In re the Estate of: Donald H. Richter, deceased Gerald Donald Richter, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0916

In re the Estate of: Donald H. Richter, deceased
Gerald Donald Richter,
Appellant,

vs.

Larry A. Richter,
Trustee of Donald H. Richter Revocable Living Trust
dated March 31, 2011 as amended, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed March 5, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File Nos. 56-PR-14-2259, 56-CV-15-2864

Gerald Donald Richter, Wadena, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Robert G. Manly, Andrew D. Smith, Vo gel Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
After a bench trial, appellant Gerald Richter challenges the district court’s
determination that there was no constructive trust that would entitle him to the Richter

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Farm and that decedent’s estate was not unjustly enriched. Appellant also raises a number
of fact issues and arguments not raised at th e district court or not properly raised before
this court. Because the district court did not err by declining to construe a constructive
trust in favor of appellant, we affirm.
FACTS
Donald H. Richter (decedent) owned a da iry farm in Otter Tail County (Richter
Farm). He had nine children. Beginni ng in 1978, decedent’s son Gerald Richter
(appellant) began performing work at the Richter Farm in exchange for a percentage of the
farm’s milk revenue. Appellant lived in the Richter Farm’s farmhouse until 1980 or 1981,
when appellant installed a prefabricated home for himself on the property at decedent’s
request. In 1983, appellant’s brother Leon Richter joined him on the farm performing
milking and other chores. Over the years, as he participated more in local politics and his
religious organization, decedent spent less time on day-to-day farm activities. Because of
this, decedent, appellant, a nd Leon Richter agreed to have appellant a nd Leon Richter
receive a larger portion of the milk revenue, as well as two calves each year and the calves’
future offspring. By 1988, appellant and Leon Richter each receiv ed 15% of the milk
revenue. In 1998, Leon sold the 52 head of cattle he had accumulated under their
arrangement and left the fa rm. Appellant remained working on the farm with his
accumulated herd and decedent’s remaining milk cows.
In 1999, appellant considered purchasi ng a nearby farm. Appellant’s brother,
Randall Richter, and decedent acco mpanied appellant to inspect it. On their return trip,
decedent dissuaded appellant from purchasing the farm, instead offering to sell the Richter

3
Farm to appellant. Under his offer, decedent would continue to receive 70% of the milk
revenue, but would apply any remaining re venue after expenses toward appellant’s
purchase of the farm. Appellant agreed to pay more of the farm expenses from his 30%
share of milk revenue to purchase the farm ev en sooner. The market value of the Richter
Farm at the time was $220,000. The parties did not determin e how long it would take to
pay for the farm under this arrangement. Between 2004 and 2014, appellant asked
decedent for an accounting of expenses paid so he could determine how much he still owed
for the Richter Farm. Decedent did not provi de an accounting to appellant. In fact,
between 1999 and 2013, appellant paid approximately $647, 688 (36.4%) of the Richter
Farm’s expenses and decedent paid $1,1 31,789 (63.6%), whic h was substantially
consistent with their agreement.1
In February 2010, decedent purchased two annuities and listed each of his nine
children as beneficiaries. For both annuitie s, appellant was given a 0% share with the
notation “farm land” writte n next to it. The district c ourt found this confirmed that
decedent intended to sell the farm to appellant.
On March 31, 2011, decedent executed a living trust that gr anted appellant the
Richter Farm upon decedent’s death. In the sp ring of 2013, decedent approached Randall
Richter, his son, and asked him to persuade appellant to purchase seed and begin planting
that season’s corn crop. Randall Richter asked decedent to give the Richter Farm’s
financials to appellant or to immediately convey the Richter Farm to appellant. Decedent

1 These figures were calculated considering operating expenses paid and depreciation on
capital contributed to the farming operation.

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replied that appellant would receive the Richter Farm upon his death. Appellant then told
decedent that he would not pl ant the corn crop, because d ecedent would not provide the
Richter Farm’s financials or convey the pr operty to him. Decedent described the
interaction with appellant as explosive. On August 8, 2013, decedent executed an
amendment to the living trust, which divided the Richter Farm equally between his nine
children and provided that appellant would receive one acre of land, all farming equipment,
and all animals. Decedent told his son Larry Richter that he amended the trust because he
was upset with appellant over their disagreement about planting the corn crop.
In January 2014, decedent died. Larry Richter became trustee of the living trust and
informed his siblings that decedent wished to divide the Richter Farm equally between
them. Despite this, appellant continued to use the farm as a dairy farm between 2014 and
2016. Since March 2014, appellant has received 100% of the farm’s milk revenue but has
not made any tax or utility payments. Instead, the trust made tax and utility payments
totaling $28,135.41.
In September 2014, appellant filed a probate action and a separate action in district
court claiming express contract, implied contract, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment.
Appellant later withdrew his claims for express and implied contract, and respondents filed
a counterclaim for money damages. Appella nt’s probate and cont ract actions were
consolidated for trial. Followi ng a bench trial, the district court made extensive findings
of fact and conclusions of law and determined that the estate was not unjustly enriched and
that appellant was not entitled to a construc tive trust conveying hi m the entire Richter

