State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1081

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Octavius Tobias Riddley,
Appellant.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-10422

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge;
and Hooten, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Octavius Tobias Riddley argues on appeal that his conviction for first-
degree criminal sexual conduct should be revers ed because the district court erred in its
evidentiary rulings at trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant was married to T.S. from 2006 to 2009. After their divorce, appellant
and T.S. rekindled their relati onship. Their revived relati onship saw appellant abuse and
threaten T.S., based on accusations that she ch eated on him. T.S. obtained an order for
protection against appellant. The order notwith standing, T.S. and appellant remained in
contact with one another; and appellant continued to threaten T.S.
On April 19, 2015, appellant told T.S. that he had money to give her for their son’s
care. T.S. agreed to meet with appellant. She drove to appellant’s mother’s house, and
appellant got into her car. Appellant hit and threatened T.S. in the car, according to T.S.’s
trial testimony. Appellant demanded that T.S. drive him to a hotel. He told T.S. to go into
the hotel and get a room in her name, and he th reatened to hurt her if she did not do what
he said. She got a room as directed, and the two checked in around 1:30 a.m. When
appellant and T.S. entered the hotel room, appellant immediately began hitting T.S., threw
a boot at her, and burned her with cigarettes. Appellant also took T.S.’s phone and accused
her of having sex with various people from her Facebook page.
After a while, appellant told T.S. to take off her skirt and un derwear and to bend
over the bed. T.S. told appellant that she did not want to have sex with him, but appellant

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said that he was going to do so anyway an d used his penis to pe netrate T.S. vaginally,
anally, and orally over a four-hour period. Eventually, appellant sent T.S. out of the room
to purchase beverages, but she instead went to the front desk and asked the attendant to call
the police. Appellant was arrested and charge d with one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct and one count of kidnapping.
Before trial, defense counsel stated an in tention to question T.S. about a letter she
had previously sent to police indicating that she had fabricated allegations against appellant
in a different matter in 2013. The district court stated that the defense was “certainly
entitled to go down that road,” but that T.S. mu st be given an opportunity to explain the
letter if she is cross-examined about it.
Appellant’s attorneys also indicated that they planned to have other women testify
about things that T.S. said to them about appellant, such as: “Stay the f--k away from my
husband, or I’ll kill you, b---h” a nd “if she, [T.S.], can’t have Octavius . . . then nobody
will.” Additionally, appellant planned to have these women testify that T.S. stalked them
and vandalized their and appellant’s vehicles . The defense stated that these instances
would be offered as relationship evidence, as evidence of bias and jealousy, and as prior
false statements. Appellant’s attorney stat ed that this evidence would show T.S.’s
“motivation to fabricate or exaggerate” th e conduct underlying the charges against
appellant. The state opposed the admission of any of this extrinsic evidence, arguing that
it constitutes character evidence and is therefore inad missible. The district court
characterized the evidence as extrinsic, and ruled that “asking the witness questions about
her bias, cross-examining her regarding bias, motive to lie, fabrication, . . . [and] her

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veracity” were all “fair grounds for cross-examination.” The district court initially reserved
ruling on whether the extrinsic evidence would be admitted. Before cross-examination of
T.S., the district court repeated that it w ould allow cross-examination concerning the
identified prior incidents, but “[a]s far as offering up extrinsic or other evidence, you’re at
this time stuck with the answer [T.S. gives] unless I see anything to change my position.”
The district court noted that it did not see a connection between the identified incidents and
T.S.’s possible bias against appellant.
Appellant’s attorney asked T.S. on cr oss-examination if she recalled telling a
Minneapolis police officer in April 2013 that appellant had never ph ysically or sexually
abused her before then. T.S. denied saying that, and testified that she would not have said
that because it was not true. T.S. acknowledged sending a handwritten letter to appellant’s
parole agent in August 2013 st ating that “all of the accusations [she had] made against
[appellant] are false” and that she had accused him of assaulting her “to get him in trouble
and sent to jail because [she] was very hurt that he had begun a relationship with another
woman.” Appellant’s attorney asked T.S. if she confronted another woman whom
appellant had been seeing in 2013, and T.S. responded that she never knocked on the door
or spoke to the woman. T.S. also denied saying “stay the f--k away from my husband or
I’ll kill you, b---h” and denied having said that if she could not have appellant, then no one
could.
When appellant’s attorney indicated an intent to have a witness testify that T.S. had
previously crashed her car into the witness’s car, the district court ruled that it would not
permit such questioning because it was collateral and extrinsic evidence. The district court

