A17-1179

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1178
A17-1179

Sela Investments Ltd., LLP,
Appellant,

vs.

H.E.,
Respondent.

Filed March 19, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CV-HC-10-5440, 27-CV-HC-10-6991

Christopher T. Kalla, Douglass E. Turne r, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Luke Grundman, Joanna K, Dobson, Mid-Mi nnesota Legal Aid, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A party requesting review of a countersign ed housing-court order is not in default
within the meaning of Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(a) for failure to obtain a transcript within
the time period prescribed in Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(c).

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O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appella nt-landlord appeals from (1) the housing
court’s orders granting respondent-tenant’s motions for expungement of two eviction-case
court files and (2) the district court’s order in each case denying review of the expungement
order on the ground that landlord had defaulted on its request for review by not obtaining
a transcript of the hearing befo re the referee. Because we c onclude that the district court
erred in finding default based on failure to obtain a transcript, and in denying review of the
expungement orders on that basis, we remand to the district court to reinstate the requests
for review.1
FACTS
In 2010, respondent-tenant H.E. leased an apartment from appe llant-landord Sela
Investments Ltd., LLP. Over the course of that year, Sela brought two eviction actions
against H.E. Both actions were settled, and H.E. moved out of the apartment.
Two years later, H.E. filed two motions fo r expungement of an eviction record, one
for each eviction action, in the housing-court division of Hennepin County District Court.
Sela opposed the motions. A housing-court re feree held a hearing, concluded that H.E.
had “failed to prove that expungement is warranted under Minn. Stat. § 484.014,” and

1 Because we remand for district court revi ew, we do not address the merits of the
expungement orders.

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recommended orders dismissing H.E.’s motions “with prejudice.” A district court judge
countersigned the referee’s recommended orders. H.E. did not appeal.
In September of 2016, H.E. again filed two motions for expungement of an eviction
record, asking the housing court to expunge th e same records, this time under the court’s
inherent authority rather than the statutor y expungement provision. The motions were
served on Sela in October. Sela did not file any responsive documents. The hearing was
set for January 24, 2017.
On January 18, a housing-court referee, upon review of the file and without a
hearing, deemed the moti ons unopposed under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.06 and
recommended orders granting the motions w ithout a hearing. The following day,
January 19, a district court judge countersigned the referee’s recommended orders.
On January 24, the scheduled hearing date, Sela appeared in housing court to object
to the motions. The same referee agreed with Sela that he had erred in deeming the motions
unopposed, but he nevertheless recommended that the expungement motions be granted on
the merits. A district court judge countersigned the referee’s recommended orders, which
were filed the following day, January 25.
First Requests for Review
On January 30, Sela filed timely requests fo r district court review of the January 25
orders granting expungement (the first requests for review). Sela contended that the court
erred in considering the expu ngement petition after a previous request was denied with
prejudice. In its filings, Sela indicated that “[n]o transcript is necessary for review of the
issues raised . . . . To the extent that a tr anscript might be necessary, [Sela] requests that

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said decision be made by the District Court Judge to whom this review is assigned. [Sela]
requests oral argument before the District Court.”
On February 1, without a hearing, a second housing-court referee recommended
orders stating, “[Sela] DOES NOT request a hearing; no hearing is scheduled,” and
requiring Sela to order transcripts of the “h earing(s) of January 19, 2017 and January 25,
2017” or “the review shall be dismissed.” 2 A district court judge countersigned the
recommended orders that same day.
On February 2, Sela filed a “supplementa l notice of request for review of the
referee’s decisions,” indicating that (1) c ontrary to the February 1 orders, Sela had
requested a hearing before the reviewing judge, (2) a transcript was not necessary because
the requests for review are “based upon le gal grounds” that the reviewing judge would
determine de novo, and (3) Sela had reques ted that the reviewing judge, not a housing-
court referee, determine whether a transcript is necessary. Apparently, a hearing was then
scheduled for February 23.
Sela did not obtain any transcripts. On February 9, without a hearing, a third
housing-court referee recommended orders canceling the district court review hearing. The
recommended orders noted that Sela had failed to order transcripts of the “hearing(s) of
January 19, 2017, and January 25, 2017.” The recommended orders also noted that “[a]
Rule 611 review ‘shall be based upon the record established before the referee’ (emphasis

