State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1136

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Hiram Abdul Langston,
Appellant.

Filed April 9, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge
Dissenting, Reyes, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CR-14-449

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After being placed on probation, appellant Hiram Abdul Langston appeared before
the district court for a probation -revocation hearing. Langston displayed disruptive
conduct at the hearing, such as interrupting the court on multiple occasions, providing
vague and evasive answers to questions, and submitting a large amount of paperwork with
quasi-legal language. Concerned about his mental health , the district court ordered a
competency evaluation which Langston refused to co operate with over the course of
several hearings. Throughout this process, the court asked Langston at least three different
times if he wanted a lawyer to represent him. Langston refused each time.
Despite Langston’s refusal to cooperate, an evaluator eventually submitted a report
indicating that Langston’s behavior was due to his personal beliefs that the government is
illegitimate—including the court system. The report noted that while Langston’s behavior
may be unusual, it was not the product of mental illness. The district court scheduled a
new hearing where it resumed Langston’s probation-revocation process. After hearing the
evidence, the court revoked Langston’s probation. Langston appeals, arguing that he was
not competent to proceed, that the district court did not adequately advise him of his rights,
that he did not adequately waive his right to an attorney, and tha t the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked his probation. We disagree and affirm the district court.
FACTS
Appellant Hiram Abdul Langston was on probation, having pleaded guilty to first-
degree assault in 2014 and given downward dispositional and durational departures by the
3
district court. Three months into his probationary sentence, Langston failed to complete a
required nonviolence group program. He also submitted a urine test that came back
positive for alcohol use , in violation of his probat ion. At a probation-violation hearing,
Langston admitted that he failed to complete the nonviolence program and was sentenced
to ten days in jail . The court reinstated the same probationary conditions, provided that
Langston attend and finish the group program. Langston was represented by a public
defender throughout these proceedings.
After the first probation violation, Langston again was accused of violating multiple
terms of his probation —including failing to attend the nonviolence program. At a
probation hearing on January 9, 2017 , Langston appeared before the same judge who
oversaw his initial plea, sentencing, and previous probation violation hearing. The judge
began the hearing by giving Langston the usual advisories for a first appearance probation
hearing, including the right to remain silent, the right to have a lawyer represent him
throughout the probation process, the right to a hearing to contest the charges that he
violated his probation, the right to confront witness es and cross-examine those witnesses,
the right to—or not to—testify, the right to see the government records against him, and if
his probation was revoked, the right to appeal with the help of a lawyer.
Before this probation hearing, Langston had been represented by a public defender.
But now, Langston was alone; and not just alone, but different —his demeanor changed.
From the start of the hearing, Langston was disruptive —interrupting the judge’s
introduction of t he case by referring to himself not as Hiram Abdul Langston, but as
appearing on behalf of his “debtor,” Hiram Abdul Langston. He handed the court a stack
4
of papers that had the veneer of being legal documents with technical jargon, but were
mostly incomprehensible. The rest of the hearing was filled with Langston repeatedly
interrupting the court; digressing into long speeches attacking the court’s legitimacy which
were peppered with unintelligible legal jargon; and referring to himself as the secured party
known as Hiram Langston. The district court tried to make sense of Langston’s behavior,
but the attempts to untangle Langston’s identity went nowhere and the court ultimately
decided to take Langston into custody and order a competency evaluation from a local
evaluator.
Over the next three months, the court struggle d to get Langston to cooperate with
the competency evaluation. In fact, the court scheduled three separate status hearings 1
between January 13 and March 21 and attempted to have Langston meet with a local
evaluator, a county evaluator, and an evaluator from a state-operated agency , including
allowing Langston to meet via video conference. Langston refused to cooperate each time.
And at one of these status hearings, Langston interrupted the district court judge, a witness,
and the prosecutor many times to declare that fraud was being committed upon the court
and to use his time to speak at some length about obscure areas of contract law. Even after

1 The dissent portrays these hearings as probation-revocation hearings, but we believe they
are better understood as status hearings to check in and evaluate Langston’s competence
which seems evident from the court’s parting words to Langston at the January 9 hearing
when it said it was order ing a competency evaluation and scheduling the next hearing “to
determine, whoever you are sir, that you are com petent to go forward.” The court
concluded this hearing with, “If we don’t have a [competency] report by Friday then I will
have to consider continuing beyond that.”
5
being admonished by the judge to remain quiet, the interruptions became so severe that the
court was forced to end the proceeding early and had Langston taken back to jail.
A competency report was filed with the court on April 14, 2017 and acknowledged
that Langston did not cooperate with the evaluation. Nonetheless, after reviewing a litany
of Langston’s medical and legal records, the evaluator determined that Langston was
competent. The evaluator’s report explained that Langston’s behavior was the product of
his personal belief that the government is illegitimate. His behavior was “not the result of
a mental illness ,” the report concluded, “ but instead the result of a culturally or
subculturally held belief system.”
With the competency report in hand, the parties reconvened on April 24, 2017.
There, the court —referencing the report —found Langston competent to proceed and
resumed the probation-revocation process that had been suspended since the court ordered
the competency evaluation back in January. The court then heard testimony from
Langston’s probation officer. After considering the charges and evidence, the court
revoked Langston’s probation and executed his 36-month sentence. Langston appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Langston makes four arguments in his appeal. 2 First, Langston argues that he was
not competent to proceed and the district court’s finding of competence is not supported
by the evidence. Second, Langston claims the district court did not properly advise him of
his right to an attorney during the probation -revocation process. Third, Langston argues

