In re the Marriage of: Sandra Kay Vogt, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0917

In re the Marriage of: Sandra Kay Vogt, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Gary Dennis Vogt,
Appellant.

Filed April 23, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-FA-14-9359

Timothy W. Billion, Robins Kaplan, L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lateesa T. Ward, Ward & Ward, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appellant-husband challenges the district court’s
(1) awards of temporary and permanent sp ousal maintenance to respondent-wife;
(2) division of martial debts and property; (3) refusal to award husband conduct-based
attorney fees; and (4) impartiality. We affirm.
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FACTS
In 1970, appellant-husband Gary Dennis Vogt married respondent-wife Sandra Kay
Vogt. The parties separated on October 15, 2014, at which time wife moved out of the
home. Ten days later, husband allegedly drov e alongside wife’s vehi cle and shot her in
the head and back. Wife su rvived. Husband was arrested and charged with attempted
murder.1 Wife filed for divorce on October 30, 2014, seeking a division of the parties’
property and debts, as well as maintenance and attorney fees.
Both parties are retired. Husband re ceives roughly $2,200 per month from a
pension, and wife receives $1 ,373.50 per month in Social S ecurity benefits. The parties
acquired a number of assets during their 44 years of marriage, in cluding a homestead
valued at $260,000. The homestead was used as collateral to open a line of credit, which
was used to make purchases, pay living expenses, and make loans to the parties’ son. The
marital property included additional real prope rty, personal property, vehicles, retirement
accounts, and bank accounts. Husband had nonmarital assets, including heirloom watches
and a “Stryker Hip Replacement settlement” worth over $85,000.
In November 2014, after filing for di vorce, wife moved for temporary relief,
including temporary spousal maintenance. A hearing was held on November 17. Husband
failed to file any responsive pl eadings, but he appeared at the hearing. After the hearing,
but before any order had been issued, husband moved for further consideration of the
temporary-relief issues. In January 2015, the district court awarded wife $2,250 per month

1 Husband was incarcerated wh en the dissolution action was commenced. He was found
incompetent to stand trial in the criminal matter and was civilly committed.
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in temporary spousal maintenance under Mi nn. Stat. § 518.131 (2014), but the court
scheduled the matter for a hearing to determ ine whether the temporary relief should be
modified. In April 2015, the district cour t amended husband’s maintenance obligation,
reducing it to $1,431.30. The amended temporary maintenance obligation was made
retroactive to November 6, 2014.
A trial was held over the course of se veral days between Ma rch 21 and June 24,
2016. Cross-examination of wife was conten tious. On the second day of trial, wife
suffered a medical emergency and was taken to a hospital by ambulance. In October 2016,
the district court entered a judgment dissolvin g the parties’ marriage. Wife was awarded
$1,431.30 per month in permanent spousal maintenance, as well as conduct-based attorney
fees. The marital assets were split equally. Husband received marital and nonmarital assets
totaling $273,204.13, and wife received $212,386.03.
In December 2016, husband moved for am ended findings or a new trial. He
requested that the district court eliminat e or reduce the spousal-maintenance award,
eliminate the award of attorney fees to wife, award him atto rney fees, reallocate the line-
of-credit debt, and direct wife to produce certain marital and nonmarital property. The
district court largely denied husband’s motion, except the court clarified some findings and
retracted its previous award of conduct-based attorney fees to wife. Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Husband raises four primary arguments. He challenges the district court’s awards
of temporary and permanent spousal maintenanc e. He asserts that the property and debt
division, particularly the division of the pa rties’ line-of-credit de bt, was inequitable and
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unsupported by the record. He argues that he is entitled to attorney fees, and he challenges
the district court’s impartiality. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding wife temporary and
permanent spousal maintenance.

