State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0912

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darryl Taylor,
Appellant.

Filed March 26, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-4347

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his multiple convictions for promoting prostitution and sex
trafficking. He argues that (1) the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

2
the contents of his cell phone because the search warrant did not authorize such a search
and was insufficiently particular and (2) the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence that he assaulted one of the sex -trafficking victims. And h e asserts other
arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
In late 2015, appellant Darren Taylor met three vulnerable women: G.J., a homeless
17-year-old runaway; E.C., a 22 -year-old woman who was homeless and addicted to
heroin; and F.B., a 33 -year-old alcoholic who left her home after meeting Taylor . As he
met them, Taylor encouraged each to pose provocatively while he and his girlfriend,
LaQueshia Moran, took photos. Taylor used the photos to create advertisements on the
website Backpage.com soliciti ng prostitution , and he communicated with the men who
responded to the advertisements. Moran instructed G.J. to go to Taylor’s residence to have
sex with men, though it is unclear whether she actually did so. F.B. and E.C. stayed at
Taylor’s residence, and he demanded that they engage in sex acts for money, often four or
five times per day. Taylor reinforced his demands with drugs and violence and took all of
the money they received.
The Woodbury Police Department conducted an undercover investigation of Taylor
in early 2016. With the information acquired in that investigation, they obtained a warrant
to search Taylor, his residence, and the vehicle he was driving for evidence of his suspected
sex trafficking and prostitution, including “[c]ellular pho nes and storage media. ” Police
recovered six cell phones, including one that was on Taylor’s person (Taylor’s phone).
Police examined all six cell phones and determined that Taylor’s phone was associated

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with the phone number that appeared in Backpage ad vertisements for F.B. and E.C. and
with the email address that was used to post advertisements for all three women. Also on
Taylor’s phone, police found numerous messages and emails indicating that he created,
posted, and maintained advertisements related to the women, and negotiated the
arrangements for men to have sex with them.
Taylor was charged with first -degree promoting prostitution (G.J.); two counts of
second-degree sex trafficking (E.C. and F.B.); and conspiring with Moran to commit
second-degree sex trafficking. He moved to suppress the contents of his phone, arguing
that “[p]olice searched [ his phone] and text messages without a search warrant.” He
asserted that police should have obtained a second warrant specifically authorizing the
search of the phone’s contents and that the search warrant was insufficiently particular with
respect to any search of his phone. The district court denied the motion. Taylor thereafter
waived his right to a jury trial. The district court found him guilty as charged and sentenced
him to 240 months’ imprisonment. Taylor appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by denying Taylor’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the examination of his phone’s contents.

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
[appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster , 752
N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches . . . shall n ot be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV . Warrantless
searches are generally unreasonable. State v. Molnau, 904 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2017)
(citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)). Even with a warrant, police are
not permitted to engage in “general or exploratory searches.” State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d
380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). A search pursuant to a warrant must be limited
to the scope of the warrant, Molnau, 904 N.W.2d at 452 (citing Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 140, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2310 (1990)), which itself must “particularly describe[] the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Taylor contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to supp ress the
evidence obtained from his phone because the warrant authorize s only the seizure of his
phone, not the examination of its contents,1 and the warrant is insufficiently particular. We
address each argument in turn.
We first consider whether the search warrant encompasses an examination of the
contents of Taylor’s phone. The scope of a search warrant is dictated by its terms. Horton,
496 U.S. at 140, 110 S. Ct. at 2310. The test for determining whether a search has exceeded
the scope of the warrant is one of reasonableness , considering the totality of the

1 The state argues that Taylor did not preserve this argument. We disagree. The record
confirms that Taylor raised various suppression arguments, including that a second warrant
was required to access the contents of his phone , a nd t he district court ruled on that
argument.

