State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1139

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anayyha Nakashia Black,
Appellant.

Filed May 21, 2018
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-9377

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Christina I. Warren, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of simple robbery, arguing that she is entitled
to a new trial because her request to proceed pro se was not timely and her waiver of
counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 6, 2016, appellant Anayyha Nakashia Black was charged with simple
robbery in violation of Min n. Stat. § 609.24, subd. 1 (2014 ). On May 31, 2016, a public
defender was appointed to represent appellant. After appellant failed to appear for trial, a
warrant was issued, and appellant was arrested.
The case was then set for a pretrial hearing. At that hearing, the prosecutor offered
to reduce the felony charge to gross -misdemeanor theft from a person in exchange for a
guilty plea. The public defender requested more time to confer with appellant concerning
this offer. When the parties reconvened, appellant indicated that she wanted to accept the
offer; however, she later said that she was trying to contact another attorney who advised
her not to take the plea deal. The district court told appellant:
THE COURT: All right. Look. Here’s your choice here: you
can take this deal that you’re being offered or you can set your
case for trial. If you set your case for trial and you want to get
a different l awyer by the trial date that we give you, you can
do that. But you can’t have two lawyers. You have to have
one.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: And now is the time for you to make that
decision. This case has been going on for almost a year.
THE DEFENDANT: I know.

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Appellant then stated that she wanted to set her case for trial.
The trial was set for March 13, 2017, and on that date, appellant told the district
court that she had a private attorney to represent her. The district court expla ined to
appellant that she had the right to hire a new attorney or to represent herself, but to do
either, she would have to first fire her public defender. The district court told appellant,
“If you fire [the publi c defender] the Public Defender s’ Office doesn’t give you another
public defender.” Additionally, the private attorney appeared on that date and said that he
would not represent appellant at trial. Appellant then stated that she would like to fire the
public defender and represent herself until she found another attorney:
THE COURT: You want to represent yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: For the time being until I can get another
attorney.
THE COURT: So you can what?
THE DEFENDANT: Until I can get another attorney in the
process.
THE COURT: Well, you don’t – on the day of trial, you don’t
get another continuance to find a new attorney. You knew
when this trial date was, and the case has been pending since
last June, and you’ve had plenty of time to get a different
attorney if you wanted one.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

After reviewing a letter from appellant explaining that she disagreed with the public
defender’s strategy, the district court told appellant her options: she did not need to follow
the public defender’s advice, she could fire the public defender, or she could hire someone
else, but she could not have a continuance for the trial. Appellant said she was not asking
for a continuance, but was hoping the private attorney cou ld represent her. The private
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attorney then stated that he thought he had made it clear that he was not willing to represent
appellant at trial.
The district court then discussed appellant’s right to counsel:
THE COURT: Now, [appellant], do you want to proceed to
trial with [the public defender] or do you want to fire him?
THE DEFENDANT: I would like to fire him.
THE COURT: Okay. And then you’re going to proceed to trial
by representing yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Would I be able to get a lawyer at that
time to like volunteer and step up for me if they –
THE COURT: Your trial date is today.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: So, if you can find somebody to represent you
today, that’s fine, but otherwise, no.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: You’ve had ample time to do this, and I don’t
know how long you’ve been displeased with [the public
defender], but you’ve certainly had the opportunity to be
talking to him for months and months, and you could have
replaced him long before now.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: So, your trial date is today. There’s no further
delay for that purpose.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: I must tell you if you represent yourself, you
are held to the same standard as a person with a law degree.
The [district c]ourt cannot give you any help. You cannot get
any help from anybody other than a standby counsel, and that
standby counsel would be [the public defender].
You will be expected to know the rules of evidence, the
rules of criminal procedure, a nd to subpoena witnesses if you
want them to appear for you. The trial is not about [the public
defender]. The trial is about what you’re charged with, right?
So, you also have been offered a non-felony disposition
in this case. No additional jail time. You’ve only been in jail
because you didn’t show up for court.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
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THE COURT: And a gross misdemeanor has a completely
different effect on potential future employment than a felony.
So, I don’t know – when I see what you say [ the public
defender] said to you –
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: I don’t see anything in there that’s wrong.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: So, it’s up to you, but I mean sometimes
lawyers get frustrated with their clients when they don’t take
advice.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: And sometimes they get frustrated with their
clients when they don’t follow court orders and get arrested
cause they didn’t show up for court.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: That happens.
THE DEFENDANT: That’s true.
THE COURT: And that’s not – that doesn’t make him an
ineffective lawyer.

Appellant again stated that she hoped the private attorney would agree to represent her, but
the private attorney again stated that he was not willing to do so. After more conversation,
appellant then stated, “I’ll fire [the public defender] and represent myself today and then if
he will stay and be my counsel for the trial, I appreciate that.” The public defender then
was appointed as standby counsel.
On March 14, 2017, the district court provided appellant with a “written petition to
proceed pro se” and instructed appellant to ask standby counsel any questions that she had.
The district court emphasized that the petition advised appellant of all the responsibilities
of representing herself and that she had to sign the documents to indicate that she
understood. The parties then went off the record for “fifteen, twenty minutes” for appellant
to discuss the petition with standby counsel. Appellant rejected the offer to plead to a gross
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misdemeanor and proceeded to trial. The district court asked appellant if she read the
petition and understood it.
THE DEFENDANT : Kind of. I don’t really understand
exactly what I’m reading.
THE COURT: I’m sorry?
THE DEFENDANT: I said kind of. I don’t understand exactly
what I’m reading.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you had quite a [n] extensive
conversation with [standby counsel]. Did you discuss that?
THE DEFENDANT : Yes. But – so this means I’m just
representing myself, right? And if I have any questions, he’ll
be willing to, like, answer my questions pretty much?
THE COURT: Okay. You’re representing yourself. Part of
representing yourself is that you [are] held to the same standard
as a lawyer. You don’t get any special consideration really. I
mean, we’ll make sure you understand the words we’re saying
and we won’t use a bunch of legal language, but if you don’t
understand the law, you can ask [standby co unsel] questions
but you don’t have – nobody can give you – I can’t give you
legal advice. You know that, right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And you will have to figure out how to
try a case.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: And we can give you the Rules of E vidence
and the Rules of Procedure, but that’s about it.
THE DEFENDANT : I just have another question. Exactly
what am I fighting? Am I fighting a simple robbery charge?
THE COURT: Yes. If you go to trial, you’re fighting a simple
robbery charge.

