A17-1228

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1174
A17-1228

In the Matter of the Expulsion of B. L. from
Independent School District No. 832, Mahtomedi Public Schools.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Department of Education
File No. 17-02E

Michael J. Waldspurger, Elizabeth J. Vieira, Rupp, Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger,
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator/cross-respondent ISD No. 832)

Andrea L . Jepsen, Amy J. Goetz, School L aw Center, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent/cross-relator B.L.)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Martha J. Casserly, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Education)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
These consolidated appeals under the Minnesota Pupil Fair Dismissal Act (the Act),
Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.40-.56 (2016), challenge the decision of respondent commissioner of

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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education affirming the decision of relator/cross -respondent Independent School District
No. 832 to expel respondent/cross-relator B.L., but reducing the duration of the expulsion.
In appeal A17-1174, the school district argues that the commissioner erred by concluding
that the school board violated B.L.’s right to due process and rendered an inadequate and
arbitrary expulsion decision. In appeal A17 -1228, B.L. contends that the commissioner
erred by concluding that substantial evidence supports the school board’s decision to expel
him for willful violation of a school -board regulation and by determining that the school
district provided the required alternative educational services. Both relators argue that the
commissioner erred by modifying the school board’s expulsion decision. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2017, B.L. was a junior at Mahtomedi High School (school). At the end
of the school day on Monday, March 20, B.L. discovered that a friend had a BB pellet gun
in his vehicle, which they had used over the weekend. B.L. took the BB gun, telling his
friend that he would return the gun to its owner. B.L. put the BB gun in his pocket, but the
end of it stuck out as he walked; he kept his hand over it so that he would not alarm anyone,
get in trouble, or get anyone else in trouble.
B.L. got into another friend’s vehicle, and they waited in a line of vehicles to exit
the school parking lot. B.L. recognized a van in the exit line and went to speak to an
occupant, with the gun still in his pocket. As he was jogging back to his friend’s vehicle,
the BB gun fell to the ground. B.L. picked it up, saying, “Hey, it’s okay,” to the people in
nearby vehicles, and returned to his friend’s vehicle. A school bus driver noticed the BB
gun, which looked like a real gun, and reported it to her dispatcher, who notified police.

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B.L. and his friend left the parking lot, drove on city streets, and returned to another
school parking lot. As B.L.’s friend pulled into the lot, B.L. waved to another student with
the BB gun in his hand. Shortly thereafter, B.L.’s friend stopped and B.L. got out of the
vehicle, putting the BB gun back into his pocket. He entered another friend’s vehicle ,
removed the BB gun from his pocket, and placed a sweater or T-shirt on top of it so nobody
would see it. B.L.’s second friend drove to a third school parking lot, then drove B.L.
home. B.L. dropped off his backpack but no t the BB gun, which he left in the vehicle as
he and his friend went to get food.
The school resource officer eventually tracked B.L. down, asking him and his friend
to return to the school. They complied, and when B.L. entered the main office, he
immediately stated: “It’s my fault.” The school suspended B.L. from school, pending
expulsion proceedings.
On March 28, the school district provided B.L. and his mother written notice that it
proposed to expel B.L. for 12 months on grounds that, by intentionally possessing the BB
gun on school property and showing it to others, he willful ly: (1) violated a reasonable
school-board regulation; (2) engaged in willful conduct that significantly disrupted the
rights of others to an education, or the ability of school personnel to perform their duties;
and (3) engaged in conduct that endangered pupils or surrounding persons.
On April 12, an independent hearing officer conducted an evidentiary hearing. B.L.
testified that he knew he was not permitted to have a BB gun on school property but did so
to keep his friend out of trouble. He acknowledged that he had received two in -school
suspensions for disciplinary infractions earlier that school year. But he also testified that