2 The State of Minnesota failed to submit a brief in this case.
6
that he did not adequately waive his right to an attorney which requires this court to
automatically reverse his probation revocation. And fourth, Langston claims the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation becaus e the public policies in
favor of keeping him on probation outweighed any need to confine him. We analyze each
issue in turn.
I. The district court’s competency finding is supported by the record.
A criminal defendant is not competent if he lacks the ability to “rationally consult
with counsel” or cannot “understand the proceedings or participate in the defense due to
mental illness or deficiency.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2; see also State v. Ganpat,
732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007). A finding th at the defendant is competent must be
supported by the “greater weight of the evidence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f).
We independently review the record to determine if the district court gave proper weight
to the evidence produced and if its fin dings are adequately supported by the record.
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d at 238.
We will begin our discussion of Langston’s argument first by reviewing the history
of the competency proceedings leading up to the April 14, 2017 competency report. We
then discuss the report’s conclusions and the district court’s decision finding Langston
competent. Finally, we address Langston’s arguments rebutting the court’s decision,
specifically that the state failed to meet its burden of proof and that he was not given enough
time to object to the report.
7
Langston’s competency status conferences
We start our review with the Janu ary 9, 2017 probation hearing. This was the first
time Langston demonstrated unusual behavior . At this hearing, Langston was verbally
combative, interrupted the court multiple times, and insisted he was not Hiram Langston
but a creditor to the secured party known as Hiram Langston. Because of this behavior,
the court ordered a competency evaluation.
But determining Langston’s competency would be no simple matter. The next three
months would see three separate status hearings that were meant to check-in and evaluate
whether Langston was competent. Three hearings were needed because Langston refused
to cooperate with the evaluation each time. For instance, Langston refused to meet with
the first, local competency evaluator and told the district court that someone had come to
meet him at the jail , but this person “wished to speak to Mr. Langston and I am not
Mr. Langston.” He echoed this explanation about the second evaluator, explaining to the
district court that this evaluator’s paperwork showed that he was there to speak with Hiram
Langston. “I am no Hiram Langston,” he told the court.
Langston’s competency report
Langston remained uncooperative for the court’s third attempt to have an evaluator
meet him, this time a forensic psychologist from a state -operated agency. Still, the
evaluator was able to submit a report on April 14, 2017 . That report found Langston
competent. To reach this conclusion, and in spite of Langston’s unwillingness to cooperate
8
and meet with her, the evaluator combed through a variety of Langston’s medical and legal
records to build a comprehensive history and evaluation of him.3
In the beginning of this report, the evaluator noted that Langston had a history of
mental health issues. The report highlighted the period between 2009 and 2015 where
Langston had several documented episodes of delusions, hallucinations, and mania, likely
due to major depressive disorder, among other diagnoses . But the report concluded that
Langston has not presented with “significant symptoms of mental illness in the recent
past.” The report indicated that j ail records d id not show any symptoms associated with
delusional beliefs and that Langston has not been treated for these symptoms since
December, 2015. Additionally, the evaluator’s review o f Langston on jail videos did not
show any significant symptoms of mental illne ss. The evaluator acknowledged that
Langston appeared agitated in these videos, but his thinking and speech were organized ,
his behavior was normal and goal-directed, he did not seem distracted or trying to respond
to internal stimuli, and he tracked and understood what jail staff were telling him .4 The
report concluded that Langston’s behavior was explained by his personal belief that the

