State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0906

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Oscar Barrios-German,
Appellant.

Filed April 16, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-7906

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
Maggie M. Gibson (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark D. Kelly, Law Offices of Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Following his convictions of first-degree controlled-substance possession and first-
degree controlled -substance sale, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through an allegedly
2
unlawful search warrant and that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions. We affirm.
FACTS
Agent John Mott, from the Dakota County Sheriff’s Department, investigate s the
illegal possession, manufacture, and distribution of controlled substances . In September
2016, a confidential reliable informan t (CRI) contacted Agent Mott and reported two
brothers known as “Rafael” and “Oscar” who were selling large quantities of
methamphetamine. The CRI provided Agent Mott with Facebook pages for a “Rafael
Quintero” and an “Oscar Barrios.” Agent Mott retrieved photographs from those pages,
and the CRI confirmed that the male the CRI knew as “Rafael” matched the photograph
from the Rafael Quintero Facebook account. Agent Mott identified Rafael Quintero by his
actual name—C.H.-Z.—but he could not identify Oscar Barrios.
The CRI participated in three controlled buys of methamphetamine from C.H.-Z.
during September and October 2016 using pre -documented currency provided by the
Dakota County Drug Task Force (DTF). During one purch ase, C.H.-Z. displayed a
handgun, told the CRI that he worked directly with Mexican drug kingpin “El Chapo,” and
said that he would soon be making a trip to Sinaloa, Mexico.
During another purchase, C.H.-Z. advised the CRI that he did not have enough
methamphetamine to fill the CRI’s order. But C.H.-Z. told the CRI that he could go to
another location, get the remaining methamphetamine, and return. The CRI agreed to buy
the rest of the methamphetamine later, but he purchased one-half of the amount he wanted
and left C.H.-Z.’s apartment.
3
After the CRI left C.H.-Z.’s apartment, DTF agents observed C.H.-Z. get into a
pick-up truck. C.H.-Z. then called a phone number listed to a “Carme Hernandez” and
drove to a secured apartment building at 2318 Silver Lane NE in New Brighton. Through
cell-phone analysis, the agents also determined that a female, C.C., was in a relationship
with an “Oscar Barrios.”
That same day, the agents obtained the New Brighton apartment rental list, learned
that C.C. rented unit 206, and retrieved a lock-box key to enter the building. After entering,
and while standing in the common hallway, the agents collected a swab specimen from unit
206’s door using a model 400B Smith Ion Detection Narcotics unit. The swab later tested
positive for cocaine.
During his investigation, Agent Mott discovered that C.C.’s Facebook page
contained photographs of the “Santa Muerte” shrine, which he knew to be a shrine
commonly displayed by those involved in drug trafficking, prostitution, smugglin g, and
other serious criminal activities. Agents had also observed multiple Facebook photographs
in which C.H.-Z. and Oscar Barr ios posed with firearms. Based on the foregoing
information, Agent Mott applied for a nighttime, no -knock search warrant for a partment
206, and a district court judge authorized it.
Agents executed the search warrant at approximately 3:45 a.m. on November 4,
2016. C.C. and appellant Oscar Barrios-German were present in the apartment. Inside a
hallway closet, underneath a cut -out floor section, DTF commander James Gabriel found
a candy bag. Inside the candy bag, he found methamphetamine. Inside a different closet,
he found a duffel bag containing a Mexican passport in Barrios-German’s name.
4
In a different hallway closet, Agent Kyle Linscheid found two stuffed animals, both
of which contained large amounts of money. He also found a box containing a large
amount of money and documents in a bedroom closet in Barrios-German’s name.
Agent Phil Windschitl searched one of the apartment’s two bedrooms. He found
the following items in the top drawer of a dresser: four individual bags of suspected
methamphetamine enclosed inside one larger bag , clothing, underwear, boxer briefs , a
Wisconsin driver’s license issued to Barrios-German, and a large bundle of cash.
Agents also recovered cash used in the controlled buys between the CRI and C.H.-Z.
In total, agents found and seized more than 400 grams of methamphetamine and $14,000.