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he received an award for assisting another student, has a good relationship with his teachers
and the school psychologist, did not intend to or actually hurt anyone with the BB gun, and
cooperated with the sc hool resource officer and administrators regarding the BB -gun
incident. His attorney argued that these facts mitigate the severity of B.L.’s conduct.
On April 17, t he hearing officer issued proposed findings of fact and legal
conclusions, recommending that the school board expel B.L. for the remainder of the 2016-
17 school year on the ground that he willfully violated a reason able school -board
regulation.
The following day, t he school board met to consider the hearing officer’s
recommendation and the record, and to make the expulsion decision. B.L. and his mother
attended the meeting; they did not dispute any of the hearing officer’s proposed findings
but requested that the school board not expel B.L. A school district attorney provided the
school board new proposed findings, conclusions, and decision, explaining that the
submissions corrected inaccuracies in the hearing officer’s findings and addressed the
school district’s two other proposed expulsion grounds. The attorney advised the school
board to expel B.L. according to the hearing officer’s recommendation. The school board
adopted the new proposed findings and conclusions but expelled B.L. for both the
remainder of the 2016-17 school year and the first semester of the 2017-18 school year.
B.L. appealed his expulsion to the commissioner. The commissioner concluded that
substantial evidence supports the determination that B.L. willful ly violated a reasonable
school-board regulation and rejected B.L.’s argument that the school district f ailed to
provide him with required alternative educational services. But the commissioner

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concluded that the school board violated B.L.’s right to due process, and that its written
decision is arbitrary and fails to provide the written explanation required under the Act.
The commissioner therefore rejected the school board’s findings, affirmed B.L.’s
expulsion based on the hearing officer’s proposed findings, and reduced the term of
expulsion to one semester, as the hearing officer recommended.
The school district and B.L. each appealed by writ of certiorari. We consolidated
the appeals for decision.
D E C I S I O N
When a school board expels a student, he may appeal to the commissioner. Minn.
Stat. § 121A.49. The commissioner’s decision is subject to limited judicial review. Minn.
Stat. § 121A.50 (providing for review under Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63-.69 (2016) ). In
conducting that review, w e consider only whether the commissioner’s decision is
unconstitutional, exceeds the commissioner’s statutory authority or jurisdiction, lacks
substantial evidentiary support, is arbitrary or capricious, or is “ affected by other error of
law.” Minn. Stat. § 14.69. We defer to a school board’s determination regarding expulsion
grounds “so long as it is reasonable and su pported by substantial evidence. ” In re
Expulsion of A.D. , 883 N.W.2d 251, 259 (Minn. 2016) . A substantial evidentiary basis
exists “where, considering the evidence in its entirety, there is relevant evidence that a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. But we owe no
deference to a school board or the commissioner on questions of law, such as statutory
interpretation and due process. See id. at 256 (statutory interpretation); In re Expulsion of
N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d 318, 327 (Minn. App. 2008) (due process).

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I. Substantial evidence support s expelling B.L. for willful violation of a school -
board regulation.

The Act identifies three grounds on which a student may be expelled. Minn. Stat.
§ 121A.45, subd. 2 (a)-(c). The focus of this appeal is the one expulsion ground that the
hearing officer recommended, the school board determined, and the commissioner
affirmed—a willful violation of a reasonable school-board regulation.
The school-board regulations at issue here are the “zero tolerance” weapons policy
and the discipline policy. B.L. does not dispute that these policies clearly prohibit students
from possessing BB guns on school property and provide for expulsion for up to one
calendar year as a minimum consequence for violation . N or does he dispute that this
prohibition and consequence are reasonable. But he argues that substantial evidence does
not support his expulsion for violating the weapons policy because (1) substantial evidence
does not indicate he was specifically aware of the weapons and discipline policies; (2) the
only version of the policies he possessed was not “clear and definite to provide notice to
[students] that they must conform their conduct to its requirements,” as Minn. Stat.
§ 121A.45, subd. 2(a), requires; and (3) substantial evidence does not indicate that he
intended to violate any school-board policy.1 These arguments are unavailing.
Regarding B.L.’s first two arguments, the record contains substantial and largely
undisputed evidence that he was aware of a clear and definite prohibition on possessing a

1 B.L. complains that the commissioner did not adequately analyze the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting this ground for expulsion. The commissioner acted in an appellate
capacity and was not bound by the requirement to “show your work” that applies to the
school board under Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 13. See N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 326.

