In re the Marriage of: Nathan Gregory Olstad, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1074

In re the Marriage of:
Nathan Gregory Olstad, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Stephanie Christine Olstad,
Respondent.

Filed June 4, 2018
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-13-8179

Shannon L. Ort, Terzich & Ort, LLP, Maple Grove, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jeffrey A. Berg, Mark V. Steffenson, Henningson & Snoxell, Ltd., Maplewood, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
Nathan Olstad challenges the denial of his motion to modify his stipulated spousal-
maintenance and child-support obligations. He contends that his ex-wife, Stephanie Olstad,
has had both a substantial increase in income and a substantial decrease in expenses that
together make the terms of the original order unreasonable and unfair. He further maintains
that the child -support order also is unreasonable and unfair for the same reasons and
because one of the parties’ children has become emancipated. Because appellant fails to
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that there was no
substantial change in circum stances warranting a modification of either obligation, we
affirm.
FACTS
Nathan and Stephanie Olstad ’s marriage began in 1996, and was dissolved by
stipulated decree entered in November 2013. Appellant is 47 years old and respondent is
45. The parties have three children together. At the time of dissolution, one of the children
was emancipated, and the other two were still minors living with the parties.
The stipulated agreement called for appellant to pay spousal maintenance for seven
years. For the first four years, appellant was required to pay respondent $2,500 per month.
Payments would then be reduced to $2,000 per month and continue for the remaining three
years. The parties agreed that, after the seven years of maintenance payments, the district
court would be divested of jurisdiction to modify spousal maintenance but, within those
seven years, either party could move the district court for modification. The parties also

3
agreed that appellant would pay respondent $478 per month in child support and w ould
pay ten percent of any bonus he received from his employer as additional child support.
At the time of dissolution, respondent’s gross monthly income was $2,87 8. She
worked at Optum Services, Inc. as a coach, working about 20 hours a week and earning
$22 an hour, for a gross monthly income of $1,907. She also worked at Lifetime Fitness
part-time, earning an additional $971 per month. Appellant also worked at Optum. He was
and still is a director of information technology, earning about $11,435 per month, with the
potential for additional bonus income. The parties stipulated that respondent’s reasonable
monthly expenses were $5,093 and that Appellant’s were $6,300.
About three years later, appellant brought a motion to terminate or modify both his
spousal-maintenance obligation and his child -support obligation. He argued that
respondent’s income had substantially increased and her expenses had substantially
decreased since the original order and that the existing maintenance order was, therefore,
unfair and unreasonable. He also argued that , because the parties’ second child was
emancipated, he should no longer have to pay ten percent of any bonus income in child
support or, in the alternative, that the obligation should be reduced to three percent. The
district court denied his motion after a hearing. In its written order, the district court found
that, although respondent’s income slightly increased, so too did her expenses, and she was
still unable to meet her need s. Therefore, the district court concluded that there was no
substantial change in circumstances which would render the original award unreasonable
and unfair. As for child support, the district court concluded that the parties’ agreement
explicitly stated that all child support would cease upon the last child’s emancipation and,

4
because there was still a child not yet emancipated, the child-support order would remain
intact.
Appellant appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court improperly denied his motion for
modification of both his spousal-maintenance and child-support obligations. We review a
district court’s decision regarding motions to modify support and maintenance for an abuse
of discretion. Haefele v Haefele , 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013) (maintenance);
Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) (support). A district court abuses its
discretion when it makes clearly erroneous findings or bases its decision on errors of law.
Id. We analyze appellant’s spousal-maintenance and child-support arguments separately.
I
Appellant argues that the district court improperly denied his m otion to modify his
spousal-maintenance obligation to respondent. A party seeking to modify a spousal -
maintenance award bears the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances that
renders the terms of the existing award “unreasonable and unfair, ” such as by showing a
substantial increase in an obligee’s gross income or a substantial decrease in her need.
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)(1) -(2) (2016). The baseline from which any change in
circumstances is measured is the later of when maintenance was set or the last time it was
modified. Youker v. Youker , 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 2003) , review denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 2003).