3 These records included the original complaint in Langston’s case, Langston’s pre -
sentence investigation report, his first probation -violation report, his criminal history and
related records, video and audio of Langston at the Koochiching County jail, social services
records, medical treatment and counseling records, letters written to the evaluator from
Langston himself, and the evaluator’s communications with several staff members at the
jail where Langston was housed.
4 For more evidence of his mental acuity, the evaluator no ted an incident in March 2017,
when Langston was taken to a nearby hospital for physical complaints. These hospital
records make no mention of any mental -health concerns and Langston was cooperative
with the officers and medical staff during his visit.
9
government—including the court system —is not legitimate; it was not due to
incompetency.
The district court’s competency determination
After the report was filed, the district court held a final status hearing to evaluate
and rule on Langston’s competence. At that hearing, the court noted the report ’s
conclusion that Langston was competent and asked if he wanted to challenge that
conclusion. This sparked disruptions from Langston and prompted the prosecutor to read
out sections of the report on the record explaining that Langston was competent to proceed.
At the end, the court asked the prosecutor, “So i t’s your position . . . that there is no
challenge on this?” The prosecutor agreed that Langston was not challenging the
competency finding. Langston said nothing at this point. “All right,” the court said, “In
as much as there is no challenge then it appears that Mr. Langston’s competent.”
Langston’s arguments
Langston argues that the state did not meet its burden of prov ing that he was
competent, especially since the evaluator never met Langston in person, which rendered
her report insufficient. But we recognize that the district court gave Langston three
separate opportunities to meet with three different evaluators. It was Langston who chose
not to meet with these professionals. We further note that the final evaluator who submitted
the competency report did not simply file the report without background or research on
Langston. The record shows that this evaluator used a large volume of Langston’s medical
and legal records to paint a full picture of him and his mental state —with some of these
records reaching back many years into Langston’s past. We are not convinced that the
10
evaluator’s failure to meet face -to-face with Langston rendered the competency report
unreliable given that it was Langston’s choice not to be interviewed and c onsidering the
robust and thorough body of records used to complete the report.
Langston further points out that the report noted past evidence of psychosis and
paranoia, which he claims manifested as his claims that he was not Hiram Langston. But
the report did address Langston’s behavior and his history of mental illness . The report
first concluded that this history was not recent, and second , that his behavior fell in line
with his personal belief in the illegitimacy of the government.5
Langston also argues that he was not given enough time to file an objection to this
competency report. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure allow any party to file an
objection to a competency report within ten days “after receipt.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 5(a). The report in this case was filed on April 14, 2017, and a hearing was held ten
days later, on April 24, 2017. Langston claims that it is “unlikely” he received it on the
same day and there is nothing in the record demonstrating prec isely when he actually

5 The competency report concluded that Langston’s disruptive behavior was likely a
product of his belief in sovereign -citizen philosophy —a philosophy where adherents
believe they can divest themselves of government jurisdiction by using specific language
in formal settings. The report explained that sovereign citizens sometimes display odd
behaviors like using “quasi -legal language,” making “nonsensical objections during
courtroom proceedings,” and avoid having their legal names u sed in any courtroom
proceeding in case such use invalidates their sovereign status , all of which Langston
exhibited in district court. The report’s conclusion was that these behaviors were not
indicative of incompetency, which is supported by federal courts that have encount ered
this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 2017) (writing
that “simply espousing sovereign citizen and other fringe views does not necessarily
demonstrate” lack of competence).
11
received it. But the record does clearly show that Langston had the report at the April 24
hearing and that he never filed a formal objection to it.
More to the point, when the district court asked Langston whether he wanted to
challenge the competency determination, Langston became disruptive. Asked at least three
more times if he would challenge the report, Langston would not answer the question. In
light of both the failure to file an objection and the failure to respond to the court’s repeated
questions of whether he challenged the competency determination , we conclude that
Langston had the opportunity to object to the competency report pursuant to Rule 20.01.
He chose not to do so.
Support for the district court’s competency finding
After independently reviewing the record, we are convinced that the district court’s
competency finding was not an error. The district court found that Langston was competent
mainly by relying on the competency report . That report convincingly showed that
Langston had not exhibited symptoms of mental illness in the recent past, that he
understood and could track what people around him were saying, and that his speech and
thinking appeared organized. The report also notes that video evidence of Langston in jail
did not reveal any significant symptoms of mental illness . And the report singles out an
instance where Langston was taken from jail to a local hospital where the hospital records
do not indicate a concern about mental illness and where Langston was cooperative with
jail and medical staff.
Given this typical behavior, the report explains Langston’s disruptive behavior in
court as a pro duct of his personal belief that the government is illegitimate and that he
12
could divest himself of government jurisdiction by using specific language. But as the
report explained, while Langston’s beliefs may weave unusual theories, it is not necessarily
indicative of mental illness. And after reviewing numerous medical, treatment, and court
records, the evaluator specifically concluded that Langston “does not appear to present
with a major mental illness or mental deficiency that would render him incapa ble of
rationally consulting with counsel, understanding the proceedings or participating in his
defense.” We believe the district court gave proper weight to the evidence and properly
found that Langston understood the proceedings and was capable of part icipating in his
own defense. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. For these reasons, we conclude that the
district court’s decision finding Langston competent to proceed was not an error.
II. The district court adequately advised Langston of his rights.
We now turn to Langston’s claim that the district court did not adequately advise
him of his rights before revoking his probation. To support his argument, Langston claims
that the district court failed to adequately advise him of his right to counsel as it appears in
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.04, subdivision 1(4). But we are not sure why
Langston assumes Rule 5.04 applies in this probation-revocation context when Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.04 is designed specifically for probati on-revocation
proceedings. Considering that these two rules contain different advisories courts must
provide, we believe they are not interchangeable. 6

