State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0978

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald James Meyer,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-4266

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith, T.,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation and execution
of his sentences, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sufficiently
2
find the third Austin factor, which requires the need for confinement to outweigh the polices
favoring probation. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). We affirm.
FACTS
A jury convicted appellant Ronald James Meyer of two counts of felony domestic
assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (201 4), and one count of domestic
assault by strangulation, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2014). In
November 2016, the district court imposed a 36-month sentence for felony domestic assault
(harm) and a concurrent sentence of 21 months for felony domestic assault (fear). The
district court stayed execution of Meyer’s sentences and placed him on probation for five
years. As conditions of probation, the district court required Meyer to (1) inform his
probation officer of any change in address; (2) complete a chemical dependency evaluation
and follow the recommendations of the evaluation; and (3) abstain from alcohol. The
district court also conditioned his probation on complying with a domestic abuse no contact
order (DANCO), which prohibited him from having contact with the victim or going back
to his former residence where the offenses were committed.
On March 9, 2017, Meyer’s probation officer filed a report alleging that Meyer had
failed to follow the recommendations of his chemical as sessment, failed to abstain from
alcohol, and failed to keep probation informed of his current address. Police arrested
Meyer at his former residence nine days later. His probation officer then filed an amended
report, adding that Meyer failed to abide by the DANCO banning him from his former
residence.
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At a probation violation hearing, Meyer admitted to the four violations of his
probation’s conditions. The state recommended that Meyer’s sentences be executed.
Meyer asked the district court to not execute his sentences and stated that he would like to
remain on probation. The district court decided to revoke Meyer’s probation and execute
his sentences, finding that Meyer intentionally and inexcusably vi olated his probation
conditions and that the nee d for confinement outweighed the polices favoring probation.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Meyer contends that the district court abused its discretion by deciding to revoke
his probation and execute his sentences. The district court has broad di scretion in
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249 –50. In order to
revoke probation, the district court must make findings regarding the three Austin factors:
(1) the probationer violated a condition of probation; (2) the violation was intentional or
inexcusable; and (3) the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
Id. at 250. Whether the district court made the req uisite findings of the Austin factors is a
question of law that we review de novo. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn.
2005). Meyer only disputes that the district court failed to make sufficient findings
regarding the third Austin factor.
“When determining if revocation is appropriate, courts must balance the
probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and
the public safety, and base their decisions on sound judgment and not just their will.” Id.
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at 606 –07 (quotation omitted) . In addressing the third Austin factor, the district court
should consider whether
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or

(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which
can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or

(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

Id. at 607 (quotation omitted).
The district court stated at the probation violation hearing,
The Court finds that the need for confinement
outweighs the polic ies favoring probation because of
[Meyer’s] prior criminal history and use of weapons and all of
the potential interventions that have been provided for [Meyer]
that [he has] disreg arded and [his] continued chemical use.
That it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
probation if probation was not revoked.

Meyer claims that the district court’s statements were “conclusory” and “reflexive” and
that the district court failed to take into account his difficult circumstances. See Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 251 (explaining that decision to revoke probation “cannot be a reflexive
reaction to an accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the
offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial
activity” (quotation omitted)). He asserts that the district court did not consider that he
maintained some contact with probation, he struggled with the treatment program
recommended by probation, and he was homeless. These arguments are unpersuasive.
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The district court’s finding that Meyer disregarded the “potential interventions” and
continued his chemical use adequately reflects the concerns raised in the probation
violation reports. According to these reports, Meyer left his inpatient treatment program
“because he didn’t want to participate.” He also tested positive for alcohol use. The state
alleged at the hearing that Meyer has 13 assault -related convictions, many of which were
alcohol-related. Because of Meyer’s continued alcohol use, his unwillingness to participate
in treatment, and his extensive criminal history involving alcohol, it was within the district
court’s discretion to determine that failure to revoke his probation would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of his violations. These findings are sufficient for the district court to
reasonably conclude that public safety and the need for confinement outweighed the
policies favoring probation.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Meyer’s
probation and executing his sentences.
Affirmed.