In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. P. S., and J. E. S., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1020

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
C. P. S., and J. E. S., Parents.

Filed December 4, 2017
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-17-541

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for appellant-mother C.P.S.)

J.E.S., Sioux City, Iowa, (pro se respondent-father)

Thomas N. Kelly, Wright County Attorney, John A. Bowen, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent Wright County Health and Human Services)

Laura Johnson, Monticello, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
C.P.S. is the biological mother of a nine-year-old boy, D.S., and a two-year-old girl,
E.S. The district court terminated C.P.S.’s parental rights to D.S. and E.S. on the grounds
that she did not comply with the duties of the parent -child relationship , that she is a
palpably unfit parent, and that reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions that
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led to the children’s out-of-home placement. The district court also found that termination
of C.P.S.’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
C.P.S. married J.E.S. in 2008 while the couple was living in Nebraska. C.P.S. gave
birth to D.S. that same year . In 2012, the Nebraska Division of Children and Family
Services began providing services to C.P.S. and J.E.S. and implemented a case plan. The
case plan addressed the need for progress on understanding “age appropriate expectations
and responsibilities of a four year old,” supervising D.S., and maintaining a safe living
environment.
The couple relocated to Minnesota in the winter of 2012. C.P.S. gave birth to E.S.
in 2015. By 2016, the couple had five children living in their home: D.S., E.S., and three
children of J.E.S. and/or his former girlfriend. The children’s teachers observed that they
frequently were late for school, without having eaten breakfast, and frequently wore dirty
clothes that smelled of cat urine. In March 2016, D.S. explained one day that he and the
other children had not had breakfast because they “did not want to wake [C.P.S.] up from
sleeping.” A school social worker reported that the children were not properly clothed in
winter and that D.S. had behavioral issues. Further investigation by the county resulted in
a finding that C.P.S. was not responsive to the children’s needs.
In May 2016, Wright County petitioned the district court for an order declaring the
children in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The district court granted the CHIPS
petition and ordered that the children be removed from the home and that C.P.S. work with
a social worker and submit to a psychological assessment. A psychologist diagnosed
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C.P.S. with “major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate” and “adjustment disorder
with anxiety.” The psychologist noted that C.P.S. ’s “symptoms of depression have been
getting worse . . . with increased feelings of worthlessness, especially during and following
her pregnancy with [E.S.].” The psychologist stated that C.P.S.’s depression and anxiety
“interfere with functioning in areas of sleep disturbance, quality of child care affected,
discord in relationship(s), inability to perform daily household routines and decreased
quality of life.” A therapist recommended weekly individual treatment sessions to develop
treatment goals and a therapy plan, but C.P.S. attended therapy only sporadically.
In August 2016, the children were returned to C.P.S.’s home for a trial home visit.
The district court ordered C.P.S. to provide a safe and clean home environment. In
December 2016, the district court returned the children to C.P.S. under the county’s
protective supervision. But in early 2017, the county received new reports that the children
in C.P.S.’s household continued to attend school smelling of cat urine and without
appropriate winter clothing. The home was unclean and unsafe because of pet waste
throughout the house and other unsanitary and unsafe items within the children’s reach. At
the county’s request, the district court ordered the children removed from the home and
placed in the county’s custody.
In February 2017, the county petitioned the district court to terminate C.P.S.’s and
J.E.S.’s parental rights to D.S. and E.S. The matter was tried on three days in May 2017.
The county called eight witnesses: a psychologist; two therapists; a police officer, who had
observed the conditions in the home; and four social workers, who testified to the children’s
improvement since their removal from C.P.S.’s home.
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C.P.S., with the assistance of counsel, presented the testimony of three witnesses.
She testified on her own behalf that she has made improvements in managing her stress,
anxiety, and depression. C.P.S. called the children’s foster mother , who testified that the
children love their parents, but the foster mother did not express an opinion as to whether
the children should be reunified with their parents because she does not “know everything”
about the situation. C.P.S. also called an adult step-daughter, S.B., who testified that she
is available to help C.P.S. care for the children and that C.P.S. has a loving relationship
with her children.
J.E.S. waived his right to counsel and testified on his own behalf. He testified that
his previous job required him to be away from home for long periods of time but that he
now is home more often to help C.P.S. with parenting and household duties. He
acknowledged, however, that the house still is in an unsafe condition.
The guardian ad litem testified that termination of parental rights would be in the
best interests of the chi ldren and that she does not have confidence that C.P.S. and J.E.S.
can provide parenting that is beneficial to the children. The guardian ad litem also testified
that foster care is necessary to ensure stability and consistency for D.S. and E.S.
In June 2017, the district court issued a 45-page order and memorandum in which
it found that the county had proved, by clear and convincing evidence , each of the three
alleged statutory grounds for termination and also had proved that termination of both
parents’ parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, the district
court granted the county’s petition and terminat ed C.P.S.’s and J.E.S.’s paren tal rights to
D.S. and E.S. C.P.S. appeals.
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D E C I S I O N
This court reviews the termination of parental rights “to determine whether the
district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). A factual finding is
clearly erroneous “if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonable supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750
N.W.2d 656, 660 -61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We are mindful that “[p]arental
rights are terminated onl y for grave and weighty reasons, ” In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462
N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990), but we give “considerable deference to the district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. Ultimately, we apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s finding as to whether a statutory
basis for terminating parental rights is present . In re Welfare of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895,
901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. Statutory Grounds for Termination