6 For example, a pre-trial defendant un der Rule 5 must be advised of his right to remain
silent, the right to a jury or court trial, and the right to have defense counsel present at
police interrogations and interviews. Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.03. None of these advisories are
13
The rules falling under Criminal Procedure R ule 5 are meant to outline the
requirements and procedures during a first appearance hearing that occurs before a trial
and conviction. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.01 (outlining the purpose of a first appearance
before trial) (emphasis added). In contrast, Rule 27.04 outlines the first appearance
requirements for a probationer facing a possible probation -revocation occurring after a
conviction—the very situation Langston faced in this case .7 Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04,
subd. 1(a). To accept Langston’s assumption that criminal Rule 5’s requirements also
apply to proba tion proceedings would essentially create two different first -appearance
rules—each with different procedures and conflicting requirements. Some examples of
conflicts between the two rules include the previously mentioned advisories courts must
provide, differences in type of document triggering a pre -trial versus probationary first

required for a probationer facing a probation-revocation pretrial under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 27.04, subdivision 2(1)(c).
7 We are not saying that the right to counsel embodied in Rule 5 does not apply to
probation-revocation proceedings. Q uite the opposite. We agree with the dissent that a
probation hearing is a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding that entitles an offender to
an attorney. State v. Ferris, 540 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. App. 1995). Instead, what we
are saying is that the procedural rules facilitating the right to counsel at a probation hearing
can be found at the rule explicitly designed for probation hearings, that rule being Rule
27.04. And the rule facilitating the right to counsel at a pre -trial first appearance can be
found at the rule built for that purpose: Rule 5. This distinction between the two procedural
rules makes sense, because probationers facing revocation do not have the “full panoply”
of procedural due process rights that pre-trial defendants do. State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d
275, 280 (Minn. 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.
Ct. 2593 (1972)) . So w hile the substantive right to counsel remains the same at these
different criminal stages, the procedures used are different.
14
appearance and the contents of those documents,8 and differing burdens of proof required
to release a pre-trial defendant versus a probationer on his own recognizance. 9
When faced with conflicts, we read the criminal procedural rules “as a whole” and
interpret each section “in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting
interpretations . . . .” State v. Carpenter , 893 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. App. 2017). The
conflicts created by Langston’s reading of the rules are addressed by simply reading Rule 5
as applying to pre -trial first appearances and Rule 27.04 as applying to post -conviction
probation proceedings.
Nor does the fact that Rule 27.04 refers to Rule 5 with regard to appointment of
counsel change our conclusion. Rule 27.04 invokes certain procedural requirements of
Rule 5 when it states, “Rule 5.04 governs the appointment of counsel for a probationer
unable to afford counsel.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2 (2). Read in context and as a
whole, the plain language of Rule 27.04 directs us to look to Rule 5.04 to see what
procedures are required when appointing counsel, which then leads us to the specific
provision in Rule 5.04 dealing with “Appointment of the Public Defender.” Minn. R. Crim.

8 A pre-trial first appearance requires a “charging document” which must contain facts
establishing that the defendant committed “the charged offense.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
5.01(c); 2.01, subd. 1. Compare this with the probationary first appearance which requires
a “warrant or summons” which must contain “a description of the [offender’s] sentence
and the probationary terms allegedly violated.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 1(2).
9 Rule 27.04, subdivision 2(3)(c), gives the “probationer” the burden of showing that the y
are not a flight risk or danger in order to be released. But a pre-trial defendant is presumed
to be release d on his own recognizance in a R ule 5, pre -trial first appearance. State v.
Rogers, 392 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. App. 1986); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subd. 1
(“On appearance before the court, a person must be released on personal recognizance . . .
unless a court determines that release will endanger the public safety or will not reasonably
assure the defendant’s appearance.”).
15
P. 5.04 subd. 1(2) (emphasis added). But this does not mean that the entirety of Rule 5.04
applies—only those procedures touching on appointment. State v. Carpenter, 893 N.W.2d
380, 384 (Minn. App. 2017) (explaining that the criminal procedure rules should be read
as a whole and in context with one another). And here the district court clearly offered to
appoint counsel for Langston.
Based on our reading that Rule 27.04’s procedural requirements apply to this case ,
we turn to whether the district court adequately advised Langston of his rights during his
probation process under criminal Rule 27.04.
Langston’s argument is that the district court failed to adequately advise him of his
right to an attorney at his Janu ary 9, 2017 first -appearance hearing for his probation -
revocation process. Because Langston did not object to the court’s alleged failure, we
analyze the district court’s advisories under the plain-error doctrine. State v. Beaulieu, 859
N.W.2d 275, 281 ( Minn. 2015). The plain -error doctrine requires Langston to establish
three things: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his
substantial rights. Id. at 279.
The district court was required to advise Langston that he has the right to “a lawyer,
including an appointed lawyer” if Langston could not afford his own. Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)a. At Langston’s probation-revocation first appearance, the court said
to Langston,
You have the right to be represented by a lawyer licensed under the state laws
of Minnesota. And if you feel you cannot afford to pay for a lawyer with
whatever currency or means of conveyance that you have, then you can ask
the court to appoint a lawyer under our laws to represent you . . . .