Agent Windsc hitl used a K9 officer to sniff the exterior of two vehicles —one
belonging to C.C. and the other to Barrios -German—that were parked in the apartment
parking lot. The K9 officer indicated a presence of controlled substances in side C.C.’s
vehicle but not in Barrios-German’s.
The state charged Barrios -German with first -degree controlled -substance
possession and first-degree controlled-substance sale. Barrios-German moved to suppress
all evidence on the ground that the swab of the apartment door constituted an unlawful
search. The district court agreed that the swab of the door was unlawful and suppressed
the evidence of cocaine obtained from it . But the district court examined the search -
warrant application in its entirety and determined that it stated sufficient facts to establish
probable cause. Therefore, the district court denied the suppression motion.
Barrios-German subsequently moved for a Franks hearing after his attorney
discovered that law enforcement had executed a search warrant at C.H.-Z.’s Minneapolis
5
residence on the same day that the search of the New Brighton apartment was
accomplished. The application for the Minneapolis residence search warrant contained
facts that were not present in the application for the New Brighton apartment—specifically
that C.H.-Z. resided at an address that was different from the New Brighton apartment.
Barrios-German argued to the district court that th e omission of this information
“weaken[ed] the probable cause to believe that drugs would be located in Apartment 206.”
The district court disagreed, determining that the dif ferences between the two search -
warrant applications did not weaken the probable cause to issue the New Brighton
apartment warrant. The district court denied Barrios -German’s mot ion for a Franks
hearing.
Following a bench trial, t he district c ourt convicted Barrios -German on both
charges. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Barrios-German contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
suppression motion because the apartment search -warrant application lacked sufficient
facts to establish probable cause and to support a no-knock, nighttime search.
A. Probable Cause
Oscar-Barrios argues that the search warrant lacked probable cause because the
affidavit did not provide sufficient facts to establish a reasonable nexus between the
methamphetamine and the New Brighton apartment, the informant was not reliable, and
the affidavit supporting the warrant omitted the fact that C.H.-Z. lived in Minneapolis.
6
A search warrant cannot issue without a showing of probable cause. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. We rev iew a district court’s probable -cause
determination under the deferential, substantial -basis standard. State v. Fawcett , 884
N.W.2d 380, 384 -85 (Minn. 2016). A substantial basis in this context means a “fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
State v. Zanter , 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). We determine
whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause by examining
the “totality of the circumstances.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985).
1. Object-Place Nexus
Relying on State v. Kahn, Barrios-German argues that the affidavit supporting the
apartment search warrant did not provide sufficient facts from which to infer a reasonable
nexus between the sale of methamphetamine and that location. 555 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Minn.
App. 1996). In Kahn, the issuing judge granted a search warrant based on the following
facts:
(1) respondent was arrested for possession of one ounce of
cocaine in Minneapolis; (2) the affiant, an expert in the field of
drug enforcement, stated that he knew “through training and
experience that an ounce of cocaine is considered more [than]
that for personal use and indicates that the person possessing
that quantity normally sells the drug in smaller quantities”; and
(3) that respondent resided at the residence to be searched.

Id. On that record , w e determined that there was no probable cause linking the
“[defendant’s] possession of one ounce of cocaine in Minneapolis to possible evidence or
contraband at his residence 75 to 85 miles away in Elgin ,” reasoning that “[m]ore than
7
mere possession of an ou nce of cocaine is required to demonstrate probable cause that an
individual is a dealer and that his home contains evidence or contraband.” Id.
In State v. Souto , the supreme court determined that a search warrant lacked a
sufficient nexus between the sale of drugs and the defendant’s residence. 578 N.W.2d 744,
749 (Minn. 1998). There, the affidavit supporting the warrant described numerous phone
calls between the defendant’s residence and a suspected drug dealer’s residence and
indicated that someone mailed a package containing drugs to the defendant’s residence.
Id. The supreme court concluded that there was not a sufficient nexus because there wa s
“no information as to [the calls’] content” and “no substantive information indicating that
[the defendant] in fact received and stored drugs for [the drug dealer] at her home.” Id.