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BB gun on school property. Each year, the school provided B.L. a student handbook that
summarizes the weapons and discipline policies and other school-board policies. The
handbook states that students are responsible for “knowing the contents of the [discipline]
policy and abiding by it” and informs students that all policies can be found on the
Mahtomedi Public Schools webpage. The handbook also specifically lists various “student
behaviors which may result in discipline,” including: “Weapon (including ‘look -alikes’)”
and “Firearm Possession.” Moreover, B.L. actually knew that he was not permitted to
possess the BB gun on school property. At the evidentiary hearing, B.L. acknowle dged
not only that he knew “it’s not o kay to have a gun at school” but also that he was
specifically aware “it was a bad thing to have a BB gun” on school property because
another student got in trouble after bringing a BB gun to a school football game. 2 And
B.L.’s explanation that he removed the BB gun from a friend’s vehicle so that person would
not get in trouble, and sought to hide it from others’ view to avo id getting in trouble,
confirms his awareness that he was violating school policy by possessing the BB gun.
The record likewise contains substantial and largely undisputed evidence
establishing B.L.’s intent. B.L. acknowledges that he intentionally took possession of the
BB gun. And he did so because of his knowledge of the BB-gun ban—so his friend would
not violate the policy by possessing the BB gun in his vehicle on school property. B.L.
points out that he meant no harm by his actions . But intent to harm is not the issue ; the

2 The school district proposed to expel that student, but he voluntarily withdrew from the
school district. B.L. testified that he was unaware of the proposed expulsion but “ thought
he got . . . arrested.”

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issue is whether B.L. made “a deliberate, intentional de cision to violate [the BB -gun]
policy.” See A.D., 883 N.W.2d at 258. Substantial evidence supports the finding that he
did.
B.L.’s willful violation of the school -board regulation banning BB guns alone
supports his expulsion. But the school district ar gues that the commissioner erred by
refusing to substantively evaluate the two other grounds for expulsion, and that substantial
evidence supports them. We disagree. The school district does not contend that the
additional grounds are integral to the expulsion decision, or that the existence of multiple
grounds explains the length of the expulsion . Cf. N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 326 (stating that
the Act “requires the school board to explain the reasons for both the expulsion and its
length”). It argues only that the commissioner should have addressed the additional
grounds “because it can provide an additional justification for expulsion if one ground is
overturned on appeal.” Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports B.L.’s
expulsion for willf ul violation of a school -board regulation , we discern no error in the
commissioner’s analysis and likewise decline to address other potential expulsion grounds.
II. The school district fulfill ed its obligation to provide B.L. alternative
educational services.

We review de novo the interpretation of the Act, including its provisions regarding
alternative educational services. A.D., 883 N.W.2d at 256. “The goal of all statutory
interpretation is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Id. We
determine that intent from the plain language of the statute. Id. But we also consider
statutory language in context, looking to the entire statute and surrounding sections on the

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same subject. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199 , 809 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Minn.
2012).
Under the Act’s plain language, a school has a “continuing responsibility” for a
student’s education when the student is denied the “current educational program” because
of an expulsion. Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.41, subd. 2, .55(a). I n practice, that responsibility
means the school must offer “alternative education services” to an expelled student, to
continue his academic progress. Minn. Stat. § 121A.55(a). A school district’s
responsibility to offer such services generally starts as soon as it moves toward expelling a
student: “No school shall [expel] any [student] without attempting to provide alternative
educational services before [expulsion] proceedings, except where it appears that the
[student] will create an immediate and substantial danger to self or to surrounding persons
or property.” Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 1. And w hen a school district commences
expulsion proceedings, its notice of proposed expulsion must “describe alternative
educational services accorded the [student] in an attempt to avoid the expulsion
proceedings.” Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 2.
B.L. argues that these latter two portions of the Act create a substantive right to
alternative educational services “reasonably calculated to prevent the expulsion proceeding
itself.”3 We disagree. The Act provides, without qualification, that willfully disobedient,

3 The day before the school -board meeting, B.L. initiated a civil action in federal court,
seeking a temporary injunction against the expulsion proceedings on grounds that the
school district had failed to provide him the requisite alternative educational services. The
federal district court denied injunctive relief. B.L. v. Mahtomedi Sch. Dist., ISD No. 832 ,
No. CV 17-1193 (D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2017) (order).

