December;
intensive outpatient treatme nt was recommended. Appella nt began attending treatment
nine hours a week. The treatment center reported that appellant was scheduled to complete
phase II by early March and, upon completing phase III of the program, would graduate in
late April of 2017.
From January to early March, appellant missed a number of scheduled breath tests.
Appellant points out that she had negative UAs during treatment throughout January and

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February. While appellant submitted a number of alcohol-negative tests, the district court
gave these recent test results less weight since the vast majority of these samples were not
observed. Testing records also show that appellant submitted a number of diluted UA
samples throughout February and March.
Appellant’s three-day termination trial be gan January 10, 2017 , and continued on
March 6 and 8. Five witnesse s testified during the trial: th e assigned Hennepin County
child protection social worker, the GAL, appellant’s individual therapist, appellant’s oldest
child, and appellant. On April 21, 2017, the di strict court terminated appellant’s parental
rights to A.J.L. This appeal followed.1
D E C I S I O N
A natural parent is presumptively a “fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the
care of his or her child,” and “[o]rdinarily, it is in the best interest of a child to be in the
custody of his or her natural parents.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
1995). As a result, parental rights may be terminated “only for grave and weighty reasons.”
In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990).
The decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary with the district court. In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (M inn. 2014). To terminate
parental rights, a district court must dete rmine that at least one statutory basis for
termination exists and that term ination is in the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subds. 1, 7 (2016); R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. In addition, the district court

1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated, and he has not appealed the termination
of his rights.

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must find, when required, that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. In
re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The “best interests
of the child” are the “paramount consideration” in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7.
Determinations of whether a statutory basi s for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present, whether termination is in the best interests of the child, and whether
parental rights should be terminated are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare
of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901-02, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A district court abuses its discretion if its underlying findings of fact
are clearly erroneous, if it misapplies the law, or if it resolves the matter in a manner that
is against logic and the facts on the record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn.
1997); Rutten v. Rutten , 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984 ). In termination proceedings,
appellate courts review the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error, taking
into account the clear-and-conv incing-evidence standard of proof used in juvenile-
protection proceedings. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-02. A factual finding is clearly
erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to th e weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,
660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
I. The district court’s finding that the de partment made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate appellant and reunify the family is not clearly erroneous.

In termination proceedings, the district co urt must make specif ic findings that the
responsible social services agency provided culturally appropriate and reasonable services

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to meet the needs of the family or that reasonable efforts we re not required. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(f) (2016); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2016). The district court must
determine whether the services were aimed to ward alleviating the conditions that caused
the out-of-home placement of the child. See In re Welfare of S.Z. , 547 N.W.2d 886, 892
(Minn. 1996) (stating that the reasonablene ss of the efforts depends on the problems
presented). The district court must consider a variety of factors, such as whether the
services were relevant, adequate, culturally appropriate, available and accessible,
consistent and timely, and rea listic. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016). The district court
may relieve the county of its obligation to provi de reasonable efforts if “the provision of
services or further services for the purpose of reunifica tion is futile and therefore
unreasonable under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(7) (2016).
Here, the district court found that the department had provided reasonable efforts to
reunite appellant and her child. During the five months the ca se was open, prior to court
involvement, the department offered voluntary services and provided a case plan aimed at
addressing appellant’s alcohol abuse to prevent A.J.L.’s foste r-care placement. Once the
case was brought to court, the department pr ioritized addressing the condition that led to
the CHIPS petition by having appellant complete multiple ch emical-dependency
evaluations. The department made repeated attempts to have appellant enter and complete
treatment. The department pr ovided appellant with a variet y of chemical-testing options
to accommodate her work schedule and allow he r to establish a record of sobriety.
Appellant was offered UAs at Minnesota Mon itoring, along with home breath tests, and
then offered UAs again after she expressed discontent with her breath-testing machine. In