Here, in contrast to Kahn and Souto, the district court granted the apartment search
warrant based on the following facts that link ed the sale of methamphetamine to the
apartment: (1) a CRI reported that two brothers, known as “Rafael” and “Oscar,” were
selling large quantities of methamphetamine; (2) the CRI and Agent Mott identified Rafael
as C.H. -Z.; (3) the CRI participated in three controlled buys with C.H.-Z.; (4) C.H.-Z.
drove to the New Brighton apartment after telling the CRI during one controlled buy that
he could retrieve more methamphetamine from another location; (5) C.H.-Z., while on his
way to get additional methamphetamine, called a number listed to a “Carme H ernandez”;
(6) C.C. rented apartment 206 in the New Brighton apartment building; ( 7) law
enforcement, using cell-phone analysis, learned that C.C. had a romantic relationship with
“Oscar Barrios”; ( 8) C.C.’s Facebook account displayed the Santa Muerte shrine; and
8
(9) C.H.-Z. displayed a handgun during one controlled buy and told the CRI that he had
ties to Mexican drug kingpin “El Chapo.”
Considering the totality of these circumstances, the district court properly concluded
that there was a sufficient nexus between the sale of methamphetamine and the New
Brighton apartment to support a search warrant. See State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619,
622-24 (Minn. 2014) (determining that search warrant affidavit established a sufficient
nexus based on “three factual allegations,” including that the defendant “ previously had
been arrested for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute ,” that the
defendant was a “crack cocaine dealer,” and that the defendant “had brandished a
handgun . . . because someone had stolen ‘a large amount of crack cocaine from him ’”);
Novak v. State, 349 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1984) (determining that there was a sufficient
nexus where the affidavit established that the defendant was “involved in the drug business
as a wholesaler, that he lived in a residence in Austin, that he had two cars, and that after
arranging on the telephone to sell a large amount of marijuana to an undercover officer he
left his house, drove around Austin, then drove to Albert Lea and made the sale”); State v.
Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that there was a sufficient nexus
because the supporting affidavit for the search warrant indicated that “two controlled sales
were arranged by telephone, defendant’s house was under surveillance[,] and defendant
was observed going straight from his house to the place where the sale took place”).
2. Confidential Reliable Informant
In challenging the probable cause underlying the warrant, Barrios-German also
attacks the CRI’s reliability, reasoning that law enforcement did not corroborate “any
9
allegations of drug possession or sale by the ‘brother’ kn own as ‘Oscar ’” and the
supporting affidavit did not state that the CRI had provided reliable information in the past.
If a probable-cause determination is based on an informant’s tip, “the informant’s veracity
and the basis of his or her knowledge are considerations under the totality test.” State v.
Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 1998). Minnesota caselaw provides six factors in
reviewing the reliability of an informant who is confidential but not anonymous to police,
including: (1) a first-time informant who has not been involved in the criminal underworld
is presumed to be reliable so long as the affidavit states that the informant is not involved
in criminal activity; (2) the informant has previously given police correct information and
the affidavit explicitly states that; (3) there is sufficient police corroboration of the
information supplied; (4) the CRI voluntarily comes forward; (5) the affidavit refers to a
“controlled purchase,” permitting the reviewing judge to presume that law enforcement
searched the informant before and after the controlled purchase and surveilled the
controlled purchase to the extent feasible; and (6) the CRI makes a statement against his or
her penal interest. Id.
An issuing magistrate is not required to determine that all six factors are present .
For example, in State v. Demry , an informant provided the name of an individual
transporting drugs, the vehicle’s description, and the unique location of t he drugs, and the
police corroborated these details. 605 N.W.2d 106, 107 (Minn. App. 2000). Citing Ward,
580 N.W.2d at 7 4, we concluded that the informant’s information supported a finding of
probable cause even though there was no indication that the informant was a first -time
10
informant not involved in the criminal underworld and no indication of having previously
given law enforcement correct information. Demry, 605 N.W.2d at 107.