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disruptive, or dangerous behavior is grounds for expulsion. Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 2.
The requirement to offer alternative educational services merely mitigates the disruptive
effect of expulsion on the student’s education, to which he has a fundamental right. See In
re Expulsion of E.J.W. , 632 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Goss v. Lopez ,
419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975)). Two key factors require this interpretation.
First, alternative educational services are fundamentally academic. The phrase itself
suggests as much, and the statutory definition confirms that alternative educational services
include academic services such as “special tutoring, modified curriculum, modified
instruction, other modifications or adaptations, instruction through electronic media,
special education services as indicated by appropriate assessment, homebound instruction,
supervised homework, or enrollment in another district or in an alternative learning center.”
Minn. Stat. § 121A.41, subd. 11. The Act recognizes that a student who engages in
behavior that prompts expulsion may also require restorative or behavioral services, but
such services are complementary to, not part of, alternative educational services. See Minn.
Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 3 (recognizing that severe student misconduct that warrants repeated
or prolonged removals from school may necessitate mental-health intervention).
Second, a student subject to expulsion proceedings is not entitled to any particular
alternative educational service. The Act contemplates a variety of alternative educational
services, including long-term alternative learning environments . Minn. Stat. § 121A.41,
subd. 11 . Such services may afford a mutually agreeable alternative to the classroom,
thereby “avoid[ing] the expulsion proceedings.” See Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 2. But

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the school is neither required to offer any particular service, 4 nor is the student required to
accept any particular service. See Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.45, subd. 1 (requiring school to
“attempt[] to provide alternative educational services” (emphasis added)), .55(a) (requiring
alternative educational services adequate to keep the student on schedule to graduate, but
only “if the [student] wishes to take advantage of them”). In short, the Act requires a school
district to offer alternative educational services but does not require that they be used to
prevent an otherwise appropriate expulsion.
Here, it is undisputed that the school district offered , and B.L. accepted , several
alternative educational services. From the first day of his suspension , B.L. had online
access to his course materials. During the pendency of the expulsion proceeding, the
school district arranged for B.L. to meet with his teachers and an intervention specialist to
support his academic progress and help him make better choices. B.L. does not dispute
that these services were satisfactory and he acknowledged at the school-board meeting that
he was on track academically. And the school district offered another type of alternative
educational service that B.L. declined —the option to transfer to another school district or
to an alternative learning center with the school district’s assistance. The Act explicitly
includes school transfer in the definition of alternative educational services, and acceptance
of this option by B.L. would have avoided expulsion. Minn. Stat. § 121A.41, subd. 11. On

4 The school district contends it was exempted from providing alternative e ducational
services under Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 1, because B.L.’s conduct created “an
immediate and substantial danger to self or to surrounding persons or property .” Neither
the school board nor the commissioner addressed this issue . We decline to consider this
issue for the first time on appeal. See A.D., 883 N.W.2d at 261 (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)).

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this record, w e conclude that t he school district satisfied its statutory obligation to offer
alternative educational services.
Nonetheless, a s B.L. asserts, the school district plainly failed to describe these
services in its notice of proposed expulsion. Indeed, the notice stated only that B.L. “will
begin receiving alternative educational services on April 3, 2017 in the form of supervised
homework” and will continue to receive services through any expulsion period. But B.L.
does not identify any prejudice flowing from the school district’s failure to expressly notify
him of services he was already receiving. A non-prejudicial technical violation of the Act’s
notice requirements is not a defense to expulsion. See Minn. Stat. § 121A.48 (stating that
a good-faith violation of the “ technical provisions ” of the Act “is not a defense to a
disciplinary procedure” absent “actual prejudice”); N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 327 (declining
to reverse for failure to furnish a list of low-cost legal resources to a student who already
had pro bono legal counsel ); cf. E.J.W., 632 N.W.2d at 781 (reversing expulsion when
school district failed to call or identify student witnesses before hearing because the
omission deprived student of fair hearing) . On this record, we conclude that B.L. is not
entitled to relief based on the notice deficiency.
III. The commissioner did not err by reducing the expulsion term.

After concluding that substantial evidence justifies B.L.’s expulsion and that B.L.
received the requisite alternative educational services, the commissioner reduced the
expulsion term because of two errors by the school board —denial of due process to B.L.
in the conduct of the expulsion meeting and the inadequacy and arbitrariness of the school
board’s written decision. We address each claimed error in turn.

