In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. G. H., Child

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1025

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. G. H., Child

Filed March 5, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-JV-15-176

Douglas V. Hazelton, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant -
C.G.H.)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Daniel R. Provencher, Assistant County
Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges an order of the juvenile division of the district court revoking
his stay of adjudication in a juvenile-delinquency case. The stay was revoked based on his
admission that he violated probation by failing to complete treatment before expiration of
the stay. Appellant argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the stay, that
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he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the revocation proceeding , and that he
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and his probation-violation admission. We
affirm.
FACTS
On January 19, 201 6, appellant C.G.H., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to third -degree
criminal sexual conduct pursuant to a plea agreement in which the state agreed to stay an
adjudication of delinquency. At the plea hearing, C.G.H. ’s attorney asked him, “ I have
advised you, p rior to putting in this plea today, that this stay of adjudication is very
important for you to keep; however, if you don’t stick with the terms of probation, you
could lose that stay of adjudication. Do you understand that?” C.G.H. stated he
understood. C.G.H. also stated that he understood that if he lost the stay of adjudication,
he would be looking at severe consequences, which could affect his ability to get into
college, impact his record as an adult, and require him to register as a predatory offender.
The district court accepted C.G.H.’s plea, stayed adjudication in accord ance with
the plea agreement, and placed C.G.H. on supervised probation for 360 days. The district
court ordered several probation ary conditions, including that C.G.H. remain law abiding,
have no unsupervised contact with nonfamily females under the age of 16, and that his
internet use be monitored.
The district court also ordered C.G.H. to follow the recommendations of a
psychosexual evaluation that he had completed prior t o the hearing . The evaluation
recommended that C.G.H. participate in weekly individual mental -health services and
family therapy.
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On March 22 , 2016, C.G.H. admitted that he violated probation by having
unsupervised contact with a 13 -year-old girl at a f riend’s house and admitted that he
brought a knife to school. On May 23, the district court adjudicated C.G.H. a petty offender
based on his admission to disorderly conduct and ordered him to complete five days of
community work service. The district cou rt continued C .G.H. on probation and ordered
him to complete the A Step Beyond treatment program, in which he was enrolled. C.G.H.
testified that he had attended 15 sessions of the program and could be in the program for
another year.
On January 3, 2017, the probation department filed a report alleging that C.G.H. had
violated probation by “[f]ail[ing] to complete the A Step Beyond program in the 360 days
of probation.” The district court held a proba tion-violation hearing on May 2 . C.G.H.
admitted that he did not complete the program within his 360-day probationary period.
C.G.H.’s probation agent informed the court that C.G.H. was completing the aftercare
phase of his treatment program and would graduate in five months. The state informed the
court, “Everyone is in agreement at this time that [C.G.H.] is doing well in the treatment
program; however . . . [i]f the Court does not revoke his stay of adjudication the Court loses
jurisdiction.” The state therefore recommended revo cation of C.G.H.’s stay of
adjudication.
On May 25, a different judge held a disposition hearing regarding the admitted
probation violation. After the hearing, the district court adjudicated C.G.H. delinquent and
ordered C.G.H. to remain on probation until his 19th birthday. The district court explained:
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Based on the prior court’s determination of the probation
violation this Court must assume the violation was intentional
and inexcusable. While this court may have difficulty with that
determination, based on its understanding that failure to
complete the program was a factor of time, not a factor of
effort, that determination was made prior to this disposition
hearing. By law a stay of adjudication granted this juvenile is
limited to a term not exceeding 360 days from the date of
disposition, that being January 16, 2016. (See Minnesota
Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 7). The pending
violation hearings tolled the timeframe until this Order.

. . . As concerns the determination for an adjudication, the need
for adjudication is a matter of protection for the public in that
it will allow the juvenile to successfully complete his treatment
regimen without the time constraints associate d with a stay of
adjudication. Furthermore, a failure to adjudicate would
depreciate the seriousness of th e underlying crime, but not of
the probation violation itself.

