David Walt Studanski, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0999

David Walt Studanski, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 2, 2018
Affirmed in part and remanded
Rodenberg, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-14-799

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant David Walt Studanski appeals from the postconviction court’s denial of
his petition for postconviction relief. We a ffirm in part and remand for resentencing
consistent with the plea agreement.
FACTS
Appellant was charged by complaint with four counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct against two young girls, then between the ages of eight and ten, committed over a
two-year period. According to the complaint, appellant forced acts of sexual penetration
on the girls. Appellant faced presumptive prison sentences on all of the charged offenses.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (2013).
Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct 1 in
exchange for an agreem ent that “[h]e would be sentenced to a stay of execution of 144
months as to each count served concurrently” and placed on probation for up to 30 years.
Appellant provided a factual ba sis for each guilty plea. He ag reed on the record that he
was pleading guilty to avoid th e possibility of being sent to prison. The plea agreement
also called for lifetime conditional release. The district court found that appellant “made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of [his] rights” and provided “an adequate fact basis to
support [his] plea to both Counts 1 and 3.” It convicted appellant of both counts. A
presentence investigation (PSI) recommended stayed sentences of 144 months on count

1 Appellant pleaded guilty to counts one and three of the complaint, representing one count
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against each of the victims.

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one and 180 months on count three, with a ten-year conditional-release period under Minn.
Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (Supp. 2013).2
At sentencing on March 20, 2015, the district court inquired whether there were any
additions or corrections to the PSI. Both pa rties addressed the amount of jail time that
appellant would serve under the plea agreemen t, and appellant’s trial counsel discussed
appellant’s amenability to probation. Neither attorney discussed the length of the
recommended stayed sentences or of the co nditional-release period. Before imposing
sentence, the district court asked, “on Count 3, am I staying 180 months?” to which the
state responded, “Correct. I th ink that’s correct, your Honor.” Appellant’s attorney did
not respond. The district court also asked, “is it correct that the agreement calls for a
lifetime conditional release?” Appellant’s atto rney responded, “Correct.” The district
court then sentenced appellant to 144 months in prison on count one and 180 months in
prison on count three. The district court st ayed the execution of both sentences, placed
appellant on probation for up to 30 years, and ordered appellant to serve 365 days in jail as
a condition for the stay of execution on each count, to be served consecutively. The district
court also imposed lifetime conditional-release periods for each count. Neither attorney
objected or requested clarification.
Appellant violated the terms of hi s probation in August 2016 when he had
unsupervised contact with minor children. Afte r appellant admitted the violation, he was

2 Minn. Stat. § 609.3455 (2010) was in effect when the conduct for which appellant was
charged began. The statute was amended in 2013, while appellant’s conduct was ongoing.
The amendment does not affect the issues in this appeal.

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sentenced to three additional days in jail and his probation was reinstated. In December
2016, Appellant petitioned for postconviction re lief, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas
because they were involuntary. 3 Appellant also sought to have his sentence amended to
include a ten-year conditional-release term, and not a lifetime conditional-release term.
The postconviction court denied appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea, but set the
case for resentencing in recognition of the original sentence having not complied with the
plea agreement.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal befo re the scheduled hearing on resentencing,
and appellant has not yet been resentenced.
D E C I S I O N
We review denial of a petition for postco nviction relief for abuse of discretion.
Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). We review the postconviction court’s
legal conclusions de novo, “but on factual issu es our review is limited to whether there is
sufficient evidence in the r ecord to sustain the postcon viction court’s findings.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley
v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Min n. 2012) (quotation omitted). A postconviction court

3 Appellant filed no direct appeal . Therefore, the issues that appellant could have raised
on direct appeal are available by postconviction petition. See Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d
89, 94 (Minn. 2006) (stating that a postconvi ction petitioner can raise nearly the same
breadth of issues in a postco nviction proceeding that could ha ve been brought in a direct
appeal).