Husband first challenges the district court’s temporary and permanent spousal-
maintenance awards. A district court has br oad discretion in decisions regarding spousal
maintenance, and we review such decisi ons for an abuse of that discretion. Erlandson v.
Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A di strict court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error, and legal issues rela ted to maintenance are reviewed de novo.
Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21,
2007). As a threshold matter, wife contends that husband forfeited any challenge to the
temporary award by failing to raise the issue in his posttrial motion. We disagree.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.131, a party may seek temporary maintenance pending final
disposition in a dissolution proceeding. Such temporary orders cease upon entry of a final
decree. Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5. These temporary orders are not appealable. Korf
v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d 706, 709 n. 1 (Minn. App. 1996); Hennepin County v. Griffin , 429
N.W.2d 283, 284 (Minn. App. 1988); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (listing
appealable orders and judgments). However, appellate courts may choose to review them
to the extent that they affect the rulings from which the appeal is taken. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.04. When a fina l dissolution decree is entered, all allowances of temporary
spousal maintenance under a prior order of th e district court become merged into the
judgment and are unenforceable, unless the judg ment makes provision for their payment.
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Richardson v. Richardson , 218 Minn. 42, 45, 15 N.W.2d 127, 129 (1944). Here, the
dissolution judgment included an award to wife of $1,431.30 for unpaid temporary spousal
maintenance. Husband has appealed not only th e district court’s posttrial order, but also
the dissolution judgment. We therefore conclude that the award of temporary maintenance
is reviewable to the extent that the dissolution judgment was affected by said award.
A. Temporary maintenance
Temporary-maintenance orders under section 518.131 are generally based solely on
affidavits and arguments of counsel. Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 8; see DonCarlos v.
DonCarlos, 535 N.W.2d 819, 821 (Minn. App. 1995 ) (stating that neither an evidentiary
hearing nor detailed findings are required for a temporary maintenance order under section
518.131), review denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 1995). Th e factors governing a temporary-
maintenance award under section 518.131 are contained in Mi nn. Stat. § 518.552 (2014).
Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 7. A district court may award spousal maintenance if it finds
that the party seeking maintenance either
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of
the spouse considering the sta ndard of living established
during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of
training or education, or
(b) is unable to provide adequate self-support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circum stances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropria te that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1. If a party lacks the ability to provide for himself or herself,
a district court may award spousal maintenance “in amounts and for periods of time, either
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temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and
after considering all relevant factors.” Id., subd. 2. In essence, the district court balances
the recipient’s needs against the obligor’s ability to pay. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698,
702 (Minn. App. 2001).
Husband asserts that the modified tem porary-maintenance award of $1,431.30 per
month was excessive. We disagree. In its order modifying the temporary-maintenance
amount, the district court found that wife ’s monthly income was $1,630 and monthly
expenses were $5,347. Evidence in the record supports these findings. This left wife with
a monthly shortfall of $3,717.
After the initial January 2015 temporary order, but before the amended temporary
order in April 2015, wife submitted a much more detailed mont hly expense summary
indicating monthly expenses of $4,353. In modifying the temporary-maintenance amount,
the district court effectively disregarded wife’s more detailed expense summary in favor of
her initial summary. Assuming, but not deciding, th at this constituted error, it was de
minimis. See Wibbens v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985) (declining to
remand for technical, de minimis error); see also Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 702 (“Because the
district court, as the factfinder, is charged with reconciling conflicting evidence, the fact
that the record might support findings other than those made by the district court does not
show that the court’s findings are defectiv e.” (quotation omitted)). Even under wife’s
revised expense summary, she still had a m onthly shortfall of $2,723. Moreover, in
modifying the temporary-maintenance amount, the district court significantly reduced
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husband’s monthly obligation from $2,250 per month to $1,431.30, effectively accounting
for a reduction in wife’s expenses.
The district court found that husband’s monthly pension income was approximately
$2,200. The court found that husband was in carcerated and failed to provide information
on his monthly living expenses. The record indicates that husband was, at that time, in jail.
However, after the initial January temporary order, but before the amended temporary
order in April, an affidavit was submitted by husband’s sister 2 stating that husband had
incurred $36,000 in legal fees 3 over the preceding two mont hs and that he had some
expenses in jail, including between $100 and $150 per month for telephone costs, as well
as other “incidentals.” Again assuming, but not deciding, that the district court erred in
finding that husband failed to provide inform ation on his monthly living expenses, such
error was de minimis. See Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d at 227. The district court, in finding that
husband was incarcerated, considered his ability to meet his own needs while meeting those
of wife. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(g). The court’s temporary order left husband
with sufficient funds to cover telephone calls and inci dentals. The court addressed
husband’s attorney expenses through other means. The district court, in its temporary order
of April 9, 2015, specifically allowed the parties to withdraw funds for attorney fees for
the dissolution and allowed husband to withdraw funds for his criminal defense, to be later
deducted from his share of the marital estate.

