State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0938

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Erik Walden Narveson,
Appellant.

Filed July 9, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Rodenberg, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-15-2238

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney , Jennifer D. Plante, Associate County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Erik Walden Na rveson appeals from his convictions of third-degree
assault, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and false im prisonment. We affirm the

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district court’s decision not to remove juror #4 for cause. We reverse appellant’s assault
conviction and remand for a new trial beca use the district court erroneously and
prejudicially declined appellant’s request for a jury instruction on self-defense. If the state
retries appellant for third-degree assault and he is convicted, the district court may sentence
appellant for the assault, which was not part of a single behavioral incident with the
criminal-sexual-conduct offense. Finally, we see no merit to appellant’s pro se arguments.
FACTS
Appellant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, third-degree
assault, and false imprisonment after a jury trial.
The State’s Witnesses’ Testimony
The state called seventeen witnesses. A ppellant and A.L. had been dating for two
years before April 3, 2015. The district court had issued a Domestic Assault No Contact
Order (DANCO) in March 2015, prohibiting appe llant from contacting A.L. On April 3,
2015, appellant returned to the house where he and A.L. had been living, in violation of
the DANCO.
A.L. testified that, on April 4, 2015, she awoke to appellant sexually assaulting her.
She testified that she fled to the kitchen and, fearful of appellant, she grabbed a knife. She
demanded that appellant collect his things and leave. Appellant then punched her in the
face, causing a blowout fracture near her left eye. A.L. testified that she tried to leave the
house, but appellant grabbed her hair and dragged her back through the house to the
bedroom. Appellant tied A.L.’s le ft wrist to his right wrist a nd her left ankle to his right
ankle. Appellant and A.L. remained tied together through the night. A.L. testified that she

3
woke up several times to “being raped” at knifepoint. The next day, when appellant wanted
to leave the house to run an errand, and fear ing that A.L. might escape or seek help,
appellant tied A.L. to a suppor t pole in the basement. Appella nt also stuffed a sock into
her mouth and tied it to her head with a rope. When he returned to the house, appellant
untied A.L. and said that he “felt bad about what happened.” A.L. then ran outside, waved
down a passing vehicle, and used the driver’s cell phone to call the police. She soon saw
appellant leave the house and ride down the st reet on his bicycle. Appellant was arrested
later.
Appellant’s Testimony
Appellant’s testimony about the incident di ffered from the state’s evidence. He
testified that he went to be d on April 4, 2015 and awoke to A.L. screaming and “having
one of her panic attacks.” He got out of bed, dressed, and started tying his shoes when he
heard A.L. “in the kitchen stabbing the wall.” He testified that A.L. returned to the
bedroom and held a “big kitchen knife” in his face. Appellant thought A.L. planned to stab
him, so he grabbed her right hand, in which she held the knife, and punched her in the face.
A.L. dropped the knife. Appellant agreed that he tied A.L.’s left a nkle to his right ankle
and her left wrist to his right wrist to preven t A.L. from leaving the house while he slept.
He also admitted that he tied A.L. to a pole in the basement so sh e could not leave the
house while he went on an errand. Appellant denied having sex with A.L. at any time after
he punched her. He denied th reatening A.L. with a knife, dragging her by her hair or
ankles, or choking her.

4
Expert Witnesses’ Testimony
A sexual-assault nurse examiner and an emergency-medicine physician testified
about the results of their examinations of A.L. They testified that A.L. had a bruised and
swollen left eye, a bruise on her neck, a linear mark below her navel, several linear marks
on her wrists and on the top of her feet, and that her hands were swollen and stiff. Vaginal
examination revealed “reddish abrasions at twelve o’clock and six o’clock on the cervix.”
A CT scan revealed two fractured facial bones. Appellant’s DNA was found in A.L.’s
vagina.
In April 2015, the state charged appellant with three counts of criminal sexual
conduct, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of third-degree assault. The jury
found appellant not guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but guilty of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct, third-degree assault, and false imprisonment. The district court
sentenced appellant to 180 months in prison on the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. It
sentenced appellant to separate 24-month executed sentences for both third-degree assault
and false imprisonment, concurrent with on e another, but consecutive to the 180-month
criminal-sexual-conduct senten ce. The district court dete rmined that the assault and
criminal sexual conduct were not part of a si ngle behavioral incident because they were
“broken up in time and behavior,” and it sent enced appellant accordingly. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant’s initial brief raised six issues: (1) his convictions must be reversed
because a biased juror was pe rmitted to serve on the jury; (2 ) his assault conviction must

