State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1014

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antwan James Woods,
Appellant.

Filed May 14, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-4581

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Antwan James Woods challenge s his conviction for unlawful possession
of a firearm, arguing that he received ineffe ctive assistance of counsel and is entitled to
relief on his pro se claims. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2014, Minneapolis police officers responded to an emergency call that
involved a man with a gun in a confrontation outside a bar. The bar’s security officer, R.S.,
and a patron at the bar, J.D., saw appellant carrying a gun. J.D. later saw appellant throw
the gun into the front seat of a van. Both witnesses identified appellant as the person
holding the gun. Officers took appellant into custody and placed him in the back of a police
vehicle. The officers escorted J.D. to the police vehicle and asked J.D. if he could identify
appellant as the man holding the gun, in a procedure known as a “show-up identification.”
J.D. identified appellant as the man with th e gun and stated that he was “1,000 percent
sure” of his identification.
Police officers later recovered the gun from inside the van, collected a DNA sample
from both the gun and appellant, and sent the fo rensic evidence to the Minnesota Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension (the BCA) for anal ysis. The BCA analyst determined that the
DNA profile obtained from swabbings of the gun matched appellant’s DNA profile.
The state charged appellant with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014), and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury
heard testimony from R.S., J.D., the respondi ng police officers, the BCA analyst, and

3
appellant, who testified in his own defense and denied possessing the gun. The jury
returned a verdict finding ap pellant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, and the
district court imposed the presumptive sentence. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appellant received effective assistance of counsel.
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d
129, 137 (Minn. 2009). We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State
v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984)). To prevail on such a claim, the defendant must
show “(1) that his counse l’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reas onable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the pr oceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke
v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104
S. Ct. at 2064, 2068). In this context, a reasonable probability is defined as “a probability
sufficient to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.
Ct. at 2068.
“The objective standard of reasonablene ss is defined as representation by an
attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney
would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67
(Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). Trial coun sel’s performance is presumed reasonable,
and we give “particular deference to trial counsel’s strategic decisions. . . .” Schneider v.

4
State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521-22 (Minn. 2007). Appellant bears the burden of proving both
prongs of the Strickland test. Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987).
Appellant argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney did not challenge the show-up identification procedure. Because counsel’s failure
to challenge the identification procedure is appellant’s principal allegation of
ineffectiveness, he must prove that his “claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable
probability that the verdict woul d have been different absent the excludable evidence in
order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106
S. Ct. 2574, 2583 (1986). A reviewing court applies a two-part test to determine whether
an identification procedure must be suppre ssed for violating a defendant’s due-process
rights. State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. 1995). We first look to whether the
identification procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive” in that the defendant “was unfairly
singled out for identification.” Id. “However, under the second prong of the test, the
identification evidence, even if suggestive, may be admissible if the totality of the
circumstances establishes that the evidence was reliable.” Id. A totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis considers (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the de gree of attention paid to the criminal; (3) the accuracy of
the prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
during the identification; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Id.
We determine that the identification procedure was reliable under the totality of the
circumstances, even if the show-up identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.
See State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 282 (Minn. 2006) (stating that identification evidence

5
may be admissible if totality of circumstance s establishes reliability of evidence, even if
identification procedure was unn ecessarily suggestive). Firs t, the two witnesses had the
opportunity to view appellant at the time of the fight. J.D. was approximately ten feet away
from appellant and testified that he was “1,000 percent” certain of his identification.
Second, both witnesses paid a high degree of attention to appellant. The witnesses testified
that they watched the altercation take place. Both witnesses saw appellant holding the gun.
Third, J.D. and R.S.’s descriptions of appellant were accurate and consistent. Fourth, the
witnesses displayed a high degree of certainty during the iden tification, and J.D. testified
that he was “1,000 percent certain” of hi s identification. Fifth, very little time—
approximately 20 minutes—passed between the crime and the identification.
Taken as a whole, the identification was reliable under the totality of the
circumstances, even if the show-up identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.
Because the identification evidence would not have been suppressed at trial, the trial result
would not have been different and trial counsel’s repr esentation did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. On this record, we determine that appellant failed to
satisfy the first prong of Strickland because he did not demonstrate that his trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Generally, a reviewing court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if
one is dispositive. Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. 2013). Nevertheless, we
determine that the outcome of the trial woul d not have been different if counsel had
challenged the show-up identification proce dure. Even without this evidence, the
eyewitnesses identified appellant as the man holding the gun. The witnesses were standing