Here, the affidavit supporting the warrant did not state that the CRI was a first-time
informant not involved in the criminal underworld or that the CRI had provided correct
information in the past. But, as the district court noted, other considerations were satisfied
that supported a conclusion that the CRI was reliable. First, the CRI contacted Agent Mott
unprompted to report that two brothers known as Rafael and Oscar were selling larg e
amounts of methamphetamine. Second, t he CRI participated in three separate controlled
buys of methamphetamine using pre -documented U.S. currency, which corroborated the
information the CRI provided with respect to C.H.-Z. Third, agents corroborated the CRI’s
information about Oscar when they observed C.H-Z. leave his Minneapolis apartment and
go to the New Brighton apartment to get more drugs and discovered through cell -phone
analysis that the woman who rented the New Brighton apartment was in a relationship with
an Oscar. Based on our review of the considerations provided in Ward, the district court
properly concluded that the CRI was reliable.
3. Omission in the New Brighton Apartment Warrant
Barrios-German argues that the omission in the New Brighton apartment search-
warrant application concerning the fact that C.H. -Z. lived in Minneapolis and not New
Brighton weakened the pr obable-cause basis to support the warrant. But as the district
court noted in denying Barrios-German’s Franks motion, that omission did not overcome
all the other facts supporting issuance of the warrant. Therefore, the district court properly
determined that there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause to issue the warrant.
11
B. Unannounced, Nighttime Entry
Barrios-German also contends that the content of the search-warrant application did
not support a no-knock, nighttime entry under Minn. Stat. § 626.14 (2016).
Under Minn. Stat. § 626.14, a district court may authorize a search warrant outside
the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. if the “court determines on the basis of facts stated in
the affidavits that a nighttime search . . . is necessary to prevent the loss, destruction, or
removal of the objects of the search or to protect the searchers or the public.” The standard
for determining if an unannounced entry is necessary is reasonable suspicion, and when
the material facts are not in dispute, we independently determine whether evidence
obtained during the execution of an unannounced warrant should be suppressed. State v.
Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).
We give great deference to the issuing judge’s determination of whether a nighttime search
warrant should be authorized under Minn. Stat. § 626.14. State v. Bourke , 718 N.W.2d
922, 928 (Minn. 2006).
The reasonable -suspicion standard is not high. Id. at 927 (citing Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422 (1997) ). But reasonable suspicion
must be supported by “a particularized showing of dangerousness, futility, or likelihood of
destruction of evidence.” State v. Botelho, 638 N.W.2d 770, 778 (Minn. App. 2002); see
Garza v. State , 632 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2001) (“[A] generalized showing of drug
trafficking is not sufficient justification for an unannounced entry because evidence of drug
trafficking does not, ipso facto, equate to a conclusion that an announced entry would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would result in the destruction of evidence.”); State v. Wasson,
12
615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 2000) (“[B]oilerplate language in the search warrant affidavit
does not satisfy the requirement for a sh owing, particular to the search at issue, that
announcing would be dangerous or allow the destruction of evidence.”).
In arguing that the affidavit does not support an unannounced, nighttime warrant,
Oscar-Barrios relies on Wasson. There, a search warrant affidavit stated that weapons were
likely present inside a house because several weapons had been seized from the same house
three months earlier. 615 N.W.2d at 320 -21. The supreme court determined that that
information, combined with the knowledge that the homeowner “had been willing to
facilitate the sale of drugs at his residence to at least the CRI and perhaps others,” provided
more than “an unarticulated hunch” and objectively supported “a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing police presence would be dangerous.” Id. at 321. The supreme
court also determined that in the unannounced-search context, appellate courts “may accept
evidence of a threat to officer safety of a less persuasive character when the officer presents
the request for a no-knock warrant to a magistrate.” Id. To that end, the supreme court
concluded that the officer presented the issuing magistrate “the particular circumstances
justifying an unannounced entry, and the magistrate approved of that method of entry.” Id.
Oscar-Barrios attempts to distinguish Wasson from the facts here because, unlike
the weapons in Wasson, drugs had not been seized from the New Brighton apartment
before. See id. We disagree with this argument. The affidavit here provided particularized
reasons for authorizing an unannounced, nighttime entry at the New Brighton apartment .
