State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1003

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donavon Allen St. Claire,
Appellant.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-31031

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney , Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Hennepin County jury found Donavon Allen St. Claire guilty of third -degree
assault based on evidence that he beat and injured a man at a light -rail station. St. Claire
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argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to prove that he caused the victim substantial
bodily harm. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 23, 2016, at approximately 7:15 p.m., the Metro Transit Police
Department received a report of an assault at the light-rail station near the intersection of
East Lake Street and Hiawatha Avenue South in Minneapolis. Officers found a 52-year-
old man, B.B., on the upper platform of the station. He was bleeding from the area around
his right eye, his forehead, and the back of his head. He had a bump on the left side of his
forehead, and his right eye was swollen shut. B.B. told officers that someone had knocked
him to the ground and punched him while he lay there. B.B. was taken by ambulance to
the Hennepin County Medical Center, where he was treated for his injuries. In a recorded
interview, St. Claire admitted that he was present at the light -rail station but denied
assaulting B.B.
In December 2016, the state charged St. Claire with third-degree assault, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2016). The case was tried to a jury on two days in March
2017. The state called four witnesses : B.B., the police officer who initially responded to
the report , the police officer who investigated the assault, and the emergency -room
physician who treated B.B. The state played for the jury a video-recording of the assault
that was captured by a surveillance camera. The state also introduced exhibits consisting
of photographs of B.B.’s injuries. St. Claire did not introduce any evidence.
The jury found St. Claire guilty. The district court sentenced him to 21 months of
imprisonment. St. Claire appeals.
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D E C I S I O N
St. Claire argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of
third-degree assault on the ground that the evidence does not establish that he inflicted
“substantial bodily harm” on B.B.
When this court seeks to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction, we undertake “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable t o the conviction, was sufficient to ”
support the conviction. State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). We assume that “the jury believed the state ’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation
omitted). If the jury’s verdict depends on its resolution of conflicting evidence, “we will
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of pro of beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100. If a criminal
offender argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient because the facts proved by the state
do not satisfy the requirements of the applicable law, our appellate review focuses on the
applicable law. See State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 122 (Minn. 2017). When interpreting
a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432,
435 (Minn. 2017).
In this case, the relevant statute provides that any person who “assaults another and
inflicts substantial bodily harm” is guilty of third -degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.223,
subd. 1. The term “substantial bodily harm” is defined by statute to mean “bodily injury
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[1] which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or [ 2] which causes a
temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ, or [ 3] which causes a fracture of any bodily member.” Minn. St at. § 609.02,
subd. 7a (2016). St. Claire contends that the state’s evidence does not satisfy any of the
three alternatives in the statutory definition. In response, the state contends that the
evidence satisfies both the first and the second alternatives.
We first consider whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the first alternative
definition of substantial bodily harm : “bodily injury which involves a temporary but
substantial disfigurement.” See id. To interpret the statutory definition, it is appropriate to
“look to dictionary definitions to determine the common and ordinary meanings of these
terms.” Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 436. The word “disfigurement” is defined as “a
deformity, defacement,” The Oxford Uni versal Dictionary 525 (3d ed. 1964) , or
“something that disfigures,” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 565
(2d ed. 1987). To “disfigure” means “[t]o mar or spoil the appearance or shape of.” The
American Heritage Dictionary 533 (3d ed. 1996). To satisfy the statutory standard, any
disfigurement must be “substantial.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a . The word
“substantial” means a “considerable size or amount,” State v. Williams, 451 N.W.2d 886,
890 (Minn. App. 1990) (quotation marks omitted), or “[a]mple” or “[c]onsiderable in . . .
amount or extent ,” The American Heritage Dictionary , supra, 1791. Thus, we interpret
the phrase “substantial disfigurement” in this context to mean a considerable amount or
extent of a defacement, deformity, or spoilt appearance of a part of a person’s body.
