State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1024

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corey Isaiah Bradley,
Appellant.

Filed December 18, 2017
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-11-35641

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
Where a district court stays imposition of a presumptively stayed sentence under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, if that stay of imposition is later vacated at a probation-
revocation hearing and the sentence is imposed and executed without jury findings or a
waiver, there is no Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s vacation of his stay of imposition and
execution of a presumptively stayed sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
based on a probation violation. Appellant argues that the district court imposed an upward
dispositional departure in viol ation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as
recognized in Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531. We disagree and affirm the district
court.
FACTS
In July 2012, appellant Corey Isaiah Bradley pleaded guilty to felony possession of
pornographic work involving a minor. See Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2010). At
his plea hearing, Bradley admitted to the underlying facts of the crime pursuant to the plea
agreement, but he did not admit to any aggravating factor for a sentencing departure. The
district court accepted his plea and sentenced Br adley to a stay of imposition with a five-
year probationary period. Under the Minne sota Sentencing Guidelines, Bradley’s
presumptive sentence was a 15-month stayed sentence.1
Bradley was eventually accused of viola ting his probation by failing to complete
treatment and appeared before the district court for a probation-revocation hearing in April

1 At the time, Bradley’s criminal-history score was zero, and his crime was a severity-level
G offense. Under the 2011 sex-offender gui delines, Bradley’s presumptive sentence was
15 months stayed. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4 (Supp. 2011).
3
2017.2 After hearing the evidence, the district court found Bradley in violation of his
probation, vacated his stay of imposition, and then executed th e presumptive 15-month
stayed sentence. Near the hearing’s conclusi on, the district court remarked that to the
extent that executing Bradley’ s sentence was an upward di spositional departure from the
sentencing guidelines, the court fo und that Bradley was not amen able to probation. This
appeal follows.
ISSUE
Did the district court violate Bradley’s Si xth Amendment right to a jury trial under
Blakely v. Washington by vacating his stay of impositi on based on a probation violation
and then imposing and executing his presumptively stayed sentence?
ANALYSIS
Bradley argues that when the district c ourt vacated his stay of imposition at his
probation-revocation hearing, it should have imposed the presumptive sentence, 15 months
stayed. Instead, the district court imposed a 15-month executed sentence which, Bradley
claims, was an upward dispositional departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
requiring jury findings or a waiver under Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
The purpose of the Minnesot a Sentencing Guidelines is to “assure uniformity,
proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” State v. Jones, 745 N.W.2d
845, 848 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Imposition of the presumptive sentence under