6
approximately ten feet away from the confront ation. Both witne sses pointed the police
officers toward appellant as th e man they had seen holding th e gun. Officers later found
the gun, and forensic testing revealed that the major DNA profile on the gun slide matched
appellant’s DNA and the probability that any other person woul d match the same DNA
profile was one in seventy-two billion. Beca use the outcome of the trial would not have
differed if defense counsel had objected to the identification procedure, we determine that
appellant failed to satisfy the second Strickland prong. Because appellant has not satisfied
his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm his conviction.
II. Appellant is not entitled to relief on his pro se arguments.
a. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of th e evidence underlying his conviction.
Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), which provides that a person who has been convicted of
a crime of violence “shall not be entitled to possess ammunition or a pistol or
semiautomatic military-style as sault weapon or . . . any other firearm.” Appellant
stipulated that he was inelig ible to possess a weapon and th e only issue fo r the jury was
whether appellant knowingly possessed the gun. The state may prove possession through
evidence of actual or c onstructive possession. State v. Salyers , 858 N.W.2d 156, 159
(Minn. 2015). Actual possession requires “proof that [the defendant] physically had the
[gun] on his person,” State v. Smith , 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), while
constructive possession requires proof that there is a strong probability, inferable from the
evidence, that the defendant consciously exercised dominion and control over the firearm

7
at the time of arrest, see State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975).
Constructive possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Salyers,
858 N.W.2d at 160-61.
The parties disagree over the appropriate standard of review. The state argues that
the conviction is sustained by direct evid ence supplied by two eyewitnesses who saw
appellant holding the gun and forensic analysis confirming that appellant’s DNA profile
matched the DNA material found on the gun. Appellant argues that a heightened standard
for review of circumstantial evidence applies. We determine that appellant is not entitled
to relief, even under a heightened standard of review. We apply a heightened standard of
review when an element of the offense rests on circumstantial evidence. State v. Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010 ). We apply a two-step analysis requiring us to first
identify the circumstances proved and then “examine independently the reasonableness of
all inferences that might be drawn from th e circumstances proved,” including “inferences
consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn.
App. 2013) (quotations omitted).
Here, the state proved the following circumstances: (1) two witnesses saw appellant
engaged in a confrontation in the middle of the street; (2) both w itnesses saw appellant
holding the gun; (3) when the police office rs arrived 20 minutes later, both witnesses
identified appellant as the man holding the gu n; (4) police officers retrieved the gun,
collected a sample of appellant’s DNA, and sent the gun and the DNA samples to the BCA
for forensic testing; (5) forensic testing confirmed that the DNA samples matched; and
(6) the probability of randomly selecting someone with a D NA profile that matched the

8
major DNA profile found on the gun was one in seventy-two billion. These circumstances
are consistent with a determination that appellant possessed the gun. See Porte , 832
N.W.2d at 310.
We next consider whether the circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable
inference other than guilt. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473-74. In light of these
circumstances, it would be unreasonable for a fa ct-finder to infer that appellant did not
possess the gun. Sufficient evidence exists to permit th e jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of unlawfully possessing a gun.
b. Legality of Arrest
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures, subject to certain exceptions. U.S. Co nst. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10.
Under Fourth Amendment caselaw, one such exception exists when an officer conducts “a
brief, investigatory stop when the officer ha s a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016) (quoting
State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008 )). Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts that a llow the officer to be able to articulate a
“particularized and objective basis for suspecti ng the seized person of criminal activity.”
State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016) (q uotation omitted). This standard is
“not high,” and a trained police officer may “d raw inferences on the basis of all of the
circumstances . . . inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”
Id. (quotations omitted). Law enforcement may continue the detention as long as

9
reasonable suspicion remains and the officers act diligently and reasonably in pursuing the
investigation. State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1990).
Appellant argues that he was unlawfully seized and detained. We disagree. At the
time of appellant’s detention, police officers had statements from two witnesses who stated
that appellant had been holding a gun. R.S. testified that his view was unobstructed and he
did not have “any doubt” that he saw appellant holding a gun. When the officers arrived,
R.S. approached the officers and identified appellant as the man holding the gun. J.D. also
informed the officers that he saw appellant holding the gun. In light of these circumstances,
we conclude that the officers had a reasonable, articulable basis to suspect appellant of
criminal activity sufficient to temporarily detain him.
c. Chain of Custody
Appellant urges this court to overturn his conviction on the ground that the chain of
custody was broken. “The chain of custody rule requires the prosecution to account for the
whereabouts of physical evidence connected with a crime from the time of its seizure to its
offer at trial.” State v. Farah , 855 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotations
omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 2014). This rule requires the district court to be
satisfied that “the item offered is the same as the item seized and is substantially unchanged
in condition.” Id. (quotation omitted). But “when the object of real evidence is unique and
thus identifiable in court based on its distin ctive appearance, a chain of custody is not
needed.” State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 25, 1992). The state provided evidence through a police officer that the gun recovered
from the scene was the same gun presented into evidence at trial. The officer testified that

10
he recovered the gun, tagged it with the case number and the gun’s serial number, put it
into a bag, and placed it into a locked locker in th e property room. At trial, the officer
identified the gun as the same one he recove red during the night at the bar, based on the
identifying information. Appellant did no t object to this evidence at trial. See State v.
Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 717 (Minn. 2003) (recognizing that failure to object to admission
of evidence constitutes forfeiture). Because the uncontroverted testimony established that
the gun collected at the scene was the same gun presented at trial, appellant’s chain-of-
custody argument fails.
Affirmed.