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The eviden tiary record in this case contains a considerable amount of evidence
concerning the nature and extent of B.B.’s injuries. Officer Peralta testified that when he
arrived at the light -rail station, he “immediately noticed that [B.B.] had [been] severely
injured, most notably, on the face and the head area.” The officer testified that B.B. “had
severe damage on his eye socket ” and that “his eye was so dama ged that his eyelid was
closed.” The officer further testified, “At no time [while] talking to [B.B.] did I see him
being able to open that eye.” The photographic exhibits show that B.B. had lacerations on
his right eyelid, fresh blood on his face, bruising on his lower eyelid, and swelling to such
an extent that his right eye was closed. The emergency-room physician who treated B.B.
testified that he had a laceration and bruises around his right eye. B.B. testified that, after
the incident, he had difficulty seeing out of his right eye because “[i]t was completely
closed.” He said that the eye was “swolled up shut” for four or five days.
The evidence in this case is similar to or more serious than the evidence that has
sustained convictions of third -degree assault in other cases. For example, in State v.
Harlin, 771 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009), this court
affirmed the appellant’s conviction because the victim’s injuries (a permanent scar on her
head, chipped teeth, and discolor ing bruises to her back ) constituted substantial
disfigurement. Id. at 50-51. Similarly, in State v. Carlson, 369 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. App.
1985), review denied (Minn. July 26, 1985), this court affirmed the appellant’s conviction
because the victim’s injuries ( bruises to her eyes, bruises to he r face, bruises to her neck
and head, and scratches to her arm) constituted substantial bodily harm (although the
opinion does not specify the type of substantial bodily harm). Id. at 327-28. In light of the
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common and ordinary meanings of the words used in the relevant statutes, and in light of
this court’s caselaw, the state’s evidence in this case is sufficient to prove substantial
disfigurement and, thus, satisfies the first alternative definition of substantial bodily harm.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a.
St. Claire contends that Carlson and other opinions offer little guidance because a
finding of substantial disfigurement “necessarily depends on the specific injuries and their
effect on a particular victim’s appearance.” St. Cl aire further contends that the evidence
in this case is insufficient to prove substantial disfigurement because the evidence
established “merely that [B.B.’s] eye was shut, not that the appearance of his face had
changed considerably .” In respons e, t he state contends that “B.B.’s eye was not just
bruised” but “completely swollen shut for nearly a week.”
We agree with St. Claire that the sufficiency of the evidence of substantial
disfigurement is a case -specific inquiry. We have conducted such an inquiry. We have
reviewed the photographs of B.B. that were taken while he was being treated at the
Hennepin County Medical Center. Based on our visual review of that evidence, as well as
our review of the testimony of the state’s witnesses, we conclude that St. Claire caused
substantial disfigurement to B.B.’s eyelids and eye socket. It is immaterial that the
disfigurement lasted less than a week because the statutory definition is satisfied if the
substantial disfigurement is “temporary.” See id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the state’s evidence is sufficient to prove that St. Claire inflicted
substantial bodily harm on B.B. by inflicting “bodily injury which involves a temporary
but substantial disfigurement .” See id. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider
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St. Claire ’s argument that the state’s evidence does not satisfy the second alternative
definition of “substantial bodily harm ,” which is “bodily injury . . . which causes a
temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” See id. In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support St. Claire’s conviction of
third-degree assault.
St. Claire has filed a pro se supplemental brief. He reiterates the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence argument raised by his appellate counsel, which we have considered and resolved.
He also argues that his conviction sh ould be reversed on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel and judicial misconduct. But he does not identify with any
particularity the deficiencies in his trial attorney’s performance or the objectionable
conduct of the district court judge who presided over his trial and sentencing. Without
specific allegations, we are unable to conduct appellate review. See State v. Sontoya, 788
N.W.2d 868, 876 (Minn. 2010); State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22-23 (Minn. 2008). We
will, however, consider an allegation of reversible error if it “ is obvious on mere
inspection.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Louden v. Louden, 221 Minn. 338, 339, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (1946)). But we do not perceive any obvious
procedural error in St. Claire’s trial. Thus, we conclude that St. Claire’s pro se arguments
lack merit.
Affirmed.