In re the Guardianship of Daniel J. Carlson

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1141

In re the Guardianship of
Daniel J. Carlson

Filed April 23, 2018
Affirmed in part and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Pope County District Court
File No. 61-PR-15-337

John E. Mack, Mack & Daby P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant Daniel Carlson)

Neil Nelson, Pope County Attorney, Troy Nelson, Assistant County Attorney, Glenwood,
Minnesota (for respondent Pope County)

Paul A. Jeddeloh, Jeddeloh & Snyder, P.A ., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent
Presbyterian Family Foundation)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-ward Daniel Carlson appeals fr om the district court’s denial of his
petition to terminate or modify his guardianship and denial of his objection to respondent-
guardian Presbyterian Family Foundation’s (PFF) sale of his personal property. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Carlson failed to establish
a prima facie case for terminati on, we affirm the decision to continue the guardianship.

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However, because the district court made insu fficient factual findings to permit appellate
review of the personal-property sale, we remand that issue to the district court.
FACTS
In September of 2015, PFF was appointed as Carlson’s guardian after the district
court found that he was incapable of meetin g his own needs for medical care, nutrition,
safety, and shelter. Carlson did not appeal that appointment.
In October of 2016, Carlson received his annual notice of right to petition for
restoration to capacity, and he promptly filed such a petition. A hearing was originally
scheduled for December 23 but then rescheduled for March 8, 2017. In the interim, PFF
filed a notice of intent to dispose of persona l property, Carlson objected, and the disposal
hearing was consolidated with the termination-of-guardianship hearing.
At the consolidated hearing, Carlson tes tified that he was able to make decisions
regarding his health care, which mental health services he needed, and which physicians to
see, without assistance from PFF. He also te stified that he planned to start his painting
business again. Carlson filed an affidavit st ating that his circumstances and capacity “to
provide for [his] support, care, education, health and welfare” had improved so much that
he was no longer incapacitated. Further, Ca rlson submitted a recent rule 20 evaluation 1
that had found him competent to stand trial in an unrelated criminal case. Finally, Carlson
objected to the sale of his personal property because “there is no harm in [his] retaining the

1 A rule 20 evaluation is an evaluation to determine a criminal defendant’s competency to
participate in criminal proceedings. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01.

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few items of personal property and vehicles/watercraft [he] possess[es] as they are of
nominal value.”
In support of continuing the guardianship , PFF elicited testimony from Carlson that,
although he planned to move out of his current housing facility, he had not begun looking
for alternative housing and needed assistance in finding housing at that point in his life.
Additionally, Carlson conceded that he was unable to obtain transportation to his criminal-
case hearings on his own and that, contrary to his direct testimony, he did not “plan on
getting back into the business” of painting.
PFF also presented testimony from Carls on’s guardianship-services provider. She
testified that she did “most of the legwork” to find Carlson’s current housing and that he
would be unable to find housin g on his own. She then de scribed Carlson’s financial
decisions before the guardianship, saying that “he blew through [his funds] with everything
he bought,” buying three pickups despite lacking a driver’s license. She testified that PFF’s
accounting department managed Carlson’s soci al security income, that doing so was
“extremely confusing for [them] ,” and that she could not “i magine how [Carlson] would
have been able to handle it.” She concluded by saying that Carlson needed “assistance in
securing the necessities of life such as food and clothing,” as well as “with medical matters
in trying to set up medical appointments and things of that nature.”
The district court issued an order de nying Carlson’s petition to be restored to
capacity and denying his objection to PFF’s disp osal of his personal property. The court
found that, other than the rule 20 report, “Carlson has provided no further expert testimony
. . . that provides an opinion that the conditions diagnosed” at the time the guardianship

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was established “have dissipated or will likely dissipate with time or treatment.” Because
the report evaluated only Carlson’s competence to stand trial and not his “ability to make
responsible decisions regarding his medical care, nutrition, clothing, shelter, or safety,” the
district court found it unpersuasive. Instead, the district court noted that the report “was
similar to the assessment” made at the time guardianship was established “with regard to
Carlson’s limited concentration, brain trauma from head injuries, delusions, chemical and
alcohol addictions, antisocial be havior and depressive disorder.” As a result, the district
court concluded that the report “does not provide . . . prima facie evidence that his
guardianship should end.” With respect to its denial of Carlson’s objection to the sale of
his personal property, the district court described PFF’s contention that sale was necessary
to provide for Carlson’s needs but did not make any factual findings.
Carlson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Carlson’s petition to
modify or terminate his guardianship.