5
also ruled as inadmissible any testimony concer ning T.S.’s alleged text messaging that if
she could not have appellant, then no one could. The district court noted that these alleged
text messages post-dated T.S.’s allegations against appellant and therefore did not tend to
show that T.S. had fabricated the allegations against appellant.
A jury found appellant guilty of the crim inal-sexual-conduct charge and not guilty
of the kidnapping charge. Appellant moved for a new trial based on, among other things,
the district court’s evidentiary rulings.1 The district court denied that motion and sentenced
appellant to 360 months in prison.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by excluding extrinsic evidence
of T.S.’s prior statements and acts.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by excluding ex trinsic evidence of
T.S.’s 2013 statements to a police officer and to other women associated with appellant.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the soun d discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden of
establishing that the trial court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby
prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted). This
standard of review applies even when “the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence

1 In his motion for a new trial, appellant also challenged the district court’s refusal to
instruct the jury on a lesser-included assault charge and requested a Schwartz hearing to
examine possible interference with the jury. Appellant raises only the evidentiary issue in
this appeal.

6
deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.” State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).
Appellant sought to introduce evidence, through testimony from witnesses other
than T.S., that T.S.: (1) told a police officer in April 2013 that appellant had never
physically or sexually abused her before then, a statement T.S. denied having made;
(2) told a police officer in Ap ril 2013 that she knocked on the door of a house owned by
M.C., who T.S. believed had be en seeing appellant; (3) said “stay the f--k away from my
husband or I’ll kill you, b---h” to M.C.; and (4) sent another woman a text message that if
T.S. could not have appellant, then nobody would.
When defense counsel sought to call a po lice officer to impeach T.S.’s testimony
on points (1) and (2), above, the district court called a recess to consider the matter. The
record shows no ruling by the district court on the issue, and appellant’s attorney made no
further effort to call or question the officer. We do not review issues that were not decided
by the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Although appellant
argues on appeal that he should have been allowed to call M.C. to testify about T.S. telling
her to stay away from appellant (point (3), above), M.C. was never called as a witness, and
the record reveals no ruling by the district court concerning M.C.’s testimony. Because
appellant made no record of an attempt to call these witnesses and the district court did not
exclude the testimony, appellant has failed to preserve this argument by presenting it to the

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district court. Therefore, we review only the district court’s exclusion of T.S.’s alleged
statement that no one else could have appellant if she could not.2
Appellant sought to introduce T.S.’s stat ement that “if she, [T.S.], can’t have
[appellant] . . . then nobody will” as evidence of bias. T.S. denied saying it when she was
cross-examined, and appellant sought to present testimony from the woman to whom T.S.
allegedly sent this text message. The district court sustained the state’s objection to this
testimony.