16
The district court’s advisory meets the requirements under Rule 27.04. All the court
was required to do was advise Langston that he had a right to “a lawyer, including an
appointed lawyer” if Langston could not afford one. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27. 04,
subd. 2(1)(c)a. The court did exactly that when it advised Langston that he had the right
to be “represented by a lawyer licensed under the state laws of Minnesota.” Because the
court adequately advised Langston of this right, it did not commit any e rror and Langston
fails to establish the first part of the plain-error analysis.
III. Langston adequately waived his right to an attorney.
Next, Langston argues that the district court did not obtain a valid wavier of his right
to counsel , which would require us to reverse his probation revocation. Even in the
probation-revocation process, defendants have the right to be represented by an attorney.
State v. Ferris, 540 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. App. 1995). And although the right to counsel
is a constitutional requirement, it can be surrendered in three ways: (1) waiver, (2) waiver
by conduct, and (3) forfeiture. State v. Jones , 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009). If a
defendant chooses to give up his right to counsel, there are certain procedural safeguards
in place to ensure the defendant understands the gravity of this decision. Those safeguards
require a defendant to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right. State v.
Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 443-44 (Minn. 2006). When the facts are undisputed—such as
in Langston’s case—we review a defendant’s waiver of counsel de novo. State v. Rhoads,
813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012).
Determining if a defendant adequately waived his right to counsel depends on the
unique facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 884-85. We consider factors such as
17
the defendant’s background, his experience, and his conduct. Id. at 889 (citing State v.
Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 275-76 (Minn. 1998)). When allowing a defendant to waive the
right to counsel, district courts should have an on-the-record inquiry with the defendant to
ensure that he understands the charges against him, the possible punishments he faces, and
anything else that would be important for the defendant to know in making the decision to
waive an attorney. Id. Still, a district court’s failure to have this on-the-record inquiry
does not necessarily mean the defendant’s revocation should be reversed. If the particular
facts and circumstances of the case show that the waiver was valid, we will keep the waiver
intact. Id.
At Langston’s January 9, 2017 probation hearing, the district court advised him that
he had “the right to be represented by a lawyer licensed under the state laws of Minnesota.”
If he could not afford a lawyer, the court advised, “then you can ask the court to appoint a
lawyer . . . to represent you.” As the court looked to schedule a future hearing, it asked,
COURT: We can do it on Friday and you can represent yourself or if you
feel you need to—
LANGSTON: I can’t represent myself, Your Honor, I am myself.
THE COURT: Well then you go right ahead—
LANGSTON: I will be representing Hiram Abdul Langston.

At the status hearing to check Langston’s competency held just four days later, the
district court again asked Langston, “Would you like a lawyer?” “No, I would not,”
Langston responded. “Why would I need a lawyer?” And later that month, at another
hearing after Langston refused to meet with his competency evaluator, the court asked,
COURT: Well let me ask you another question. Do you want to be
represented by a lawyer here today, Mr. Hiram Abdul of the family of
18
Langston, also kn own as the secured party, formally known as Hiram
Langston?
LANGSTON: I wasn’t formally known as anyone. Um, no, I would not.
COURT: All right.
LANGSTON: No, thank you.

Also at this hearing, Langston objected that his pro bation officer was not credible. After
the district court denied the objection, Langston said that he did not understand why the
objection was denied. The court explained, “I can’t advise you what your rights or the law
is. That’s subject matter for a lawyer and that’s why I kept saying if you want a lawyer I
will get you one. But I can’t advise you what the law is.”
When we view the district court’s multiple inquiries with Langston, the language
used in those inquiries, Langston’s overall behavior, and the whole context of the
proceedings, w e are convinced that Langston knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel . We acknowledge that the district court’s inquiries with
Langston about waiving his right to an attorney were somewhat atypical, but we observe
that this is likely explained by Langston’s conduct rather than a lack of diligence by the
district court judg e. Langston’s personal beliefs cultivated a chaotic court environment.
We are allowed to consider Langston’s conduct as a n important factor in the waiver
analysis.
And given the overall context and language of the court’s discussions and
advisories, Langston’s behavior, and Langston’s familiarity with the legal system , we
19
believe that the overall circumstances show that Langston waived his right to counsel
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 884-85.10
Langston also argues that the district court failed to secure his waiver of counsel in
writing as required by Minnesota Statute section 611.19 (2016) and Minnesota Criminal
Procedural Rule 5.04, subdivision 1(3). But we previously determined that Rule 5 applies
to first appearances in a pre-trial setting and not to first appearances in a probation-violation
context—which is what we have in Langston’s case.11 And while it is true that Minnesota
Statute section 611.19 imposes a written-waiver requirement, we have previously held that
it is not a constitutional requirement and allowed oral, on -the-record waivers if the
surrounding circumstances support it. See State v. Nelson , 523 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Minn.
App. 1994) (determining that a criminal defendant’s oral waiver of counsel was valid even
in light of section 611.19’s requirement that the waiver be “in writing,” and citing previous
cases for support); see also Worthy , 583 N.W.2d at 275 -76 (“Whether a waiver of a
constitutional right is valid depends upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”)