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Appellant argued to the district court that the maintenance award became
unreasonable and unfair because , s ince the dissolution in 2013, respondent’s income
substantially increased while her need substantially decreased. The district court disagreed,
finding that a $582 increase in respondent’s gross monthly income did “not render the
current spousal maintenanc e award unreasonable and unfair” and that , “[e]ven if [her]
expenses were somewhat less today, her need would not be fully met even with the
[existing] maintenance award.” Appellant maintains that these findings were clearly
erroneous. “To conclude that findings of fact are clearly erroneous we must be left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Rasmussen v. Two Harbors
Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013) (quotations and ellipsis omitted) . We now
analyze the district court’s findings related to respondent’s gross income and expenses.
A
Appellant first contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that
respondent’s gross monthly income had only increased to $3,459 from the $2,877 that she
was earning at the ti me of dissolution. A district court considering a motion to modify
maintenance must review all relevant factors “that exist at the time of the motion, ”
including the parties’ gross incomes. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(d) (2016). In general,
“gross income” includes “any form of periodic payment .” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 (2016) .
Here, the district found that respondent’s gross monthly income was $3,459 by adopting
the calculations she provided in her affidavit. Respondent reached that figure by summing
her g ross monthly incomes from her employment with Optum , Life Time, and a yoga

6
retreat she hosted once a year. Appellant challenges only the calculation of her gross
monthly income from the annual yoga retreat and Optum.1
Respondent’s income from the annual yoga retreat
Appellant contends that respondent earns significantly more from her annual yoga
retreat than she claims. Respondent stated in her affidavit that she makes about $1,000 a
year from the retreat, which she divides by 12, to get $83 per month. Appellant calculates
her gross monthly income from the yoga retreat at about $282 per month. To reach this
figure appellant adds together a number of figures that appear in a document titled
“Explanation of Alleged ‘Unknown Deposits and Withdrawals’” that respondent submitted
to the district court. The document contains a list of transactions to and from respondent’s
Wells Fargo bank account; each listed transaction is accompanied by an explanation of
why money was being received or removed.
Appellant does not explain why he used deposits from yoga workshops and a three-
month yoga contract with a school district in his calculation of respondent’s gross income
from her annual-yoga retreat. Respondent’s affidavit explained that she no longer held the
yoga wor kshops because she used to host them in her ex -boyfriend’s home, but “after
[their] separation the opportunity to hold workshops [was] not available.” She also

1 Appellant also argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that respondent’s
income increase from $2,877 to $3,459 represented only a 16% increase in her income. He
is right. ($3,459-$2,877)/$2,877 = 0.2023 or 20.23%. But the error is harmless because the
district court’s finding that there had not been a substantial change in circumstances was
not based on its percentage calculation, but the actual dollar difference: “An increase in her
earned income of $582 per month does not render the current spousal maintenance award
unreasonable and unfair.” Therefore, we ignore this error. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61
(requiring harmless error to be ignored).

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explained that her three -month yoga contract with the school district was a “one -time
contract” that will not be offered again. Further, the “Explanation of Alleged ‘Unknown
Deposits and Withdrawals’” document from which appellant gets his figures is a list of
selected transactions that does not account for the hundreds of other transactions that
appear in the record. Essentially, the district court made a credibility determination, and it
found respondent’s figures more credible than appellant’s. We defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. See Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Appellant fails to demonstrate that the district court clearly erred by finding that
respondent’s gross monthly income from her annual yoga retreat was $83.
Respondent’s income from Optum Services, Inc.
Appellant next challenges the accuracy of respondent’s gross monthly income from
Optum, which she calculated at $2,270.03. He argues that her calculation of gross income
is undermined by the paystub that she submitted with her affidavit that covered the
November 13, 2016 to November 2 6, 2016 pay period. He notes that the paystub shows
that her year-to-date gross income was $27,569.88. He then divides that number by 47 to
find her weekly gross income of $586.59. (He uses 47 instead of 52 because the paystub
did not include the five weeks remaining in 2016 that respondent had not yet worked.) He
then multiplies that figure by 4.33 to get her gross monthly income of $2,539.95. See Minn.
Stat. § 518A.29(d) (2016) (“Weekly income shall be translated to monthly income by
multiplying the weekly income by 4.33”). This is $269.92 more than the $2,270.03 figure
that the district court used to determine whether there had been a substantial change in
circumstances.

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At first glance, appellant’s calculation appears to be right. But the paystub’s year -
to-date figure includes $100 for a “Bravo –Cash Award,” $37.50 for a “Bravo Points
Award,” $413 for a “Rewarding Results” bonus, and $1,875 for “Non -Taxable Expense
Reimburse[ment].” Respondent factored in the $413 for the “Rewarding Results” in her
total gross monthly income, just not in her calculation of her gross monthly income from
Optum. But she did exclude from her calculation the $1,875 reimbursement, the $37.50
from the “Bravo Points Award,” and the $100 from the “Bravo–Cash Award.” The inquiry
therefore becomes whether appellant has demonstrated that the district court, by its
adoption of respondent’s calculation, clearly erred when it excluded these figures from its
calculation of her gross monthly income from Optum. Appellant fails to meet this burden.
The relevant inquiry in determining whether money is gross income is whether it is
a “periodic payment to an individual.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710 (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.29(a)); see Lynch v. Lynch , 411 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Bonuses
which provide a dependable source of income may properly be included in calculation of
future income”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1097). In her affidavit—the one the district
court adopted as fact —respondent explained that she did not include the “Bravo Points
Award” and the “Bravo –Cash Award” because she only received the two payments “for
sharing a good idea in the suggestion box and helping with a special project.” In other
words, they were not periodic payments. We do not assume error on a ppeal. See Loth v.
Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949) (stating that “on appeal error is
never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be
reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who re lies upon it”