2 We note that, contrary to this recommende d order, the only hearing that took place was
on January 24.

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added). See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 611( a).” A district court judge countersigned the
recommended orders that same day, February 9.
Second Requests for Review
On February 20, Sela filed timely (second) requests for district court review of the
February 9 orders dismissing the first reques ts for review. In th e second requests for
review, Sela argued that the February 9 orde rs were erroneous because (1) there was no
January 19 hearing so there was no transcript to obtain, (2) rule 611(c) authorized a
reviewing judge to extend the deadline to obtain a transcript of the January 24 hearing upon
a showing of good cause and Sela had not be en given the opportunity to ask a reviewing
judge to extend the deadline, and (3) good cause existed to not require a transcript because
the issues could be decided on legal grounds for which no transcripts were necessary. Sela
requested oral argument before an assigned reviewing judge.
On May 31, the district court, without a hearing, filed an identical order in each case
denying the second requests for review on the basis that Sela was “in default.”
Sela appealed in both cases, challengi ng the orders described above. We
consolidated the two appeals and construed the appeals as taken from the January 25
expungement orders and the May 31 orders dismissing the second requests for review on
the basis of default.
ISSUE
Does a party’s failure to ob tain a transcript within th e time period prescribed in
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(c) constitute a default within the meaning of Minn. R. Gen. Pract.
611(a)?

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ANALYSIS
Sela argues the district court erred in its May 31 orders by dismissing the second
requests for review on the basis that Sela was in default under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(a)
for failing to obtain a transcript. Sela assert s: as a matter of law Minn. R. Gen. Pract.
611(c) does not require a party requesting review to obtain a transcript in all instances as a
condition of obtaining a review; these cases present a situation in which a transcript is not
necessary because they presen t pure questions of law; and the district court therefore
abused its discretion in concl uding that Sela’s failure to obt ain a transcript constituted a
default. The resolution of this case turns on the interpretation of the statute governing the
housing court, as well as the rules of gene ral practice, both of which appellate courts
interpret de novo. See Poehler v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 899 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 2017)
(interpreting another Minnesota statute); Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn.
2016) (interpreting a Minnesota rule of civil procedure).
Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 1 (2016), establishes the Hennepin County housing-
calendar program, also known as housing court. The statute provides that a party may seek
a judge’s review of a housing-court referee’s decision by filing a timely notice of review:
Review of a recommended order or finding of the referee by a
district court judge may be had by notice served and filed
within ten days of effective notice of the recommended order
or finding. The notice of review must specify the grounds for
the review and the specific provisions of the recommended
findings or orders disputed, and the district court judge, upon
receipt of the notice of review, shall set a time and place for the
review hearing.

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Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 6 (2016). Minn. R. Gen. Prac t. 611 establishes procedural
rules regarding such reviews:
(a) Notice. . . . [A] party no t in default may seek review
by a judge of a decision or sentence recommended by the
referee by serving and filing a notice of review. . . .

A judge’s review of a decision recommended by the
referee shall be based upon the record established before the
referee. Upon the request of any party, a hearing shall be
scheduled before the reviewing judge.

. . . .

(c) Transcripts. The petitioner must obtain a transcript
from the referee’s court reporter. . . .

Any transcript request by the petitioner must be made
within one day of the date the no tice of review is filed. The
transcript must be provided with in five business days after its
purchase by the petitioner.

For good cause the reviewing judge may extend any of
the time periods described in this Rule 611(c).

In this case, Sela “served and filed w ithin ten days of effective notice of the
recommended order or finding” a notice of its in tent to seek review of the January 25
expungement orders. See Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 6. That notice “specif[ied] the
grounds for the review and the specific provisions of the recommended findings or orders
disputed.” See id. Thus, there is no question that Sela complied with the statutory
requirements for obtaining a district court review.
The more difficult question is whether Sela complied with Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611.
When interpreting a procedural rule, courts lo ok first to the plain language of the rule.
Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Minn. 2014). Courts “may also consider

