State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0928

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Morgann Craighead Buie,
Appellant.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-9586

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Christiana M. Martenson, Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Thomas Aaron Wilson, Special Assistant Public Defender, Wilson Law Firm P.L.L.C., St.
Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Sc hellhas, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for second-degree controlled-
substance possession, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
drug evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 8, 2016, the state charged appellant Morgan Buie 1 with a second-degree
controlled-substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014), for
methamphetamine possession. Buie challenged the constitutionality of the police officer’s
expansion of the scope of the investigative stop and welfare check.
At a contested omnibus hearing, former South Lake Minnetonka Police Officer
Ryan Burke testified that, around 3:30 a.m., on April 7, 2016, he was patrolling in a squad
car when he responded to a report of an an onymous 911 call about two people “possibly
having sex” in a vehicle in front of a residence on Glencoe Road. Officer Burke had
previously been to that residence to help a woman in distress after a fight with her
boyfriend. A training officer once told Officer Burke that he had responded to calls at that
residence and that he believed that the residence involved some type of “meth drug use.”
On this occasion, Burke noticed that Glencoe Road was not well lit and was void of
traffic as he approached the residence. On arrival, he saw a light-tan SUV, with its
headlights off, parked in front of the residence, which was dark inside. The vehicle matched

1 The case heading incorrectly spells Buie’s first name as “Morgann” with two “N’s.” Buie
informed the district court that his first name only contains one “N.”

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dispatch’s description. Officer Burke then observed a man exit the vehicle on the driver’s
side and appear to want to le ave the scene. Officer Burke told the man that he was there
because of a call reporting suspicious activity , and he asked the man his name. The man
identified himself as Buie. Officer Burke asked who was with him, and Buie pointed to a
woman in the vehicle and said she was his girlfriend. The woman was lying down in the
passenger seat motionless, and appeared “passed out or sleeping.”
Buie gave short answers to Officer Burk e and appeared “fidge ty.” He informed
Officer Burke that he had recently purchased the vehicle and that it was not yet registered
in his name. Buie also said that he was vi siting a friend at the residence. Officer Burke
suspected Buie of engaging in lewd acts, prostitution, or human trafficking, and he wanted
to check on the well-being of the woman. Because the woman was still motionless, Officer
Burke checked on her welfare by asking, “Are you okay[?],” to which she replied, “Yeah,
I’m fine.” Officer Burke wrote in a report that the woman appeared slow and tired, but that
she “appeared to be okay.” Buie told Officer Burke that the woman’s name was K.K. After
the woman awoke, she said that her name wa s K.A.D. The difference in reported names
caused Officer Burke to become more suspicious about prostitution or human trafficking.
Buie explained to Burke that the woman went by K.K. on F acebook and in general, and
that she did not use her legal name.
Officer Burke testified about his traini ng and experience, which included how to
identify human-trafficking situations and prostitution. While working for Minneapolis Park
Police, he handled calls involving sexual conduct in vehicles. He was trained to separate
men and women in domestic disputes when asking for information because, he explained,

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often victims may be too fearful to be truthful in front of their abusers. Based on his
suspicion of human traffick ing or prostitution, Officer Burke employed the same
investigative technique that he uses in domes tic disputes, and told Bu ie to stay where he
was.
Officer Burke checked Buie’s name and license plates and called for backup so that
he could question Buie and K.A.D. alone. While he looked up the information in his squad
car, a man exited the residence and stated, “The y’re staying at my house. Everything is
fine.” Officer Burke asked the man to return to the house because he had not yet spoken
with K.A.D. and Buie alone. Wh en the second officer arrive d, Officer Burke approached
the passenger side of the vehicle to speak with K.A.D. and knocked on the window. K.A.D.
was again lying down and appeared to be tired . Burke shined his flashlight in the vehicle
and noticed a hypodermic needle on the floor board underneath a center console and the
front passenger seat.
The officers detained Buie and K.A.D. in different squad cars, and Officer Burke
called Hopkins Police for a K9 to sniff the perimeter of the vehicle due to his suspicion of
narcotics possession. When sniffing the perimeter of the vehicle, the narcotics K9 alerted
twice. Officers obtained a search warrant, sear ched the vehicle, and found a baggie that
contained 13 to 14 grams of methamphetamine.
The district court concluded that Offi cer Burke did not unlawfully expand the
investigative stop and denied Buie’s motion to suppress. Buie stipulated to the prosecutor’s