5
be reversed because the court declined to instruct the jury on self-defense; (3) his sentence
for criminal sexual conduct must be reversed because the district court imposed an upward
durational departure without stating reasons for doing so; (4) his sentence for criminal
sexual conduct must be reversed due to inadmissible hearsay admitted at the Blakely
sentencing trial; (5) he should not have been sentenced for assault and false imprisonment
because both offenses were committed during the same behavioral incident as the criminal-
sexual-conduct offense; and (6) the district c ourt erred in not awarding jail credit against
his criminal-sexual-conduct sentence. On November 27, 2017, appellant’s counsel
submitted a letter to this cour t withdrawing issues (3), (4), and (6). Accordingly, we
address only issues (1), (2), and (5).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion
to remove juror #4 for cause.

Appellant argues that the district court seated a juror who expressed actual bias and
was not rehabilitated. This, he argues, is a stru ctural error requiring reversal of all of his
convictions. See State v. Logan, 535 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the error
is structural if a biased juror is allowed to sit in judgment of a criminal defendant).
Both the United States and Minnesota Consti tutions protect the right of a criminal
defendant to an impartial jury. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. 2001). A party
may seek to have a potential juror removed if his “state of mind—in reference to the case
or to either party—satisfies the court that the juror cannot try the case impartially and
without prejudice to the substa ntial rights of the challenging party.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.02, subd. 5(1). An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a district court’s

6
denial of a party’s challenge of a juror for cause. State v. Barlow, 541 N.W.2d 309, 312
(Minn. 1995).
We give great deference to the district court’s determination of a juror’s impartiality.
State v. Drieman, 457 N.W.2d 703, 708 -09 (Minn. 1990); State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d
204, 206 (Minn. 1985). In co nsidering a juror’s bias, the di strict court may consider the
potential juror’s demeanor, State v. Munt , 831 N.W.2d 569, 576 (Minn. 2013) (quoting
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.14, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2892 n.14 (1984)), hear the
juror’s testimony, and evaluate his ability to be impartial, Drieman, 457 N.W.2d at 708-
09. “The test of an impartial juror is not that he shall be completely ignorant of the facts
and issues when sworn, but that he can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” State v. Andrews, 282 Minn. 386, 394,
165 N.W.2d 528, 534 (1969) (quotation omitted). “The juror must simply undertake to try
the case fairly.” Graham, 371 N.W.2d at 206. If a juror indicates his “intention to set aside
any preconceived notions, and demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the trial judge that [he
is] able to do so, [an appellate court] will not lightly substitute its own judgment.” State v.
Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. 1982).
Whether a juror should be removed from a jury panel for cause because of bias
requires a two-step analysis. State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 623 (M inn. 2015). First,
we must determine whether the juror expressed actual bias. Id. In doing so, we review the
juror’s voir dire answers in context. Id. The party challenging a juror’s bias must establish
that the juror responded to questions in a way that demonstrated “strong and deep
impressions” that would prevent the juror from “lay[ing] aside [his] impression or opinion”

