State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1034

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathan Lee Adams,
Appellant.

Filed July 9, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-16-841

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presid ing Judge; Reyes, Judge; and T. Smith,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues on appeal that the dist rict court failed to follow the proper
procedures to ensure that he was competent both to stand trial and validly waive his right

2
to counsel. Appellant also argues in his pro se supplemental brief that the state tampered
with evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 22, 2016, St. Cloud police officers received a dispatch call about possible
drug-selling activity. When th e officers encountered appella nt Nathan Lee Adams, who
matched the description of the suspect, and attempted to stop him, appellant ran away and
threw items on the ground. Officers soon de tained appellant and recovered the items,
which included a baggie containing what was later confirmed to be methamphetamine.
The police officers’ squad-car video recorded the entire event.
Respondent State of Minnes ota charged appellant with second-degree controlled-
substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016), misdemeanor
fleeing police on foot in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2016), and petty
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.092
(2016).
Court-appointed counsel initially represen ted appellant, but appellant later fired
counsel during a contested omnibus hearing in September 2016 because he did not agree
with counsel’s trial strategy. Before counse l’s discharge, the district court asked him
whether appellant was competent, and counsel confirmed that he was. In November 2016,
the district court secured a written waiver from appellant and provided appellant with
standby counsel.
During a second contested omnibus hearing, appellant cross-ex amined one of the
police officers who testified that he saw a ppellant reach into hi s pocket and discard

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something out of it. Appellant secured an answer from the o fficer that the officer could
not see the pocket of the shorts that appellant wore that day. The district court noted the
effectiveness of appellant’s cross-examination.
During the pretrial hearing in January 2017, appellant asked the district court to
subpoena his previously discharged counsel for appellant to question regarding whether
the state or the police tampered with the squad-car-video evidence. After the district court
denied his request, appellant had an outburst and made extremely disrespectful comments
to the district court. The district court removed appellant from the courtroom and asked
standby counsel for his opinion about appellant’s competency. Standby counsel answered
that there may be an issue. However, the district court did not order further inquiry into
appellant’s competency because, after a recess, appellant had calmed down and promised
to be respectful. The district court asked appellant whether he felt competent to proceed
to trial, to which appellant answered, “I am of sound mind.” The district court instructed
appellant to be respectful to the witnesses, the prosecutor, and others, and resumed the
hearing.
During the subsequent jury trial, the stat e and appellant each examined witnesses
and made arguments. While conducting the cross-examination of a police officer,
appellant had another brief out burst, used profane language, and demanded counsel. He
calmed down after consulting with standby counsel and continued pro se. The jury found
appellant guilty of all charges. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by not inquiring further into appellant’s
competency.

Appellant argues that the district court s hould have conducted further inquiry into
his competency. We are not persuaded.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution protects legally
incompetent defendants1 from being tried or convicted. Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 718. A
defendant must also be comp etent in order to waive his or her constitutional right to
counsel. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 171 (Minn. 1997).
A district court does not deprive a defendant of his or her due-process right to a fair
trial if it “observe[s] procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or
convicted while incompet ent to stand trial.” Drope v. Missouri , 420 U.S. 160, 172, 95
S. Ct. 896, 904 (1975). The question of wh ether the district court followed adequate
procedures is different than the question of whether the defendant was actually competent.
Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 718. Here, appellant challenges only the adequacy of the procedures
used by the district court to determine that he was competent to stand trial.
We determine whether the district c ourt observed adequate procedures by
considering only whether it should have conduc ted further inquiry in to the defendant’s

1 A criminal defendant is competent to stand trial if he or she “‘has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer wi th a reasonable degree of rati onal understanding’ and ‘has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Bonga v. State,
797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 402,
80 S.Ct. 788, 788 (1960)); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 (“A defendant is incompetent . . . if
the defendant lacks ability to: (a) rationally consult with counsel; or (b) understand the
proceedings or participate in the defense due to mental illness or deficiency.”).

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competence. State v. Bauer , 310 Minn. 103, 108, 24 5 N.W.2d 848, 852 (1976).
Specifically, we “review the r ecord to determine whether the district court gave proper
weight to the information suggesting incomp etence” in concluding that there was not
sufficient doubt of the defendant’s comp etency that required further inquiry. Camacho,
561 N.W.2d at 174.
There is no precise test to determine whether there was su fficient doubt that
warranted further inquiry by the district court. Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 719 (quoting Drope,
420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908). Instead, the need for further inquiry “depends entirely
on the surrounding circumstances.” Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 720 (quotation omitted). The
district court may consider relevant factors, including the “defendant’s irrational behavior,
his demeanor at trial, and any prior medica l opinion on competence to stand trial.” Id. at
719 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908). Any one factor may alone be
sufficient to warrant further inquiry. Bauer, 310 Minn. at 116, 245 N.W.2d at 855
(quotation omitted).
Here, appellant contends that his fixation on the authenticity of the squad-car video,
his demeanor and outbursts at the pretrial hear ing and the trial, and some of his remarks,
including a joke he made during his closing argument, should have raised sufficient doubt
that warranted further inquiry. However, afte r a careful review of the record, we are
satisfied that the district court gave proper weight to each factor.
Appellant did not behave irrationally throughout the entirety of the proceedings. He
worked with standby counsel, made appropr iate arguments, and followed the district
court’s instructions. He even conducted an effective cross-examination, as noted by the

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district court. Although appellant unsucce ssfully argued that the squad-car video was
tampered with, nothing in the record suggests that such argument was the result of mental
illness or incompetency. And appellant’s joke during his closing argument is not indicative
of incompetency.
Appellant’s demeanor at the pretrial hear ing and the trial did not warrant further
inquiry into his compet ency. Although appellant had out bursts and was disrespectful to
the district court on several occasions, they were the result of his frustration that he could
not set forth his preferred defense. See Bonga , 797 N.W.2d at 721 (noting that being
emotionally upset and legally incompetency are different). After the first outburst,
appellant calmed down, acknowledged his behavi or, explained that he was under a lot of
stress because of the recent deaths of three family members, and promised to be respectful.
After the second outburst, appellant again calmed down after consultation with standby
counsel and promised to refrain from further outburst. The district court noted that a jury
trial may cause stress to pro se defendants, indicating that it did not believe appellant’s
outburst was the result of incompetency.
Finally, although appellant argues that he was suffering from post-traumatic-stress
disorder and depression at the time of trial, there is nothing in th e record demonstrating
that his behavior was the result of these c onditions. Therefore, the district court gave
sufficient weight to the evidence and did not err in determining that there was no reason to
doubt appellant’s competency.

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II. Appellant’s pro se argument lacks merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant appears to argue that the state introduced
an altered squad-car video. However, appellant did not make any legal argument or cite to
legal authority, both before the district cour t and on appeal, and we therefore deem the
issue waived. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (appellate courts “will
not consider pro se arguments on appeal th at are unsupported by either arguments or
citations to legal authority.”)
Affirmed.