State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0982

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Torrance Lovell Jefferson,
Appellant.

Filed April 30, 2018
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-19773

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi Lynn Proulx, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Co urt of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of ineligible person in possession of a firearm,
appellant Torrance Lovell Johnson argues that the state failed to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and the district court erred by admitting prejudicial hearsay evidence.
We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
1. Sufficiency of the evidence
Jefferson argues that the evidence he knowingly possessed a firearm is not sufficient
to support his conviction. On a claim of insufficient evidence, this court conducts “a
painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and the reasona ble
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient
to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). If a conviction is based on circumstantial ev idence, we apply a two -
step analysis. Id. First, we identify the circumstances proved, deferring to the jury’s
acceptance or rejection of evidence. Id. Second, we “determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent wi th any other rational hypothesis other
than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). At this point in the analysis, we do not defer to the
jury. Id.
Jefferson was convicted of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). Jefferson stipulated that he was not
eligible to possess a firearm, so the only question for the jury wa s whether he knowingly

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possessed a firearm. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Possession may
be actual or constructive. Id. Constructive possession is shown by proving that the firearm
was under a defendant’s exclusive control, or, if other people had access to the firearm,
that “there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the ti me [the
firearm is found] the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and
control over it.” Id.
The jury found the following circumstances: (1) police were called to a parking lot,
where they saw Jefferson, who appeared to be urinating, and two others; (2) Jefferson fled
from police, and was arrested by police within two minutes, and he did not challenge his
identification as the person who fled; (3) Jefferson jumped a fence and headed into an alley
between Washburn Avenue and Vincent Avenue; (4) one officer remained in the parking
lot and his partner, who was in his squad car, began to circle the block; (5) the officer saw
Jefferson heading west near 3031 Vincent Avenue, which backs up to garages at 3100 and
3104 Washburn Avenue; (6) the officer in the squad radioed the other officer, who seized
Jefferson in a vacant lot next to 3104 Washburn; (7) within a few minutes, another officer
began looking for contraband in that area and found a gun in between the garages at 3100
and 3104 Washbur n; (8) the gun was in good condition and apparently had not been in
place for very long; (9) Jefferson cut his hand and was bleeding, but no evidence was given
about the extent of the injury, and no blood was found on the gun; (10) no fingerprints were
found on the gun, but Jefferson could not be excluded as a source of the DNA found on the
gun, although 89.9 percent of the population could be excluded; (11) the BCA was satisfied
that the DNA evidence was valid despite potential contamination by a BCA employee; (12)

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a juvenile female, who was at the parking lot and who was detained because she did not
have identification, was placed in the squad car with Jefferson, and remarked, “You’re not
goin[g] to jail. You don’t have your fingerprints on it ;” and (13) the juvenile appeared to
be speaking about the gun, and not the taser that was removed from her possession before
she was placed in the squad car.
Jefferson argues that this is similar to Harris, in which the supreme court concluded
that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to show that Harris knowingly possessed
a firearm. 895 N.W.2d at 602 -03. But in Harris, three people were found in close
proximity to the handgun, none of whom could be excluded by DNA testing; Harris was
driving a car that he did not own; and the handgun was concealed in the roof of the car,
slightly behind the driver’s seat. Id. at 602. Here, the other two people at the scene were
detained in the parking lot by one officer and testimony placed Jefferson in the area where
the handgun was found. Jefferson’s sudden flight from a marked squad car also supports
an inference of guilt. See State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 747 (Minn. 2010) (stating
that consciousness of guilt can le ad a defendant to flee police, even if there are other
motivations, and it is the jury’s job to determine if a defendant’s story is credible).
These proved circum stances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt, based on the short time involved in the entire incident,
the observation of Jefferson by either one officer or the other at key points during the
incident, the discovery of the gun in the area where Jefferson was seen, the good condition
of the gun, the DNA evidence, and the juvenile’s comment that was recorded in the squad
car. The circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Jefferson’s conviction.

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2. Admission of hearsay evidence
Jefferson argues that the district court erred by permitting the state to introduce the
squad audio recording, which contained the juvenile’s hearsay statement , “You’re not
goin[g] to jail. You don’t have your fingerprints on i t.” Jefferson did not object to
introduction of the audio recording containing the hearsay statement. A reviewing court
may refuse to consider a challenge to evidence admitted when the defendant has not
objected or given grounds for the objection, but may consider whether an evidentiary ruling
constituted plain error. See State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617-18 (Minn. 2014). In
doing so, we determine whether there was error, whether the error was plain, and whether
it affected the defendant’s substant ial rights. Id. at 618. If we conclude that all three of
these elements are present, we will assess whether we “should address the error to ensure
fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Both parties agree th at the juvenile’s recorded remark is hearsay. Hearsay
statements are statements, “other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hears ay statements are generally not admissible, unless they fit within an
exception to the rule. Minn. R. Evid. 802. The remark here does not fit within the specific
exceptions enumerated in Minn. R. Evid. 803, 804. But “[a] statement not specifically
covered by rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule,” if certain conditions are met. Minn.
R. Evid. 807. The court may admit such a statement if (1) it is offered as evidence of a

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material fact; (2) it is more probative than any other evidence the proponent can find with
reasonable effort; and (3) “the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.” Id.1
The juvenile’s statement meet s these criteria. The state offered the statement to
prove that Jefferson knowingly possessed the handgun, a material fact. With no admission
by Jefferson, and no direct evidence that he possessed the handgun, it was more probative
than other evidence of possession. The general purpose of the evidentiary rules—fairness,
elimination of expense, ascertainment of truth, and just determination of proceedings —is
served by statement’s admission. Minn. R. Evid. 102. Finally, the statement ha s
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” The statement was voluntary;
the declarant appeared to be trying to reassure Jefferson; the declarant had personal
knowledge of the situation; and her remarks are corroborated by the circumstantial
evidence in the case. See State v. Griffin , 834 N.W.2d 688, 693 -95 (Minn. 2013). In
addition, the juvenile’s statement was recorded and, therefore, accurate—there was no need
to rely on someone’s memory of the remarks.
The hearsay statement was admissible under rule 807. Th erefore, Jefferson has
failed to demonstrate error, the first prong of the plain-error doctrine.
Affirmed.

1 This rule also requires the statement’s proponent to inform the adverse party in advance;
the audio recording’s existence was known to Jefferson before trial.