Carlson challenges the district court’s c onclusion that his guardianship should not
be terminated, arguing that the district cour t failed to consider the necessary factors for
continuing the guardianship, failed to c onsider converting th e guardianship to a
conservatorship, and failed to address his request to discharge PFF and appoint a different
guardian. We review guardian-removal de cisions for an abuse of discretion. In re
Guardianship of DeYoung , 801 N.W.2d 211, 216 (Minn. App. 2011). “We defer to the
district court’s factual determ inations and credibility assessmen ts. But because a district

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court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law, we apply a de novo standard of
review to its interpretation of statutes[.]” In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d 710,
714 (Minn. App. 2014) (citations omitted).
“A ward . . . may petition for removal of a guardian or conservator on the ground
that removal would be in the best interest of the ward or protected person or for other good
cause.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-112(b) (2016 ). “Upon presentation by the petitioner of
evidence establishing a prima facie case for termination, the court shall order the
termination and discharge the guardian unle ss it is proven that continuation of the
guardianship is in the best interest of the ward.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-317(c) (2016).
Additionally, “the court may terminate a guard ianship if the ward no longer needs the
assistance or protection of a gu ardian.” Minn. Stat. § 524. 5-317(b) (2016). Finally, in
addition to terminating the guardianship, a court “may modify the type of appointment or
powers granted to the guardian if the extent of protection or assistance previously granted
is currently excessive or insufficient.” Id.
The district court concluded that Carls on had failed in “estab lishing a prima facie
case for termination,” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-317 (c), because there was no evidence that the
circumstances leading to the establishment of the guardianship had changed. This factual
determination is supported by the record. Carlson’s guardianship was established in 2015
because he was unable to meet his needs for “medical care, nutrition, safety, and shelter.”
In support of changed circumstances, Carls on relied primarily on th e rule 20 evaluation
that found him competent to stand trial. Howe ver, as the district court noted, that report
“did not specifically address the question of Carlson’s restoration to capacity.” Instead, it

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showed that the conditions leading to the guardianship were unchanged. Witness testimony
confirms the district court’s assessment. Carlson’s guardianship-services provider testified
that Carlson still required assistance for medica l care, nutrition, and housing. In light of
this testimony and the district court’s appropriate weighing of the rule 20 report, the court
was within its discretion in concluding that Carlson’s guardianship should be continued.
We also reject Carlson’s argument that th e district court should have converted the
guardianship to a conservatorship. Conservatorships invest the conservator with the power
to manage the ward’s financial matters, whereas guardianships invest the guardian with the
power to establish an abode and impose the duty to ensure food and medical care. Compare
Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(1), (2) (2016) ( listing powers and duties of a guardian), with
Minn. Stat. § 524.5-417(c) (listing powers of conservator). Ther e was testimony that
Carlson is incapable of more than just managing his finances ; he also requires assistance
in obtaining housing and medi cal care. Based on that testimony, the district court was
within its discretion in refusing to convert the guardianship to a conservatorship.
Carlson also complains that the district court did not discharge PFF as his guardian
and appoint a different entity. But Carlson ra ised that argument for the first time before
this court. Although Carl son’s petition to the district court did say “Petition for
Termination of Guardianship/Conservator ship and Discharge of Guardianship/
Conservatorship,” at the hear ing on his petition, Ca rlson indicated that the only issues
before the court were terminating the guardianship and disposing of his personal property,
not discharging his current gua rdian and appointing a new one. “It is well settled that a
party may not raise for the first time on appeal a matter not presented to the court below.”