2 Husband’s sister was later appointed as his guardian ad litem.
3 The affidavit fails to provide a breakdown of husband’s incurred legal expenses, and it is
unclear whether the $36,000 was incurred for his criminal defense, the dissolution, or some
other matter.
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Given the parties’ incomes and expenses, we cannot conclude that the district court
abused its broad discretion by awarding wi fe $1,431.30 per month in temporary
maintenance. Further, given that the only am ount being reviewed he re is the past-due
obligation of $1,431.30 imposed in the decree, minimal errors in determining the parties’
monthly expenses are inconsequential. The divorce involved assets approaching a half-
million dollars. See Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark , 787 N.W.2d 690, 69 4 n.1 (Minn. App.
2010) (concluding that a $400 error in calcula tion by the district court was de minimis),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Husband argues that wife’s temporary- maintenance award constituted a windfall
because she had access to approximately $30,000 in marital assets to pay for her expenses.
However, wife, in an affidavit, gave an acc ounting of how nearly $25,000 of those assets
were expended between October 2014 and Febr uary 2015. The affidavit, at a minimum,
indicated that wife was running a monthly deficit and did no t have the ability to provide
for her reasonable needs. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1. The district court found that
wife was “solely responsible for payment of all monthly expenses and protecting the
marital estate,” and her reported monthly e xpenses did not include “medical expenses
resulting from injuries allegedly inflicted by [husband].” Husband’s argument that wife
received a windfall is unavailing. Husband also attacks the veracity of wife’s expense
summary. The district court found the summary to be credible. We will not second-guess
a district court’s credibility determination. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). The record supports the award of temporary maintenance.

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B. Permanent maintenance
Husband challenges the award of permanent spousal maintenance, arguing that the
award is excessive and that wife’s actual expe nses do not support the award. The district
court awarded wife $1,431.30 per month, based on findings that she receives $1,373.50 in
monthly income, her monthly expenses are $3,100, and her project ed future monthly
expenses are $3,144.11. Accordingly, wife has a projected monthly shortfall of $1,770.61.
The court noted that wife was 65 years old a nd “fully disabled.” The court found that
husband receives approximately $2,200 per month fro m a pension, and his expenses are
minimal because he is committed. The findings underlying the district court’s permanent-
maintenance award are supported by the record, and we cannot conclude that the district
court abused its broad discretion in making such an award.
Husband claims wife’s expenses are inflated and inconsistent. He points to wife’s
three submitted expense summaries: an October 2014 summary showing monthly expenses
of $3,155, a November 2014 summary showin g monthly expenses of $5,347.51, and a
February 2015 summary showing monthly expenses of $4,353.
At trial, wife submitted additional eviden ce to show her mont hly expenses. In
awarding permanent maintenance, the distri ct court relied on wife ’s revised expense
summary of February 2015, as well as the additional evidence and testimony received at
trial. For example, the district court found that wife had monthly medical expenses of $90,
rather than the $433 reported in February 2015. The district court’s expense findings are
supported by the record.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discre tion by equally dividing the parties’
line-of-credit debt, and the division of the parties’ marital property was not
based on clearly erroneous findings.

