A17-0981

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0943
A17-0981

In re the Estate of: Duane Francis Strub, Deceased.

Filed February 12, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Houston County District Court
File No. 28-PR-16-354

William G. Peterson, Peterson Law Office, LLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellants
Alan Strub and Matthew Strub)

Wayne E. Pflughoeft, Joseph E. Winandy, Pflughoeft, Pederson, Johnsrud & Winandy,
LLP, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent Janice L. Scheidecker)

Kari C. Stonelake-Hopkins, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent
Merchants Bank, N.A.)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A district court has subject -matter jurisdiction to remove a personal representative
in an informal probate proceeding under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-301 (2016).
O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order s (1) removing appellants as personal
representatives in a probate matter and (2) denying their motion to vacate the removal
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order, appellants argue that the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction to remove
them as personal representatives in an informal probate proceeding. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 22, 2014, Duane Strub e xecuted a will that nominated two of his
children, appellants Alan and Matthew Strub, as co-personal representatives of the estate.
Duane Strub died on January 14, 2016. Upon application for informal probate and informal
appointment of personal representatives, the registrar accepted the application, informally
probated the will, and appointed appellants as personal representatives. The will provided
that both appellants and Duane Strub’s girlfriend, respondent Janice Scheidecker, would
receive a portion of the residue of the estate . The residue of the estate included two real
estate parcels that are adjacent and encompass approximately 212 acres. The will also
provided respondent with a life estate and a right to purchase a homestead in the estate for
50% of its estimated market value in the year of Duane Strub’s death.
In June 2016, respondent asked appellants to conduct an appraisal of the farmland
in order to exercise her option for partition of the land in the estate . Appellants’ attorney
responded by letter , stating, “The farmland will not be for sale and an appraisal is not
necessary at this time.” On October 6, respondent asked appellant s to arrange for an
appraisal of the farmland and to provide her with an appraisal that had already been
completed for the house. Appellants’ attorney responded, stating “An appraisal of the farm
is not necessary or required. If Ms. Scheidecker would like an appraisal, she can have it
done and pay for it on her own.” Appellants did not provide respondent with a copy of the
completed appraisal of the house.
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Respondent petitioned the district court on November 21 , 2016 , to remove
appellants as personal representatives on the grounds that they had disregarded their
responsibilities and refused to proceed with an appraisal of the land . In appellants’
responsive filing in December, appellants attached the appraisal for the house that was done
on October 2 but never provided to respondent and stated that they had “arranged for an
appraisal of the Family Farm and [would] discuss a potential buyout with [respondent].”
The district court determined that appellants “have failed to act in the best interests
of the Estate by denying [respondent] the ability to liquidate her portion of the
farmland. . . . They have used their power to act for their own benefit rather than proceed
toward the full settlement of the Estate.” The district court discharged appellants as
personal representatives of the estate and ordered the parties to either stipulate to a new
personal representative or, if they could not agree, to submit names of other candidates to
the district court.
The district court stated that, once identified, the new personal representative would
draft a proposal for partition of the farmland. If the parties could not agree on the proposal,
the new personal representative would be directed to bring an action for partition to the
district court under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-911 (2016).
Appellants moved the district court to vacate its order removing them as personal
representatives, arguing that the district court should have considered the actions that
appellants took after the hearing but before the district court issued its order. The district
court denied thei r motion. Appellants now challenge the district court’s order removing
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them as personal representatives and the order denying their motion to vacate the removal
order. We consolidated the appeals.
ISSUE
Does a district court have subject -matter jurisdiction to remove a personal
representative in an informal probate proceeding commenced under Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-301?

ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to remove
them as personal representatives because (1) respondent did not commence a formal testacy
proceeding and (2) respondent did not satisfy the procedural requirements to remove them
as personal representatives. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we
review de novo. Nelson v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. 2015 ). Subject-matter
jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to hear and decide an issue in controversy. In re
Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 2007) (citing Robinette v. Price, 214 Minn. 521, 526, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1943) . A district court has original jurisdiction
in all civil cases, including cases in law and equity for the administration of estates of
deceased persons. See Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3; Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(4) (2016).
“[D]istrict courts exercise all the functions of the probate court. . . . ” In re Guardianship
of Doyle, 778 N.W.2d 342, 345 n.1 (Minn. App. 2010). They have “jurisdiction over all
subject matter relating to estate s of decedents.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-302(a) (2016) .
Because district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over all matters relating to the
estate of a decedent and because the r emoval of a personal representative relat es to a
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decedent’s estate, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to remove appellants as
personal representatives from decedent’s estate.
Authority to Remove Personal Representatives
Appellants argue that a district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to
remove a personal representative appointed in an informal probate proceeding unless an
interested party commences a formal testacy proceeding with the district court . The
“informal appointment proceedings” statute in the Minnesota Probate Code does not
support appellants’ argument. An informal appointment fully establishes a personal
representative’s status, but “ [a]n appointment, and the of fice of personal representative
created thereby, is subject to termination as provided in sections 52 4.3-608 to 524.3-612
. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-307(b) (2016). Respondent properly petitioned the district court
to remove appellants under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-611(a) (2016), which states that “[a] person
interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal representati ve for cause at
any time.” Therefore , appellants were not insulated from removal simply because they
were appointed through an informal probate proceeding. The district court acted pursuant
to its authority granted by Minn. Stat. §§ 524.3-307(b), -611 (2016), when it removed
appellants as personal repr esentatives based on its determination that they refused to
perform their duties.
Additionally, the removal statute’s placement in the Minnesota Probate Code does
not support appellants’ argument that the district court may only remove a personal
representative if an interested party has commenced a formal testacy proceeding . The
personal-representative removal statute is not listed in the “formal testacy” sections, Minn.
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Stat. §§ 524.3-401 to -414 (2016), or the “informal probate” sections, Minn. Stat. §§ 524.3-
301 to -311 (2016), but it is within “Part 6, Personal Representative; Appointment, Control
and Termination of Authority,” Minn. Stat. §§ 524.3-601 to -618 (2016). And the removal
statute that provides that a district court may remove a personal re presentative for cause
does not include any language referring to formal or informal probates. Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-611. To the contrary, t he statut e provides that a district court may remove a
personal representative “at any time” if “it is in the best i nterests of the estate” or if the
personal representative otherwise fails in performing statutorily assigned duties. Minn.
Stat. § 524.3-611(a)-(b).
Appellants further contend that the Minnesota General Rules of Practice
demonstrate that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to remove them
as personal representatives. We disagree. Appellants rely on Minn. Gen. R. Pract. 405,
which states that “[t]he court has no power to intervene in any unsupervised administration
unless a formal petition invoking the court’s authority i s filed by an interested person. ”
Appellants contend that a “formal petition” refers to a petition for a “formal testacy
proceeding.” But t his a rgument is not supported by the probate code’s “General
Definitions” section, which defines a “petition” as “a written request to the court for an
order after notice.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(41) (2016).
The probate code defines a “testacy proceeding” as “a proceeding to establish a will
or determine intestacy.” Minn. Stat. § 524.1-201(54) (2016). Respondent did not petition
the district court for a formal testacy proceeding because she did not seek “to establish a
will or determine intestacy.” Id. Instead, respondent filed a formal “petition” invoking the
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district court’s authority to remove appellants as personal representatives. The district
court properly exercised its authority to intervene in the informal probate proceeding
because a “formal petition i nvoking the court’s authority [was] filed by an interested
person.” See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 405.
Minn. Gen. R. Pract. 402 and 4 15 also support the conclusion that a district court
may act in an informal probate proceeding. Minn. Gen. R. Prac t. 402(b) states that an
informal proceeding is conducted by a judge, a registrar, or a person designated by the
judge for probate of a will or appointment of a personal representative. And Minn. Gen.
R. Pract. 415 (a)(1) states that “ [e]ach judge of the c ourt may at any time perform the
functions of registrar regardless of whether the court has designated other person s to
perform those functions.”
Appellants also argue that Minn. Stat. § 524.3-302, which states that “[i]nformal
probate is conclusive as t o all persons until superseded by an order in a formal testacy
proceeding,” prevents the district court from acting in a probate proceeding unless an
interested person commences a formal testacy proceeding. We are not persuaded. Minn.
Stat. § 524.3-301 d efines both an “informal probate proceeding” and an “informal
appointment proceeding,” which demonstrates that these phrases constitute two separate
proceedings. “An informal probate proceeding is an informal proceeding for the probate
of decedent’s will. . . . An informal appointment proceeding is an informal proceeding for
appointment of a personal representative . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 524.3 -301. Respondent did
not move the district court to probate the will. Respondent only sought to remove
appellants as personal representatives, and the “informal probate proceeding” in which the
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registrar probated the will is still “conclusive as to all persons .” We therefore conclude
that an interested party was not required to commence a formal testacy proceeding before
the district court could remove appellants as personal representatives in the informal
probate proceeding.
Procedural Requirements to Remove Personal Representatives
Appellants also assert that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
because respondent did not meet the procedura l requi rements outlined in Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-403, which applies to parties seeking to commence a formal testacy proceeding.
But this statute does not apply because, as noted, respondent was not seeking to commence
a formal testacy proceeding. Respondent was required to meet the procedural requirements
outlined in Minn. Stat. § 524.3-611(a), which applies to the removal of a personal
representative. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-611(a) states that when a “person interested” petitions
the district court to remove a personal representative, “the court shall fix a time and place
for hearing. Notice shall be given by the petitioner to the personal representative, and to
other persons as the court may order.” Respondent was a “person interested in the estate”
because she is designated in the will as a devisee. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-611(a). She filed a
petition to remove appellants as perso nal representatives. She provided notice to the
personal representatives by serving appellants’ attorney. Therefore, respondent satisfied
the procedural requirements for remo ving a personal representative , and the district court
properly exercised its authority to remove appellants as personal representatives.

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D E C I S I O N
The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction in the informal probate proceeding
to remove appellants as personal representatives of decedent’s estate. We therefore affirm
the district court’s order s removing appellants as personal representatives and denying
appellants’ motion to vacate the removal order.
Affirmed.