State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1166

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sedrick Lamar Holt,
Appellant.

Filed June 4, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-16-4381

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief App ellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Kalitowski,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, §10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Sedrick Lamar Holt was driving a car and failed to signal a turn. He was
pulled over, falsely identified himself, smelled of alcohol, refused to complete preliminary
sobriety tests, and, even after nine tries, did not provide an adequate breath sample for
alcohol-content testing. He was subseque ntly convicted of first -degree driving while
impaired—test refusal, false information to police, and driving after cancellation. Holt
challenges his driving-while-impaired conviction, arguing the officer lacked the requisite
reasonable, articulable suspic ion to request a preliminary breath test and lacked the
requisite probable cause to request a breath test under the implied consent law. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 23, 2016, a law enforcement officer noticed a car with only one
functioning headlight and witnessed it fail to signal when it made a turn . The officer
initiated a stop . Upon request, t he driver provided proof of insurance, but not a driver’s
license. He identified himself and provided a date of birth , but when the officer entered
that information into his system, it brought up a photo that did not match the driver. The
officer continued to attempt to identify the driver , but the driver could not confirm his
address or when he last had his license renewed. The officer placed the driver under arrest
for giving a false name.
While walking the driver to his squad car, the officer noticed he smelled of alcohol
and asked how much alcohol he had to drink that night. The driver was nonresponsive. At
the same time, a second officer searched the driver’s car and found a gun.
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After transporting him to a police station, the officer was able to identify the driver
as appellant Sedrick Lamar Holt. Once identified, the officer discovered Holt’s driving
privileges were cancelled, and he had an acti ve felony warrant. The officer also noticed
Holt’s eyes were red and watery. The officer asked Holt to complete field sobriety tests or
a preliminary breath test, but Holt refused. Holt was then read the Implied Consent
Advisory, after which he called and spoke to multiple lawyers.
Holt agreed to a breath test . He was instructed on how to provide an accurate
sample, but after nine tries Holt was unable to provide that sample . The officer deemed
Holt’s failure to provide an adequate sample a refusal.
Holt was charged by complaint with first-degree driving while impaired—refusal to
submit to a chemical test, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision
2 (2016); possession of a pistol without a permit, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
624.714, subdivision 1(a) (2016); providing false information to police , in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.506, subdivision 2 (2016); and driving after cancellation
inimical to public safety, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 171.24, subdivision 5
(2016).
Holt filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges, arguing the officer
had neither a reasonable basis for the stop, nor probable cause to ask Holt to provide a
breath test. A contested omnibus hearing was held on the matter, where the two officers
involved in Holt’s arrest testified, and the district court viewed the squad and booking
videos.
The district court denied Holt’s motion, deciding:
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[The first officer] reported that he pulled over the Vehicle
because, among other reasons, the Vehicle did not signal when
it turned right on to Annapolis Street. Not signaling to take a
right is a traffic violation. Therefore, [the first officer] had the
requisite particularized and objective basis for the traffic stop.

And that:

[The first officer] had probable cause to request that Defendant
take the implied consent test. There were multiple indicators
that would lead a cautious person to believe that Defendant was
under the influence. [The first officer] notice[d] the smell of
alcohol emanating from Defendant’s breath and he also noticed
that Defendant had red, watery eye s. Moreover, Defendant
was not willing to cooperate and declined to take either a PBT
or any field sobriety tests when asked. These were three
common indicia of intoxication (i.e. odor of alcohol, bloodshot
watery eyes, and uncooperative attitude), and w ere sufficient
to constitute probable cause to request that Defendant take the
implied consent testing.

Following the district court’s decision, Holt pleaded guilty to driving after
cancellation, but proceeded to a jury trial on the other charges. The jury found Holt guilty
of test refusal and providing false information to police, but acquitted him of possession of
a firearm without a permit. The district court sentenced Holt to 46 months in prison for
first-degree driving while impaired —test refusal, and concurrent 365 -day sentences for
providing false information to police and driving after cancellation.
Holt appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Holt argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence
and dismiss the charges because (1) the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to support a request that Holt submit to a preliminary breath test; (2) the officer
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did not have probable cause to request Holt submit to a test via the implied consent
procedure; and (3) the district court made erroneous factual findings.1 “When reviewing a
district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we r eview the district
court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal
determinations de novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quoting
State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)).
I. The officer had a reasonable basis to request Holt complete a preliminary breath
test.

Under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.41, subdivision 1 (2016), an officer may
require a preliminary screening test when that officer “ has reason to believe from the
manner in which a person is driving, operating, controlling, or acting upon departure from
a motor vehicle ” that the person was driving while impaired. The officer must have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion, meaning a “particularized and objective basis fo r
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981).
Whether an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is determined by the
totality of the circumstances. State v. Martinson , 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998).
Articulable suspicion can arise when there is evidence of sufficient indicia of intoxication.
State v. Driscoll , 427 N.W.2d 263, 265 -66 (Minn. App. 1988). Both an odor of alcohol
and bloodshot and wat ery eyes are indicia of intoxication. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d
687, 696 (Minn. App. 2012). And a traffic violation coupled with indicia of intoxication