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circumstances, including the context provided by the warrant application. Molnau, 904
N.W.2d at 452-53.
“A warrant generally authorizes police to search all containers they reasonably
believe could contain the items sought.” Id. at 452. A cell phone, like a computer, contains
data. See State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Minn. App. 2013) (describing a
computer hard drive as “effectively a ‘container’ of [the sought] data”), review den ied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013) . But a cell phone is not a “container” for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. In rejecting such a characterization, t he Riley Court
emphasized that a cell phone is unlike physical containers , such as a person’s pockets or
wallet, because it both contains and affords access to extensive and personal information.
Id. at 2489-91; see also State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 216 (Minn. App. 2012) (noting
that cell phones are capable of “the creation and storage of private data that the owner does
not intend for others to view”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012). Consequently, even
when police are authorized to seize a person’s cell phone, the owner continues to have a
reasonable expectati on of privacy in the contents of the phone—and police must get a
warrant to access those contents. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488, 2494-95.
The police had such a warrant here. It authorized the seizure of “[c]ellular phones
and storage media.” The phrase “and storage media” distinguishes the physical cell phone
from its digital contents; by its terms the warrant authorizes police to seize both. We are
persuaded that the only reasonable interpretation of what it means to “seize” a cell phone’s
digital content s is to access them. The detailed warrant application confirms this
interpretation. See Molnau, 904 N.W.2d at 452. It avers that police had probable cause to

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believe that Taylor’s phone contained evidence of sex trafficking and prostitution,
including photos, text messages, and connections to the Backpage advertisements, 2 and it
states that police intended to “retrieve[] and record[] the electronic data” from the cell
phones. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the search warrant
authorized police to seize Taylor’s phone and to seize the storage media it contained by
retrieving those digital contents and examining them for evidence of sex trafficking and
prostitution.
We turn next to Taylor’s two particularity challenges. A warrant must “particularly
describe[] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. This requirement is designed to prevent general or exploratory searches by
“limiting the authorization to search to the specif ic areas and things for which there is
probable cause to search.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1016
(1987). The warrant must leave “nothing . . . to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.” State v. Miller , 666 N. W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). A
search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement
is unconstitutional. Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 557 -58, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1289 -90
(2004). When determining whether a clause in a search warrant is sufficiently particular ,
a court must consider “ the circumstances of the case ” and “the nature of the crime under
investigation and whether a more precise description is possible under the circumstances.”
Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387 (quotation omitted).

2 Taylor does not dispute that the warrant application established probable cause to believe
that his cell phone contained digital evidence of sex trafficking and prostitution.

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Taylor principally argues that the warrant is not sufficiently particular because it
refers to “cellular phones,” rather than identifying specific phones by phone number or
description. This argument is unavailing. Taylor cites no authority for the principle that a
warrant must direct police to a specific cell phone based on description or phone number ,
and we are not persuaded that doing so was required here. The warrant authorized police
to seize “cellular phones” on Taylor’s person, in his residence, and in his vehicle . This
description directed police to a specific set of objects, albeit of unknown number, located
in specific places; it left nothing to the discretion of the officer s executing the warrant .
Moreover, as the state points out, had the warrant described the phone to be searched by
reference to a particular phone number, permitting the seizure of only the phone attached
to that number, it would have authorized the seizure of the very phone whose incriminating
contents Taylor seeks to suppress.
Taylor also asserts that the warrant is insufficiently particular in describing the
contents of the phone to be searched. He contends that a warrant must specify the type of
data to be searched (such as call logs, text messages, and emails) or it impermissibly allows
police “to search the entirety of the phone without any limitations or expectations.” We
are not persuaded. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that such a level of
specificity is not always possible. See Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387 (requiring consideration
of “ whether a more precise description is possible under the circumstances” (quotation
omitted)). Contrary to Taylor’s argument, police had specific “expectations” in examining
the digital contents of his cell phone —they sought evidence of sex trafficking and
prostitution. A search for such evidence on a cell phone predictably encompasses the