2 Bradley was found in violation of his probation in June 2014. At that time, the district
court continued Bradley’s stay of imposition with an intermediate sanction of additional
jail time.
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the guidelines “is mandatory ab sent additional findings.” Id. (quoting State v. Shattuck ,
704 N.W.2d 131, 141 (Minn. 2005)). Th ese “additional findings” refer to the Blakely
requirement, which states that any facts supporting a departur e above the maximum
guidelines sentence requires either a jury to find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt or
the defendant to admit to those facts. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000); see also Blakely , 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S. Ct. at
2537). In Minnesota, Blakely applies to both upward dura tional departures (sentences
longer than the presump tive guidelines) and dispositi onal departures (executing
presumptively stayed sentences). State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 44-45 (Minn. 2005).
The critical question in this case is wh en, exactly, Bradley was sentenced. Bradley
argues that his actual sentencing occurred afte r his stay of imposition was vacated at his
2017 probation-revocation hearing, when the district court executed his presumptive
sentence. In Bradley’s framing of the issue, because the 2017 revocation hearing was his
first sentencing hearing, the district court was obligated to either impose the presumptive
stayed sentence or abide by Blakely requirements. The state argues that Bradley’s actual
sentencing occurred back at his 2012 hearing, when the district court gave Bradley the stay
of imposition, and by the time Bradley appeared for the probation-revocation hearing, any
Blakely concerns had long passed.
Resolving this dispute means deciding when a defendant is sentenced on a stay of
imposition: either when the stay of imposition is given, or wh en it is taken away. We
ultimately conclude that a defendant is sentenced with in the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines when a stay of imposition is given, not when it is later vacated.
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Under the sentencing guidelines, sentenci ng occurs in two steps: (1) the imposition
of sentence and (2) the execution of the im posed sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines
definition of terms (Supp. 2011). The imposition of the sentence consists of pronouncing
the sentence to be served in prison. Id. The execution of an imposed sentence consists of
transferring the felon to the custody of the commissioner of corrections to serve the prison
term. Id.
The guidelines provide that a “stayed sentence” may be accomplished in one of two
ways, either by a stay of imposition or a stay of execution. Id. If the court grants a stay of
imposition, the court does not impose (or pronounce) a prison sentence. Id. The comments
to the guidelines note that when a stay of imposition is given, “no sentence length is
pronounced, and the imposition of the sentence is stayed to some future date.” Id. at cmt.
2.C.05 (emphasis added). The word “length” is key, illustrating that while a stay of
imposition lacks a defined length of imprisonment, it is still a sentence as understood by
the guidelines.
Our conclusion that a stay of imposition is an actual sentence that merely lacks a
pronounced duration is supported in three wa ys. First, the comments to the sentencing
guidelines state that if the sentence on a stay of imposition “is ever imposed, the
presumptive sentence length shown in the appr opriate [guidelines grid] cell should be
pronounced, and a decision should be made wh ether to execute the presumptive sentence
length given.” Id. This contemplates that a sentencing judge revoking a stay of imposition
may choose whether or not to execute th e presumptive sentence. And while we
acknowledge that the sentencing guidelines comments are not precedential, their insights
6
help inform our analysis. See Asfaha v. State, 665 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 2003) (stating
that comments to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are “only advisory and not binding
on the courts”).
Second, our conclusion is supported by comparing a stay of imposition with a stay
of adjudication, specifically, analyzing when each attaches a conviction upon a defendant.
With a stay of adjudication, there is no conviction or sentence imposed. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines cmt. 2.D.106 (2016); see also Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2015)
(concluding that a stay of adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1, does not result
in a judgment of conviction or sentence). Only when a stay of adjudication is vacated is
that defendant convicted and sentenced. See Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a) (2016)
(outlining the available sentences “[u] pon conviction”). In that scenario, Blakely would
apply and the district court would be mandated to impose the presumptive sentence absent
additional findings. See Jones, 745 N.W.2d at 848 (stating that Blakely applies to any
imposed sentence beyond the statutory maximum).
In contrast, when a defendant receives a stay of imposition, the defendant still has a
conviction under the guidelines. State v. Ohrt, 619 N.W.2d 790, 79 2 (Minn. App. 2000)
(stating that a stay of imposition is treated as a conviction, not merely a plea or a finding
of guilt on which adjudication has been stay ed). Upon conviction, if the presumptive
sentence is a stayed sentence, the guidelines give courts the option of choosing either a stay
of imposition or a stay of execution as the a ppropriate sentence. Mi nn. Sent. Guidelines
definition of terms (Supp. 2011). In Bradley’s case, the dist rict court chose a stay of
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imposition. Granted, this c hoice did not carry a prison lengt h, but it was still a “stayed
sentence” under the guidelines, and therefore, an actual sentence.
Third, our conclusion that a stay of impos ition is a sentence is supported by Minn.
Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3(1) (2016). That statute states that if a court finds that a defendant
violated probation, and if imposition of sent ence was previously stayed, the court may
“again stay sentence or impose sentence and stay the execution thereof, and in either event
place the defendant on pr obation or order interm ediate sanctions pursuant to section
609.135, or impose sentence and order execution thereof .” Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd.
3(1) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of this statute allows a court to rescind the stay
of imposition and then “impose sentence and order execution thereof,” exactly what
occurred in Bradley’s case. Id.
Bradley draws our attention to two cases in support of his argument that after
vacating a stay of imposition, executing a presumptively stayed sentence requires Blakely
findings. First, he cites State v. Allen for the proposition that upward dispositional
departures are treat ed the same for Blakely purposes as upward durational departures.
Allen, 706 N.W.2d at 44-45. We do not disagree; in fact, Allen is quite clear on this point.
Id. at 46 (“The additional loss of liberty that results from execution of a presumptively
stayed sentence, it is plain, exceeds the maxi mum sentence authorized by a plea of guilty
or jury verdict, and violates the constitutional rule.”). However, Allen involved a
sentencing hearing and not a pr obation-revocation hearing, making it inapplicable to the
issues now before the court. See id. at 43.
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Next, Bradley argues that State v. Beaty is analogous. 696 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. App.
2005). Beaty involved a vacated stay of impositi on at a probation-revocation hearing
where the district court imposed an upward durational departure above the presumptive
sentence. Id. at 412. However, Bradley’s case involves executing a presumptively stayed
sentence after Bradley violated the terms of hi s stay. The guidelines provide courts the
option of either a stay of imposition or a st ay of execution on a presumptively stayed
sentence; no such option is available to courts in the context of a durational departure.
Therefore, Beaty is inapposite to this case.
After Bradley pleaded guilty in 2012, the sentencing guidelines presumed a 15-
month stayed sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4 (Supp. 2011). This gave the district court
a sentencing choice: a stay of imposition or a stay of execution. Regardless of the choice,
this was Bradley’s sentencing hearing, and when the court gave him a stay of imposition,
Bradley was sentenced under th e meaning of Minnesota law. After Bradley violated
probation, he passed through a traditional probation-revocation proceeding, was found in
violation of his probation, and his presumptively stayed sentence was executed. 3 There
was no Blakely issue because any such issue had l ong since expired after Bradley was
sentenced in 2012, and neither the federal cour ts nor the courts of this state recognize a
Sixth Amendment right to a jury for probation-revocation hearings. See Minnesota v.

3 The parties do not dispute that Bradley was afforded a probation-revocation hearing and
that the district court complie d with all required findings and procedures in that regard.
See State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2005); State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246
(Minn. 1980).
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Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435-36 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1146-47 n.7 (1984) (stating that there
is no right to a jury trial before revoking probation).
Lastly, we briefly note the policy impli cations of Bradley’s position. Stays of
imposition are useful tools in the administra tion of justice. They offer a means of
converting felony convictions into misdemeanors. Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (2016).
This encourages defendants to cooperate with probation and puts th em on a path toward
the ultimate goal of rehabilitation.
Accepting Bradley’s argument would jeopardize this beneficial tool. It would mean
that a defendant on a stay of imposition would need to viol ate probation twice before the
sentence could be executed. For district c ourts, the prospect of giving a defendant two
bites at the apple may be unpalatable. This would discourage the use of stays of imposition
at the original sentencing hearing and enc ourage quicker revocation of those stays,
resulting in a potential increase in conviction rates which carry the burden of collateral
consequences through many facets of daily life. Aside from the fact that there is no legal
basis to accept with Bradley’s argument, we see no policy reason to do so either.
D E C I S I O N
Bradley was sentenced when the district c ourt stayed imposition of his sentence in
2012. The revocation of that stay based on a probation viol ation did not result in a new
sentence requiring compliance with Blakely.
Affirmed.