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Due Process
Whether a given procedure violates due process presents a question of law, subject
to de novo review. N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 327. To obtain relief, “a party generally must
establish that the alleged error—even a constitutional error—resulted in prejudice.” Id.
A student has a statutory and constitutional right to due process in expulsion
proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 121A.42; E.J.W., 632 N.W.2d at 780. In evaluating whether a
student was afforded due process, we consider the risk that the procedures used erroneously
deprived the student of the right to an education, and the potential value and feasibility of
alternative procedures. E.J.W., 632 N.W.2d at 780-81 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976) to expulsion procedures).
The Act affords significant procedural safeguards to a student facing possible
expulsion. The school district must provide notice of the proposed expulsion, including “a
complete statement of the facts, a list of the witnesses and a description of their testimony.”
Minn. Stat. § 121A.45, subd. 2. The school district must afford the student a prompt,
convenient, recorded, impartial evidentiary hearing. Id., subds. 1, 3-7. At the evidentiary
hearing, the student may be represented by counsel and may testify, compel testimony, and
present other evidence. Id., subds. 2(f)(1), 9-11. Thereafter, the hearing officer must tender
a recommendation to the school board and the student. Id., subd. 12. The school board
then must meet to consider the hearing record and the hearing officer’s recommendation ;
in doing so, it “may provide the parties with t he opportunity to present exceptions and
comments to the hearing officer’s recommendation.” Id., subd. 13. The school board must
render its expulsion decision at the meeting and in writing. Id.

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While t he school district followed e ach step of the process in pursuing B.L.’s
expulsion, the commissioner concluded that the school board’s conduct with respect to its
own expulsion meeting deprived B.L. of due process. To evaluate this conclusion, w e
consider the circumstances of that meeting. The day before the meeting, the assistant
principal notified B.L.’s mother that the attorney who represented the school district at the
evidentiary hearing would not be present for the school -board meeting . But almost
contemporaneously that same attorney also confirmed that B.L. could attend the meeting
to present exceptions and comments. B.L. and his mother did attend the meeting, without
B.L.’s attorney. B.L.’s mother told the school board that B.L. is a good child with strong
school relationships w ho made and took responsibility for a mistake and should not be
expelled. Two school district attorneys also attended, including the one who represented
the school district at the evidentiary hearing . The second attorney urged the school board
to adopt new findings to correct errors in those of the hearing officer and to address all
three expulsion grounds. And he advised the school board to follow the hearing officer’s
recommendation to expel B.L. for the remainder of the current semester. The school board
adopted the new proposed findings but expelled B.L. for two semesters.
B.L. and the commissioner contend these circumstances deprived B.L. of due
process because they deprived him of legal counsel and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard before the school board. We are not persuaded. Consistent with the Act’s procedural
guarantees, B.L. was afforded the right to counsel and an opportunity to be heard at the
evidentiary hearing , where he and his attorney participated in creating the record from
which the school board made its expulsion decision. In considering that record, the school

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board permitted B.L. to present exceptions and comments to the hearing officer’s
recommendations. That he did so without his attorney does not diminish that opportunity,
as the right to counsel at the school-board meeting is neither guaranteed under the Act, see
Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 13, nor necessary to safeguard against an erroneous
expulsion, given the limited scope of the optional “exceptions and comments” portion of
the school board’s process.
Moreover, there is no indication that the absence of B.L.’s attorney from the meeting
made any difference . B.L. contends he was prejudiced because his attorney could have
alerted the school board to mitigating factors, which the school district’s attorney omitted
from his submissions. But B.L.’s mother ably highlighted the mitigating factors that the
hearing officer noted . And the school district’s attorney , despite omitting the mi tigating
factors from his submissions, expressly and repeatedly advised the school board to follow
the hearing officer’s recommendation for a one -semester expulsion. The school board
rejected that advice. On balance, this record does not indicate that any procedural defects
in the school board’s meeting contributed to its decision to expel B.L. for two semesters.5

5 The commissioner and B.L. assert two additional flaws in the school board’s process:
(1) the school district’s attorney “play ed unclear roles” at the school -board meeting by
alternately referring to himself as the school district’s attorney and t he school district
administration’s attorney and (2) members of the school board “participated in making the
determination under review ”—the decision to propose expulsion. Neither distinction
makes a difference because the school board is the governing body of the school district
and the entity responsible for both proposing and deciding expulsions . Minn. Stat.
§§ 121A.41, subd. 9, .47, subd. 1.