5
Farm. The district court awarded respondent s $28,135.41 for expe nses related to the
Richter Farm between 2014 and 2016.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by declin ing to construe a constructive trust in
appellant’s favor and finding that decedent’s estate was not unjustly enriched.

The existence of a constructive trust is a question of fact fo r the trial court.
Freundschuh v. Freundschuh , 559 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 24, 1997). A constructive trust is an equitable remedy designed to prevent a
party from benefiting from unjust enrichment. Id. “A constructive trust may be imposed
where [appellant] shows the existence of a fi duciary relation and the abuse by [decedent]
of confidence and trust bestowed under it to [appellant’s] harm.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Unjust enrichment occurs where one party knowingly receives something of value to which
they are not entitled, and the circumstances suggest it would be unjust for the person to
retain that benefit. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 2001).
It is not enough to show that one party be nefited from the efforts of another, the benefit
must be unjust in the sense that it is illegal or morally wrong. Id. Recovery under unjust
enrichment is an equitable remedy. Southtown Plumbing, Inc. v. Har-Ned Lumber Co.,
Inc., 493 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn. App. 1992).
“In an appeal from a bench trial, we do not reconcile conflicting evidence.” Porch
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied
(Minn. June 26, 2002). “We give the distri ct court’s factual findings great deference and

6
do not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” Id. “However, we are not bound by and
need not give deference to the district court’s decision on a purely legal issue.” Id. “When
reviewing mixed questions of la w and fact, we correct erroneous applications of law, but
accord the [district] court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and review such
conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. (alteration in original).
A. Rental Valuation and Purchase Price Calculation
Appellant argues that the district court e rred in its calculation of the money paid by
appellant toward the purchase price of the Ri chter Farm. The district court determined
that, in 1999, decedent agreed to sell the Richter Farm to appellant and that decedent would
apply his share of the milk revenue after expenses to the purchase price. The parties agreed
that the Richter Farm’s 1999 purchase pric e was $220,000. In determining whether
decedent’s actions were morally intolerable such that he might have been unjustly enriched,
the court sought to determine if appellant ha d ever fully paid the purchase price of the
Richter Farm using the combined milk reve nue. That is, it sought to define whether
“[appellant] gave so much purchase money to [decedent] above fair market terms that
[appellant] is entitled to receive the entire Richter Farm even absent a written agreement.”
The district court observed that a father’s de cision to let his son use farmland rent-free to
generate income to be used to purchase the farm constitutes a gift, and gifts are not binding.
The district court chose to apply a fair market rent to the farm and subtracted that from the
net milk revenue. The court reasoned that, though decedent allowed appellant to use the
farm without paying rent, the fair market valu e of the rent should be considered, because
appellant used decedent’s own assets “to generate the revenue he now wishes to use toward

7
[the Richter Farm].” The district court calculated how much money had been attributed to
the purchase price using revenu e between 1999 (the date th e agreement was formed) and
2013 (the date the trust was amended, which showed a clear intent to deprive appellant of
full ownership of the Richter Farm).
The district court determin ed that the fair rental va lue of the farmland was $6,630
per year. This finding was based on appellant’s testimony regarding the actual rent paid to
adjacent landowners for similar land under similar use. The fair rental value of the farm’s
buildings was deemed to be $24,000 per year, which was based on respondents’ witness’s
uncontroverted testimony regard ing United States Department of Agriculture data. The
total fair rental value of th e farm, then, was $30,630 per year. Between 1999 and the
amendment of the trust in 2013, appellant benefited from approximately $444,135 in total
forgiven rental costs. This figure does not include any accrued interest.
The district court then cal culated that decedent’s net income in excess of $444,135
was $90,507, which falls short of the agreed-upon purchase price of $220,000. The district
court noted that this figure would be further reduced by the fair rental value of decedent’s
livestock used by appellant in milk production. The district court’s analysis is based on
facts in the record and we see no error of law. See Porch, 642 N.W.2d at 477.
B. Rent Values Not Clearly Erroneous
Appellant argues that the rent values used by the district court are clearly erroneous
because the district court effectively applie d 2014 rents to past years (1999-2013).
Appellant did not submit evidence rebutting the determination of rents and the district court