9
(quoting Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 216 Minn. 489, 495, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464 -65 (1944));
Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (applying this aspect of Loth).
Appellant fails to explain why these payments are , in fact, periodic payments or why the
payments should nonetheless be included in the gross-income calculus.
Respondent’s affidavit is silent as to why it excluded the reimbursement funds from
the calculation of her gross income. “[E]xpense reimbursements . . . received by a [p arty]
in the course of employment . . . shall be counted as income if they reduce personal living
expenses.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(c) (2016) (emphasis added) . In other words,
reimbursements are excluded from gross income unless shown to reduce personal living
expenses. See id. Appellant does not argue that the $1,875 Optum reimbursed respondent
was used to reduce her personal living expenses. Again, we do not assume error, and we
cannot say that the district court erred by excluding the reimbursement from respondent’s
gross monthly income from Optum.
With the money from the “Bravo Points Award,” the “Bravo–Cash Award,” and the
reimbursement properly excluded from the calculation, respondent’s gross monthly income
from Optum comes out to be $2,262.08 .2 Adding to that figure the $1,072 a month from
Life Time, the $83 a month from her annual yoga retreat, and the $34 a month from her
“Rewarding results bonus” equals $3,451.08, which is $7.92 lower than what respondent

2 The paystub lists her bi -weekly income before tax at $1,044.84. To find gross monthly
income, we multiply weekly income by 4.33. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(d). Because we are
dealing with bi -weekly income, we multiply $1,044.84 by 2.165 ( half of 4.33 ), which
equals $2,262.08.

10
and the district court calculated her gross income to be. This small difference is de minimis.
See Huckbody v. Freeburg, 388 N.W.2d 385, 388-89 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that
an $86.21 difference between its calculation and the district court ’s calculation of
respondent’s monthly income at $2170 .51 was de minimis ). Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that the district court clearly erred in calculating respondent’s gross monthly
income at $3,459.
Imputation of income
Appellant next argues that, regardless of what respondent’s actual income is, the
district court abused its discretion by not imputing a higher income to her and using that
imputed income to find that there had been a substantial change in circumstances. He bases
his argument on the purpose of temporary maintena nce. The terms “temporary
maintenance” and “rehabilitative maintenance” are often used interchangeably. See Gales
v. Gales , 553 N.W.2d 416 , 418 (Minn. 1996) (contrasting “temporary rehabilitative
maintenance” with permanent maintenance) ; Torkelson v. Torke lson, 373 N.W.2d 630
(Minn. App. 1985). And rehabilitative maintenance assumes that the recipient spouse will
make an effort to reach self-sufficiency. See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198-99
(Minn. 1987). But appellant ignores the fact that he and respondent stipulated to this
maintenance arrangement. “[A] stipulation fixing the respective rights and obligations of
the parties represents their voluntary acquiescence in an equitable settlement, and the
district court should ‘carefully and only reluct antly’ alter its terms.” O’Donnell v.
O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn . App. 2004) (quoting Claybaugh v. Claybaugh,
312 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Minn. 1981)). In O’Donnell, this court concluded that the

11
presumption that a child-support order is unreasonable and unfair if it deviates more than
20% from the guidelines was rebutted by the fact that the parties stipulated to the order. Id.
at 477.
Here, the district court stated,
[A]side from [ appellant’s] statements that the parties
contemplated [respondent’s] ability to work full time
employment, there is nothing in the record to suggest that this
was a part of the parties’ initial contemplations when
stipulating to the temporary spousal maintenance. Both parties
also agree that prior to her re -entering the wor kforce,
[respondent] was a stay at home mother for their three children.
A maintenance award “must be evaluated in the context of
other provisions of a dissolution judgment.” Rauenhorst v.
Rauenhorst, 724 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
Given the context of the Decree and the circumstances of the
parties at that time and currently, the Court does not find it
appropriate to impute income to [ respondent] simply because
she is not working a full time position at United Health Group.

