State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1094

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kyle Richard Greene,
Appellant.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-VB-17-410

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney,
Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kyle Greene, Grove City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant was convicted of driving after su spension of his license. On appeal, he
argues that the district court abused its di scretion by denying admission of a driver’s-
2
license-application receipt into evidence and that his trial was held in violation of his right
to a speedy trial. We affirm.
FACTS
On the night of February 16, 2017, a Kandiyohi County sheriff’s deputy spotted a
car driving with a burned-out headlight. The deputy initiated a traffic stop and encountered
the driver, appellant Kyle Richard Greene. Greene was driving with a suspended license,
and the deputy issued Greene a citation for driving after suspension.
Greene appeared in court pro se and ente red a not-guilty plea on March 15, 2017.
On April 12, Greene again appeared pro se fo r an evidentiary hearing where he requested
that his case be dismissed for lack of probable cause. The district court denied that request.
On May 15, Greene filed a motion to dismiss his case for a violation of his right to a speedy
trial. The state responded that neither pa rty had made a demand for a speedy trial but it
would interpret Greene’s current motion as a speedy-trial demand.
Greene’s trial was held on June 15. Greene testified in his own defense and admitted
to driving the car, but argued that he was un aware his license was suspended. Greene
attempted to introduce what he claimed was his driver’s license but was actually a receipt
for a driver’s-license application he had comp leted in January 2017. The district court
denied this evidence because it was “irrelevant to the issue of whether or not Mr. Greene’s
privileges to drive were susp ended or not.” The jury u ltimately found Greene guilty.
Greene appealed pro se to this court.

3
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by refusing to admit into evidence
Greene’s application receipt for a driver’s license.

Greene argues that the district court abus ed its discretion when it refused to admit
into evidence his application receipt for a driver’s license. “Evidentiary rulings rest within
the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). A district court abuses its
discretion when it misapplies the law. Johnson v. State, 733 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. App.
2007), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). But even an erroneous evidentiary ruling
will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates “a reasonable possibility
that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.” State v. Post,
512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994). It is th e appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion and that appellant was prejudiced. Amos, 658 N.W.2d
at 203.
Greene attempted to introduce what he desc ribed as “a duplicate of [his] driver’s
license that [he] had” when he was pulled ov er. The district court refused to admit the
evidence because—contrary to Greene’s claim—the document was an application receipt
for a driver’s license, not a duplicate of his license. In making its decision, the court said,
“The application for renewal at the local DMV would be irrelevant to the issue of whether
or not Mr. Greene’s privileges to drive were suspended or not.” Evidence is relevant if it
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
4
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. The questi on at Greene’s trial was whether his driving
privileges were suspended on February 16, 2017. The existence of a receipt for a driver’s-
license application—completed before Greene was cited for driving after suspension—did
not make any fact central to this main question more or less probable.
Further, admitting the application receipt w ould have been conf using for the jury
because Greene insisted it was a “duplicate” of his license—which it was not. Requiring
the state to produce evidence ex plaining why this receipt wa s not a valid substitute for a
license would have needlessly muddied the waters—especially where the receipt did not
speak to whether Greene’s driving privileges were suspended. Even relevant evidence may
be excluded if it could be misleading or conf using for the jury. Minn. R. Evid. 403. For
these reasons, we conclude that the application receipt was not relevant, and any possible
probative value was outweighed by its confusing or misleading nature.
Even if we were to agre e with Greene that his application receipt had some
relevancy, it would still be inap propriate to overturn the dist rict court’s decision. On
appeal, Greene shoulders the burden of demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability
that his verdict would be different if the eviden ce had been admitted. Post, 512 N.W.2d
at 102. He has not met his burden. The evid ence shows that the department of public
safety sent Greene a notice in September 201 6 informing him that, effective in October,
his license would be suspended. A certified driving record from April 2017 shows that the
last activity in Greene’s driving history was the October suspension . Faced with this
evidence, we believe that Greene fails to demonstrate a reasonabl e probability that his
verdict would be different if his application receipt had been admitted.
5
For all the reasons discussed, we conclude that the dist rict court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to admit Greene’s application receipt at trial.
II. Greene’s speedy trial right was not violated.

Greene argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated because his trial was held
92 days after he entered his not-guilty plea . “A speedy-trial ch allenge presents a
constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339
(Minn. App. 2009). “A defendant must be trie d as soon as possible after entry of a plea
other than guilty. On demand of any party after entry of such plea, the trial must start
within 60 days unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
11.09(b). Any delay is a “triggering mechan ism” in which the le ngth of that delay
determines if further review is necessary. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn.
1999). Where the length of the delay is pres umptively prejudicial, courts must make
further inquiry into the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and whether the delay prejudiced the defendant. Id. In Minnesota, any delays
above 60 days from the date of the demand for a speedy trial raise a presumption that a
speedy-trial violation has occurred. Id. at 315-16. Still, the 60-day limit only means that
any delay beyond then raises a presumption that a violation occurred. Id. at 316.
Greene entered his not-guilty plea on March 15, 2017, and his trial was held 92 days
later, on June 15. However, Gr eene never demanded a speedy tr ial. At best, Greene’s
motion on May 15 requesting that his case be dismissed for a speedy-trial violation could
be construed as a speedy-trial demand. Even then, his trial was held 31 days later, on
June 15. Greene’s argument incorrectly assumes that his 60-day speedy-trial clock started
6
ticking after he entered his not -guilty plea, but the speedy-trial requirement is triggered
from the date of demand. Id. at 315-16. Given that Greene’s trial was held within 60 days
of his possible demand for a speedy trial, we determine that Greene’s speedy-trial right was
not violated.1
Affirmed.

1 Greene makes additional arguments in his brief, including that the state failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence, that the district court abused its discretion by not using more context
around a case quotation in a written order, and what appears to be a civil tort-law claim for
conversion. Greene failed to raise these claims in the district court, and we decline to
consider them for the first time on appeal. State v. Hughes, 758 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn.
2008) (explaining that appellate courts generally will not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal).