State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1026

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Darrell Holmes,
Appellant.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-15-577

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bradford Colbert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from his convictions for first-degree possession of a controlled substance,
first-degree sale of a controlled substance, and giving a fa lse name to a police officer,
appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his pretrial suppression motion , arguing
that all of the evidence was the product of an unreasonable seizure and his incriminating
statement was the product of custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. We
affirm.
FACTS
On February 20, 2015, Sergeant Sobczak from the Fond du Lac Tribal Police
Department conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle because it had expired tabs and he knew
that the driver, S.T., had a revoked driver’s license. Sobczak made the stop as the vehicle
turned into a driveway. A ppellant Antonio Darrell Holmes was sitting in the passenger
seat, and two children were sitting in the back seat.
Sobczak approached the vehicle and spoke with S.T. about the vehicle’s expired
tabs and her revoked license. In previous interactions with Sobczak, S.T. had told Sobczak
that people from Chicago were bringing drugs to the area. While S.T. was still sitting in
her vehicle, S.T. gestured to appellant while telling Sobczak in a quiet voice that appellant
“was one of the guys” she had been telling Sobczak about. According to Sobczak’s written
report, he asked S.T. to step out of the vehicle because she was acting suspiciously and he
wanted to separate her from appellant to understand what she was trying to say. S.T. went
with Sobczak to his squad car, where she told him, “This is one of the individuals that I’ve
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been telling you about that comes up from Chicago and sells the drugs up out of
Mahnomen.”
Sobczak asked S.T. where she was coming from. S he said that she was coming
from another individual’s residence, where she dropped off her brother so that he could
buy drugs. At this residence, S.T. said she had seen a large amount of marijuana and heroin
that was “about the size of a softball .” S.T. said that appellant came out of the residence
and asked her for a ride to the address where the car was now stopped. S.T. did not know
appellant’s name, but knew his nickname was “Say Say.” S.T. did not know why appellant
wanted a ride to that residence.
S.T. then consented to a vehicle search. Nothing illegal was found in that search.
Sobczak testified that at that point, S.T. was free to go, but she elected to stay in his squad
car with her children. After speaking with S.T., Sobczak knocked on the front door of the
residence. The occupant told Sobczak that she recognized appellant because he had come
to her residence once or twice looking for hypodermic needles.
Shortly after Sobczak stopped the vehicle, Officer Durfee arrived as backup. Durfee
arrived as Sobczak and S.T. were walking to Sobczak’s squad car. Sobczak asked Durfee
to assist another officer , Miller, with watching appellant. As he approached the vehicle,
Durfee heard Miller asking appellant to identify himself. Appellant said that his name was
“Timothy Walker” and his birthdate was July 1 3, 1988. Durfee and Miller ran that name
through dispatch more than once, but they received no results. Durfee testified that after
he gave this name, appellant got out of the vehicle for a reason unknown to Durfee. Durfee
patted appellant down for weapons, because this behavior was unusual during a traffic stop.
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Durfee felt something on appellant and asked appellant what it was. Appellant told Durfee
it was money. Durfee then took appellant to his squad car and ask ed appellant questions
about his identification so he could input the correct spelling into his own computer.
Appellant told Durfee that he had an Illinois driver’s license, but that it was not on him.
Durfee was unable to confirm appellant’s identificat ion through any of the systems to
which he had access, which included running dispatch through Illinois records.
Durfee testified that he believed appellant had given a fake name because if
appellant had a state -issued license, Durfee’s systems would have shown results. Durfee
told appellant that he was detaining him before putting him in the back seat of the squad
car. Durfee patted appellant down before putting him in his squad car, and he took the
money out of appellant’s front pocket. Durfee then spoke to Sobczak about how he could
not identify appellant. The officers decided to take appellant to get fingerprinted at a border
patrol station, which Durfee testified was approximately 19 miles away.
Durfee testified that he told appellant that appellant was not under arrest at this time,
but that he was taking appellant to border patrol to get fingerprinted because he needed to
positively identify him. Durfee told appellant that if his fingerprints showed that he was
“Timothy Walker,” he would be released. Durfee testified that shortly after they began
driving, appellant said “I have to tell you the truth who I am,” then said that his name was
“Reginald Norvell” and that his birthdate was January 6, 1988. Durfee ran this name
through dispatch, but believed that Norvell’s physical description did not match appellant’s
height and weight. Durfee then told appellant that he was under arrest because he did not
believe he had given his real name. Durfee took appellant to jail for booking a nd
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identification. At the jail, Durfee requested that appellant be strip searched for contraband.
The officers found a grayish-white powdery substance, which was later determined to be
heroin.
The state charged appellant with first -degree possession of a controlled substance
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014) (count 1); first -degree sale of a
controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014) (count 2);
introducing contraband into a jail in violation of Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(b) (2014)
(count 3); and giving a false name to a police officer in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.506,
subd. 2 (2014) (count 4). Appellant brought a pretrial motion to suppress his statements
and the evidence seized from him. The district court denied appellant’s motion. The state
dismissed count 3, and a jury convicted appellant of counts 1, 2, and 4. The district court
sentenced appellant to 117 months in prison. Pursuant to a stipulated agreement and due
to a change in drug -sentencing guidelines, the district court reduced appellant’s s entence
to 90 months on October 3, 2017.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress
evidence found on appellant pursuant to a s earch incident to arrest and a non-Mirandized
statement made by appellant. Appellant argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated because the officers had neither reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the
traffic stop nor probable cause to arrest him. Appellant also argues that his Fifth
Amendment r ights were violated because he was subjected to custodial interrogation
without a Miranda warning. When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we
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review factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega,
770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009) (quotations omitted). A factual finding “is not clearly
erroneous if it is reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” State v. Barshaw, 879
N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016).