C.G.H. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
When it is in the best interests of the child to do so and
not inimical to public safety and when the child has admitte d
the allegations contained in the petition before the judge or
referee . . . [and] before a finding of delinquency has been
entered, the court may continue the case for a period not to
exceed 180 days on any one order. The continuance may be
extended for one additional successive period not to exceed
180 days, but only with the consent of the prosecutor and only
after the court has reviewed the case and entered its order for
the additional continuance without a finding of delinquency.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7(a) (2016).
The corresponding provisions of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency
Procedure contain language that mirrors the statutory language. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq.
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P. 15.05, subd. 4(A)-(D). In addition, Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(E), provides,
“Adjudicating a child for an offense after initially granting a continuance without
adjudication is a probation revocation and must be accomplished pursuant to Rule 15.07.”
“A probation revocation proceeding to adjudicate the child on any allegation initially
continued without adjudication must be commenced within the period prescribed by Rule
15.05, subdivisions 4(B) or (C), or juvenile court jurisdiction over the charges terminates.”
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(F).
C.G.H. contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his stay of
adjudication. “When a statute provides the basis for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over
the juvenile, the issue of jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review.” State
v. J.E.S., 763 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Minn. App. 2009). C.G.H. argues:
[The statute and rule] limit the [district court’s] ability to retain
jurisdiction on a stay of adjudication following a guilty plea to
one 180-day period, with the option to extend a successive 180-
day period subject to certain criteria. When the [district court]
stayed adjudication on its original disposition order for 360
days, it ran afoul of these criteria.

C.G.H. concludes:
Because the [district court] failed to enter an order subsequent
to the original disposition order which would have extended
[his] stay period beyond the initial 180 days, Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 7 (2016), and Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 15.05,
automatically divested the [district co urt] of jurisdiction 180
days after the January 19, 2016, disposition order.
C.G.H. relies on In re Welfare of M.J.M., in which this court held that “[a] district
court does not have jurisdiction to revoke a stay of adjudication in a juvenile delinquency
matter after expiration of the [maximum] 180-day period allowed by law to continue the
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stay.”1 766 N.W.2d 360, 361 (Minn. App. 2009) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009) .
In M.J.M., probation-revocation proceedings were commenced and the district court
vacated a stay of adjudication after the maximum 180 -day stay period had expired. Id. at
363. We held that rule 15 divested the district court of jurisdiction over the case 180 days
after issuance of the order staying adjudication. Id. at 364. M.J.M. is distinguishable
because the probation-revocation proceedings here commenced within the maximum stay
period of 360 days.
C.G.H. does not cite authority es tablishing that if a district court does not strictly
comply with the procedural requirements for extending a stay of adjudication, it loses
jurisdiction before expiration of the stay. And C.G.H. acknowledges that this court has
previously overlooked nonc ompliance with such procedural requirements. See In re
Welfare of M.A.R. , 558 N.W.2d 274 , 276 (Minn. App. 1997) (“ Because the initial order
contemplated a term that exceeded 90 days and allowed for an extension of the term
without judicial review, the ord er did not comply with the precise requirements of [the
statute]. Nevertheless, the state agreed to the initial 180 -day term as part of the plea
agreement.”).
Although the district court did not technically compl y with the procedure for
extending the initial 180-day stay to a 360 -day stay, there was adequate compliance with
the statute and rule. For example, the district court held a hearing and reviewed the case

1 When M.J.M. was decided, Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2008), and Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4, provided for an initial stay period of 90 days with the option of
an additional 90 -day successive stay period. Thus, the maximum period for a stay of
adjudication was 180 days.
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within the initial 180 -day period and determined that continu ing the stay until the end of
the 360-day period was appropriate. We fail to see how C.G.H. was harmed by the district
court’s approach, with which he agreed. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court was not without jurisdiction to revoke the stay.2
II.
C.G.H. contends that he received in effective assistance of counsel because no
reasonable attorney would have advised him to admit violati ng a condition that was never
ordered. Specifically, C.G.H. argues that his completion of the A Step Beyond treatment
program before expiration of his 360 -day stay of adjudication was never ordered as a
condition of probation and that, therefore, his failure to do so cannot be a violation of
probation.
C.G.H.’s argument finds support in caselaw.
To find a violation of the terms of the disposition order by clear
and convincing evidence, the district court must necessarily
identify the specific conditions that the probationer violated, as
Austin requires. And, as a matter of fundamental fairness, the
district court must also ensure that the conditions that the
probationer is alleged to have violated were actually imposed
and that the juvenile had notice that violation of the conditions
of probation could result in revocation.

In re Welfare of R.V., 702 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Minn. App. 2005); see also State v. Ornelas,
675 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Minn. 2004) (“[B]efore a probation violation can occur, the condition
alleged to have been violated must have been a condition actually imposed by the court.”).