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even relied on appellant’s own evidence in construing the rent values, at least for the land.
The district court’s determination of rent value was not clearly erroneous. Id.
C. Application of Appellant’s Share of Annuity to Purchase Price
Appellant argues that a proportional share of the annuities should have been applied
to the purchase price of the farm, since decedent excluded appellant from the annuity
contracts under the assumption that appellant would receive the farm. Though there was
evidence that decedent might have envisioned that appellant was to receive the farm in lieu
of benefiting from the annuity payments, decedent also amended that will to divest
appellant of the Richter Farm. Appellant and decedent’s agreement regarding the purchase
of the Richter Farm did not include any prom ise regarding the annuity or attributing its
proceeds to the purchase. Because its decision not to include the annuities in its equitable
determination was based on reasonable evidence in the record, the district court did not err.
Id.
D. Soybean Proceeds to Pay Principal
Appellant argues the district court erred in calculating how mu ch of the farm’s
proceeds went toward paying the principal between 1993 and 2013. Specifically, appellant
argues that the district court included the expenses for raising the soybean crop, but did not
include revenue generated by the soybean cr op. Appellant’s te stimony described how
appellant and decedent agreed that all of decedent’s milk revenue after expenses would be
applied to the purchase price of the Richter Farm. There was no testimony about allocating
expenses and revenue for the soybean crops. Because the agreement did not specify what
expenses were to be included, the district court interpreted this to mean it included all farm

9
expenses. Because the district court’s find ing was based on reasona ble evidence in the
record, its finding was not clearly erroneous. Id.
E. Farm Expenses Reduced Milk Revenue to Be Applied to Purchase Price
Appellant argues that farm expenses between 1993 and 2013 should not have
reduced the amount of milk revenue applied to the purchase price of the farm. Appellant
also argues that he only agreed to share in some of the expe nses in order to purchase the
farm sooner. The farm’s expenses had to be paid in any case. Whether they were paid by
appellant or decedent still reduced the total of the milk re venue by the same amount, and
the amount applied to the purchase price would remain the same. The district court did not
err when it calculated the amount to be applied to the purchase price.
F. Capital Contributions
Appellant argues that his capital contri butions to the farm were erroneously
excluded from the district court’s equity de termination. Appellant claims the home he
purchased and installed, the machine sheds he constructed, and the upkeep of the property
he performed should have been included in the calculation of unjust enrichment. Appellant
did not provide evidence about how these improvements impacted the value of the Richter
Farm or whether the improvements even remain on the farm. Because appellant did not
submit evidence to support these figures, the district court’s decision to exclude them from
its order is not erroneous. Id.
G. Associated Milk Producers Incorporated Equity Account
Appellant argues that an Associated M ilk Producers Incorporated (AMPI) equity
account (totaling $10,965), which generated its value from milk revenue, should have been

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attributed to the purchase pr ice. The district court note d that the exhibit submitted to
support this argument included only a year’s worth of accoun ting. The exhibit did not
show that the equity account ha d accrued its entire value during the relevant time period,
and, therefore, the district court could not rule with certainty that it should be wholly
attributed to the purchase price. Because the district court base d its determination on
reasonable evidence in the record, excluding the AMPI equ ity balance from the purchase
price was not clearly erroneous.
H. Appellant’s Labor
Appellant argues that decedent was unj ustly enriched by appellant’s labor.
Appellant argues that, if, as the court found, he received $927,667 in milk revenue minus
$647,688 in expenses, he would have received only $279,979 in net income over 15 years.
This equates to $18,665 per yea r, which appellant claims is an amount so low as to show
he has been morally wronged. Taken as true, this income is very low for a person working
full time on a farm. Nevertheless, it is not this court’s role to reweigh evidence that was
considered by the district court. In re Estate of Riggle, 654 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. App.
2002). The district court’s weighing of equities is supported by reasonable evidence in the
record and does not misapply the law. The district court’s decision is not clearly erroneous
or an abuse of discretion. We affirm the district court’s decision finding no unjust
enrichment and that there was no constructive trust.

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II. The factual findings a re not clearly erroneous.