As the district court recognized, the affidavit stated that the individuals linked to the New
Brighton apartment were known to carry firearms and were suspected to have ties to the
13
Sinaloa Drug Trafficking Organization. In addition, C.H.-Z. and Oscar-Barrios had been
seen in multiple Facebook photog raphs posing with firearms, the CRI informed law
enforcement that C.H.-Z. displayed a black nine -millimeter handgun during a controll ed
purchase of methamphetamine, Agent Mott observed the Santa Muerte shrine on C.C.’s
Facebook page, and other individuals residing in the New Brighton apartment building
would be less likely to be outside the building or in the hallways during a nighttime
execution of the warrant. See Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d at 43 (concluding that affidavit facts
established reasonable suspicion when no -knock warrant contained information that an
individual selling drugs from the apartment was involved in gang activity, a confidential
informant feared for their safety, and a concerned citizen observed someone in the
apartment with a handgun). As the district court explained, “[s]everal reasonable
inferences can be drawn from these facts.” Barrios -German and/or C.H. -Z. could have
been in apartment 206 and may have destroyed evidence if the officers announced their
presence. And knowing that both individuals possessed guns, there were concerns about
“a safety hazard for both law enforcement and the other residents of the apartment
building.”
These particularized facts provide more than the mere boilerplate language that we
have determined insufficient in the past. See State v. Anhalt, 630 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn.
App. 2001) ( determining that general observations in affidavit regarding “what drug
dealers are known to do and how drugs may be discarded easily, none of which were
specific to [the defendant]” did not justify an unannounced entry); State v. Martinez, 579
N.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Minn. App. 1998) (concluding that warrant-affidavit language that
14
drug traffickers “are often armed with firearms and other dangerous weapons and will use
these weapons” did not justify an unannounced entry), review denied (Minn. July 16,
1998). As in Wasson, Agent Mott presented “particular circumstances justifying an
unannounced entry, and the magistrate approved of that method of entry.” 615 N.W.2d
at 321. We therefore conclude that t he district court properly determined that there was
reasonable suspicion of a threat to officer safety or a threat of destruction of evidence to
authorize an unannounced, nighttime entry.
C. The Swab of the Apartment Door
Barrios-German argues that the swab of C.C.’s apartment door constitutes an
unlawful search. To date, no Minnesota appellate court has addressed this question.
Nevertheless, we do not reach it in this case because, as the district court found, even if the
evidence of cocaine obtained from the swab of the apartment door is excluded, there was
still a substantial basis in the record to establish probable cause for the apartment search
warrant.
II.
Barrios-German contends that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to
establish that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine because the state
“produced no substantive evidence that [Barrios -German] was ever present at any drug
transactions, or in actual possession of any drugs.”
“We review the sufficiency of the state ’s circumstantial evidence de novo. ” State
v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn. App. 2015). In doing so, “we thoroughly review the
15
record to determine whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
at 832.
Barrios-German was convi cted of first-degree methamphetamine (sale) and first -
degree methamphetamine (possession). See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd s. 1(1), 2(a)(1)
(2016). A person is guilty of the former if “ on one or more occasions within a 90 -day
period the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures of a total weight of 17 grams or
more containing . . . methamphetamine.” Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1); see Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a (2016) (“‘Sell’ means: (1) to sell, give away, barter, deliver,
exchange, distribute or dispose of to another, or to manufacture; or . . . (3) to possess with
intent to perform an act listed in clause (1).”). A person is guilty of possession if “the
person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a total weight of 50 grams or more
containing . . . methamphetamine.” Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1).
There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction if “no other
reasonable, rational inferences [exist] th at are inconsistent with guilt. ” Sam, 859 N.W.2d
at 831 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted); see State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
599 (Minn. 2013); State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010 ). To determine
if the circumstantial evidence is consistent with an appellant’s guilt, we apply a two-step
analysis. Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 833 (citing Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598). “First, we
determine the circumstances proved, giving due deference to the fact-finder and construing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict .” Id. Second, we determine if “the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational or
reasonable hypothesis.” Id. We must look at the circumstances proved not as isolated facts
16
but rather as a “complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly
to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude . . . any reasonable inference other than guilt ,”
Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted), while giving “no deference to the fact
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences,” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted).