10 Langston also argues that the district court’s failure to ensure he adequately waived
counsel is a structural error that requires automatic reversal of his probation revocation. A
structural error is an error in a proceeding that is so severe that it triggers “automat ic
reversal of a conviction.” State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 850-51 (Minn. 2011). But
we have already determined that Langston adequately waived his right to counsel, which
means that the district court did not commit an error and we do not reach this argument.
11 Even if Rule 5’s pre -trial requirements applied in this case, our analysis would not
change. The “in writing” requirement in Rule 5.04, subdivision 1(3 ), is similar to
Minnesota Statute section 611.19 and our analysis would be the same for both.
20
(quotation omitted).12 We further note that “[a]ny error that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01.
Based on the authorities discussed, we are convinced that failing to get a defendant’s
waiver of counsel in writing does not trigger automatic reversal of the defendant’s
conviction. A defendant’s oral, on -the-record waiver may be valid if the surrounding
circumstances justify it .13 With this in mind, and given Langston’s disruptions , the
courtroom environment in this case, and the fact that the court asked Langston at least three
times if he wanted a lawyer and was met with an emphatic “no” each time, we conclude
that the district court did not err by failing to secure Langston’s waiver in writing.
For all the reasons discussed, we conclude that Langston adequately waived his right
to counsel, the district court’s failure to capture that waiver in writing was not a reversible
error, and the district court employed the proper procedures under Rule 27.04.14

12 The dissent also attempts to distinguish Langston’s case by relying on State v. Garibaldi
for the idea that a defendant who was not offered standby counsel did not adequately waive
counsel. 726 N.W.2d 823, 831 (Minn. App. 2007). A close reading of Garibaldi supports
our determination that Langston waived counsel based on the circumstances . This court
decided Garibaldi by relying on a supreme court decision stressing that the waiver -of-
counsel analysis is a “fact-specific examination” of the “surrounding circumstances” of
each individual case, and it is not subject to a strict, checking-the-boxes approach. Id. at
829. The failure to offer standby counsel was just one of many variables to take into
account. Id. at 831.
13 We also recognize State v. Hawanchak where we reversed a defendant’s conviction
because the court failed to obtain a written waiver of counsel. 669 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn.
App. 2003). But in Hawanchak, the defendant explicitly asked the district court for a public
defender twice —which the court disregarded, and the court failed to make a record
showing that the defendant waived counsel. Id. In contrast, the district court asked
Langston at least three times if he wanted an attorney and mad e a thorough record of
Langston’s responses. Langston said “no” each time.
14 Langston also claims that the district court should have asked him if he wanted a lawyer
one final time when the court resumed his probation -revocation hearing after finding him
21
IV. The distri ct court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Langston’s
probation.

Langston finally argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation. A district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). A
district court abuses its discretion when “it acts arbitrarily, without justification, or in
contravention of the law.” State v. Mix, 646 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2002) , review
denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
Probation is meant to rehabilitate a defendant, so revocation should only be used as
a last resort when treatment has failed. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980).
Before revoking probation, a district court must do three things: (1) specifically identify
the condition or conditions violated; (2) find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable; and (3) find that the policies favoring probation no longer outweigh the need
for confinement. Id.
Langston only centers his argument around the last factor of the probation -
revocation analysis, that is, whether the need to confine Langston outweighed the public
policies encouraging probation. He claims that the district court had alternate treatment

competent on April 24, 2017. Certainly, this would be the preferred practice. But the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a district court does not need to renew a
defendant’s waiver of counsel unless there has been a “substantial change in
circumstances” after the initial waiver. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 887. Here, the only thing
that changed between Langston’s previous waivers and his probation-revocation hearing is
that he was found competent, and we are not aware of any authority saying that a finding
of competence is a substantial change in circumstances.
22
and local jail-time options at its disposal that counterbalanced any reason to send him to
prison. To weigh this factor, courts consider three questions:
 Is confinement necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity by the offender?

 Is the offender in need of correctional treatment which can m ost
effectively be provided if he is confined?

 Would it unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violatio n if the
probation were not revoked?