Number and Value of Cattle

Appellant argues that the district cour t erroneously determined the number and
value of the cattle obtained th rough his arrangement with d ecedent. This court reviews
findings of fact for clear error. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. If there is reasonable evidence in
the record to support the court’s findings, there is no error. See Rasmussen v. Two Harbors
Fish Co. , 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Mi nn. 2013). We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict. Id. The district court determined that appellant had around 52
cattle and decedent had around 30 cattle. The di strict court reached this conclusion from
appellant’s own testimony. Because the district court based this conclusion on reasonable
evidence in the record, the decision was not clearly erroneous. Id.
III. Appellant failed to properl y brief issues on appeal.
Appellant raises a number of issues withou t providing adequate analysis or citation
to the record. Although appella nt is a pro se litigant, this court generally holds pro se
litigants to the same standard as attorneys, see Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001), and arguments unsupported by authorities or argument are “not []
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection,” Schoepke v.
Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971).
Even so, we will address these issues.
A. Discovery Requests
Appellant alleges that the district cour t improperly refused to compel respondents
to comply with discovery requests made on Febr uary 1, 2016. Appellant did not have an

12
attorney during portions of the discovery process. Following appellant’s filing of the action
in September 2014, discovery was to conclude by January 8, 2016, and trial was scheduled
to start on February 16, 2016. Complicating matters, appellant’s attorney withdrew from
representation on December 31, 2015. Appellant does not provide citations to caselaw or
the record showing how respondents improper ly obstructed the discovery process, or on
what grounds the district court should have compelled discovery. We note that over a year
had passed between appellant’s complaint and th e end of discovery, and that appellant’s
discovery request was made after the date discovery was to be completed. We see no basis
for appellant’s appeal regarding discovery.
B. District Court Malice and Trial Transcript Inaccuracy
Appellant claims the transcript does not accurately reflect what happened at the
court trial and argues that the district court treated him with malice. Appellant does not
offer evidence to support thes e claims, and, therefore, we are unable to review his
accusations. We do note, however, that our review of the district court records shows that
the district court treated appellant respectfully.
C. 2014 Milk Revenue
Appellant argues that the district court’s finding that appellant claimed 100% of the
Richter Farm’s milk revenue during 2014 was clearly errone ous. Appellant also argues
that the district court erred by failing to impose sanctions against respondents, arguing that
respondents knew their pleading to be false when they claimed that appellant received
100% of the milk revenue for 2014. Appellant is relitigating an issue resolved in his favor
by his motion for amended findings. There, th e court determined that appellant did not

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receive 100% of the milk revenue for 2014, instead finding that the estate collected revenue
during the months of January through March. Appellant provides no rationale why this
court should reconsider this issue or how respondents knew their pleadings to be false.
D. Cross-Examination of Larry Richter
Appellant argues that the district cour t erred by refusing to allow him to cross-
examine Larry Richter at the January 3, 2017 hearing on the motion to amend findings.
Appellant was not denied the opportunity to cross-examine Larry Richter at the hearing—
Larry Richter never testified. In fact, the di strict court seemed to indicate that it was
bending the rules in favor of equity by allowi ng appellant to testify at the hearing in the
first place. Appellant claims he has a due- process right to confront an accuser, but
appellant is not on trial, nor is Larry Richter an accuser.
E. Utility Payments
Appellant argues the electric utility pa yments were erroneously added to the
expenses incurred by decedent between 1993 a nd 2013. Appellant cl aims he paid those
utility payments, and that they should not have been deducted from the money that was to
go toward the purchase price of the Richter Fa rm. Appellant does not cite to evidence in
the record to support this claim. Therefore, we cannot review this claim.
F. The 70% Agreement
Appellant argues the district court erred by stating that appellant and decedent had
an agreement whereby decedent would receive 70% of the milk revenue and cover 70% of
the expenses. Appellant cites the alleged fact that decedent had no capital interest in the
farm equipment as proof for his argument. Appellant cites his own testimony as proof the

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farming equipment was improperly appropriated to the trust by decedent. Appellant does
not argue how this evidence shows how the parties did not have an agreement to share the
revenue and expenses at 70% and 30%. Therefore, we cannot review this claim.
G. Docketing of Judgment
Appellant argues that opposing counsel acted improperly by docketing a judgment
three days after a hearing, apparently directed by ex parte instruction of the district court.
Appellant provides record of a judgment en tered on October 21, 2016, that was docketed
on January 6, 2017, and provides no further evidence or analysis of his claim. We cannot
review this claim.
H. Appellant’s Attorney
Appellant argues that his attorney did no t present arguments to the court to his
satisfaction, and that the only reason he used an attorney in the first place was because the
district court judge earlier said that his request for a continuance would not be “considered
seriously” if he was not represented by counse l. Appellant offers no legal authority to
support this assertion and does not specify wh at relief he is seeking. We cannot review
this claim.
I. District Court Consideration of A ppellant’s Late Response to Posttrial
Motion

