In the Matter of the Application of Kimberly Baker.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0911

In the Matter of the Application of
Kimberly Baker.

Filed January 8, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Cleary, Chief Judge
Concurring specially, Connolly, Judge

Minnesota Board of Teaching
OAH Docket No. 5-1302-33332

Bethany M. Gullman, Ll. Rhyddid Watkins, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for relator Kimberly Baker)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Nathan J. Hartshorn, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Board of Teaching)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Pres iding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2 (2016), does not require an applicant to show that
the training program underlying her out-of-state teaching license is similar to the training
program underlying the Minnesota license for which she applies.
O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Kimberly Baker challenges a decision by respondent
the Minnesota Board of Teach ing (the board) denying her application for a Minnesota
2
special-education teaching license. Because we hold that the board’s decision was based
on an error of law, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Baker received her Iowa teaching license (Iowa license) in 200 2 after graduating
from the University of Northern Iowa’s unified program and completing two student-
teaching experiences. Baker’s Iowa license allows her to “teach children from birth
through [age eight] 1” including students with disabilitie s. Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-
13.26(3)a. (2016). 2 In November 2013, Baker applied for three Minnesota teaching
licenses based on her Iowa license: (1) ea rly-childhood education; (2) elementary
education; and (3) early-childhood special e ducation (ECSE). In April 2014, the board
issued the first two licenses to Baker, but denied the ECSE license because the “Iowa
License did not result from essentially equivalent training to that required by Minnesota.”
An ECSE license allows a teacher to “provide evaluation and specially designed instruction
to eligible children, birth th rough age six, who exhibit a broad range of developmental
delays or disabilities.” Minn. R. 8710.5500, subp. 1 (2016).

1 The regulation authorizes a license holder to teach “children from birth through grade
three.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-13.26(3)a. The regulation proceeds to break down this
grade range to birth through age eight. Id. r. 282-13.26(3)b.(1)1. For clarity and
consistency, we will use the “birth through age eight” scope of the Iowa license when
comparing it with the ECSE license, which has an age rather than grade scope.

2 The substantive law governing Baker’s Iowa license did not change between the time she
received the license and the time that the board made its decision in May of 2017. Compare
Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-14.140(16) (2002), with Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-13.26(3)
(2016). The applicable provisions of this regul ation have since been rescinded. 40 Iowa
Admin. Bull. 97-99 (July 5, 2017).
3
In 2015, the Minnesota Legislature am ended Minn. Stat. § 122A.23 governing
licensure for applicants with out-of-state licenses.3 The law, with such changes noted with
underlining (additions) and strikeouts (deletions), provides:
Subd. 2. Applicants licensed in other states. (a) Subject
to the requirements of secti ons 122A.18, subdivision 8, and
123B.03, the Board of Teaching must issue a teaching license
or a temporary teaching license under paragraphs (b)(c) to (e)
(f) to an applicant wh o holds at least a baccalaureate degree
from a regionally accredited college or university and holds or
held a similar an out-of-state teaching license that requires the
applicant to successfully co mplete a teacher preparation
program approved by the issuing state, which includes either
(1) field-specific teaching methods and, student teaching, or
essentially equivalent experience, or (2) at least two years of
teaching experience as the teac her of record in a similar
licensure field.
(b) The Board of Teaching may issue a standard license
on the basis of teaching experience and examination
requirements only.
(c) The Board of Teaching must issue a teaching license
to an applicant who:
(1) successfully completed all exams and human
relations preparation componen ts required by the Board of
Teaching; and
(2) holds or held an out-of-state teaching license
to teach the same a similar content field and grade levels if the
scope of the out-of-state license is no more than two grade
levels less than a similar Minnesota license, and either (i) has
completed field-specific teach ing methods, student teaching,
or equivalent experience, or (i i) has at least two years of
teaching experience as the teac her of record in a similar
licensure field.