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addition to treatment, the department’s reha bilitation and reunification efforts included
ensuring that appellant was receiving couns eling/therapy and trying to include her in
A.J.L.’s school events. Th e record supports the district court’s findings that the
department’s efforts were reasonable and that appellant failed to utilize services to the
extent necessary to provide for successful reunification.
Appellant argues that the department’s efforts to reunify the family were
unreasonable because her case plan and the de partment’s efforts centered on addressing
appellant’s alcohol abuse and demonstrating sobriety. Esse ntially, appellant argues that,
because the department was overly focused on chemical dependency, it failed to offer her
other appropriate services such as a parenting assessment and classes. We disagree. It was
appellant’s chemical dependency and acco mpanying alcohol abuse that led to the
department’s initial involvement and, eventua lly, A.J.L.’s out-of-home placement. The
department’s priority among services was rightly chemical-dependency treatment, as it was
appellant’s alcohol abuse that created an unsafe environment for A.J.L., not her parenting
skills.
“The issue that brought this case to the department for alcohol abuse still, after two
and a half years, has not been adequately addressed,” the social worker testified. Appellant
had five months to utilize the department’s voluntary services to address and manage her
chemical dependency before her child was taken out of hom e. Appellant then, from the
time she signed the plan in July 2015, had over a year and half to comply with the case
plan and get her child back. Nevertheless, appellant continued using alcohol excessively
to the point of repeated incapacitation and hospitalization. Appellant was aware of the case

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plan’s requirements, underwent numerous ch emical-dependency assessments where both
inpatient and outpatient treatment was recommended, and knew she was required to submit
to breath and urine testing. Yet, she missed visits with her child and was discharged from
treatment due to continued absences. On this record, we conclude that clear and convincing
evidence supports the district court’s finding that the depa rtment made reasonable efforts
to reunite appellant and her child.
II. The record supports a statutory basis for terminating appellant’s parental
rights.

The district court determined that several statutory grounds existed for termination
of appellant’s parental rights, including that “reasonable efforts, under the direction of the
court, have failed to correct the conditions le ading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). The condition that led to the placement of A.J.L. in foster care
was appellant’s chemical dependency and alcohol abuse and the resultant unsafe
environment for A.J.L. As discussed above, the department made reasonable efforts to
address that condition.
The district court may presume that reas onable efforts have failed upon a showing
of five factors:
(A) the parent has been diagnosed as chemically dependent by
a professional certified to make the diagnosis;
(B) the parent has been required by a case plan to participate in
a chemical dependency treatment program;
(C) the treatment programs offered to the parent were
culturally, linguistically, and clinically appropriate;
(D) the parent has either fa iled two or more times to
successfully complete a treatment program or has refused at
two or more separate meetings with a caseworker to participate
in a treatment program; and

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(E) the parent continues to abuse chemicals.

Id., subd. 1(b)(5).
The district court found that appellant was diagnosed as chemically dependent, was
required to participate in treatment, failed to complete appropriate treatment on more than
two occasions, and continued to abuse chemicals. Applying the statutory presumption, the
district court found that the department had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement of the child. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
The district court made additional finding s that A.J.L. had been living outside
appellant’s home and care for over a year, a case plan for reunification had been approved
and ordered, appellant had faile d to substantially comply w ith this case plan, and the
department had been making reasonable efforts to reunify the family for nearly two years.2
The record supports the district court’s findings. Appellant had been diagnosed as
chemically dependent by numerous service providers and was repeatedly required to
engage in both inpatient and outpatient trea tment. Appellant fail ed, on more than two
occasions, to follow through with the recommendations of her treatment program and was
discharged from treatment due to repeated absences. While appellant insisted she had been
sober since March 2016, the record reflects a pattern of continued alcohol abuse well into
December 2016. Throughout th e fall of 2016, appellant s ubmitted positive chemical-test

2 These findings may have supported a second statutory presumption that reasonable efforts
had failed. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv). However, the district court
did not choose to invoke this second presumption.