2 Appellant’s trial counsel made several refere nces during trial to an intention to elicit
testimony about statements made by T.S. to a police officer and to M.C. The district court
each time questioned appellant’s trial counsel about the purpose of such testimony.
Ultimately, appellant did not call either the police officer or M.C. to testify at trial. Despite
appellant’s argument on appeal, appellant’s briefing does not identify where in the record
the district court ruled that these two witnesses could not te stify or that their testimony
would be limited to specific things. Appellant moved for a new trial, indicating that he
“tried to introduce evidence” that was “largely held to be inadmissible ‘extrinsic
evidence,’” apparently referring to the intend ed testimony of a police officer and M.C.
concerning T.S.’s out-of-court statements. Bu t appellant did not id entify in either his
written motion or at the motion hearing where in the record the dist rict court limited or
prohibited such evidence. We generally will not consider issues that were not decided by
the district court. Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357. And beca use appellant did not properly
preserve the issues related to the police officer’s and M.C.’s proposed testimony, we would,
at most, review for plain error. State v. Melanson , 906 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Minn. App.
2018). “Plain error exists wh en the district court commits an obvious error” that is
prejudicial and affects the outcome of the case. Melanson, 906 N.W.2d at 566 (citations
omitted). But appellant’s briefing on appeal does not argue plai n error. Even if we were
to review the purported exclusion of the police officer’s and M.C.’s testimony, and even if
we were to assume that the district court erroneously prohibited the introduction of these
purported out-of-court statements by T.S., appellant would still not be entitled to reversal.
For the same reasons given below, the outco me of the case would not have been any
different. See Infra, Section II, p. 11-12. The state presented such overwhelming evidence
of appellant’s guilt that the jury would surely not have reached a different conclusion had
it learned of these marginally relevant and temporally remote out-of-court statements by
T.S.

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Evidence of bias is admissib le to impeach the credibility of a testifying witness.
Minn. R. Evid. 616. “Moreover, extrinsic evidence of . . . misconduct may be admitted to
show that a witness is motivated by bias.” State v. Lanz-Terry , 535 N.W.2d 635, 640
(Minn. 1995). Such evidence is used to show why the witness “might change her story” to
favor one party over the other. State v. Copeland, 656 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Minn. App. 2003).
Even though extrinsic evidence may be used to show bias , “not everything tends to show
bias, and courts may exclude evidence that is only marginally useful for this purpose.”
State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at
640). When assessing the district court’s re striction of cross-examination, a reviewing
court must differentiate between “general credibility attacks and attacks on a witness’s
testimony designed to reveal bias.” Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640.
A defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine a witness testifying against
him for bias. Id. at 641. But “the extent to which extraneous matters are permitted into a
criminal case . . . rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.” Id. The district court
“may exclude evidence of extraneous matter s based on concerns a bout such things as
harassment, decision making on an improper ba sis, confusion of the issues, and cross-
examination that is repetitive or only marginally relative.” Id. While the “general rule [is]
that all evidence which may tend to impeach a witness is relevant,” in “instances . . . where
the probative value of the im peachment evidence may be out weighed by its tendency to
prejudice or confuse the jury,” the district court has the discretion to exclude it. State v.
Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1979).

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Appellant cites to Copeland, Lanz-Terry, and State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862 (Minn.
1995), in his brief, but clarifies in his reply brief that these cases were cited “solely for the
purpose of defining what constitutes ‘bias’ evidence.” While Pride and Lanz-Terry do set
out rule statements concerning impeachment with bias evidence, both cases discuss the
extent to which a defendant may cross-exam ine a witness on collateral matters under the
Confrontation Clause. Neither case concerns the use of extrinsic evidence under Minn. R.
Evid. 616. Pride, 528 N.W.2d at 865-67; Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 639-41. Here,
appellant’s trial counsel was permitted to cro ss-examine T.S. concerning her interactions
with the other women. The di strict court warned counsel th at he would be “stuck” with
the answers given by T.S. This limitation was within the district court’s discretion. Lanz-
Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 640.
In other cases cited by appellant, courts have allowed extrinsic evidence of bias to
attack the credibility of a witness when the evidence showed prior interactions between the
witness and the defendant. For example, in State v. Waddell, the supreme court upheld the
admission of extrinsic evidence in the form of testimony from the defendant’s girlfriend
and her roommate that the de fendant had previously raped the girlfriend and that the
girlfriend was afraid of what the defendant would do if she reported it. 308 N.W.2d 303,
304 (Minn. 1981). The supreme court reasoned that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting this extrinsic evidence because the girlfriend’s sexual relationship
with and fear of the defendant showed that she may be biased to testify in the defendant’s
favor. Id. Likewise, in Copeland, we found that extrinsic evidence of the defendant’s prior
assaultive behavior toward the victim, who recanted her claims during her trial testimony,