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case, and the district court found him guilty and sentenced him to a stayed 90-month prison
term.2
Buie now appeals the pretrial order denying his suppression motion.
D E C I S I O N
Buie does not challenge the legality of (1) Officer Burke’s initial investigative stop
and welfare check, (2) his observation of the hypodermic needle, or (3) the narcotics K9
sniff of the vehicle. He challenges the district court’s conclusion that Officer Burke had a
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the initial investigative stop and welfare check.
Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a mixed question of fact and constitutional
law. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing a district court’s
determination of the legality of an investigatory stop, this court reviews its findings of fact
for clear error and its conclusion on reasonable suspicion de novo. Id.
Both the United States and Minnesota Co nstitutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is generally unreasonable.” State
v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). One exception to the warrant requirement

2 Defense counsel in district court and on app eal cite Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3,
which allows a stipulated-facts trial when both the defense and the prosecution agree to
stipulate to a set of facts and a judge determines whether the defendant is guilty. See Dereje
v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Minn. 2013) (analyzing Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3).
But the parties made it clear to the district court that they were proceeding under State v.
Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980), and Buie’s pretrial counsel informed him that
the pretrial issue was dispositive. Buie preserved his right to appeal only the pretrial ruling.
Notwithstanding reference to the wrong rule, Bu ie stipulated to the prosecution’s case
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to preserve his right to appeal the pretrial order.

6
allows the police to conduct a “brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that cr iminal activity is afoot.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 486; Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on spec ific, articulable facts that allow the
officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the seized pers on of criminal activity.” State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502
(Minn. 2016) (quotations omitte d). “The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “A trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences on the basis of
all of the circumstances . . . inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person.” Id. (quotations omitted). A di strict court must assess the totality of the
circumstances of the stop. Id.
An investigative stop remain s valid when “each incremental intrusion during a stop
is strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop
permissible.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). An
investigative stop may become unlawful if it moves beyond a duration which is necessary
“to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” or beyond the scope of the stop and the
circumstances that rendered the initiati on of the investigation permissible. State v.
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S.
at 18, 88 S. Ct. at 1878 (“[A] search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolera ble intensity and scope.”). “An intrusion not
closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid . . . unless there

7
is independent probable cause or reasonablen ess to justify that pa rticular intrusion.”
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (citation omitted).
Appellate courts first determine whether an expansion of a stop beyond its original
justification occurred. Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 351. We agree with the district court that the
scope of the stop expanded when Officer Burke detained Buie in order to further investigate
whether Buie was engaged in human trafficking or prostituti on. We conclude that the
expansion of the initial scope of the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion. As
described by the district court, the totality of the circumstances included:
(1) [Officer Burke] was dispatched to the scene on a report of
two people engaging in sexual activity in an SUV matching the
description of the SUV that [Buie] was exiting, (2) it was
between the hours of 3:00 and 4: 00 in the morning, in a dark,
low-traffic residential neighbor hood, (3) a woman was either
sleeping or passed out in the passenger seat of the SUV,
(4) when asked, [Buie] provided a last name for the woman that
did not match her legal last name, and (5) the vehicle was
parking in front of a house known to Officer Burke as a
location where drug activity was suspected.

Additionally, the tan SUV was not registered to Buie, who appeared nervous and fidgety,
and Burke had previously been to the residence on a call involving a domestic dispute.
Buie argues that because Officer Burke’s initial susp icion of illegal activity was
“low,” his suspicion should ha ve been dispelled when he did not observe sexual activity.
We are not persuaded. Deferring to Officer Burke’s training and experience and his ability
to suspect circumstances that would elude an untrained eye, we conclude that he possessed
a reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of human trafficking or prostitution and
reasonably expanded the initial scope of the investigative stop to enable him to speak with

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K.A.D. outside of the presence of Buie. Ba sed on the totality of circumstances and his
training and experience, Officer Burke reas onably suspected the occurrence of human
trafficking or prostitution. Appe llate courts are “deferential to police officer training and
experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would
elude an untrained eye.” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 88–89 (Minn. 2000).
Buie asserts that each of the district c ourt’s factual findings was insufficient to find
a reasonable suspicion to justify an expansion of the stop’s scope. Even if each fact alone
does not provide reasonable suspicion, Buie ’s argument is unpersuasive. “‘[I]nnocent’
factors in their totality, combin ed with the investigating offi cer’s experience . . . can be
sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion.” State v. Martinson , 581 N.W.2d 846,
852 (Minn. 1998); accord United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 9–10, 109 S. Ct. 1581,
1587 (1989) (“ Terry itself involved ‘a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent’ if
viewed separately, ‘but which taken together warranted further investigation.’” (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880−81)); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441,
100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980) (“[T]here could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly
lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”).
In sum, Officer Burke had a reasonable suspicion that human trafficking or
prostitution was occurring and was justified in expanding the initial scope of the stop. The
district court therefore did not err by denying Buie’s suppression motion.
Affirmed.