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also abuses its discretion by acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Reed v. State, 793
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
I. The postconviction cour t acted within its discretio n in denying appellant’s
request to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Appellant argues that he is entitled to wit hdraw his guilty pleas because they were
entered involuntarily, resulting in a manifest injustice.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to wi thdraw a valid guilty plea after
sentencing. State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2 010). A court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty pl ea if it “is necessary to co rrect a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manife st injustice occurs wh en the guilty plea is
invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). “To be constitutionally valid,
a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The
validity of a plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
Appellant agrees that his guilty pleas we re entered knowingly and were supported
by an adequate factual basis. Appellant’s only argument on appeal is that his pleas were
involuntary.
Whether a plea was voluntary is a question of fact; we review a district court’s
determination for clear error. State v. Danh , 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994). “The
involuntariness of a guilty plea constitutes such a manifest injustice as to entitle a defendant
to withdraw his plea.” Butala v. State , 664 N.W.2d 333, 339 (M inn. 2003) (quotation
omitted). “The voluntariness requirement ensu res a defendant is not pleading guilty due
to improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. The supreme court has

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also stated that “the Stat e also cannot induce a guilty pl ea based on a promise by the
prosecutor that goes unfulfilled or was unfulfillable from the start, such as a plea agreement
involving the promise of an illegal sentence.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn.
2017). “In short, a plea is involuntary when it is induced by coercive or deceptive action.”
Id. Additionally, “[i]nducement of a guilty plea by promises that cannot be fulfilled
invalidates the plea.” State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Min n. 2000). Courts
determine whether a plea is voluntary by examining “what the parties reasonably
understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Courts
consider “all of the relevant circumstan ces” in making this determination. Danh, 516
N.W.2d at 544 (quotation omitted).
An unfulfilled plea agreemen t is not always rendered involuntary such that it
requires withdrawal; rather, if a “plea agreem ent has been breached, the court may allow
withdrawal of the plea, order specific performan ce, or alter the sentence if appropriate.”
State v. Brown , 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000); Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 43
(“[P]ossible remedies include requiring specific performance of the agreement, altering the
sentence, or allowing the plea to be withdraw n.”). But a plea agre ement that calls for a
sentence not authorized by law canno t be specifically enforced. Brown, 606 N.W.2d at
674. We review a district court’s interpre tation and enforcement of plea agreements de
novo. Id.
Appellant agrees that his guilty pleas we re not induced by coer cion, fraud, or any
apparent deception. At the pl ea hearing, appellant agreed that he was entering the guilty
pleas to avoid being sent to prison. And he was not sent to prison. However, appellant

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argues that his guilty pleas were rendered in voluntary when the dist rict court sentenced
him to a stayed sentence of 180 months on co unt three instead of the agreed-upon 144
months. Consequently, he contends, a manifest inju stice entitles him to plea withdrawal.
Appellant relies on Theis, Danh, and Butala for the proposition that plea withdrawal is
always required when a manifest injustice exists.
The district court acted within its discretion in denying plea withdrawal on the facts
here. The cases upon which appellant relies are clearly distinguishable from the present
circumstances. First, in Theis, the supreme court concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea
was inaccurate because he “maintained his innocence, [and] did nothing at the plea hearing
to affirm that the evidence supporting the[] allegations would lead a jury to find him guilty
of” the charged offense. 742 N.W.2d at 650. Because the plea in Theis was insufficient to
support a conviction, it was necessary to allow the defendant to withdraw it to correct the
resulting manifest injustice. Id. at 651. Butala and Danh both involved promises of
immunity or leniency to fam ily members in exchange for th e defendant’s entry of guilty
pleas. Butala, 664 N.W.2d at 336; Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 540-41. The state made no such
promises here. Moreover, the supreme court in Butala and Danh did not hold that the
defendants were entitled to plea withdrawal as of right. 66 4 N.W.2d at 340; 516 N.W.2d
at 544.4

4 The court noted in Danh that “withdrawal might not be in [the defendant’s] best interests
because if he were to withdraw his plea, he would face trial on th e reinstated original
charges.” 516 N.W.2d at 544.

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At oral argument, appellant also argued that State v. Wukawitz , 662 N.W.2d 517
(Minn. 2003), not cited in either party’s brie f, supports his position th at he is entitled to
withdraw his guilty pleas. However, Wukawitz is not on point. Wukawitz involved the
imposition of a conditional-release term in vi olation of the plea agreement after the
defendant had already been sentenced and no conditional-release term was included. 662
N.W.2d at 520. The supreme court held that “in those limited circumstances where
imposition of a conditional-release term after sentencing would violate the plea agreement,
the district court may allow the de fendant to withdraw his plea.” Id. Appellant’s plea-
withdrawal argument does not concern the imposition of a conditional-release period after
sentencing. Wukawitz has no application here.
The record indicates that the breached plea agreement here resulted from mistakes
by the attorneys and the district court. Th e district court asked at sentencing if the
agreement called for a 180-month stayed senten ce on count three. The prosecutor stated
that it did, and defense couns el did not correct that res ponse. After announcing that
sentence on count three, the district court said, “That complies with the plea agreement, is
that true?” to which the prosecutor said, “I think it’s within the scope of the plea agreement”
and appellant’s attorney said, “It is, your Honor.” The record shows beyond question that
the district court intended to honor the plea agreement.
When this mistaken 180-month sentence on count three was identified in appellant’s
petition for postconviction relief, the state agreed that the district court should resentence
appellant in conformity with the plea ag reement. The postco nviction court denied
appellant’s request to withdraw the guilty pleas and set the matter for resentencing