Id. at 251. Revoking probation cannot be a “reflexive reaction to an accumulation of
technical violations,” but instead, there must be a showing that the offend er’s behavior
demonstrates that he “cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The district court decided that incarcerating Langston outweighed the public policy
benefits of probation for multiple reasons. The court st arted by observing that Langston
has a history of violence, including a charge of disorderly conduct .15 Next, the court
mentioned Langston’s refusal to cooperate with all three competency evaluations as recent
evidence that Langston “violated his probation willfully and knowingly, intentionally and
without justified excuse.” The court also acknowledged the seriousness of the underlying
crime, mentioning that Langston was originally charged with first -degree assault, which
the court described as a “very, ve ry serious offense.” 16 Given the severity of the offense,

15 The district court judge also referenced a domestic-violence report concerning Langston
in explaining the decision to revoke probation.
16 The court explained that this was a severity level nine offense that carried a minimum
imprisonment of 74 months and a maximum of 103 months in prison.
23
his lack of cooperation with probation, his previous probation violation, his demeanor in
court, and his previous history of violence, the court believed that Langston “is a danger to
society” and that his treatment and counseling would be “ best obtained in a confined
institutional setting.”
Although Langston argues that alternate treatment and local jail -time options
outweighed the need to imprison him , the district court addressed this by emphasi zing
Langston’s prior probation violation where he failed to comply with treatment. The court
was also concerned that Langston’s refusal to cooperat e with the competency evaluator
patterned behavior similar to his previous refusal to attend a required nonviolence program,
which resulted in his first probation violation . And while Langston claims there is no
evidence showing he was susceptible to violence, the court clearly underscored that the
underlying offense was very serious and that Langston had a history of violence.
We are also mindful that the district court judge in this case was the same judge who
sentenced Langston to both a dispositional and durational departure. This is the same judge
who—when Langston first violated probation —gave Langston ten days in jail while
keeping all other probationary terms intact and encouraged Langston to continue working
on treatment. From our view of the complete record, this district judge was interested in
giving Langston every opportunity to take advantage of treatmen t and to help Langston
emerge from this process with a positive outcome and experience. Langston did not avail
himself of these opportunities. The district court’s decision to revoke Langston’s probation
was not made arbitrarily, without justification, or in contravention of the law —the
requirements to find an abuse of discretion. Mix, 646 N.W.2d at 250.
24
Overall, we do not believe the district court made an error in this case. The court’s
competency determination was based on a thorough report. The court also properly
advised Langston of his right to an attorney and Langston adequately waived that right at
least three times. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the need
for confining Langston outweighed the public -policy goals of keeping him on probation.
For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to revoke Langston’s
probation.17
Affirmed.

17 Langston submitted a pro se brief in this case , and after considering his claims in that
brief, we find no discernable legal argument with which this c ourt has the authority to
address. For this reason, we do not address Langston’s pro se arguments. See State v.
Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 740 -41 (Minn. 2011) (“Claims contained in a pro se
supplemental brief with no argument or citation to legal authority in support of the
allegations are deemed waived.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
D-1

REYES, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Appellant Hiram Abdul Langston pleaded guilty to first -
degree assault—great bodily harm. The district court sentenced him to 36 months in prison,
stayed execution of the sente nce, and placed him on supervised probation for four years.
Court-appointed counsel represented appellant from his initial appearance until sentencing.
After appellant’s first probation violation, the district court held a probation -
revocation hearing, where appellant was represented by court -appointed counsel. At the
hearing, the district court ordered appellant to serve ten days in jail and reinstated his
probation on several conditions.
Approximately two years later, appellant violated the conditio ns of his probation
again. Appellant was not represented by counsel during the subsequent probation -
revocation hearing. The record does not contain any explanation as to why appellant was
not represented by court -appointed counsel even though he qualified as indigent. After
appellant displayed unusual behavior during this hearing, in contrast to prior appearances,
the district court ordered a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to Minn. R . Crim. P. 20.01.
However, appellant adamantly refused to meet with the psychiatric examiners and then
interfered multiple times at subsequent hearings, which resulted in four additional
probation-revocation hearings. Appellant was not represented by cou nsel at any of those
hearings either. The district court revoked appellant’s probation and this appeal follows.
Appellant argues that the district court failed to obtain a valid waiver of counsel
during the probation-revocation hearings. Appellant’s argument has merit.
D-2

The Constitutions of both the United States and Minnesota guarantee criminal
defendants the right to the assistance of counsel and the implied right to self-representation,
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819,
95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975), both of which extend these rights to probation -revocation
hearings. State v. Kouba, 709 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. App. 2006) (citations omitted); see
Mempha v. Rhay , 389 U.S. 128, 135 -37, 88 S. Ct. 254, 257 -58 (1967) (concluding that
counsel must be provided during hearings that combine sentencing and probation
revocation). Because a pro se defendant relinquishes many of the traditional benefits of
counsel, any waiver of the right to counsel must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2527, 2541. Minnesota statute and
rules provide clear and explicit safeguards to ensure that criminal defendants voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive their right to counsel. Minn. Stat. § 611.19 (2016);
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4).
Minn. Stat. § 611.19 states that “waiver shall in all instances be made in writing,
signed by the defendant, except that in such situation if the defendant refuses to sign the
written waiver, then the court shall make a record evidencing such refusal of counsel.”
(emphasis added). “ The canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is
mandatory.” State v. R.H.B. , 821 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted); see
Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2016).
Similarly, Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4), states that the distr ict courts “must
ensure that defendants . . . enter on the record a voluntary and intelligent written waiver of
the right to counsel.” Rule 5.04 also mandates that the district court advise the defendant
D-3