3 The applicable provisions of this statute have since been repealed, effective July 1, 2018.
2017 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 5, art. 3, § 36(b), at 80 (to be codified at Minn. Stat.
§ 122A.23 (2018)).
4
2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2, § 18, at 25; see also Minn. Stat. § 122A.23,
subd. 2 (2016).
Baker appealed the denial of the ECSE license and requested a contested-case
hearing. After a hearing conducted over th ree days, the administrative-law judge (ALJ)
issued recommended findings of fact and conclusions of la w, and recommended that the
board issue an ECSE license to Baker. The ALJ based his recommendation on an
interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd . 2 (2016). The board accepted all findings
of fact and some of the conclusions of law, but refused to follow the ALJ’s
recommendation. The board concluded that the ALJ misapplied Minn. Stat. § 122A.23,
subd. 2, by failing to require Baker to dem onstrate that the ECSE license was a “similar
Minnesota license” to her Iowa license. Specifically, the board concluded that the licenses
were not similar because they did not require similar training. This certiorari appeal
follows.
ISSUES
I. Did the board err by interp reting Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(c), to require that
an applicant’s out-of-state training progra m be similar to a Minnesota training
program?

II. Did the board violate Baker’s due proce ss rights when its director acted in both
adversarial and adjudicative functions?

ANALYSIS
An administrative agency’s decision enjoys a presumption of correctness; we defer
to the agency’s expertise and special knowledge in its field. In re Annandale NPDES/SDS
Permit Issuance, 731 N.W.2d 502, 514 (Minn. 2007). “We presume the agency’s decision
5
. . . is correct, but the court may reverse an agency decision if the decision was affected by
an error of law.” N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 374, 377
(Minn. 1984). “The standard of review is not heightened where the final decision of the
agency decision-maker differs from the recommendation of the ALJ.” In re Excelsior
Energy, Inc., 782 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. App. 2010).
I. Statutory Interpretation
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” J.D.
Donovan, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp. , 878 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2016). The board
interpreted section 122A.23, subdivision 2(c), to require comparison of the training
programs underlying an applicant’s out-of-state teaching license and the Minnesota license
for which she applies. We hold that this interpretation runs contrary to the plain meaning
of the statute.
We follow the plain language of a statute when it is unambiguous. Vlahos v. R&I
Constr. of Bloomington, Inc. , 676 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn. 2004); Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2016). “Under the basic canons of statutory construction, we construe words and phrases
according to rules of grammar and according to their most natural and obvious usage unless
it would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.” Vlahos, 676 N.W.2d
at 679; Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2016).
The plain language of s ubdivision 2 does not require the training programs
underlying out-of-state licenses to be si milar to the training programs underlying
Minnesota licenses. Subdivision 1 provides a means of obt aining a Minnesota license by
virtue of an out-of-state applicant’s traini ng. Minn. Stat. § 122A. 23, subd. 1 (2016). In
6
contrast, subdivision 2 is devoid of any mention of training programs and instead provides
a means of obtaining a Minnesota license for a pplicants already licensed in other states.
Id. § 122A.23, subd. 2.
The history of section 122A .23 supports our plain-la nguage interpretation.
Subdivision 2 was first introduced into the statutes in 2000 by an omnibus bill, 2000 Minn.
Laws ch. 489, art. 6, § 5, at 1960-61, and required the board of teaching to
(a) . . . issue a teaching license or a temporary teaching
license under paragraphs (b) to (e) to an applicant who holds at
least a baccalaureate degree from a regionally accredited
college or university and holds or held a similar out-of-state
teaching license that requires th e applicant to successfully
complete a teacher preparati on program approved by the
issuing state, which includes field-specific teaching methods
and student teaching or essentially equivalent experience.
(b) The board of teaching must issue a teaching license
to an applicant who: (1) successfully completed all exams and
human relations preparation components required by the board
of teaching; and (2) holds or held an out-of-state teaching
license to teach the same conten t field and grade levels if the
scope of the out-of-state license is no more than one grade level
less than a similar Minnesota license.

Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2 (2000).
At that time, subdivision 2(a) required an applicant to hold a “similar out-of-state
teaching license” to be eligible for a Minnesota teaching license, but subdivision 2(b) did
not contain such requirement. Id. Though subdivision 2(b) describes “a similar Minnesota
license,” the bill’s accompanying research summary describes that provision
4 as requiring
the board “to issue a Minnesota license if the applicant successf ully completed all

4 Subdivision 2(b) is now subdivision 2(c). 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2,
§ 18, at 25.
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examinations and human relations components required by the board of teaching and holds
or has held a license in another state to teac h the same content field and equivalent grade
levels as that under a Minnesota license.” H.F. 3800 H. Research B. Rep. (2000) (emphasis
added). The legislature did not intend to promulgate a similarity requirement in
subdivision 2(b) analogous to the one in subdivision 2(a); the phrase “similar Minnesota
license” in subdivision 2(b) simply refers to the Minnesota license for which an applicant
applies.
At the time of her application in 2013, Baker was subject to subdivision 2(a),
requiring that her out-of-state license be si milar to the Minnesota license for which she
applied. Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(a) (2012). However, in 2015, before the board’s
final decision on Baker’s application, the legislature amended this subdivision and replaced
the words “a similar” with the word “an.” 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2,
§ 18, at 25. The statute now requires the board to “issue a professional five-year teaching
license or an initial professional one-year teaching license under paragraphs (c) to (f) to an
applicant who holds at least a baccalaureate degree from a regionally accredited college or
university and holds or held an out-of-state teaching license . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 122A.23,
subd. 2(a) (2016) (emphasis added). Conseque ntly, when the board made its decision in
2017, an applicant holding an out-of-state license was subject only to the requirements in
paragraphs (c) to (f) of the statute.5 Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(a) (2016).

5 The legislature also amended subdivision 2(a) to read: “[t]he Board of Teaching must
issue a teaching license or a temporary teaching license under paragraphs (c) to (f)” instead
of the former “(b) to (e).” 2015 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 3, art. 2, § 18, at 25; Minn.
Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(a) (2016).
8
Subdivision 2(a) no longer requires an out-of-state a pplicant to hold a teaching
license similar to a Minnesota license. While the phrase “similar Minnesota license” still
appears in subdivision 2(c), even if that provision is read to require an out-of-state applicant
to prove that her out-of-state license is similar to a Minnesota license, there is no additional
requirement of comparing the underlying training programs to ascertain such similarity.
“Similar Minnesota license” is the statutor y phrase at issue, not “similar training
program.” Teaching special education to children from birth through age six (ECSE
license) is wholly with in the scope of teaching special education to children from birth
through age eight (Iowa license). In other wo rds, Baker’s Iowa license qualifies her to
teach the same content field (special education) to the same ages (birth through age six) as
the ECSE license.6 Baker’s Iowa license is certainly similar to the ECSE license.
The landscape of section 122A.23, especi ally in light of its recent amendments,
establishes that the legislature did not intend to require comparison of the training programs
underlying licenses: the requirements focus exclusively on the resulting licenses and their
similarities in terms of what they allow license holders to do.7 We hold that subdivision 2

6 In its order, the board denied that the Iowa license allowed a teacher to teach a similar
content field and grade scope as the ECSE license, but at the hearing a board witness
testified that the Iowa license and the ECSE license allowed a teache r to teach the same
content field and grade levels.

7 As the ALJ concluded: “Had the legislature intended an applicant for a teacher’s license,
already licensed in another state, to undergo training identical or even similar to teacher
license applicants in Minnes ota, it would have said so. . . . Instead, the legislature
unambiguously provided that licen sure be granted when the ap plicant has an out-of-state
license in a similar licensure area.”
9
does not require an applicant to show that the training program underlying her out-of-state
teaching license is similar to the training program underlying the Minnesota license for
which she applies. Accordingly, we reverse because the board’s decision was affected by
an error of law.8
II. Due Process
Baker contends that her due-process rights we re violated when the director of the
board acted in both an adversarial and adjudicative function. Because we reverse on other
grounds, we need not review this issue, but we pause to address what occurred in this case.
At oral argument we learned that, while the director did not serve in a decision-
making role, she was present when the board de liberated on Baker’s application. Such
conduct from an organizational leader, who ha d been involved in th e adversarial process
with the Licensing Committee a nd before the ALJ, exacts unspoken pressure on voting
board members even where, as here, there is no clear due process violation or other
indication of bias in the record. 9 We believe even this appearance of impropriety
significantly thwarts the public’s trust in the board of teaching and the administration of
justice generally. We strongly urge the board to reconsider this practice.