2 Because we are not persuaded that the district court lost jurisdiction by proceeding in the
manner that it did, we do not consider the state’s argument that C.G.H. waived his
jurisdictional challenge.
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Our close review of the record does n ot indicate that the district court expressly
ordered C.G.H. to complete the A Step Beyond program within the time remaining in his
360-day stay of adjudication. Indeed, the state concedes that the district court did not do
so, arguing instead that the condition was implied. Thus, we are concerned that the district
court’s revocation was based on a condition that it never actually imposed. However,
C.G.H. raises that issue in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
When assessing an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a ppellate courts
use a “two -pronged analys is, focusing on whether counsel’ s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and whether a reasonable probability exists that the
outcome would have been different but for counsel’ s errors.” State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d
129, 137 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). An appellate court may review a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on appeal if the record is sufficient .
Voorhees v. State , 627 N.W.2d 642, 644 , 649 (Minn. 2001) . However, an ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claim generally should be raised in district court, rather than on direct
appeal. See S tate v. Gustafson , 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000) (referring to
postconviction proceedings). “A . . . hearing provides the court with additional facts to
explain the attorney ’s decisions, so as to properly consider whether a defense counsel ’s
performance was deficient.” Id. (quotation omitted). In Gustafson, the supreme court
declined to reach the merits of an ineffect ive-assistance-of-counsel claim, explaining that
because “the record before [the court was] devoid of the information needed to explain the
attorney’s decisions,” any conclusions regarding whether the attorney’s performance was
deficient would be “pure speculation.” Id. Instead, t he supreme court preserved
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Gustafson’s right to pursue an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a postconviction
petition. Id.
Here, t he record does not contain any evidence regarding C.G.H.’s attorne y’s
decisions, the reasons for those decisions, or the advice that the attorney provided. Because
the record is inadequate, we decline to reach the merits of C.G.H.’s ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim. Instead, we preserve C.G.H.’s ability to pursue an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim in the juvenile division of the district court.
III.
C.G.H.’s final contention is that his “plea and subsequent admission to probation
violations constitute a manifest injustice and must be withdrawn.” “Ordinarily, a matter of
this kind may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Hemstock, 276 Minn. 457,
458, 150 N.W.2d 562, 563 (1967). However, if a challenge to a plea is based “entirely on
matters in the record, and no material fact disputes exist,” this court may properly consider
the issue. State v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 413 & n.1 (Minn. App. 2004).
C.G.H. relies on Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 2(B) , which provides, “The
court may allow the child to withdraw a guilty plea . . . at any time, upon showing that
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Caselaw indicates that “[a]
manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty
plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94
(Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law
that appellate courts review de novo. Id.
C.G.H. argues:
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[Although] the record demonstrates [he] was aware of the
rights he was giving up in both his initial plea and his probation
violation admissions, it is equally clear he did not understand
the consequences of giving up those rights.
There is no evidence that [he] was advised at the outset
or ever understood that if treatment did not conclude within
360 days of the Court’s initial disposition Order he would lose
the stay of adjudication.

The requirement that a plea be intelligent “ensures that a defendant understands the
charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96.
“‘Consequences’ refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and
fine.” Id. An individual does not have the right to withdraw a guilty plea based on a lack
of knowledge regarding the collat eral consequences of his plea. Kaiser v. State , 641
N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. 2002). C.G.H.’s challenge to the validity of his guilty plea fails
because he does not claim that he did not understand the direct consequences of his plea.
As to C.G.H.’s challenge to the validity of his admission to the probation violation,
we are not aware of authority imposing the requirements for a constitutionally valid guilty
plea on an ad mission to a probation violation , and C.G.H. does not cite such authori ty.
Even if we were to assume that the constitutional standards for a valid guilty plea apply to
a probation-violation admission, C.G.H.’s challenge to his admission would fail for the
same reason that his challenge to his guilty plea fails: he does not allege that he did not
understand the direct consequences of his admission.
Conclusion
C.G.H. fails to establish that because the district court did not strictly comply with
the procedural requirements for imposing a 360 -day stay, it lacked jurisdiction when it
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revoked his stay of adjudication . He also fails to establish that withdrawal of his guilty
plea and probation-violation admission is necessary to correct a manifest injustice . We
therefore affirm the revocation of his stay of adjudication. However, because the record is
inadequate to determine C.G.H.’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of c ounsel
in the revocation proceeding , we decline to address the merits of th is claim for the first
time on appeal . Instead , we preserve C.G.H.’s ability to raise the issue in the juvenile
division of the district court.
Affirmed.