7
and “render[ing] a verdict based on the evidence presented in the court.” Munt, 831
N.W.2d at 577 (alteration in original); see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639,
1642 (1961) (requiring more than “the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the
guilt or innocence of an accused”). Second, a nd if a juror has expressed actual bias, we
must determine whether that juror was rehabilitated. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d at 623. A juror
is considered rehabilitated if he “states unequivocally that he or she will follow the district
court’s instructions and will set aside any pr econceived notions and fairly evaluate the
evidence.” State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2010 ). We defer to the district
court’s observation of the demeanor of a prospective juror. Graham, 371 N.W.2d at 206.
Here, juror #4 readily admitte d that he finds sex crimes very disturbing. His wife
and a friend of his were, in separate incidents, sexual-assault victims. Nevertheless, juror
#4 said that he thought he could be fair and impartial. The district court asked juror #4
about the experiences of his wife and his friend and whether those experiences would affect
his ability to consider the case. Juror #4 explained that “[i]t would be very hard” because
the subject of criminal sexual conduct makes him feel angry. The district court asked juror
#4 whether he could fairly view and consider the evidence in the case, and not base his
decision on “passion, prejudice, or sympathy.” Juror #4 replied, “I believe so.”
During voir dire, appellant’s trial counsel asked juror #4 additional questions about
his ability to serve as an impartial juror:
COUNSEL: . . . What we ask is that you set [your
experiences] aside so that they don’t interfere with your duties
as a juror on this case. Do you understand that?

JUROR #4: Yes.

8

. . . .

COUNSEL: . . . But you will try. . . . To set aside those
experiences and make a decision based on the evidence.

JUROR #4: I would try to the best of my ability.

COUNSEL: And not get angry and let your passions and
emotions take over and make a decision based on that.

JUROR #4: I believe so.

. . . .

COUNSEL: If you listen to the ev idence in this case and you
start thinking about your wife’s and your friend’s situation, do
you think that might interfere with your ability to focus on this
case?

JUROR #4: I don’t think so.

COUNSEL: The fact that no one was ever prosecuted in those
two cases that you have prior experience with, . . . would you
be more inclined to find my client guilty in order to make sure
that that doesn’t happen again?

JUROR #4: No, I don’t think that would happen.

In denying appellant’s motion to exclude juror #4 for cause, the district court
observed juror #4 to have been “quite pleasant,” “smiling,” and “friendly in his answers to
the Court and to counsel.” The district court explained that it believed that juror #4 would
not act upon his anger about his prior experien ces with sexual assault, and that he would
“perform his duties in a way that would be fair and impartial . . . . He provided an
understanding of the nature an d importance of the need to be impartial and a willingness
to try to do so.”

9
Appellant cites Logan, 535 N.W.2d 320, and Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, to support
his contention that juror #4 expressed actual bias and was not adequa tely rehabilitated.
Both cases are distinguishable.
In Logan, the supreme court concluded that th e trial court abused its discretion
because it denied defense couns el’s challenge for cause de spite the prospective juror
expressing that he would “give greater credence to the testimony of police officers than to
the testimony of other witnesses.” 535 N.W.2d at 324. During voir dire, the prospective
juror explained that he “would favor the testimony of police officers over the testimony of
other witnesses” and that his feeling that violent crime had increased would carry “some
weight with him in decidi ng the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 321. Although the prosecutor
asked the prospective juror a series of leading questions, to which the juror responded that
he would “try” to be fair and follow the inst ructions given by the trial court, the juror
reverted to his original sentiment that he would still “favor in some way” some testimony
over others. Id. at 324.
The supreme court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial
because the district court erred by seating the prospective juror. Id. at 325. The supreme
court reasoned that the prospective juror “ca ndidly admitted he likely would give greater
credence to the testimony of police officers than to the testimony of other witnesses.” Id.
at 324. The prospective juror did not “swear that he could set aside any opinion he might
hold and decide the case on the evidence;” he merely said that he would try. Id. (quotation
omitted). The supreme court concluded there had been “a clear showing of actual partiality