8 Baker also contends that the board’s deci sion was arbitrary and capricious and was the
result of an improperly unpromulgated rule. Because we reverse on other grounds, we
need not address these issues.

9 At oral argument, counsel for the board affirmed that Licensing Committee members
were also present during the vote, which raises similar concerns.
10
D E C I S I O N
Section 122A.23, subdivision 2, does not require compar ing the training programs
underlying Minnesota and out-of-state teaching licenses. The board’s decision interpreting
the statute as such is affected by an error of law. We reverse the board’s decision denying
Baker an ECSE license and remand.
Reversed and remanded.

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CONNOLLY, Judge (concurring specially)
I concur with the majority ’s thoughtful opinion that the Minnesota Board of
Teaching (the Board) erred in its interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2(c) (2016)
when it denied a license to the relator Kimberly Baker. I write separately to state that I
would reach the due process issue. I believe that relator’s due process rights were clearly
violated because the Board’s executive director was involved in both an adversarial and
adjudicative role during the licensure proceedings.
This court reviews procedural-due-process issues de novo. Zellman ex rel. M.Z. v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn.
July 28, 1999). The protections under the du e process clauses of the United States and
Minnesota constitutions are identical. Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. , 432 N.W.2d 448,
453 (Minn. 1988). “The amount of due process required . . . depends on an analysis of the
particular situation.” Lamusga v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 536 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn.
App. 1995). “[Q]uasi-judicial proceedings do not invoke th e full panoply of procedures
required in regular judi cial proceedings.” Barton Contracting Co., In c. v. City of Afton ,
268 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[j]ustice
requires that the judicial process be fair and th at it appear to be fair; it necessarily follows
that a presiding judge must be impartial and must appear to be impartial.” State v. Pratt,
813 N.W.2d 868, 87 8 (Minn. 2012) (emphasis added). In Pratt, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed a conviction where the presiding judge in a criminal trial had also been hired
as an expert witness by the coun ty attorney in an unrelated civil lawsuit. The appearance
CS-2
of impartiality should apply to quasi-judi cial proceedings when an individual’s
constitutional interest is at stake.
“To establish the existence of a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must
first show that he had a liberty or property interest and that state action deprived him of that
protected interest.” Phillips v. State, 725 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Minn. App. 2007). A property
interest may come from a statute “that secure[s] certain benefits and that support[s] claims
of entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701,
2709 (1972). Here, relator ha s a property interest in the statute defining eligibility for a
Minnesota teaching license by out-of-state applicants who had been licensed in other states.
Minn. Stat. § 122A.23, subd. 2 (2016). Relato r was deprived of that interest when the
Board denied her license application.
Relator asserts that her due-process right s were violated because the executive
director of the Board that wa s deciding whether or not to ap prove her license application
acted in both an adversarial and adjudicative role. The Board relies on Urban Council on
Mobility v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res. , 289 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1980) in arguing that dual
roles within an agency do not violate due process unless the decision-maker is actually
biased. However, in that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the mere presence
of agency staff at an agency hearing did not violate due process. Id. at 736. I agree. But
what happened here was fundamentally different. The executive director was involved with
the Licensing Committee’s origin al evaluation of relator’s a pplication. Then, she was a
significant part of the Licensing Committee’s adversarial role as relator’s opposing party
in the process. The final step of that pr ocess was the Board’s decision at the May 12
CS-3
hearing. When the Board retired to make its decision, the executive director actually was
present and in the room for the Board’s deliberations.
The Board argues that because “[t]here is no evidence that [the executive director]
cast a vote for (or against) the Board’s final decision,” that there was nothing improper.
The Board completely misses the point. It does not matter that she did not cast a vote. She
was in the room when the vote was taken. Su ch a procedure is anal ogous to an attorney
arguing before a panel of this court, then joining the judges while we deliberate our
decision. Whether the attorney actually votes or not, such an action flies in the face of due
process because there is a strong appearance of unfairness and partiality. Therefore, I
conclude that because of the executive director’s actions, the Board violated relator’s due-
process rights protected under the United States and Minnesota constitutions.