In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: R. L. W. and S. F. M., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0958

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
R. L. W. and S. F. M., Parents.

Filed January 22, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File Nos. 69DU-JV-15-368, 69DU-JV-16-581

Bill L. Thompson, Law Office of Bill L. T hompson, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant-
father S.F.M.)

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney , Benjamin Stromberg, Assistant County
Attorney, Sara Jankofsky, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent
St. Louis County)

Elisa Beyer, Duluth, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presid ing Judge; Worke, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant S.F.M. appeals from the distri ct court’s order terminating his parental
rights to two children. He challenges each of the four statutory grounds on which the
district court relied in terminating his rights: that appellant inflicted egregious harm under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b)(6) (2016); that he is pa lpably unfit to parent under

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Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016); that the children are neglected and in foster
care under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2016); and that reasonable efforts failed
to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2016). Record eviden ce supports the district court’s findings,
and the district court did not abuse its disc retion in terminating appellant’s rights. We
affirm.
D E C I S I O N
We review the termination of parental rights “to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of Children
of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). A factual finding is clearly erroneous “if it
is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by
the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61
(Minn. 2008). “Termination of parental rights will be affirmed as lo ng as at least one
statutory ground for termination is supp orted by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d
49, 55 (Minn. 2004). We give deference to the district court’s ultimate conclusion, In re
Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005), and review that conclusion under
an abuse-of-discretion standard, In re Welfare of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App.
2012).

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I. The record supports the district court’s finding that S.F.M. is palpably unfit to
parent.

Appellant challenges the district court’s de termination that he is palpably unfit to
parent. A district court may terminate parental rights to a child it if finds that the parent
is palpably unfit to be a pa rty to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct
before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the
parent and child relationship either of which are determined by
the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent
unable, for the reasonably fo reseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
needs of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). The petitioner must prove “a consistent pattern of
specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that appear will
continue for a prolonged, indefinite period a nd that are permanently detrimental to the
welfare of the child.” J.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661 (citation omitted).
Record evidence supports the district court’s findings concerning appellant’s
palpable unfitness. Appellant failed to take responsibility for exposing child 1 1 to adult
sexual activity. Appellant masturbated near child 1, at least one time ejaculating onto the
child’s arm, engaged in sexual intercourse while child 1 was in the room, and permitted
child 1 to view cell-phone videos of sexua l encounters between appellant and child 1’s
mother. Appellant admitted that, while in the bathtub with child 1, the child put the child’s
mouth on appellant’s penis. “This happened more than on ce.” The district court found
that “the totality of the eviden ce paints a picture that at its worst is the intentional sexual

1 We accept the convention used by the distri ct court and by the parties on appeal to
designate the two children. Child 1 is the older child and child 2 is the younger child.

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abuse of a four-year-old child by [the child’s] fa ther and at its best is an irresponsible,
wholly inappropriate, and damaging lack of boundaries regarding adult activity.” The
district court’s findings are not clearly erro neous. The evidence su pports those findings.
Therefore, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by ruling appellant to
be palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship.
To terminate parental rights, the pe titioner must provide clear and convincing
evidence that one of the stat utory grounds justifying te rmination under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b), is satisfied. T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708. “Only one ground must
be proven for termination to be ordered.” Id. Here, the district court also found that the
children suffered egregious harm, are neglecte d and in foster care , and that reasonable
efforts failed to correct cond itions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement. It
appears to us that the record supports each of these grounds as well, but because the record
amply supports the district court’s palpab le-unfitness finding, we do not exhaustively
discuss the other statutory bases for term ination found by the district court. See In re
Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 1995).
II. The record supports the district court’s finding that reasonable efforts were
made to reunify appellant with his children.

Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the parent and to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family are required by law. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2016). A
district court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify parent and children is
reviewed for clear error. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387. When assessing the reasonableness
of efforts, courts consider “the length of time the county was involved and the quality of

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effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review
denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). The petitioner must target reunification efforts at alleviating
the conditions giving rise to the out-of-home placement, and conform those efforts to the
problems presented. In re Welfare of S.Z. , 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996). The
reasonable efforts also must be culturally appropriate and meet the needs of the child and
the family. Minn. Stat. § 260. 012(f) (2016). A presumption that reasonable efforts were
made and were unsuccessful arises when
(i) a child has resided out of the parental home under
court order for a cumulative pe riod of 12 months within the
preceding 22 months. In the case of a child under age eight at
the time the petition was filed allegi ng the child to be in need
of protection or services, the presumption arises when the child
has resided out of the parental home under court order for six
months unless the parent has maintained regular contact with
the child and the parent is complying with the out-of-home
placement plan;
(ii) the court has approved the out-of-home placement
plan . . . ;
(iii) conditions leading to the out-of-home placement
plan have not been corrected [, which is presumed] upon a
showing that the parent or pa rents have not substantially
complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan;
and
(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the social
services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the
family.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).
The district court’s order references each of the four statutory considerations. First,
the children were removed from appellant’s hom e after the district court adjudicated the
children as children in need of protection or services. In additi on to the out-of-home
placement plan, the district court ordered that appellant comply with the reunification plan

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and with the court’s orders. Appellant did not substantially comply with the court’s order,
the case plan, the parenting plan, or the re commendations both contained in and resulting
from the plan. The district court found th at the petitioner made reasonable efforts to
provide services to appellant, but those reas onable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the out-of-home placement. The record supports this finding.
Appellant was provided, in an effort to reunify, a psychosexual evaluation, a parent-
education program, efforts to stabilize appellant’s mental-h ealth issues and establish
appropriate family boundaries, assistance with anger-management issues, efforts to
establish and maintain a safe and clean home environment, and other services as part of the
out-of-home placement plan. Although a ppellant submitted to the psychosexual
evaluation, he largely failed to comply wi th any of the recommendations. Appellant
attended therapy sessions, but only for a short time. After missing several sessions, those
services were terminated. Appellant ulti mately refused to attend further therapy,
participate in medication management, or submit to a polygraph test. The record
demonstrates real efforts to reunify and an absence of effort by appellant to accomplish
that goal. The district court did not clearly err in finding that reasonable efforts were made
to reunify appellant with his children.
III. The record supports the district court’s finding that termin ation of parental
rights is in the best interests of the children.

Whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests is “the
paramount consideration.” In re Welfare of J.R.B ., 805 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012); Minn. Stat . § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). In

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considering the best interests of a child, the district court must balance three factors:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). Competing interest s may include “a stable environment [and]
health considerations.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard
to a district court’s determination con cerning the children’s best interests. J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905.
Here, the district court found that it is in the children’s best interests to terminate
appellant’s parental rights because he cannot appropriately care for the children. Both
children are in foster care and require a timely, safe, and stable home environment. See In
re Welfare of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 134-35 (Minn. 2014) (discussing the importance of
timely permanency for children placed out of the parental home). The district court found
that “[a] continued relationship with their father would be far more hazardous and harmful
than beneficial to the children” because appellant continues to struggle with the issues that
led to the initial out-of-home placement.
Record evidence supports the district cour t’s best-interests determination. Child 1
has suffered significant trauma and continues to suffer from the effects of that trauma. The
guardian ad litem reported that child 1 “has already suffered greatly and will likely struggle
with these [post-traumatic] i ssues for many year s to come.” Child 1 has gone through
treatment programs, but the child’s needs ca n only be met by someone who “is skilled,
calm, and very patient, to keep [the child] sa fe.” With continued care and services, both

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children can be “raised in a safe, stable an d healthy environment.” Although appellant
wants to care for his children, their interests outweigh his. The district court did not err in
finding on this record that termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the best interests
of these children.
Because record evid ence supports the district cour t’s findings, and because the
district court properly applied the law to those findings, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it terminated appellant’s parental rights to both children.
Affirmed.