10
for police testimony” and that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the for-
cause challenge. Id.
In Fraga, the supreme court concluded that a district court abused its discretion by
denying a request to remove a prospective juror for caus e because the juror provided
equivocal answers about whether he could deci de the case based on the evidence and not
on his personal knowledge of the case and the victim. 864 N.W.2d at 624-25. During voir
dire, the prospective juror explained that he knew about the case and had discussed several
details of it with his family and friends who were involved in the case. Id. at 623-24. When
asked whether he could “put all of that aside and decide the case so lely based upon what
[would be] presented . . . in the courtroom,” the juror said that he thought it would be hard
to be fair and impartial because he knew about the case, but the juror eventually answered,
“I guess I could do that, yes.” Id. at 624-25. Answers to othe r similar questions did not
unequivocally state that the juror would set aside any preconceived notions and be fair. Id.
at 625. When asked whether he could be fair and impartial, and whether he could decide
the case based on the ev idence, he responded, “Besides th e fact I know about the case, I
don’t, no. I think it would be hard.” Id. at 625 (emphasis omitted ). The supreme court
determined that the prospectiv e juror expressed actual bias and that he was not properly
rehabilitated because he could not state “une quivocally” that he would set aside his
preconceived notions and be fair. Id. at 625.
Here, the district court found that juror #4 did not have a bias that would prevent
him from setting aside his previous experiences and anger for the purpose of rendering a
fair and unbiased verdict. Although juror #4’s answers incl uded the likes of, “I’d like to

11
think I could” and “I believe so,” the district court determined that juror #4 was not biased
and that, even if biased, he had been rehabilitated. 1 Juror #4 stated that he could follow
instructions of the district court, set aside his emotions, and “make a decision based on the
evidence.” The juror une quivocally stated that he did not think that he would be more
inclined to find appellant guilty “to make sure that [another sexual assault] doesn’t happen
again.” Juror #4 explained that he could “set aside any opinion he might hold and decide
the case on the evidence.” Unlike the jurors in Logan and Fraga, juror #4 did not express
a predisposition to believe certai n testimony, nor did he have either prior exposure to the
facts of this case or foreknowledge of appellant. See Logan, 535 N.W.2d at 324; see also
Fraga, 864 N.W.2d at 625.
The district court did not find juror #4 to have expressed actual bias. We have only
the voir dire transcript, and unlike the district court, we are not positioned to make the fine
distinctions the district court made about the conviction with which juror #4’s answers
were given. We cannot say on this record th at the district court abused its discretion in
finding that juror #4 did not exhibit actual bias.
The district court also found juror #4 to have been rehab ilitated even if actual bias
had been shown, and we defer to that determination. The juror believed himself capable
of separating his strong feelings about sexual assault (which we pr esume are shared by

1 The meaning of a person’s answer, “I belie ve so,” depends on the conviction and voice
inflection used in addition to the words themselves. Other prospective jurors responded
similarly to the district court’s question about setting aside prior experiences and remaining
impartial. Those prospective jurors were not challenged for cause. The district court must
have found that juror #4’s delivery of the wo rds “I believe so” indicated that the juror
firmly believed himself to be capable of serving without bias.

12
most right-thinking people) from his deliberations as a juror. Here again, we defer to the
better-positioned district court, which determined juror #4 to have been rehabilitated. See
Logan, 535 N.W.2d at 323 (stating that a district court’s determination that a “prospective
juror’s protestation of impartiality is believable is entitled to special deference” (quotation
omitted)). We see no abuse of the district court’s discretion.2
II. The district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
Appellant argues that the district court sh ould have instructed the jury on self-
defense, because he presented evidence that he punched A.L. because she threatened him
with a knife and he feared immediate bodily ha rm or death. Appellant also argues that
evidence of a prior act of violence commi tted by A.L. against him should have been
admitted at trial because it supported his reasonable belief that A.L. would stab him.
Appellant preserved the jury-instruction i ssue by requesting the instruction. The
district court denied the request. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a
district court’s decision about whether a jury instruction should be given. State v. Hannon,
703 N.W.2d 498, 509 (Minn. 2005 ). A district court abuses its discretion if it refuses to
give an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case “if there is evidence to support it.”
State v. Kuhnau , 622 N.W.2d 552, 557 (Minn. 2001). But, “[i]f the defense was not

2 Appellant also argues that the district court’s reliance on juror #4 having been “pleasant,”
“smiling,” and “friendly” say nothing about his bias. In context, we disagree. Appellant’s
argument that juror #4 demonstrated bias is based on juror #4 having said that sex-assault
offenses made him “angry.” In assessing whether such anger is disqualifying, the observed
emotional expressions seem at least somewhat relevant. A juror with disqualifying “anger”
about a class of cases would not emote as the district court observed juror #4 doing.

