State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0961

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lamar Terrelle Warren,
Appellant.

Filed April 2, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-17-349

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Brent R. Carlsen, Assistant County
Attorneys, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of gross-misdemeanor escape from custody for
failing to return to custody after a temporary fu rlough expired, in violation of Minn. Stat.

2
§ 609.485, subd. 2(1) (2016). He asserts that the district court committed reversible error
by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review
Appellant argues that the district court e rred in denying his motion for a judgment
of acquittal after the close of the state’s case-in-chief. “At the close of evidence for either
party, the defendant may move for . . . a judgment of acquittal on one or more of the charges
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Minn . R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd.
18(1)(a). We review the district court’s de cision on a motion for a judgment of acquittal
de novo, as a question of law. State v. McCormick , 835 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. App.
2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). “[T]he te st to be applied is whether, after
viewing the evidence and all resulting inferences in the light most favorable to the state,
the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted).
II. We review all the evidence presented at trial.
Appellant asks us to limit our review to the evidence presen ted during the state’s
case-in-chief. We decline to do so. “[W]here a defendant chooses to introduce evidence
after his motion for judgment of acquittal has be en denied, we consider the whole record
and not just the evidence produced by the State.” State v. Tscheu , 758 N.W.2d 849, 857
n.7 (Minn. 2008) (citations an d quotations omitted). Thus, when examining whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we are not limited solely to the evidence
introduced by the State, and may instead review the record as a whole. Id.; see also State
v. Golden, 216 Minn. 97, 102, 12 N.W. 2d 617, 619 (1943) (no ting that reviewing court

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considers “all the evidence presented in the case”); State v. Traver, 198 Minn. 237, 238,
269 N.W. 393, 393-94 (1936) (“[T]he question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict or decision is . . . to be dete rmined on appeal by a consideration of all the
evidence presented in the case.”); State v. Baker, 161 Minn. 1, 2, 200 N.W. 815, 815 (1924)
(stating that the relevant inquiry is whether there is a “case for th e [fact-finder] when all
the evidence was in”). Given the weight of authority, it is appropriate for this court to
consider the entirety of the trial record in reviewing the district court’s decision.
III. Sufficient evidence supports the conviction.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction. Our
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record
to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. DeRosier,
695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 20 05) (quotations omitted). We “presume that the jury
believed the State’s witnesses and disb elieved any contrary evidence.” State v.
Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d 64, 71 (Minn. 2009). Th e verdict will not be disturbed “if the
[fact-finder], acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could r easonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012).
Appellant argues that the district c ourt erred by denying his acquittal motion
because the state failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to escape from custody.
A person is guilty of escape from custody if he “escapes while held . . . in lawful custody
on a charge or conviction of a crime. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.485, subd. 2(1). “‘Escape’

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includes departure without lawful authority a nd failure to return to custody following
temporary leave granted for a specif ic purpose or limited period.” Id. § 609.485, subd. 1
(2016). Failure to return from a furlough constitutes an escape. See Headbird v. State, 375
N.W.2d 90, 92 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Dec. 13, 1985). This offense is
not a specific-intent crime, as “the only intent required to constitute the crime of escape is
the intent to do the act which results in the departure from custody.” State v. Kjeldahl, 278
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 1979); see also State v. Knox, 311 Minn. 314, 322, 250 N.W.2d 147,
154 (1976) (stating that acts constituting escape-from-custody offense “must be intentional
and voluntary”).
Appellant stipulated that he was in la wful custody at a corrections center in
connection with an impaired-driving offense. Appellant received a temporary furlough for
a four-hour period. Appellant failed to return to custody by the expiration of the temporary
furlough, and the state charged him with escaping from custody. The jury found appellant
guilty of the charge. The ques tion presented on appeal is wh ether the state satisfied its
burden of establishing that appe llant’s failure to return to custody after his temporary
furlough expired was intentional and voluntary, as required by Knox and Kjeldahl.
Appellant argues that his conviction rest s on circumstantial evidence, warranting
stricter scrutiny on appeal. While we determine that direct evidence supports the verdict,
appellant’s challenge also fails under a heightened-review standard.
First, direct evidence suppo rts the intent element. The district court granted
appellant a four-hour furlough to retrieve his belongings from a hotel in Grand Forks,
where he had been living. Af ter collecting his belongings fro m the hotel, appellant also

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attempted to collect his car, which was in someone else’s possession. Appellant knew that
he was late returning to custody and stated, “I can accept bein[g] in . . . trouble as long as
I got my belongings back,” revealing that appe llant’s failure to return at the end of his
furlough was intentional and voluntary. At trial, appellant reiterated that he knew he was
“late getting back” from leave, and understood that he was out of custody beyond the
expiration of his temporary furlough. “Confe ssions are held to be direct, rather than
circumstantial, evidence of guilt.” State v. McClain, 208 Minn. 91, 95-96, 292 N.W. 753,
755 (1940). Here, appellant’s admissions th at he made a conscious choice to delay
returning to custody in order to collect his belongings satisfi es the definition of escape
under Knox and Kjeldahl and constitutes direct evidence of guilt. Direct evidence, in the
form of appellant’s admission, supports a de termination that he escaped from custody by
failing to return at the end of his temporary furlough, and, in turn, supports the conviction.
Second, when an element of the offense, such as one’s state of mind, has been
proved circumstantially, we apply a heightened standard of review. See State v. Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010) (recognizing that a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence requires heightened scrutiny). We first identify the circumstances proved and
defer to the jury’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances.” State v. Porte , 832
N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 2013). We then “examine independently the reasonableness
of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved,” including
“inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the state proved the following
circumstances: (1) appellant knew his temporary furlough expired; (2) he knew he was late

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returning to custody at the end of his furlough ; and (3) he did not return to custody until
after the furlough expired. The fact-finder could reasonably have inferred that appellant’s
escape from custody was intentional and voluntary based upon the circumstances proved.
With regard to the second Al-Naseer factor, the circumstances proved are inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. To successfully challenge a conviction based
upon circumstantial evidence, appellant bears the burden of “point[ing] to evidence in the
record that is consistent with a rational theory ot her than guilt.” State v. Taylor , 650
N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). The possib ility of a defendant’s innocence does not
require reversal if “the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.”
Id. Here, appellant has not identified evidence in the record consistent with a rational
theory other than guilt, and we determine that the evidence is sufficient to permit the fact-
finder to conclude beyond a r easonable doubt that appellan t was guilty of escaping from
custody, even under a heightened standard of review. Thus, the district court did not err
by denying appellant’s acquittal motion.
Affirmed.