C.P.S. first argues that the district court erred by finding that she neglected the duties
of the parent-child relationship and that she is palpably unfit to be a parent. C.P.S. does
not argue that the district court erred by finding that reasonable efforts have failed to correct
the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement. “Termination of parental
rights will be affirmed as long as at least one statutory ground for termination is supported
by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re
Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004) (emphasi s added). By not
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challenging the district court’s finding that reasonable efforts have failed to correct the
conditions that led to the children’s out -of-home placement, C.P.S. has effectively
conceded that one of the three statutory grounds of the distri ct court’s decision is proper,
and that ground is sufficient by itself . See id. Nonetheless, we will proceed to consider
C.P.S.’s argument that the district court erred by finding that she is palpably unfit to be a
parent.
A district court may terminate parental rights to a child if it finds
that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016). Proving palpable unfitness is an onerous
burden. In re Children of T.R ., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). The county must
prove “a consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of
the hearing that appear will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are
permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In this case, t he district court found that C.P.S.’s mental -health problems are
significant and that her prognosis for improvement is poor. The district court found that
C.P.S. has not made sufficient progress “in both her parenting skills and mental health
treatment” and is not “able to permanently care for [D.S.] or [E.S.] for a prolonged period
of time.” The district court also found that C.P.S.’s “ mental illness directly affects her
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ability to parent, primarily because it is untreated and has resulted in severe neglect of
multiple children including [D.S.] and [E.S.].” The district court further found that C.P.S.’s
“unresolved mental health issues have already and would likely continue to endanger the
children’s physical and emotional health.” The district court concluded that the county had
proved by clear and convincing evidence that C.P.S. “is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent and child relationship.”
The evidence in the record supports the district court’s findings. A psychologist
testified that C.P.S. suffers from major depression and anxiety. The psychologist also
testified that C.P.S.’s mental-health issues “aren’t being treated,” that C.P.S. cannot make
decisions by herself and feels “unstable or insecure if [she has] to be left alone to function
independently,” and that C.P.S. does not have the ability to improve her parenting abilities.
A social worker testified that C.P.S.’s mental health plays a crucial role in her parenting
abilities and that C.P.S. has a tendency to isolate herself and ignore the children’s needs.
The social worker tes tified that C.P.S. likely would not attend therapy because she
struggles to attend therapy without children in her care. Multiple witnesses testified to the
pattern of incidents in which the home was determined to be filthy and unsafe and in which
the children attended school in clothing smelling of cat urine.
C.P.S. contends that she is not palpably unfit because her mental health has
improved significantly and that “the cleanliness issues in the home that led to the out -of-
home placement no longer exi st.” C.P.S. ’s evidence was contradicted by the county’s
evidence. The district court, as the fact -finder, found the county’s evidence more
persuasive. On appellate review, this court’s task is to determine whether the district
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court’s findings are supported by the record. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We conclude that
the evidence supports the district court’s findings and its ultimate determination of palpable
unfitness.
Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by finding that C.P.S. is palpably
unfit to be a parent. That conclusion is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of at least one
statutory basis for termination . See R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55. In light of that conclusion,
as well as the district court’s finding that reasonable efforts have failed to correct the
conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement, we need not consider whether
the district court erred by finding that C.P.S. neglected the duties of the parent -child
relationship.
II. Best Interests
C.P.S. also argues that the district court erred by finding that terminati on of her
parental rights to D.S. and E.S. is in the children’s best interests.
“In terminating parental rights, the best interests of the child are the paramount
consideration, and conflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are
resolved in favor of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7. “In analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must balance three fact ors:
(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). The district court “must consider a child’s best interests and explain
its rationale in its findings and conclusions.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn.
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App. 2003). We apply an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s
determination that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905.
The district court found that t he children’s “needs for stability, health
considerations, and preferences” weigh in favor of terminating parental rights. The district
court stated that it is important that the children receive care and guidance from parental
figures and a safe and stab le environment, “free from animal urine, animal feces, [and]
overwhelming clutter.” The district court further concluded that the children need someone
to provide food and clothing for them, feed them, and support them in their educational
endeavors. Fur thermore, “[b]oth children need a caregiver who is mentally stable and
capable of providing necessary supervision [and] who will protect them from unsafe
people.”
The evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding. The psychologist
testified that the bond between C.P.S. and the children is not particularly st rong. In
addition, the guardian ad litem testified that the attachment between C.P.S. and the children
is unhealthy. More importantly, the county’s w itnesses testi fied that the childre n have
improved and have thrived in foster care. The guardian ad litem testified that, before D.S.
was placed in foster care, he was anxious, angry, and withdrawn, but now he is improving
and showing “the benefits of the stability that he is experiencing.” The guardian ad litem
testified that E.S. has made an even greater transformation. Before she was placed in foster
care, she was “intense and wild in her ways of trying to get attention in how she interacted
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with her siblings, how she interacted with the animals ,” but now she is active and curious
and is showing excellent progress in her speech.
Thus, the district court did not err by finding that termination of C.P.S.’s parental
rights to D.S. and E.S. is in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.