13
prejudiced by a refusal to issue an instruction, there is no reversible error.” Hannon, 703
N.W.2d at 509.
The defendant bears the burden of “going forward with evidence to support a claim
of self-defense.” State v. Basting , 572 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. 1997). In determining
whether appellant produced sufficient eviden ce to support his self-defense claim, we
consider “whether such evidence was sufficient to shift the burden to the state to disprove
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn.
2006). Whether reasonable grounds exist for appellant’s belief that the danger of death or
great bodily harm is imminent is an objective test. See State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 256,
170 N.W.2d 104, 113 (1969). We resolv e all doubts in appellant’s favor. Johnson, 719
N.W.2d at 631-32. If the defendant meets hi s burden of production, the state bears the
burden of disproving one or mo re of the following elements of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm;
(3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and
(4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid
the danger.

Id. at 629.
Both appellant and A.L. testified that A.L. was holding a knife when appellant
punched her. Appellant testified that he feared A.L. would stab him because this was not
the first time that “anything like that ever happened” between them. Before appellant could
explain that A.L. had stabbed his hand a few weeks before this incident, the district court

14
stopped this series of questi ons and excluded the evidence that appellant intended to
introduce. The district cour t reasoned that the state had not been sufficiently notified of
the prior assault and that A.L. had already left town so sh e could not rebut appellant’s
testimony.
Appellant argues that reasonable grounds exis ted for him to believe that he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm because he heard A.L. stabbing the kitchen
wall and, shortly thereafter, she appeared in the bedroom doorway holding a large kitchen
knife. “When self-defense is asserted, evidence of a specific act is admissible only to show
that a defendant reasonably feared great bod ily harm, provided that the defendant proves
that he knew of the specific act at the time of the alleged offense,” State v. Zumberge, 888
N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017), and “where commonsense indicates that these acts could
legitimately affect a defendant’s apprehensions,” State v. Matthews, 301 Minn. 133, 134,
221 N.W.2d 563, 564 (1974). Such evidence must be relevant and more probative than
prejudicial. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 203 (Minn. 2006) (citing Minn. R. Evid.
403). Because appellant sought to support hi s claim of self-defense with evidence of a
prior incident where A.L. stabbed his hand, we conclude that the evidence in question goes
to appellant’s state of mind, and appellant was not required to have provided notice of the
evidence to the state.3

3 Had the evidence been introduced to show prior acts by A.L. and cast reasonable doubt
on the state’s claim of his guilt, State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 279 (Minn. 2003),
the “reverse-404(b)” or “reverse- Spreigl” analysis would be appropriate, including
consideration of whether the evidence would “establish motive, intent, absence of mistake
or accident, identity or common scheme or plan,” State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 113
(Minn. 1990) (citing State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965)).

15
Even absent the prior-incident evidence, appellant introduced sufficient evidence to
warrant his self-defense instruction. Appell ant testified that he was passed out in the
bedroom when he awoke to A.L. screaming and having a panic attack. He testified that he
was preparing to leave the house, but, as he was dressing and tying his shoes, he heard A.L.
“in the kitchen stabbing the wall.” Appellant testified that A.L. then entered the bedroom,
screamed at him, and pointed a large kitchen knife at him. He claims to have believed that
A.L. was going to stab him, and that he hit her in an effort to defend himself.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a ppellant, who requested the
instruction, see State v. Dahlin , 695 N.W.2d 588, 597 (Mi nn. 2005), and resolving all
doubts in appellant’s favor, as we must, Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 631, we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s request for a jury instruction on
appellant’s self-defense theory and on the state’s burden to disprove one of the elements of
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Wh ether appellant acted in self-defense is a
question for the jury, but absent an instruction to guide the jury’s assessment of appellant’s
self-defense claim, appellant was effectively denied his right to present a defense
reasonably supported by the evidence at trial. The denial of a self-defense instruction
prejudiced appellant.4

This is not the case here. The proposed te stimony about the earlier stabbing was not the
“reverse-Spreigl” type; it was evidence tending to show why appellant’s fear of A.L.
holding a knife was reasonable. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d at 694.

