In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Steven Allan Housman.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1175

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Steven Allan Housman.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Judicial Appeal Panel
File No. AP15-9099
Chippewa County File No. 12-PR-08-1104

Robert L. Gjorvad, Runchey, Louwagie & Wellman, P.L.L. P., Marshall, Minnesota (for
appellant Steven Allan Housman)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Anthony R. Noss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

David M. Gilbertson, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent
Chippewa County)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Steven Allan Housma n argues that the judicial appeal panel (the panel)
erred by denying his petition for a full discharge from the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(MSOP). Because we agree with the panel that appellant did not meet the statutory criteria
for discharge from civil commitment, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant has a history of harmful sexual conduct committed against children under
the age of ten. In 2009, the district court indeterminately committed appellant to MSOP as
a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and as a sexually psychopathic person (SPP). This
court affirmed appellant’s commitment on ap peal. Appellant thereafter petitioned the
special review board (the SRB) for a full discharge from civil co mmitment. The SRB
recommended that appellant’s petition for a full discharge from MS OP be denied, and
appellant filed a petition for rehearing and rec onsideration with the panel. Following a
two-phase hearing during which the panel received numerous exhibits and heard testimony
from multiple witnesses, including appe llant, the panel adopted the SRB’s
recommendation to deny appellant’s petition in its entirety and denied appellant’s petition
for a full discharge from civil commitment. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“This court reviews a judicial appeal panel’s decision for clear error, examining the
record to determine whether the evidence as a whole sustains the panel’s findings.” Matter
of Civil Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied
(June 20, 2017) (citing Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 534 (M inn. App. 2014)). “In
this review, we do not reweigh the eviden ce as if trying the matter de novo.” Id. “If the
evidence as a whole sustains the panel’s findings, it is immaterial that the record might also
provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (citation
omitted). However, we review questions of st atutory construction and the application of
statutory criteria to the facts de novo. Id.

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A person civilly committed as an SDP/SPP may petition the SRB for discharge from
commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 2 (2016). The SRB “shall hold a hearing” on
the petition and, within 30 days of the hearing, “shall issue a report with written findings
of fact and shall recommend denial or appr oval of the petition to the judicial appeal
panel. . . .” Id., subds. 3(a), 4. The committed person may petition the panel for rehearing
and reconsideration of the S RB’s decision. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a) (2016).
Minnesota law enumerates three factors to be considered in determining whether a
discharge petition should be granted, and provides that a civilly committed person shall not
be discharged unless:
it appears to the satisfaction of th e judicial appeal panel, after
a hearing and recommendation by a majority of the special
review board, that the committed person is capable of making
an acceptable adjustment to op en society, is no longer
dangerous to the public, and is no longer in need of inpatient
treatment and supervision.
Minn. Stat. § 253D.31 (2016); see also Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)
(“To justify discharge, the st atutory discharge criteria for persons committed as mentally
ill and dangerous to the public re quire a showing that the person is capable of making an
acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer
in need of inpatient treatment and supervision.”).
Application of the statutory criteria must “comport[] with the basic constitutional
requirement that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual [was originally] committed.” Call, 535 N.W.2d at 318 (citations
and quotations omitted). Thus, a person committed as an SDP/SPP “must be discharged if

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no reasonable relation exists between the original reason for commitment and the continued
confinement.” Id. at 319. The petitioning party bears the burden of coming forward with
the evidence and presenting a prima facie ca se, with competent ev idence, demonstrating
entitlement to the requested relief. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d) (2016). If the
petitioning party meets th is burden of production, the co mmissioner of human services
bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the discharge should be
denied. Id.
The commissioner satisfied the statutory burd en here. The panel determined that
the commissioner “ha[d] shown by clear and convincing evidence that the petition for full
discharge should be deni ed” under section 253D.28, subdivision 2(d), and Call. The
panel’s decision is supported by each of the three statutory factors articulated in Minnesota
Statutes section 253D.31, regarding appellant’s ability to make an acceptable adjustment
to open society, the threat of danger he poses to the public, and his continuing need for
inpatient treatment and supervision.
Acceptable adjustment to open society
The panel determined that the commissioner proved by clear and convincing
evidence that appellant was incapable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society.
The panel found that:
[Appellant’s] non-participation in sex offender treatment and
his ongoing behavioral issues, including the failure to comply
and abide by facility rules, persuades this Panel that [appellant]
continues to have treatment need s that can only be addressed
in his present setting, and th at at present [he] cannot
successfully transition into open society. [He] remains a
danger to the public.