I.
Both the Minnesota and United States C onstitutions guarantee, “The right of the
people to be secure in their perso ns, houses, papers, and effects , against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantl ess
search or seizure is unreasonable unless it falls under a recognized exception. Ortega, 770
N.W.2d at 149. If a police officer discovers evidence from an unreasonable search or
seizure, that evidence must be suppressed. State v. Smith , 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn.
2012).
“Investigative stops are permitted if there is a particularized basis for suspecting
criminal activity.” State v. Fort , 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003) . Here, the vehicle
was stopped because it had expired tabs and Sobczak knew that the driver had a revoked
license. Thus, the officers had reason for suspecting criminal activity and a basis for
stopping the vehicle to further investigate that activity. Appellant does not dispute this.
Instead, appellant argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to expand the scope
of the traffic stop to include him.
“When considering whether a traffic stop violated a person’ s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under Minn. Const. art. I, § 10, we first determine
whether the officers expanded the duration or scope of the stop beyond the stop’s original
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justification.” Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 351. A traffic stop may be expanded in scope or
duration if an officer has reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity. Id. at 350.
Reasonable suspicion requires “specific and articula ble facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Davis, 732
N.W.2d 1 73, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Whether a police officer had
reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Lande , 350
N.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Minn. 1984).
Appellant cites to State v. Johnson , 645 N.W.2d 505 (Minn. App. 2002) to argue
that this court has held that a traffic stop was impermiss ibly expanded to include a
passenger when a police officer asked for the passenger’s driver’s license and subsequently
looked into the identification. However, appellant mischaracterizes Johnson. In Johnson,
this court held that a police officer may ask a vehicle’s passenger to prove that he has a
valid driver’s license when the vehicle’s driver does not have a valid license. 645 N.W.2d
at 508. The reason the traffic stop was impermissibly expanded in Johnson was that the
police officers then took Johns on’s driver’s license and ran a warrant s check on it. Id.
Here, the driver of the vehicle, S.T., had a revoked driver’s license; therefore, the officers
were entitled to ask appellant to prove that he had a valid driver’s license. Durfee testified
that he asked appellant about his driving status “[b]ecause the driver of the vehicle was
revoked, and you need a valid driver to drive that vehicle out of the parking lot.” Appellant
told the officers that he had a valid driver’s license out of Illinois, and since appellant did
not have the license on him, the officers ran the name and birthdate appellant provided
through dispatch for validation. The officers did not run a warrants check on appellant.
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By attempting to verify appellant’s driver’s license, the officers did not expand the scope
of the stop beyond its original justification.
After the name and birthdate that appellant provided did not garner any results in
the state where appellant claimed to have a valid driver’s license , Durfee became
suspicious that appellant had given him a fake name. Durfee testified that in his experience,
when an individual says he has a license out of a different state, and he spells his name for
you, but no results show up, he is giving you a fake name. Durfee then detained appellant
in the back of his squad car and spoke with Sobczak about how he cannot positively identify
appellant. At that point, Durfee had reasonable suspicion that appellant was committing a
crime, which justified detaining appellant.
Alternatively, appellant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the evidence
obtained from his search should have been suppressed because the police did not have
probable cause to arrest him. Since appellant did not argue this issue in front of the district
court, the district court did not thoroughly consider if and when the police had probable
cause to arrest appellant. This court has declined to “decide issues which are not first
addressed by the [district] court and are raised for the first time on appeal even if the issues
involve constitutional questions regarding criminal procedure.” State v. Sorenson , 441
N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989).
II.
Appellant also challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress
his non-Mirandized statement that he made while bein g taken to the border p atrol station
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for fingerprinting. A Miranda warning is required when a suspect “is both in custody and
subject to interrogation.” State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010).
The state does not dispute that when appellant gave a second name to the police,
appellant was in custody for Miranda purposes, but it contends that the district court
properly concluded that the statement appellant sought to suppress was voluntary rather
than the pr oduct of interrogation . When determining whether an individual was
interrogated, this court independently examines the totality of the circumstances based on
the facts as found by the district court. State v. Jackson , 351 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn.
1984). I nterrogation includes both express questioning and its functional equivalent,
meaning “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01,
100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 -90 (1980). The crux of the inquiry is whether, from the suspect’s
perspective, the police conduct reflects “a measure of compulsion above and be yond that
inherent in custody itself.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant argues that he was interrogated because while he was in the back of
Durfee’s squad car on the way to the border p atrol station, Durfee stated that if appellant
provided a name and a fingerprint that matched, he would be released, which caused
appellant to state that his name is “Reginald Norvell” with a birthdate of January 6, 1988.
However, the evidence does not suggest that appellant’s statement was made in response
to anything Durfee said. Durfee’s testimony indicates that before driving to the border
patrol station, Durfee told appellant “that he is being detained, he’s not under arrest at this
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time, and if he is truly who he says he is with a fing erprint, [Durfee] would release him.”
Durfee then testified that “[w]hen we started . . . he was in the back of my squad car.
Halfway down [the road], he said, ‘I have to tell you the truth [about] who I am.’” That is
when appellant gave the name Regina ld Norvell. The time lapse between Durfee’s and
appellant’s statement suggests that appellant volunteered the information.
Additionally, t he district court found that “[a]ccording to [appellant’s] own
testimony, on the way to be finger printed, he realized he was not going to be released, so
he provided the name of Reginald Norvell to Officer Durfee.” Appellant’s statement
appears to have been motivated by an attempt to get out of custody rather than
interrogation. This is not “a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself.” Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d at 7 24. There is no indication that when appellant
gave the name Reginald Norvell and the birthdate January 6, 1988, he was responding to
interrogation by Durfee. Thus, the district court did not err by denying appellant’s motion
to suppress his statement.
Affirmed.