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standard communication elements of the phone , including text messaging and call logs .
But it also encompasses a wide range of evidence specific to the offenses under
investigation, as the language of the warrant demonstrates. The warrant authorized police
to seize photos, social-media information, financial information, contact information, and
“lists linked to prostitution”; that police examined the contents of Taylor’s phone for such
evidence was not only reasonable but predictable. We conclude the warrant particularly
identified the cell phones to be seized and the digital evidence to be accessed from those
phones.
Finally, Taylor has not demonstrated that any error warrants reversal. A
constitutional error does not require reversal if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Minn. 2006) . When a district court erroneously
fails to suppress evidence, we consider the impact of the challenged evidence and do not
reverse if the “verdict is surely unattributable to the erroneously admitted evidence.”
Barajas, 817 N.W.2d at 220 (quotation omitted). That standard is met here. The evidence
obtained from Taylor’s phone corroborated F.B.’s and E.C.’s testimony about Taylor’s use
of Backpage advertisements and how he communicated with men who responded to those
advertisements. But that is not the only cor roborating evidence. F.B. and E.C. detailed
their experience being photographed for the advertisements, offered for prostitution , and
threatened and manipulated into performing sexual acts for money . Law enforcement
officers also described their months of undercover investigation, which otherwise
confirmed numerous details of Taylor’s operation, including the link between his phone
number and numerous Backpage prostitution advertisements. Because ample independent

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evidence supports the district c ourt’s findings of guilt, we conclude that they are surely
unattributable to the admission of evidence from his phone.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that Taylor
assaulted F.B.

We review a district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v.
Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
To warrant reversal, the appellant must demonstrate both abuse of discretion and resulting
prejudice. Id.
“Minnesota has long adhered to the common -law rule excluding evidence of prior
bad acts except where the evidence fits within a specific exception.” State v. Riddley, 776
N.W.2d 419, 424 (Minn. 2009) ; see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (prohibiting bad -acts
character evidence). One exception to this general rule is “ immediate-episode evidence.”
State v. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d 222, 239 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 881 N.W.2d
531 (Minn. 2016) . This exception permits the state to “ prove all relevant facts and
circumstances which tend to establish any of the elements of the offense with which the
accused is charged, even though such facts and circumstances may prove or tend to prove
that the defendant committed other crimes. ” Riddley, 776 N.W.2d at 425 ( quotation
omitted). To be admissible, the other crime need not prove an element of the charged
offense but must be linked to the charged offense in time and circumstances, “so that one
cannot be fully shown without proving the other,” or where evidence of the other crime
constitutes part of the events at issue. Id. (quotation omitted). This exception has permitted
evidence of drug possession in a prosecution for a drug-store robbery and of a kidnapping

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that motivated a charged murder. Id. at 426 -27 (collecting cases). And we r ecently
affirmed the admission of immediate -episode evidence that a defendant charged with sex
trafficking and promoting prostitution used violence and threats of violence to “coerce their
continued participatio n in the prostitution scheme.” Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d at
240.
The district court admitted such evidence here. F.B. testified that Taylor assaulted
her on March 16, 2016, after she asked him not to post her Backpage advertisement, argued
with him, and indicated that she wanted to leave. Taylor beat her and used scissors to cut
off her hair. He also struck her head against the corner of a window, drawing blood. F.B.
suffered a concussion, black eyes, and bruises. This episode is consistent with and
corroborates F.B.’s and E.C.’s testimony that Taylor beat them to keep them from leaving
and compel them to continue to engage in sex acts for his monetary benefit. Because the
assault was temporally and causally linked to the sex -trafficking of F.B. and the other
offenses with which Taylor was charged, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the evidence. Moreover, given the substantial unchallenged testimony from F.B.
and E.C. about Taylor’s use of violence, threats, and drugs t o coerce their continued
prostitution, we discern no harm from the admission of the assault evidence .3 Because

3 In a pro se supplemental brief, Taylor also argues th at G.J. was not credible, the district
court erred by failing to give itself an accomplice-liability instruction, and the evidence is
insufficient. We have carefully reviewed the record and applicable law and conclude
Taylor is not entitled to relief on any of these grounds.

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Taylor has not demonstrated abuse of discretion or prejudice, his evidentiary challenge
fails.
Affirmed.