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The evidence sustains the panel’s findings. At the judicial review hearing, the
commissioner called Peter Puffer, a licensed psyc hologist and the clinical director at
MSOP. Puffer testified that appellant’s discharge petition “was not supported by MSOP
clinical leadership.” Puffer testified that a ppellant was “not a participant in treatment at
MSOP,” “ha[d] not consented to participat e in treatment,” and had not successfully
completed a sex offender treatment program. Puffer also testified that appellant’s history
revealed “multiple failu res to comply with direction,” including refusing to sign release
conditions, violating his release, and failin g to respond well in the community. The
commissioner also called Dr. Lauren Herbert, a licensed psychologist who oversees risk
assessments for civilly committed individuals in MSOP. Herbert agreed that appellant was
incapable of making an acceptable adjust ment to open society. The commissioner
presented a Sexual Violence Risk Assessment Update, authored by Herbert, in which she
opined that
[Appellant] has not participated nor made sufficient progress
in sex offense specific treatment programming. While it does
not appear [he] has engaged in sexually aggressive behaviors
[at MSOP], his victim pool is largely documented as minor
victims; access to such individual s is restricted in his current
setting. Thus, it remains unclear as to whether or not he could
control his sexually abusive behavior in the community.
Appellant argues that he would make an acceptable adjustment to open society
because he has a strong employment history, which would allow him to obtain employment
immediately, and is eligible to receive VA benefits. Even assuming this assertion is true,
the panel’s factual findings on this factor are supported by the evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.

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Danger to the public
The panel determined that appellant remains a danger to the public. The panel found
that appellant “has never expressed interest nor has he consented to participation in
treatment at MSOP,” and “remain[ed] a no n-participant in th e offered treatment
programming.” The panel heard testimony from MSOP’s clinical leadership that appellant
was “in denial of essential elements of hi s sexual offense history” and “continue[d] to
represent a danger to the public given his l ack of accountability.” The panel found that,
given appellant’s failure to participate in sex offender treatment and his ongoing behavioral
issues that could only be addressed in commitment, “[he] remains a danger to the public.”
The evidence supports these findings. Herbert testified that appellant “still poses a
danger to the public.” Herbert submitted a re port stating that “[i]f granted a discharge,
without treatment efforts, there is little assu rance [appellant] would refrain from [alcohol
or substance] use; in turn, exposing the comm unity to risk.” The panel also reviewed a
sexual violence risk assessment report from fo rensic evaluator Elisa Tattar, in which she
indicated that appellant “is presently a non-participant in the three-phase treatment program
and his remaining treatment need areas ar e not indicative of reduced treatment or
[community] supervision.” Tattar’s report indicated that appellant’s records show that he
had “beliefs associated with hostility toward women” and exhibited “impulsive behavior.”
Appellant argues that the panel erre d by not properly crediting conflicting
testimony. Robert Riedel, a licensed psychol ogist specializing in forensic practice,
testified that appellant had “reached a level of dangerousness and a level of understanding
that he was no longer a danger to the public and could be safely re leased.” Appellant

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contends that Riedel’s testimony “clearly show[s]” that appellant is no longer a danger to
the public. The panel disagreed. The panel considered the evidence from Riedel, Herbert,
and Tattar, and determined that Herbert and Tattar’s reports were “credible” and their
“clinical judgment persuasive.” The panel weighed Riedel’s report against the other
evidence offered and found the reports of Tattar and Herbert to be “more persuasive” than
Riedel’s report. This court does not “reweigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo,”
and, “[i]f the evidence as a w hole sustains the panel’s finding s, it is immaterial that the
record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.”
Matter of Civil Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d at 650. Th e evidence, as a whole,
sustains the panel’s finding that appellant represents a danger to the public.
Inpatient treatment and supervision
The panel found that the commissioner demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that appellant “continues to require inpatient treatment and supervision.” The
facts support this finding. Puffer testifie d that appellant conti nued to need “further
inpatient treatment and supervision for a sexual disorder.” Puffer noted that “historically
and at present, multiple examiners have id entified [appellant] as having a pedophilic
disorder or simply an attracti on to children,” but that, despite these diagnoses, appellant
“actively resisted any opportunity that he’s been offered to engage in a change process and
remains steadfast in his refusal to address thos e issues.” Herbert testified that appellant
had a pedophilic disorder, other specified pe rsonality disorders with antisocial features,
and severe alcohol use disorder. Tattar si milarly diagnosed appellant with pedophilic
disorder and noted that “[t]he diagnosis of Pedophilic Disorder involves recurrent and

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intense fantasies, urges, and/or behavior in volving sexual arousal toward prepubescent
children.” Both Herbert and Tattar opined th at appellant continued to require inpatient
treatment. The panel found Herbert and Tattar’s reports credible, found that appellant had
“not engaged in MSOP treatment programming,” and noted that the records were “unclear
as to whether [he] successfu lly completed any outpatient sex offender treatment.” The
panel’s finding that this factor weighed against discharge is sustained by the evidence as a
whole.
In sum, we determine th at the commissioner established by clear and convincing
evidence that appellant does not satisfy the three-factor test articulated in Minnesota
Statutes section 253D.31 and Call for a full discharge from civil commitment at MSOP,
and we therefore affirm.
Affirmed.