State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1111

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dontania Danielle Petrie,
Appellant.

Filed July 2, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-16-5394

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted Co unty Attorney, Ja mes Spencer, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Associate Co unty Attorney, Roches ter, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, J odi Lynn Proulx, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of pr omoting prostitution, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by adm itting recorded out-of-c ourt statements as
nonhearsay statements of a co-conspirator. We affirm.
FACTS
While a special investigative unit of the Rochester Police Department conducted an
undercover sting operation targeted at prostitution, a police officer responded to an “escort”
advertisement on Backpage.com and arranged to meet the “escort” at a hotel. The officer
waited in an agreed-upon room at the hotel and was equipped with a hidden recording
device and accompanied by additional officers on standby in an adjoining room. Appellant
Dontania Petrie visited the room and confir med that the officer would pay $200 for one
hour of services. When the officer asked if Petrie would do “anything bareback,” referring
to sex without a condom, Petrie responded, “I don’t do none of that, no.” Then Petrie told
the officer, “I’m just gonna le t her in,” and admitted anothe r woman, B.H., to the room.
Petrie also told the officer, “Yeah, you deal with her. Y eah, I’m just the one who collects
the money. . . . I’m the Madam. . . . I’m in charge.”
Petrie collected the money from the officer and instructed B.H., as follows: “[W]hen
you come into hotels, make sure you, um, check, like, everywhere. You got to check
facilities and stuff like that. And, like, the closet and stuff and just make sure that there’s,
like, no – no one’s there.” The officer assured Petrie, “It’s just me,” and asked if she wanted

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to stay. Petrie told the officer it would cost an additional $150 if she stayed; he declined to
pay more, and Petrie left the room.
The officer asked B.H. if she had any cond oms. She said, “No, I don’t. Let me try
to . . . .” The officer suggested, “I’ll just finish on you,” and B.H. agreed. The officer then
knocked on the door to the adj acent room to signal the other officers for an arrest, telling
B.H. that a friend would be joining them. Befo re they responded, Pe trie knocked on the
door from the hallway to ask about the officer’s knock. As the officer interacted with Petrie,
he noticed his voice echoing through a phone that she held, and the officer understood that
Petrie was monitoring his activit ies in the room with the ph one. Petrie and B.H. then
discussed condoms, and Petrie either indicated that she would get some for B.H. or that
B.H. had them. Petrie went back into the hallway, and B.H. told the officer that he would
have to give Petrie additional money for the “friend.” The officers from the adjacent room
then entered and arrested B.H. and Petrie.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Petrie with promoting prostitution and
receiving profits from prostitution. At Petrie’s ju ry trial, the state sought to present the
recorded conversation between Petrie, the officer, and B. H. Petrie objected to the
admission of B.H.’s statements as hearsay. Th e district court admitted the statements as
nonhearsay statements of a co-conspirator under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The jury found
Petrie guilty of both charges, and the dist rict court convicted Petrie of promoting
prostitution.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
“Evidentiary rulings lie w ithin the sound discretion of the district court.” State v.
Ahmed, 782 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. App. 2010). “On appeal, the appellant has the burden
of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby
prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). Evidentiary error does not
warrant reversal unless there is a “reasona ble possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly a ffected the verdict.” State v. Robinson , 718 N.W.2d 400, 407
(Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
A co-conspirator’s out-of-court statem ent may be admissible as a nonhearsay
statement by a party-oppone nt. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2 )(E). A statement by a co-
conspirator may be admitted if the proponent of the evidence shows “by a preponderance
of the evidence, (i) that there was a conspir acy involving both the declarant and the party
against whom the statement is of fered, and (ii) that the statement was made in the course
of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. The district court may consider the statement
itself in determining whether th is standard is met, so long as additi onal evidence also
demonstrates the conspiracy. Id.; see also State v. Hines , 458 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn.
App. 1990) (stating that “[i]n determining whet her a conspiracy exists , a [district] court
may . . . consider the statements of the alleged co-conspirator”), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 1990).
A conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a crime and at least one party’s
“overt act” in furtherance of that agreemen t. Minn. Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2 (2014).
Minnesota law makes it a crime to engage in , solicit, induce, promote, or profit from

5
prostitution—hiring, or offering or agreeing to hire, an individual to engage in sexual
penetration or contact. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.321, subd. 9, .322, .324 (2014).
Petrie argues that the state failed to sa tisfy the first prong of rule 801(d)(2)(E)
because it presented insufficien t evidence of a prostitution c onspiracy between B.H. and
her. Petrie does not dispute that she and B.H. had a prior agreement to meet at the hotel in
response to the officer’s request for one hour of services. She contends instead that this
agreement does not indicate criminal conduct because there was no “conversation or other
overt acts between [Petrie] and B.H. verifyin g that the ‘services’ involved sexual contact
or prostitution,” rather than noncriminal c onduct such as “dancing or stripping, as was
regularly promoted [on Backpage].” We disagree.
The undercover officer testified that Backpage hosts advertisements for dancers and
strippers. But he also testified that within the “adult section” there are distinct sections for
“strippers” and for “escorts.” Petrie and B.H. were at the hotel related to an “escort”
advertisement, not a dancing or stripping advertisement. And their conduct was consistent
with that advertisement. Petrie told the officer, in front of B.H., that she is “the Madam,”
the one in charge who collect s the money. When the officer asked B.H. about a condom,
she indicated that she did not have one but agreed that the officer could “finish on [her].”
And then when Petrie returned to the room a short time later, she also discussed condoms.
This evidence as a whole amply established that Petrie and B. H. conspired to offer B.H.
for hire for sexual penetration or contact, justifying the admission of B.H.’s statements
under rule 801(d)(2)(E).

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Moreover, any error in admitting B.H.’s statements was harmless, as those
statements accounted for only a small porti on of the evidence against Petrie. The
undercover officer’s testimony and Petrie’s own recorded statements independently
established that Petrie promoted B.H.’s prostitution by soliciting or procuring patrons for
her via online advertising, text me ssaging, and person al supervision. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.321, subd. 7(1) (2014) (defining promoting prostituti on to include soliciting or
procuring patrons). On this record, no reasonable possibility existed that B.H.’s few
incriminating statements significantly affected the verdict.
Petrie submitted a pro se s upplemental brief in which sh e emphasizes or explains
various factual issues and refers to a written statement from B.H. that is not in the record.
She presents no legal arguments and cites no legal authority. To the extent that she suggests
that certain testimony or other evidence sh ould have been discredited or weighed
differently, appellate courts defer to a jury’s determinations on such matters. See State v.
Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016) (noti ng that appellate court defers to fact-
finder’s credibility determinations). Petrie’s pro se supplemental brief does not establish a
basis for relief.
Affirmed.