Husband next challenges the district court’ s division of the parties’ marital debts
and property. “District courts have broad discretion over th e division of marital property
and appellate courts will not alte r a district court’s property division absent a clear abuse
of discretion or an erroneous application of the law.” Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 898
(Minn. App. 2005). A division of marital debts is treated the same as a division of marital
assets. Justis v. Justis , 384 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn.
May 29, 1986). “To overcome the presumption that property [acquired during the parties’
marriage] is marital, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is nonmarital.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). “Appellate
courts will affirm the [district] court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in
fact and principle even though the appellate court might have taken a different approach.”
Sirek, 693 N.W.2d at 898 (quotation omitted). “We defer to the [district] court’s findings
of fact and will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Husband challenges the division of the part ies’ line-of-credit debt, the division of
an insurance payment for a damaged vehicle, and the division of marital diamonds and
nonmartial watches. We address each issue in turn.
A. Line-of-credit debt
Husband argues that the district court’s di vision of the parties’ line-of-credit debt
was inequitable and unsupported by the record. The line-of-credit debt, at the time of the
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decree, was approximately $134,993. The distri ct court divided the de bt equally, except
that wife was apportioned an additional $700 of debt.
Husband first asserts that, between 2009 and 2014, $54,604 of debt was incurred for
the benefit of third parties and against husband’s express directives. Essentially, he argues
that wife gave unauthorized gifts and/or lo ans to the parties’ son and daughter-in-law.
Husband cites Minn. Stat. § 519.05(a) (2016) fo r the proposition that the $54,000 in gifts
and loans is a nonmarital debt. Section 519.05(a) states that “[a] spouse is not liable to a
creditor for any debts of the other spouse.” But, the issue here is not one of debts owed to
a creditor, and Minn. Stat. § 519.05(a) is therefore inapplicable.
Husband also points to Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2016), which requires district
courts, when dividing marita l assets, to consider “the contribution of each in the
acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital
property.” The district cour t found that “both parties had access to and control over the
[line-of-credit] account,” and that husband fa iled to offer proof that wife dissipated or
wasted marital assets. These findings are sup ported by the record. The district court did
not abuse its broad discretion in dividing the line-of-credit debt equally.
Husband points to $22,776.73 that wife withdrew from the parties’ line of credit on
October 6, 2014, prior to the parties’ separation. He asserts that there is a recorded police
statement wherein wife stated that she decide d to take the funds because she was leaving
husband. Under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2016), a sp ouse contemplating divorce
may not dispose of marital property without the consent of the other spouse, except to pay
for normal living expenses or in the usual course of business. Husband had the burden of
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showing that wife disposed of the marital assets in contemplation of separation or divorce
and that the assets were not spent “in the usual course of business or for the necessities of
life.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, su bd. 1a. The district court sp ecifically accepted wife’s
accounting of how the withdrawal was spent a nd determined that all but $700 of the
withdrawal was used for living expenses and to pay marital debt. The district court found
wife’s accounting to be credible, and we will not second-guess a district court’s credibility
determination. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. Even in the recorded statement to police that
husband cites, wife states that she took the funds in order to make payments on the parties’
line-of-credit debt.
B. Insurance proceeds
Husband challenges the district court’s apportionment of an insurance payout. The
insurance payout was made to wife because her vehicle was damage d during the alleged
attempted murder. Wife received $13,688.25 and used the funds to pay outstanding debts,
with $9,401.04 of those debts being marital in nature, and $4,287.21 being nonmarital. The
district court determined that the insura nce payment was a mar ital asset and awarded
$8,987.73 to wife and $4,700.52 to husband. Essentially, the court considered the amount
that wife had spent on nonmarital debt as part of her property award. The district court did
not abuse its discretion.
Husband challenges wife’s cl aim that she used part of the insurance payout for
marital debt, namely, property taxes. Wife claimed that she spent $2,654.36 on property
taxes: $1,288.44 for the first-half property taxes for the homestead, and $1,365.92 for the
first-half property taxes for a hunting parcel. Husband argues that wife’s claim concerning
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the taxes is false and unsupported by the record. Th e record supports the district court’s
finding that wife used the insurance payout for taxes. Wife testified as much, and the
district court found the testimony to be credible. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210.
C. Diamonds and watches
Husband argues that he should be awarde d “at least $1,000” for diamonds and “a
reasonable amount” for watches, which wife failed to produce. The district court, in the
decree, effectively concluded that the diamon ds were marital prope rty and ordered that
they be auctioned. The co urt determined that the watches were husband’s nonmarital
property. Wife claims that the diamonds and watches could not be located.
Husband moved for a new trial or amende d findings and argued that wife did not
produce the diamonds for auction and did not re turn the nonmarital watches. The court
clarified the language in the decree by noting that if watches are located by wife, they shall
be returned to husband, and if the diamonds ar e located by wife, half of the value of the
diamonds shall be given to husband.
Husband fails to illuminate a defect in the decree or posttrial order. He argues that
he should have been awarded “half the monetary value of the parties’ diamonds.” He was
awarded half the value; the diamonds simply ha ve not been produced. He argues that he
should receive fair compen sation for the watches, but he was awarded the watches
themselves, they just have no t been produced. On the pecu liar facts in the record, we
discern no reversible error.

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III. We decline to address husband’s argument concerning attorney fees.

Husband next argues that he was entitled to conduct-based attorney fees because
wife made frivolous motions and false statemen ts. His argument is unsupported by legal
analysis or citation. We therefor e decline to address the issue. See Ganguli v. Univ. of
Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to address issues
unsupported by legal analysis or citation).
III. Husband’s claims of judici al bias are unavailing, an d his due-process rights
were not violated.

Finally, husband argues that the district court was biased. He asserts that the district
court was overly critical of him, overly sympathetic to wife, and consistently made rulings
in wife’s favor. Upon review, we find no evidence of judicial bias or violation of husband’s
right to due process.
In reviewing claims of judicial bias, we consider whether the district court
“considered arguments and motions made by bo th sides, ruled in favor of a complaining
[party] on any issue, and took ac tions to minimize prejudice.” Hannon v. State , 752
N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). We presume that judges approach cases with a neutral
and objective disposition. State v. Burrell , 743 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. 2008). We
consider the record as a whole when ad dressing claims of judicial bias. State v. Morgan,
296 N.W.2d 397, 404 (Minn. 1980).
The district court’s rulings are not indi cative of bias, and furthermore “[a]dverse
rulings by a judge, with out more, do not constitu te judicial bias.” State v. Sailee , 792
N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011) (quotation
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omitted). The district court divided the parties’ marital property equally and awarded
husband a significant amount of nonmarital property, resulting in his total property award
being greater than wife’s award. The district court denied wife’s request to place husband’s
nonmarital property into a constructive trust. The district court also amended the decree
and removed an award of attorney fees to wife. This is not indicative of bias.
The district court’s comments and actions during the proceedings also fail to show
bias. This was a contentious divorce, and husband was charged with attempting to murder
wife prior to the proceedings. On the second day of trial, there was a medical incident, and
wife was removed from the courtroom and ta ken to the hospital. Subsequently, wife
requested that she undergo cross-examination via written questions, but the district court
required that she be subjected to oral cross-examination. This evidences impartiality.
Husband argues that the district court re peatedly accused him and his counsel of
depleting marital funds. He points to an instance where the court was discussing the slow
pace of trial. Counsel for wife stated that the lengthy trial was depleting the marital estate,
and the court echoed this concern. This co mment does not demonstrate judicial bias.
Rather, the district court was voicing a legitim ate concern that had implications for both
parties. The record indicates that the parties were significantly depleting marital assets on
legal fees. Husband argues that the district court displayed bias by referring to wife as an
alleged victim of domestic violence who was be ing retraumatized at trial. However, the
court was simply addressing the quality of wife’s testimony and speaking in general terms.
Upon review, the totality of the circumstances do not indicate judicial bias.
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Husband asserts that his right to due process was violated because the court limited
wife’s deposition to a written-response format and limited his ability to cross-examine wife
during the trial. District cour ts have wide discretion regard ing discovery and, absent an
abuse of that discretion, a district court’s discovery decision will not be altered on appeal.
Shetka v. Kueppers, Kueppers, Von Feldt & Salmen, 454 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1990).
Husband fails to develop his argument or of fer any legal analysis on how the use of a
written-format deposition violates his right to due process. We therefore decline to address
this issue. See Ganguli, 512 N.W.2d at 919 n.1 (declining to address issues unsupported
by analysis or citation). As for cross-examination, husband’s due-process rights were not
violated. Due process requires that a heari ng be “fair, practicable, and reasonable.”
Saturnini v. Saturnini, 260 Minn. 494, 498, 110 N.W.2d 480, 483 (1961). The scope of
the hearing must be “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Boddie v. Connecticut , 401
U.S. 371, 378, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786 (1971). The district court, in an effort to limit the stress
to wife, requested that counsel for husba nd refrain from using exhaustive impeachment
efforts and simply offer the evidence inconsistent with wife’s testimony. Generally, a wide
range of inquiry should be allowed on cross-examination, but the manner and scope of that
examination rests largely with the discretion of the district court, and no reversible error
occurs unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion. Mattfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106,
126, 32 N.W.2d 291, 305 (194 8). Here, given the extent of the cross-examination that
husband was allowed to undertake, and the pr ior medical incident in the courtroom, the
district court’s effort to streamline the impeachment process was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.