Appellant argues that this finding was erroneous, but his argument fall s short. According
to appellant, the fact that the parties agreed that the maintenance order could be modified
during the seven -year window in which it was to be paid is evidence that the parties
contemplated that respondent may rehabilitate more quickly than the seven year temporary
payment duration. “That the record might support findings other than those made by the
[district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” Vangness v.
Vangness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000). In order to successfully challenge a
district court’s findings, the challenging party “must show that despite viewing that
evidence in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings . . . the record still
requires the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. Appellant’s

12
subjective view of the stipulation —which explicitly state d that the consideration for the
parties’ agreement to deprive the district court of jurisdiction after maintenance terminated
included “the terms of the spousal maintenance agreement”—is not enough to overturn the
district court’s finding.
The district court also offered a separate, independent reason for why it would not
impute income to respondent. Citing Carrick v. Carrick , 560 N.W.2d 407 (Minn.
App. 1997), the district court stated that it could impute respondent’s earning capacity to
her income only if it first found she was underemployed in bad faith, which it concluded
was not the case. Appellant argues that Carrick is inapplicable. He cites to Passolt v.
Passolt, 804 N.W.2d 18 ( Minn. App. 2011) , and maintains that the Carrick-bad-faith
inquiry does not apply in cases like this one. But Passolt never said that a district court
must impute income to an obligee based on her ability to earn a higher income; rather it
simply held that a district court considering the appropriateness of a maintenance award
“may consider a maintenance recipient’s prospective ability to become fully or partially
self-supporting without making a finding that the recipient has acted in bad faith to remain
unemployed or underemployed.” 804 N.W.2d at 19 (emphasis added). And here, it is clear
that the district court considered respondent’s ability to earn a higher income; it just also
concluded that appellant and respondent agreed to a maintenance award that did not require
respondent to try and earn a higher income. The district court did not err by giving more
weight to one factor over another. See Robert v. Zygmunt , 652 N.W.2d 537, 545 (Minn.
App. 2002). Appellant has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred by refusing
to impute income to respondent.

13
B
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by adopting
respondent’s claimed monthly expenses as fact. Based on his own analysis of respondent’s
bank and credit -card sta tements, appellant claims that her actual monthly expenses are
$4,188.57 and not $5,809 as the district court found . Because the district court, despite
appellant’s analysis, found that respondent’s monthly budget was reasonable, it implicitly
did not find his analysis credible on this point. As noted above, we defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations, Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210, even when those
determinations are implicit. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App.
2009).
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by failing to find that respondent
was living a “luxury lifestyle” far beyond the marital standard of living. Specifically , he
states that Respondent
[s]pent an average of $396.56 per month on clothes an d shoes
($1,506.69 in one month alone); $345.02 per month in travel;
$211.14 per month for hair, nails, and spa expenses; and
$220.38 per month for restaurant dining. These increases and
additions are discretionary and not in accordance with the
marital standard of living.

But that is it. Appellant does not explain how those figures are not in accord with the marital
standard of living. And, as touched on above, the district court found that respondent’s
budget was “reasonable in light of the lifestyle and income that [the parties] earned together
during the marriage, and does not find that [respondent] is using excess funds to support a
‘luxury lifestyle.’” To show a substantial change in circumstances that renders the existing

14
award unreasonable and unfair, appellant is required to compare the parties’ circumstances
at the time of dissolution to their circumstance at the time he brought his motion to modify.
See Maschoff v. Leiding, 696 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn. App. 2005) (making this observation
in the context of a child support dispute) . Appellant’s conclusory statement that
respondent’s clothes, shoes, nails, travel, and spa expenses are inconsistent with the marital
standard of living is not enough to overcome the district cour t’s finding that respondent’s
budget was reasonable.
II
Appellant also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his motion to modify
child support as an abuse of discretion. As the order stands, appellant is required to pay ten
percent of any bonus he receives as child support. He says this is unreasonable and unfair
because, since the order was first imposed, one of the two children respondent was caring
for has been emancipated. He also notes that Minn esota Statutes section 518A.39,
subdivision (2)(b)(4) (2016), states, “It is presumed that there has been a substantial change
in circumstances” that makes the terms of an existing child-support order unreasonable and
unfair if “the existing support obligation is in the form of a percentage and not a specific
dollar amount.”
But this ten percent obligation is in addition to his set specific dollar amount
payment of $478 per month. And appellant agreed to this structure. This court must give
the plain and ordinary meaning to the unambiguous terms of a stipulated judgment and
decree. See Starr v. Starr, 312 Minn. 561, 562-63, 251 N.W.2d 341, 342 (1977) (applying
general rule for construction of contracts to dissolution). The language is clear:

15
In the event [ appellant] receives a bonus through his
employment, he shall pay 10% of the gross amount of the
bonus to [respondent] within 20 days of receipt, together with
verification of receipt of the bonus (including a copy of the
bonus paystub), as and for additional child support. This
obligation shall terminate together with the basic support
obligation upon the last child’s emancipation.

(Emphasis added).

Under the stipulation, the bonu s obligation continues until the last child’s
emancipation, and when appellant moved for modification, the last child had not yet been
emancipated. There was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.