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was admissible “to demonstrate [the victim’s] bias in favor of [the defendant] due to her
fear of him.” 656 N.W.2d at 603. Both of these cases involved extrinsic evidence of the
witness’s relationship to or interactions with the person toward whom the bias was alleged,
not some third party.
Here, the district court, having allowed appellant to cross-examine T.S. about these
marginally relevant matters, was concerned th at allowing appellant to call a witness to
counter T.S.’s answer would result in a “trial within a trial.” The resulting focus would be
on T.S.’s relationship with th e other women and not on whet her appellant committed the
charged offenses. As the district court aptly noted, it is “unclear” how T.S.’s interactions
with other women would relate to the beating and rape that she reported to the police. The
district court found that the alleged interac tions between T.S. and the other women were
“tangential, collateral, and unrelated to the charges for which Defendant was on trial.” The
district court found that the offered evid ence only bore on T.S.’s credibility and that
extrinsic evidence was not admissible for that purpose.
“[I]mpeachment evidence, like substantive evidence, is subject to the requirements
of Minn. R. Evid. 403,” and “the district court has broad discretion when deciding whether
to exclude impeachment evidence under Rule 403.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875,
883 (Minn. 2015) (citations omitted). The distri ct court, implicitly determining that the
proffered testimony to dispute whether T.S. sent a text message about whether she or
another woman could “have” appella nt was not relevant to the is sues in the trial, did not
abuse its discretion.

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II. Even if the district co urt abused its discretion, any error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Even if the district court abused its discretion, which we do not conclude that it did,
appellant would be entitled to a new trial only if he also demonstrated prejudice. We
review erroneous evidentiary rulings for harmless error in cases where a defendant
“contends that his constitutional rights have been violated.” State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d
701, 713 (Minn. 2003). An evidentiary error asserted to violate a defendant’s constitutional
rights is reviewed to determine whether it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; in other
words, “the jury’s verdic t must be surely unattri butable to the error.” State v. Lilienthal,
889 N.W.2d 780, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotati on omitted). “[I]f the evidence had been
admitted and the damaging potential of the ev idence fully realized, we must be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would ha ve reached the same verdict” in order to
find the error harmless. Quick, 659 N.W.2d at 716.
We are satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the
same verdict even if the ch allenged evidence had been ad mitted. The evidence against
appellant at trial was overwhelming. T.S. testified at length about the threats, beating, and
multiple instances of sexual penetration that appellant forced her to endure. The desk clerk
from the hotel testified that T.S. was scared and bleeding when she asked him to call 911,
and that T.S. told him that her boyfriend had beat her and burned her with a cigarette, all
of which is consistent with T.S.’s trial testimony. The responding police officer also
testified that T.S. was “visibly shaking, cr ying, had a split upper lip , dried blood around
her mouth, and blood on her dress.” T.S. described the beating and sexual assaults in detail

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to the officer after she was taken to the hospital. This description was again consistent with
T.S.’s trial testimony. A nurse also testifie d that T.S. described how appellant sexually
assaulted her. The nurse described in detail the injuries that T.S. suffered and testified that
her injuries were consistent with the reported sexual assault.
Moreover, appellant was permitted to cross-examine T.S. about all of the prior acts
of jealousy and prior inconsistent statements concerning which appellant now argues. But
the district court did not permit appellant to call a woman to dispute whether T.S. sent one
text message. After extensively cross-examining T.S. about these prior statements and acts
of jealousy, appellant’s tria l counsel argued to the jury in summation that the sexual
conduct in the hotel room was consensual and that T.S., motivated by jealousy, had lied to
get appellant in trouble. Appe llant presented his theory of the case—that T.S. fabricated
the sexual-offense accusations against him out of jealousy—during cross-examination and
in closing argument. The jury rejected it.
On this record, it is implausible to think that the jury’s verdict would have been
different had the district court’s evidentia ry rulings on these ta ngential matters been
different. The state’s evidence against appellant was overwhelming and appellant had the
opportunity to present and argue his theory of the case to the jury at trial. The jury’s verdict
is surely unattributable to the district court’s evidentiary rulings. Even if the district court
abused its discretion by excluding the extrinsic evidence proffered by appellant, any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 787.
Affirmed.