To prove constructive possession, the state must prove either that “the
methamphetamine was in a place under [Barrios -German’s] exclusive control to which
other people do not normally have access” or that there is a strong probability that he was,
at the time of discovery, “consciously exercising dominion and control over the
methamphetamine.” Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 833. Here, it is undisputed that Barrios-German
did not have exclusive control of the closet or dresser drawer in which the agents found
methamphetamine; the areas were not secured by lock s, and C.C. is listed as the renter of
the New Brighton apartment. Therefore, we consider whether the state proved beyond a
reasonable do ubt that Barrios-German “ exercised dominion and control ov er the
methamphetamine found in the [closet and dresser drawer].” Id.
When taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances proved
include: (1) Agent Mott started investigating the case after a CRI told him that brothers
Oscar and Rafael were involved in large-scale methamphetamine distribution; (2) the CRI
conducted three controlled buys at C.H.-Z.’s residence using pre-documented currency;
(3) during one purchase, the CRI requested four ounces of methamphetamine, but C.H.-Z.
told him that he only had two ounces; (4) C.H.-Z. told the CRI that he could go to another
location and return with the additional two ounces to complete the order; (5) in a bedroom
17
dresser drawer, Agent Windschitl found four individual bags of methamphetamine inside
a larger bag and a large amount of cash next to a Wisconsin driver’s license in Oscar
Barrios-German’s name; (6) in a closet in the same bedroom, Agent Linscheid found letters
and documents in Barrios -German’s name; (7) in the hallway closet, Agent Linscheid
found bags of methamphetamine hi dden inside two stuffed animals ; (8) in a duffel bag in
a different closet, Commander Gabriel found a Mexican passport in Oscar Barrios -
German’s name; ( 9) Barrios-German stayed with C.C. at least one night a week; ( 10) he
and C.C. were in a romantic relationship; and ( 11) he met C.H.-Z. while working for the
roofing company.
Barrios-German testified that he had been employed by a commercial roofing
company for approximately eight or nine years and that he worked every day of the week,
including weekends. He met C.H.-Z. through working for the roofing company. He stated
that he did not know why his driver’s license was found in a drawer next to
methamphetamine. He also testified that he is in a romantic relationship with C.C., but
that he only stayed with her one night a week.
Barrios-German maintains that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time and that
C.C. and C.H.-Z. “were conspiring to possess and sell methamphetamine.” But we have
affirmed convictions based on constructive possession when a defendant’s personal effects
were found in close proximity to drugs. See, e.g., Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 270 (concludi ng
that defendant constructively possessed drugs when box containing the marijuana
displayed the defendant’s name); State v. Colsch , 284 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn. 1979)
(concluding that defendant constructively possessed drugs when papers identifying the
18
defendant and the defendant’s checkbook were found near the drugs); State v. Carr, 311
Minn. 161, 163, 249 N.W.2d 443, 445 (1976) (concluding that defendant constructively
possessed drugs whe n information identifying him was found in the same drawer as the
drug paraphernalia); State v. Wiley, 295 Minn. 411, 422, 205 N.W.2d 667, 675 (1973)
(concluding that defendant constructively possessed drugs when drawer where the drugs
were found contained items displaying the defendant’s name).
“A person may constructively possess drugs jointly with another person.” State v.
Barnes, 618 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001);
see Sam , 859 N.W.2d at 834 (explaining that constructive possession “need not be
exclusive, but may be shared”). Here, agents found methamphetamine inside a dress er
drawer next to Barrios-German’s Wisconsin driver’s license, documents in his name inside
a closet, and his passport inside a duffel bag. See Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 834 (“Proximity is
an important considerati on in assessing constructive possession.” (quotation omitted) ).
The only reasonable inference is that Barrios -German exercised dominion and control of
the methamphetamine. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the state
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Barrios-German exercised dominion and control
over the methamphetamine found in C.C.’s apartment such that Barrios-German is guilty
of first-degree controlled-substance sale and first-degree controlled-substance possession.
Affirmed.