4 The district court’s reason for prohibiting the admission of eviden ce about that earlier
assault incident is erroneous. But the district court may, on remand, consider whether any
other basis exists on which the evidence may be excluded.

16
III. The assault and false-imprisonment convictions occurred in a separate
behavioral incident from the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.

The district court concluded that the cr iminal-sexual-conduct conviction was not
part of a single behavioral incident, and it sentenced appellant accordingly. Although we
reverse appellant’s assault conviction, the stat e may elect to pursue the charge of third-
degree assault on remand. If appellant is ag ain convicted of the assault, the single-
behavioral-incident question will again arise, so we address it now in the interests of
judicial economy.
Minnesota Statutes provide that a court ma y only sentence a defendant once for a
single behavioral incident, even if the incident results in multiple crimes. Minn Stat.
§ 609.035, subd. 1 (2014); State v. Williams , 608 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. 2000). In
determining whether multiple cr imes comprise a single behavi oral incident, we consider
“factors of time and place . . . [and] whet her the segment of conduct involved was
motivated by an effort to obtai n a single criminal objective.” Id. (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted); see also State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 404, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525
(1966). We also consider whether the offenses “arose from a continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct” and whether the offender “manifested an indivisible state of mind.”
State v. Johnson , 653 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. App. 2002); see also State v. Soto , 562
N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 1997); State v. Chidester , 380 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn. App.
1986), review denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1986). The state bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conduct underlying th e offenses did not occur as
part of a single behavioral incident. Williams, 608 N.W.2d at 841-42.

17
Criminal sexual conduct has been considered a separate behavioral incident when it
was not part of “a single criminal objective” underlying multiple offenses, and it “was not
a necessary prelude to any other crime.” State v. Bookwalter , 541 N.W.2d 290, 295-96
(Minn. 1995). Here, the district court dete rmined that the convictions for third-degree
assault and third-degree criminal sexual conduc t were two separate behavioral incidents
because “there are breaks, there are gaps in time in the acts that occurred against this
victim. . . . The acts are separate, they’re br oken up in time and behavi or.” The district
court agreed with the state that appellant “d idn’t rape [A.L.] because he had broken her
face. They’re two different and distinct things.”
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the criminal-sexual-conduct
offense was not part of a single behavioral incident with the assault and false-imprisonment
offenses. Although the offens es were committed at the same place, the criminal-sexual-
conduct offense did not occur at the same time as the other offenses, and appellant was not
motivated to obtain a single criminal objective. Between the late night or early morning
hours of April 4, 2015 and April 5, 2015, and while in a back bedroom, appellant punched
A.L. in her face. After “quite some time” passed, they moved to the living room. That
afternoon and throughout the next night, A.L. testified that she woke “to being raped.”
Appellant testified that he pu nched A.L. to disarm her, a nd that he tied up A.L. in the
basement because he “didn’t want to face the music.” Because the incidents were separated
by time and did not share a single criminal motivation, we conclude that the district court

18
properly found the assault an d false-imprisonment to have been separate behavioral
incidents from the criminal-sexual-conduct offense.5
IV. We see no merit to appellant’s pro se arguments.

Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in 13 ways and states that
each of “these instances clearly had a cumulative negative effect” on his ability to present
his defense. Appellant does not support thes e statements with argument or authority.
Without support for any of appellant’s varied contentions, we deem these assertions waived
and do not address them. See State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn.
App. 1997); State v. Butcher , 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 1997). We also observe that the clear majority of appellant’s ineffective-
assistance claims relate to trial strate gy, which are generally unreviewable. Andersen v.
State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

5 Should the state pursue the assault claim against appellant on remand, and if appellant is
convicted, the district court must resenten ce him in the order required by Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.B.1(e) (2016) (third-degree assault first, third-degree criminal sexual conduct
second, and false-imprisonment third).