of the implications of self -representation, includi ng the charges, offenses, possible
punishments, that there may be defenses and mitigating circumstances, and “all other facts
essential to a broad understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel,
including the advantages and disadva ntages of the decision to waive counsel .” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a defendant
“should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 (quotation omitted). In addition, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has emphasized the need for a “heightened degree of caution in waiver
procedure,” In re welfare of G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Minn. 2000), and this court has
consistently emphasized the importance of adhering to rule 5.04, see State v. Garibaldi ,
726 N.W.2d 823, 830-31 (Minn. App. 2007).
The majority states that rule 5.04 applies to pre-trial initial appearances but does not
apply to probation -revocation hearings. Not so. Not applying Rule 5.04 to probation-
revocation hearings would violate constitutional protections of a defendant’s right to
counsel at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 227, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1932 (1967). Furthermore, it runs con trary to this court’s
precedent. This court has applied rule 5.04 to proceedings conducted after the pre -trial
stage. See State v. Maddox, 825 N.W.2d 140, 147 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying rule 5.04
to a restitution hearing); State v. Balma, 549 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. App. 1996) (applying
rule 5.04 to a probation -revocation hearing). And the plain language of rule 27.04
expressly states that rule 5.04 governs the appointment of counsel for an indigent
D-4

probationer. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(2). The record is clear that appellant could
not afford counsel. When a defendant is charged with a felony, the appointment-of-counsel
process under Rule 5.04 includes the waiver of counsel. Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd.
1(4).
Here, appellant did not explicitly waive his right to counsel because the district court
failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611.19, rule 5.04, or the precedent that
binds it. Beginning in January of 2017, appellant had five probation -revocation hearings
where the district court did not obtain or attempt to obtain a written waiver of counsel from
appellant. The district court did not conduct an on -the-record colloquy regarding the
implications of the waiver, including the advantages and disadvantages of self-
representation, prior to concluding that appellant had waived counsel. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 5.04, subd. 1(4); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541. Additionally, the district
court did not appoint advisory counsel to assist appellant after it determined that he had
waived counsel. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 2 (permitting appointment of advisory
counsel to combat concerns of “the potential disruption by the defendant”).
During the first hearing, after appellant made confusing remarks about his wish to
appear pro se that did not unequivocally waive his right to counsel, the district court asked
no further questions. At the second hearing, t he district court asked whether appellant
would like a lawyer. When appellant said no, the district court ended the conversation
without answering appellant’s question, “why would I need a lawyer?” At the third
hearing, appellant asked the district court a question about contract law. The district court
answered, “[t]hat’s subject matter for a lawyer and that’s why I kept saying if you want a
D-5

lawyer I will get you one.” There was no discussion of appellant’s right to counsel or a
waiver that occurred during the fourth and fifth hearings. Thus, although the district court
expressed some general concerns about appellant proceeding without counsel, it did not
rise to the level of the advice required to validly waive counsel, such as the implications of
self-representation.
Nor did appellant implicitly waive his right to counsel by conduct. Waiver by
conduct “occurs if a defendant engages in dilatory tactics after he has been warned that he
will lose his right to counsel.” State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 505 (Minn. 2009). “The
same colloquy required for affirmative waivers must also be given before a defendant can
be said to have waived his right to counsel by conduct.” Id. at 505. Again, no such on -
the-record colloquy occurred here. The record also does not indicate whether appellant
understood the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself. See State v. Worthy ,
583 N.W.2d 270, 276 (“[T]o determine whether a waiver of the right to counsel is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, [district] courts should comprehensively examine the defendant
regarding the defendant’s comprehension of the charges, the possible punishments,
mitigating circumstances, and any other facts relevant to the defendant’s understanding of
the consequences of the waiver.”) (quotation omitted). Unlike the defendants in Worthy
and State v. Brodie , 532 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1995), appellant did not unequivocally
terminate court-appointed counsel. In addition, appellant was not offered the benefit of
advisory counsel after the dis trict court determined that he had waived counsel. See
Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d at 831 (determining no valid waiver when defendant did not have
advisory counsel). See also Worthy , 583 N.W.2d at 276 (valid waiver when defendant
D-6

terminated court-appointed counsel and had advisory counsel); Brodie, 532 N.W.2d at 557
(Minn. 1995) (same).
Appellant unquestionably engaged in dilatory conduct during the probation -
revocation hearings, and I commend the district court for its patience in dealing with
appellant throughout the proceedings. However, appellant was never asked for and did not
provide a written waiver of counsel nor was he informed of the consequences of his waiver
as required b y U.S. Supreme Court and Minnesota precedent, Minn. Stat. § 611.19, and
rules 5.04 and 27.04. Because appellant neither explicitly nor implicitly waive his right to
counsel, I would reverse.18

18 Because I would reverse and remand due to the lack of a valid waiver by appellant, I do
not address appellant’s additional arguments raised in this appeal.