Appellant then consulted with standby counsel off the record, and she elected to waive a
jury. The district court then explained the trial process and how to subpoena a witness.
The trial began on March 14, 2017 , and lasted two days. Th roughout the trial,
standby counsel assisted appellant in her defense. Appellant was convicted of the charged
felony and was sentenced.
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This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant does not argue that the district court erred by refusing to appoint a
substitute counsel or by refusing to grant a continuance; rather, she argues that the district
court erred when it granted her request for self-representation because her request was not
timely and her waiver of counsel was not done knowingly and intelligently.
Under the Minnesota and the United States Constitutions, a criminal defendant is
guaranteed the right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. However,
a defendant also has a constitutional right to represent herself. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d
880, 885 (Minn. 2012). When a defendant seeks to represent herself, the district court
“must determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives right to counsel.” State v. Richards, 456
N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 1990) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct.
2525, 2541 (1975)). This court will reverse a district court’s finding that a waiver of
counsel is valid if that finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 276
(Minn. 1998). “A finding is clearly erroneous when there is no reasonable evidence to
support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake occurred.” Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 885. However, when the facts a re
undisputed, whether a waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent is a constitutional
question that this court reviews de novo. Id.
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I.
Appellant argues that the district court should not have allowed her to represent
herself because her request to proceed pro se was not timely . To support her argument,
appellant cites an Eighth Circuit case that affirmed a district court’s denial of defendant’s
request for self -representation because the district cour t judge was “well within his
discretion” to determine the request was untimely when it was “made for the first time on
the morning of trial.” Parton v. Wyrick , 704 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1983). However,
despite appellant’s suggestion, Parton does not hold that , when a defendant requests to
represent herself on the day of trial, the request is automatically untimely. It holds that the
district court was within its discretion to deny the defendant’s request under those
circumstances. Additionally, the timing of Parton’s request was only one reason the district
court denied her petition to represent herself. See i d. (considering the gravity of the
possible punishment and determining self -representation might result in injustice to
defendant). Whether a request for self-representation is timely is a discretionary matter for
the district court to consider for the sake of its own efficiency.
When discussing a defendant’s request to relinquish self-representation after having
waived her right to c ounsel, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the district court
has discretion to decide if the request is timely. State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 205
(Minn. 1996) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 n.46 ). In Richards,
the district court denied appellant’s request to relinquish self-representation after balancing
it “against the progress of the trial to date, the readiness of standby counsel to proceed, and
the possible disruption of the proceedings.” 552 N.W.2d at 206-07.
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Here, appellant requested to proceed pro se the morning of her trial date, but before
the trial had begun, so there was no risk of disrupting the proceedings or the progress of
the trial. The public defender whom appellant had fired was present and will ing to be
appointed as standby counsel. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting
appellant’s request to represent herself.
II.
Appellant next asserts that her waiver of counsel was not made knowingly and
intelligently. Generally, in felony cases, a defendant must sign a written waiver of the right
to counsel, but if she refuses to sign a waiver, “the [district] court shall make a record
evidencing such refusal of counsel .” Minn. Stat. § 611.19 (2014). Before accepting a
signed waiver, t he district court must “fully advise the defendant by intense inquiry
regarding the nature of the charges, the possible punishment, mitigating circumstances, and
all facts essential to a broad understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right
to counsel, including the advantages and disadvantages of the decision to waive counsel.”
State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “Whether a waiver
of a constitutional right was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.” Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 884 (citing Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 275-76).
Appellant argues that her waiver was not knowing and intelligent because the
district court “never meaningfully questioned her about whether she truly grasped th e
ramifications of her decision ” as is required by State v. Krejci , 458 N.W.2d 407 (Minn.
1990). Respondent counters that the district court had numerous discussions with appellant
10
that contradict appellant’s claim. The district court warned appellant multiple times about
the risks of proceeding pro se . Specifically, the district cou rt warned appellant that she
would be held to the same standards as an attorney and she would be expected to know the
rules of evidence, the rules of criminal procedure, and how to subpoena witnesses.
The district court reviewed appellant’s letter that exp lained why she wanted to fire
her public defender. It then informed appellant that it did not believe that the public
defender had done anything wrong. The district court informed appellant that, if she chose
to fire her public defender on the day of trial, she would not be provided with another public
defender and would not be granted a continuance to find private counsel. The district court
reminded appellant that she had been o ffered a non-felony disposition, which meant that,
if she took it, she would not have to serve any more jail time. The district court informed
appellant that a felony conviction had more serious consequences for potential future
employment than a gross -misdemeanor conviction. The district court then extensively
walked appellant through what proceeding p ro se entailed, and appellant signed a written
petition waiving her right to counsel . Appellant acknowledged that she and the public
defender talked about what the waiver said.
The district court gave appellant ample information to ensure her waiver was made
knowingly and intelligently. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting appellant’s
request to proceed pro se.
Affirmed.