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Inadequate and Arbitrary Decision
A school board must base its expulsion decision upon “the recommendation of the
hearing officer” and “ the record” from the evidentiary hearing. Minn. Stat. § 121A.47,
subd. 13. The school board must issue its decision in writing and “state the controlling
facts on which the decision is made in sufficient detail to apprise the parties and the
commissioner of education of the basis and reason for the decision. ” Id. In short, it must
explain how the evidence “connects rationally with [its] choice of action,” articulating the
reasons for both the expulsion and its length. N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 326 (quotation
omitted). A school board’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if it represents the school
board’s “will and not its judgment. ” Beste v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 , 398 N.W.2d 58,
63 (Minn. App. 1986).
The commissioner concluded that the school board’s wr itten decision is arbitrary
and insufficient under Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 13, because the school board failed to
(1) identify which portions of the hearing officer’s findings were not substantiated by the
record, (2) address the mitigating factors pr esented at the hearing and set forth in the
hearing officer’s proposed findings; and (3) “state the controlling factors supporting an
upward departure from the independent hearing officer’s recommendation.” We agree.
While the school board thoroughly explained its decision to expel B.L. , it did not
articulate the reasons for its duration —two semesters, rather than the one -semester
expulsion that the hearing officer recommended. See Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 13 ;
N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 326. And it entirely failed to address the mitigating factors that B.L.
advanced and the hearing officer found . See N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d 326 -27 (stating that a

17
school board must address any mitigating circumstances that a student raises). The school
district insists that these factors were addressed during the school board members’ recorded
discussion. But that discussion does not constitute the school board’s collective decision
and cannot satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 121A.47, subd. 13. We are similarly
unpersuaded by the school district ’s assertion that the school board properly disregarded
B.L.’s claimed mitigating circumstances because they do not reduce the severity or
dangerousness of his actions; the school board did not provide this or any other explanation
in its written decision. These unexplained omissions do not comply with Minn. Stat.
§ 121A.47, subd. 13 , and indicate arbitrary decision -making, indicative of the school
board’s will and not its judgment. See Beste, 398 N.W.2d at 63 (stating that summary
rejection of a hearing officer’s specific recommendations evince s arbitrary action). We
therefore consider the appropriate remedy for these errors.
Remedy
The commissioner had, and we now have, the discretion to remedy an erroneous
expulsion decision by reversing, remanding for further proceedings, or modifying the
decision. Minn. Stat. §§ 14.69, 121A.49. Both B.L. and the school district argue that the
commissioner erred by modifying the school board’s decision. We c onsider their
arguments in turn.
B.L. contends the commissioner should have reversed the school board’s decision
rather than simply modifying it to reduce the duration of the expulsio n. We disagree.
Despite flaws in the school board’s decision, B.L.’s un disputedly fair and procedurally
appropriate evidentiary hearing yielded substantial evidence that B.L. willful ly violated a

18
reasonable school -board regulation. To reverse the expulsion outright would erase an
entire process that was only partially flawed.
The school district argues that the commissioner erred by reducing the expulsion
length, rather than remanding for the school board to make additional findings supporting
the longer expulsion . We agree that such a remand may be an appropriate remedy for a
school board’s failure to address mitigating factors, explain its rejection of proposed
findings, or explain the length of an expulsion. N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d at 326. But we discern
no error in the commissioner’s decision to modify the school board’s decision in much the
same manner as an appellate court does when the appropriateness of a specific outcome is
apparent from the record . See Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (authorizing modification); see, e.g.,
Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 -74 (Minn. 2007) (vacating convictions for lesser-
included offenses). Moreover, B.L. acknowledges that it is the expulsion itself that matters,
not its length, particularly now that the expulsion period has ended . Accordingly, we
decline to remand for additional findings and affirm the commissioner’s decision.
Affirmed.