Appellant argues that the district court claimed it would consider his late motion
response and later reneged on its promise. Though appellant’s response to respondents’
motion to amend the judgment was not timely, the district court did consider appellant’s

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response in crafting its order, contrary to appe llant’s claims. Appellant does not specify
what relief he is seeking by making this argument and we cannot review it.
J. Requiring Appellant to Pay Rich ter Farm Expenses Between 2014 and
2016

Appellant argues the district court erred by requiring him to pay the Richter Farm’s
expenses between 2014 and 2016. Appellant operated the Richter Farm for the years
following decedent’s death, an d kept 100% of the milk re venue from Marc h 2014 until
trial. The district court declined to require appellant to pay rent to decedent’s estate, since
he had a rent-free agreement with the estate. The district court then explained that appellant
could not expect the estate to pay for the utility bills while he was reaping the sole benefit
from the farm. Appellant does not identify evidence in the record explaining why he should
profit from the Richter Farm while not paying its operating costs.
Because these issues are not supported by either authorities or evidence, and error
is not obvious on mere inspection of the record, we decline to address them. Id.
IV. Appellant raises issues no t properly preserved for appeal.

On appeal, appellant raises a number of argum ents not presented to the district court.
Appellant initially filed separate probate and c ontract actions in the district court. The
actions were consolidated, but, at trial, appellant only presented the issues of constructive
trust and unjust enrichment. Appellant’s probate argument s were not presented to the
district court, and issues surrounding the ad ministration of the trust were not argued.
Appellant claims that he requested that certain issues be presented, but that his attorney did
not present them at trial. Even so, this court will not consider issues that were not raised

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in the district court, because those issues are not properly preserved for appeal. See Oanes
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn. 2000). This is in part because addressing
an issue accompanied by an incomplete record often leads to distorted analysis. See
Schmuckler v. Creurer , 585 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 22, 1998).
We note that appellant raised a number of the following issues in his response to
respondents’ motion to amend the judgment a nd findings. We are cognizant of the fact
that appellant’s attorney withdrew from re presentation following trial, and appellant
responded to respondents’ posttr ial motions pro se. Being without counsel, appellant
presented issues his former atto rneys declined to argu e before the district court. In fact,
many of the issues raised in his response were raised for the first time. Generally, a party
may not raise an issue for the fi rst time in a posttrial motion. Kitchar v. Kitchar , 553
N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. App. 1996) (providing an exception where a party who learns of a
new underlying fact during trial may preserve the issue for appeal by raising it in a posttrial
motion), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). Accordingly, the following issues were not
properly preserved for appeal.
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred when it declined to construe
decedent’s annuity contracts as satisfying the Statute of Frauds for the purpose of creating
a contract between appellant and decedent. Th is argument is offered to show an express
or implied contract, but appellant withdrew both of those claims before trial.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by refusing to award the value of
decedent’s machinery to appellant, which was contrary to the trust documents. This

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argument relates to appellant’s probate clai ms, which were not properly preserved for
appeal. Appellant did not raise his probate issues at trial, even though he had an
opportunity to do so.2
Appellant argues the district court erred by refusing to adjudicate the value of the
precious metals kept in decedent’s safe or to order discovery on the issue. Appellant claims
this is relevant because of his share of dece dent’s estate. Appellant also argues that the
district court erred by refusing to grant him the farm equipment and plot of land promised
to him in the amended trust. These arguments relate to appellant’s probate case. Appellant
did not raise any of his probate issues at trial, and they are not preserved for appeal.
Because these issues were not raised be low, we will not consider them now. See
Oanes, 617 N.W.2d at 403 (holding that issues not raised below ar e not considered on
appeal).
Affirmed.

2 The parties waived opening st atements in lieu of posttrial motions and proposed orders.
Appellant referenced the pour-over will in his posttrial motion, but only to the extent that
it protected appellant from rent or reimbursement claims by respondents and that appellant
was entitled to further milk revenue. He did not claim he was entitled to residue of the
estate under the pour-over will.