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samples and appeared intoxicated before and du ring supervised visits with her children.
One month before trial began, she was hospitalized due to what strongly appeared to have
been excessive alcohol consumption, despite appellant’s testimony to the contrary.
Throughout her two-year involvement w ith the department, appellant completed
numerous chemical-dependency assessments, was repeatedly discharged from treatment
due to noncompliance, was arrested for driv ing while intoxicated, consistently missed
required breath tests, and su bmitted positive chemical-test samples and, most recently,
diluted samples. Appellant has had multiple alcohol-induced relapses requiring medical
attention, including a hospitalization and suic ide hold one month prio r to the termination
trial. Appellant has denied using alcohol dur ing most of these inst ances and repeatedly
failed to give accurate reports regarding her alcohol abuse to service providers. At the time
of trial, A.J.L. had been in out-of-home placement for 658 days an d appellant remained
unable to have unsupervised or overnight vi sits because she could not demonstrate and
maintain sobriety.
Although appellant clearly loves her child, clear and convincing evidence supports
the district court’s finding that reasonable efforts have failed to correct her alcohol abuse.
Despite the department’s efforts to ensure th at appellant had the necessary resources to
become sober, maintain her sobriety, and bu ild a support system, reasonable efforts have
failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement out of the home. Because
we conclude that one statutory basis for term inating parental rights exists, we need not
address the other bases identified by the district court for terminating parental rights. See
In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004) (“Termination of

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parental rights will be affirmed as long as at least one stat utory ground for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best
interests.”).
III. The district court acted within its discretion in finding that termination was in
the child’s best interests.

Even if a statutory ground for termination exists, the di strict court must still find
that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re Children of
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). The district court must explain its rationale
“for concluding why the termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re
Termination of Parental Rights of Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (M inn. App. 2003). A
best-interests analysis requires consideratio n of the child’s and parent’s interests in
preserving the parent-child relationship and of any competing interests of the child. Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). “Competing interests [of the child] include such things
as a stable environment, health considerations[,] and the child’s preferences.” J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted).
The district court’s best-interests finding is well-supported by the record. The
district court found that A.J.L’s special need s require “an attentive and stable caregiver”
and that he has been in “limbo far too long.” A.J.L. has been in foster care since May 2015,
and appellant has not been responsible for providing for his day-to-day care for almost two
years. Appellant’s oldest child testified to the strong bond between A.J.L. and his mother
and believed appellant could be a good ca regiver. While the court acknowledged the
“strong parent and child relati onship” between appellant and A.J.L, it also necessarily

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considered “the testimony regarding the kind of caretaker [appellant] has been since at least
December, 2014, and the kind of caretaker the child deserves.”
The district court found that appellant would not be able to be the “caretaker that
[A.J.L.] requires” in the reasonably foreseeable future due to her continued alcohol abuse.
In making this determination, the district court credited the testim ony provided by the
social worker and GAL that the child needed a permanent, safe, stable home, and that
appellant’s chemical dependency rendered her unable to parent and meet her child’s needs
or make good decisions for him. Appellant and her individual ther apist testified that
termination of appellant’s parent al rights would not be in A.J. L.’s best interest. But the
district court is in the best position to make credibility determinations, Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d
at 625, and chose to give more weight to the social worker’s and GAL’s recommendations.
While appellant argues that she has “maint ained a capacity to parent” and, at the
time of trial, was “very high-functioning,” the record indicates that her continued alcohol
abuse has made appellant unavailable to care for A.J.L. A.J.L. has “an overriding interest
in a stable, sober, available, attentive, and competent caregiver.” Based on the record, the
district court acted within its discretion in fi nding that the child’s best interests would be
served by terminating appella nt’s parental rights. B ecause a statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincin g evidence and termination is in A.J.L.’s
best interests, we affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights to A.J.L.
Affirmed.