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In re Welfare of K.T. , 327 N.W.2d 13, 16-17 (Minn. 1 982). Because Carlson did not
present the district court with a request that PFF be discharged, we do not consider this
argument here.
II. The district court made insufficient factual findings to permit appellate review
of its order denying Carlson’s objectio n to PFF’s disposal of his personal
property.

Carlson challenges the district court’s deni al of his objection to PFF’s disposal of
his personal property, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prov e that the sale of
the property was necessary to cover Carlson’s expenses. We review a district court’s
approval of a guardian’s proposed property di sposal for an abuse of discretion. Cf.
O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d at 714 (“We review a district court’s determination of the terms of a
guardianship for an abuse of discretion.”); In re Conservatorship of Brady , 607 N.W.2d
781, 784 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the district court’s determination of what is in the
conservatee’s best interests is an ultimate issue deduced from other facts in the record, we
review that determination for an abuse of di scretion.”). But even discretionary decisions
that fall within statutory limits must be supported by factual findings. See Lee v. Lee, 775
N.W.2d 631, 643 (Minn. 2009 ) (remanding for the district court to make factual findings
supporting its discretionary decision regard ing the effective date for modification of
maintenance).
Guardians have “the duty to provide for the ward’s care, comfort, and maintenance
needs, including food, clothing, shelter, health care, social and recreational requirements,
and, whenever appropriate, training, education, and habilitation or rehabilitation.” Minn.
Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2). If these require ments cannot be met “through governmental

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benefits or services to which the ward is entitled,” then the guardian may turn to the ward’s
estate to do so. Id. In evaluating whether expenses sh ould be incurred on behalf of the
ward, “[t]he best interests of the ward should be the decisive factor in making any choice
on his behalf.” See Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 583, 2 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1942).
The district court’s order deals almost entirely with whether Carlson’s guardianship
should be terminated. Only one sentence in the findings of fact addresses the necessity of
PFF’s sale of property. It reads, in its en tirety, “PFF contends the sale of the personal
property of Carlson is necessa ry to provide basic shelter, food, and medical treatment or
care; including pharmacological treatment for mental illness.” Further, this one sentence
merely recites PFF’s position, rather than explicitly saying the court found that position
credible. This court has previously indicated that such recitations are not proper findings
because they merely restate testimony rath er than adopt that testimony as true. O’Brien,
847 N.W.2d at 716. The district court’s order goes on to conclude that conservators have
the duty “to pay out of the protected person’s estate all lawful debts of the protected
person.” However, the district court, in the order, never affirmatively finds that such debts
exist, or that Carlson would be unable to obtain shelter, food, or medical care without the
sale of his property.
Looking at the district court’s order, we are unable to determine whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying Carlson’s objection because the district court made
insufficient findings of fact to permit appellate review. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld , 311
Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W. 2d 168, 171 (1976) (stating that findings of fact will “assure
consideration of the statutory fa ctors[,] . . . facilitate appellate review[,] . . . [and] satisfy

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the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly considered”); see also In re
Civil Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Minn. 2014) (citing this aspect of Rosenfeld
and noting that, while “[t]he evidence in the record may be sufficient to support [the district
court’s] conclusion, . . . in the absence of findings about that evidence, we cannot be
certain”). Because we lack the factual findings needed to address Carlson’s argument that
the sale of his property is unnecessary, we remand for the district court to make the requisite
findings and fully consider Carlson’s argument. See In re Estate of Eckley , 780 N.W.2d
407, 415 (Minn. App. 2010) (“Because the di strict court failed to consider appellant’s
arguments and failed to make the findings needed to address these contentions, we
remand.”). In so doing, the district court may, in its discretion, reopen the record. See
State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co., 845 N.W.2d 808, 821 (Minn. 2014).
Affirmed in part and remanded.