County of Anoka, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1060

County of Anoka, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Housing and Redevelopment Authority in and for the City of Ramsey,
Respondent Below,

Ramsey-Arbor Properties, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2017
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-14-5758

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Dan Klint, Jason J. Stover, Assistant
County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Howard A. Roston, Benjamin R. Tozer, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant landowner challenges the summary judgment granted to respondent
county, arguing that genuine issues of material fact as to whether the condemned land is
part of a larger parcel p reclude summary judgment. Because there are genuine issues of
material fact concerning appellant’s property, we reverse the grant of summary judgment
and remand for trial.
FACTS
In 2006, Arbor Commercial Group (ACG), owned by Steve Young, purchased land
in respondent County of Anoka. The western part of the land was known as Parcel 20; the
eastern part was known as Tract A. The two parts are contiguous but have separate legal
descriptions. In 2008, ACG applied for permission to develop Tract A by constructing a
multi-tenant office building, which opened in 2009. Parcel 20 was not developed.
Appellant Ramsey-Arbor Properties, LLC, of which Young was also the owner, then
acquired the land from ACG.
In 2014, respondent exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire Parcel 20 for
a new interchange at the intersection of two highways. Initially, respondent sought the
whole of Parcel 20, but later dropped a strip of land adjoining Tract A from the
condemnation petition. That strip became known as Parcel 20B; the condemned land was
known as Parcel 20A.
Appellant’s condemnation award, $412,247, was based solely on the value of Parcel
20A and did not include any compensation for damage to Tract A caused by the taking.
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Appellant challenged the award in district court, arguing that the taking damaged Tract A.
Respondent moved for partial summary judgment. Its motion was granted ; appellant’s
award was limited to damages incurred by the ta king of Parcel 20A and excluded any
damages the taking may have caused to Tract A.
Appellant challenges the grant of summary judgment, arguing that genuine issues
of material fact preclude it.1
D E C I S I O N
On appeal from summary judgment, this court reviews de novo whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact. STAR Centers, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d
72, 76 (Minn. 2002). “[S]ummary judgment is inappropriate if the nonmoving party has
the burden of proof on an issue and presents sufficient evidence to permit reasonable
persons to draw different conclusions.” Schroeder v. St. Louis Cty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 507
(Minn. 2006).
[T]racts of land may be considered as a unit for the purpose of
the assessment of the damages for a taking from only one of
such tracts, provided that the use to which the tracts are applied
is so connected, that the taking from one in fact damages the
other.

Minn. Stat. § 117.086 (2016) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 117.08 (1970) , (predecessor statute,
providing that, in a taking, the landowner is to be reimbursed “for the value of the land
taken” and for “damages, if any . . . to other property involved”). Caselaw has interpreted

1 Because we conclude that the grant of summary judgment was precluded by g enuine
issues of material facts , we do not address appellant’s argument that the district court
misapplied the law.
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the statutes. See e.g., Victor Co. v. State, 290 Minn. 40, 186 N.W.2d 168 (1971) (applying
Minn. Stat. § 117.08).
The measure of damages under the constitutional requirement
to pay just compensation for property, not only taken but
destroyed or damaged, comprehends that the award be a single
award for the entire damage for the land taken plus any
consequential damages resulting to the owner’s remaining
land, considered not as an independent item of loss but as an
element of damage affecting the market value of the tract
remaining.

Id. at 44, 186 N.W.2d at 171-72. A claim for consequential damages requires “p roof that
the land taken and the owner’s remaining land possess special adaptability for a particular
unitary use and [are] actually and permanently put to such use, and that a taking of one
tract result[s] in damage to the tract remaining.” Id., 186 N.W.2d at 171.
In Victor, the owner of a manufacturing plant had complied with a city ordinance to
provide parking for employees and customers by maintaining a parking lot half a block
away from the plant. Id. at 41, 186 N.W.2d at 170. When the parking lot was taken, the
commissioners “refused to consider the owner’s claim that the market value of the
manufacturing plant property was diminished by the taking of the parking lot.” Id. at 42,
186 N.W.2d at 170. But the supreme court concluded that “the taking of an off -street
parking lot required to be provided by city ordinance could have the effect of diminishing
the market value of the manufacturing plant it was provided to serve.” Id. at 44, 186
N.W.2d at 171. The owner’s remedy for the commis sioners’ decision was “ taking an
appeal to the district court for a determination of the owner’s claim to consequential
damages to the manufacturing plant and a jury reassessment of the damages awarded by
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[the] commissioners,” because “[w]hether physically distinct tracts are adaptable to, and
actually and permanently used as, a single unitary tract is a question for the jury unless the
evidence is conclusive.” Id. at 41, 45, 186 N.W.2d at 170, 172.
Here, the evidence is not conclusive. Genuine issues o f material fact exist as to
whether Parcel 20A and Tract A are a single unitary tract : There are disputes over the
driveway, lighting, utilities and storm water systems, appraisers’ opinions, intent of the
owner/developer, irrigation , landscaping, and zon ing, among other issues. The se are
material to whether Parcel 2 0A and Tract A meet the unitary -use standard that is a
prerequisite to awarding consequential damages for the nontaken property, Tract A.
Respondent relies on City of Minneapolis v. Yale , 269 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1978)
(concluding that “the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding that the use of the
[owner’s] buildings was ‘so connected’ that the taking of [one b]uilding damaged the other
noncontiguous properties”). Yale, 269 N.W.2d at 758 . Yale, like Victor, concerned
noncontiguous pieces of property , one of which was taken .2 Id. at 754 -55. Yale is
procedurally distinguishable; in that case, the parties filed cross -appeals from the
commissioners’ decision. Id. at 756. A professional real estate appraiser testified for the

2 In Yale, the supreme court noted that “Victor . . . was decided prior to the effective date
of Minn. Stat. § 117.086” and applied “the newer statutory standard contained in Minn.
Stat. § 117.086.” Yale, 269 N.W.2d at 757 n.1. Respondent argues that “[i]t is not at all
clear that the Victor decision is relevant, given the subsequent enactment of Minn. Stat.
§ 117.086.” But Victor held that consequential damages could be awarded for the effect
of a taking on a noncontiguous parcel of land, and the legislature incorporated this holding
into the revised statute: “[N]oncontiguous tracts of land may be considered as a unit for the
purpose of the assessment of the damages for a taking from only one of such tracts . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 117.086. Far from making Victor irrelevant, the new statute codified it, at
least in part.
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owner that the building taken was an “‘integral and necessary part’ of the entire unit.” Id.
at 758. The taking authority’s witness had been “instructed to appraise [the taken property]
as a separate parcel and not as a part of the complex” and therefore could not “testify as to
the unity of use issue.” Id.
The district court conducted a personal tour of the complex and
subsequently heard oral testimony over a 2 -day period. After
so doing, the dist rict court in its findings of fact cited 14
different categories of facts which supported its conclusion that
there was a unity of use among all the buildings.

Id. at 757. Yale does not support resolving a consequential -damages case on summary
judgment.3
Reversed and remanded.

3 Respondent also relies on Yale for the proposition that “the unified use must be present
at the time of the taking, rather than a hypothetical or even probable future use.” But the
supreme court in Yale was rejecting the argument that the owner’s ada ptation of other
properties to perform the function of the taken property proved that there was no unity of
use: “[I]n Minnesota, damages in condemnation actions are to be measured by the damage
caused at the time of the taking. Consequently, whatever the [owner] did to preserve the
efficient functioning of its operation after the time of the taking is of no consequence here.”
Id.