9
consistent with the plea agreement. Minne sota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05,
subdivision 1, requires plea withdrawal only when “necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” And the district court concluded that, because resentencing consistent with the
plea agreement was possible, plea withdrawal was not “necessary.” The law affords the
district court the authority to order specific performance of a plea agreement or alter the
sentence to conform to such an agreement when doing so is possible. Brown, 606 N.W.2d
at 674; Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d at 43. Contrary to appellant’s contention that he is
entitled to choose between the alternative remedies, the postconviction court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellant’s petition to withdraw his pleas. It was and is prepared
to resentence appellant consistent with the plea agreement. On remand, the district court
must resentence appellant to the agreed-upon 144 months, stayed, for count three.
II. The district court erred in impo sing lifetime conditional release.
Although the postconviction court did not address this issue, appellant argues that
the district court erred in imposing a lifetime conditional-release term and that he is entitled
to a ten-year conditional-release term on both counts. The state agrees.
Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which appellate courts review
de novo. State v. Noggle , 881 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 2016). Minn. Stat. § 609.3455
(Supp. 2013) provides for co nditional-release terms for sex offenders. Subdivision 6
provides for a mandatory ten-year conditional -release term for first- and fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Id. Subdivision 7 provides for a mandatory lifetime conditional-
release term for offenders who have a prior sex-offense conviction. Id. The statute defines
“prior sex conviction” as occurring “if the offender was convicted of committing a sex

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offense before the offender has been convicted of the present offense, regardless of whether
the offender was convicted fo r the first offense before th e commission of the present
offense, and the convictions involved separate behavioral incidents.” Id., subd. 1(g).
In State v. Nodes, the supreme court interpreted the meaning of a prior sex-offense
conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455 wh en a defendant was convicted of two sex
offenses in the same hearing. 863 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 2015). The supreme court held that,
when a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one after the other, at a sentencing hearing,
the offender has a prior sex-offense convicti on for the purpose of sentencing the second
conviction and no “particular te mporal gap” is required, so long as “one conviction is
entered before the second.” Id. at 82.
We have interpreted the s upreme court’s reasoning in Nodes in a number of
unpublished opinions to conclude that, wher e a district court accepts two guilty pleas
“simultaneously,” it is error fo r the district court to impose a lifetime conditional-release
period under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455. See State v. Ingalls, 2017 WL 5560033 (Minn. App.
2017); State v. Klanderud, 2016 WL 6395252 (M inn. App. 2016); State v. Rekdal, 2015
WL 7199866 (Minn. App. 2016). 5 The district court entered appellant’s convictions

5 The supreme court’s decision in Nodes did not explicitly ho ld that entering two
convictions at the same time could never result in a lifetime conditional release. Instead,
it held that when convictions are entered sepa rately, even if by only seconds, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, subd. 7, applies. However, th e legislature has not amended Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455 in light of Nodes, and our several unpublished opinions interpreting Nodes as
the state concedes is proper here. Be cause the state makes no argument that Nodes does
not preclude the application of Minn. Stat . § 609.3455, subd. 7, in the present
circumstances, and agrees that a ten-year c onditional-release period is proper, we do not
reach this question.

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simultaneously in one statement on the record. Therefore, appellant had no “prior sex
convictions” when he was sentenced on count three. Accordingly, the district court erred
by sentencing appellant to a lifetime conditional-release term and not a ten-year conditional
release.
In sum, we affirm the postconviction co urt’s denial of appellant’s request to
withdraw his guilty pleas. We remand to the district court to modify appellant’s sentence
on count three to conform to the plea agreement. Based on the state’s agreement, we also
direct the district court on remand to vacate the lifetime conditional-release term and
impose a ten-year conditional-release term on both counts.
Affirmed in part and remanded.