1 Holt does not challenge the basis for the stop on appeal.
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can provide reasonable, articulable suspicion. Holtz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d
363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983). The district court determined the totality of the circumstances
provided the officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion. We agree.
Here, the officer stopped Holt after observing him commit a traffic violation —he
failed to signal a turn. The officer approached the vehicle, and Holt only rolled down his
window two to three inches to talk to the officer. After talking to the officer and failing to
confirm necessary information to prove his identity, Holt was removed from the car and
placed under arrest for providing a false name to police. It was when Holt was removed
from his car and placed into a squad car that the officer first noticed Holt smelled of alcohol
and asked how much alcohol Holt had to drink that evening. And once the officer brought
Holt to the police station, he noticed Holt had red and watery eyes. The officer than asked
Holt to complete field sobriety tests or a preliminary breath test. Because t he officer
witnessed a traffic violation and noticed multiple signs of intoxication prior to requesting
the preliminary test, he had reasonable , articulable suspicion that Holt was driving while
impaired by alcohol consumption. See Holtz, 340 N.W.2d at 365.
Holt argues the officer lacked reasonable , articulable suspicion because (1) he did
not notice the indicia of intoxication immediately upon contact with Holt; and (2) the
officer stated he wanted Holt to take the test to help him to determine if Holt was too
intoxicated to drive the vehicle. We are not persuaded.
Holt attempts to distinguish this case from others where officers observed indicia of
intoxication immediately upon contact with a driver. See, e.g., State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d
672, 674 (Minn. App. 2004) (during the officer’s initial conversation with the driver, he
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observed a strong odor of alcohol coming from the driver’s breath, bloodshot watery eyes,
and slurred speech). And he asserts the officer here could not have the same reasonable ,
articulable suspicion because his observations of indicia of intoxication were not similarly
immediate. But none of the cases cited by Holt stand for the proposition that an officer’s
observations of indicia of intoxication must be immediate to support reasonable, articulable
suspicion.
Furthermore, the facts here demonstrate a reasonable basis for why the officers’
observations were not immediate. As the arresting officer explained in his testimony,
Holt’s window was only slightly open when the officer talked to him in his car. And when
Holt exited the car, approximately 20 minutes into the stop, the officer quickly noticed the
smell of alcohol, demonstrated by the officer’s question asking Holt how much alcohol he
had to drink that night. And while the officer did not notice Holt’s red or watery eyes until
he was at the police station, this too is reasonable based on reduced visibility due to Holt’s
window being only slightly open and the fact that this stop took place at night. The timing
of the officer’s observation supporting int oxication does not invalidate the officer’s
reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Holt additionally argues that, because the officer told him he wanted him to take a
preliminary breath test to assist “in determining if [the officer] believed that [Holt] was too
intoxicated to have been driving his vehicle,” the officer must not have had reasonable,
articulable suspicion prior to requesting the test . This too is unpersuasive. First, this
language refers to a “determination,” more than a mere suspicion. The officer could have
reasonably suspected Holt was too impaired to drive while waiting for test result s to
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confirm his suspicion. Second, the officer easily could have been referring not to a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was too intoxicated t o drive, but to the probable
cause the officer would need to conduct implied consent procedures. The officer’s
comment does not invalidate his reasonable, articulable suspicion to request that Holt
submit to a preliminary breath test.
Because the officer observed Holt commit a traffic violation and observed multiple
indicia of intoxication, he had sufficient articulable suspicion to support his request that
Holt submit to a preliminary breath test.
II. The officer had probable cause to request that Holt submit to a test under the
implied consent law.

“Probable cause exists when all the facts and circumstances would lead a cautious
person to believe that the driver was under the influence.” Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
509 N.W.2d 380, 392 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 517 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1994) . And
Minnesota Statutes section 169A.51, subdivision 1(b) (2016), provides that an officer can
invoke the implied consent procedures when an officer has probable cause and the person
has refused to take a preliminary test.
Holt’s entire probable cause argument rests on his previous argument that the officer
did not have the requisite articulable suspicion to ask that he c omplete the preliminary
breath test. Because there was sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask for that
test, we conclude there was sufficient probable cause for the officer to request a test under
the implied consent law. This probable cause is based on Holt’s refusal to take the
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preliminary breath test, in addition to his traffic violation and the indicia of intoxication
detailed above.
III. The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.

In his pro se brief, Holt challenges several of the district court’s factual findings.
First, he argues that one of the two officers involved in his arrest did not testify that
he noticed a smell of alcohol or red and watery eyes, which undercuts the finding that
indicia of intoxication were present. But the first office r, the one who actually made the
arrest and interacted with Holt at the police station, did notice these attributes. The second
officer did not have direct contact with Holt, he merely provided assistance and searched
Holt’s car.
Second, Holt takes issue with the fact that after the officer noticed a smell of alcohol
he did not place him under arrest for DWI or ask him to do field sobriety tests in the field.
As a result, Holt questions what he was actually arrested for. But as is demonstrated in the
video, Holt was originally arrested for providing false information to police. The officer
additionally explained that , even though he smelled alcohol on Holt’s breath, Holt was
already in handcuffs and the officer would not remove handcuffs and conduct field sobriety
tests with an individual who was already lying to officers. At the station, Holt was asked
to submit to field sobriety tests or a preliminary breath test, refused, and after failing to
submit an adequate sample under the implied consent law, he was also placed under arrest
for test refusal.
Third, Holt challenges the conclusions drawn from the fact that he had red and
watery eyes, saying he had fallen asleep at the station —implying the red and watery eyes
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were a result of the sleep. But the officer noticed Holt’s red and watery eyes before asking
him to take a preliminary test and before Holt fell asleep.
Finally, Holt implies that the officer did not have adequate knowledge to operate
the breath test machine. But the officer testified at the omnibus hearing that he was trained
to operate the machine. In sum, the district court’s factual findings are supported by the
record. Holt’s pro se challenges to the contrary are without merit.
Affirmed.