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a rule’s purpose, history, and procedural context.” Cox v. Mid-Minn. Mut. Ins. Co. , ___
N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A16-0712, slip. op. at 7 (Minn. Jan. 24, 2018) (citation omitted)
(quotation omitted) (interpreting the Minnesota Rules of Civ il Procedure). Courts “read
the rules in light of one another.” Id. (quotation omitted).
H.E. argues, and the district court conclude d, that rule 611(c) required Sela to obtain
a transcript and that failure to do so constituted default, warranting dismissal of the review
under rule 611(a).3 In support of this conc lusion, H.E. points to th e first sentence of rule
611(c): “The petitioner must obtain a transcri pt from the referee’s court reporter.” The
mandatory term “must,” H.E. argues, leaves no ambiguity as to whet her a transcript is
required. And, he argues, becau se rule 611(a) provides that district court review shall be
“based upon the record established before the referee,” a transcript is always required as a
condition of review.
Reading the language of rules 611(a) and 611(c) in light of each other, and taking
into account the procedural context of the ru le, however, we conclude otherwise. Rule
611(a) provides that “a party not in default” may seek re view by filing a timely notice of
review. It further provides that “[u] pon the request of any party, a hearing shall be
scheduled before the reviewing judge.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph (a) does not identify
a transcript as a condition of receiving a hearing, nor does it identify the failure to obtain a
transcript as a default. And, while rule 61 1(c) states that “[t]he petitioner must obtain a
transcript from the referee’s court reporter,” we conclude that this sentence mandates not

3 The district court did not cite rule 611(c), bu t it did state that Sela had failed to order a
transcript “as required by law,” apparently referring to rule 611(c).

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that a transcript always be obtained but that the source of any transcript be the official court
reporter.
The reading that obtaining a transcript is not a condition of review under rule 611(a)
is buttressed by the second paragraph in rule 611(c), which begins, “Any transcript request
by the petitioner must be made w ithin one day of the date the notice of review is filed.”
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(c). The use of the word “any” as a modifier of “transcript
request” suggests that, in some instances, tran script requests may not occur. But if there
are to be some such instances, then it must be the case that a transcript request is not
required in all instances. This language and the context indi cate that rule 611 as a whole
contemplates requests for review being heard by the district court, even if the petitioner
has not obtained a transcript.
The purposes underlying the creation of the housing court further support this
reading. The housing court was “established to provide expedited relief.” Bass v. Equity
Residential Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). It
has also been recognized that, at the time of its creation, “legislators presumed that the
unified system would provide greater uniformity , efficiency, and justice.” Robin Powers
Kinning, Selective Housing Code Enforcement and Low-Inco me Housing Policy:
Minneapolis Case Study , 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 159, 1 73 (1993). Two of these goals—
efficiency and expedited review—are particularly relevant here. Requiring a party seeking
review of a referee’s recommendation to obta in a transcript in every case imposes an
unnecessary burden on litigants, both landlords and tenants, particularly when, as Sela
argues is the case here, the request for review is premised wholly on a question of law.

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Similarly, in such cases, requiring the additional step of obtaining a transcript would serve
only to slow the review process.
We find less guidance in the history of Mi nn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(c). Rule 611(c)
was promulgated in 1991 as part of the br oader promulgation of the rules of general
practice, which superseded most preexisting local district court rules. Order Promulgating
Minnesota General Rules of Pr actice for the District Courts , No. CX-89-1863 (Minn.
Sept. 5, 1991). However, Title VII of those rules, which addresses housing court, was not
the first set of rules regarding housing court. Rather, in 1990 the Fourth Judicial District,
which encompasses Hennepin County, promulgate d special rules of practice for its pilot
housing-court program. Spec. R. Pract., Fourth Jud. Dist. 18.01-.04 (1991). These special
rules of practice were the basis for, and were superseded by, Title VII of the General Rules
of Practice. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 601 task force cmt. 4 As relevant to this case, the
superseded special rule 18.04 indi cated, “If the petitioner challenges a finding of fact or
evidentiary ruling, the petitioner must obtain a transcript from the referee’s court reporter.”
Spec. R. Pract., Fourth Jud. Dist. 18.04 (emphasis added). Notably, that rule did not require
a transcript in all instances. Instead, it requi red a transcript only if “a finding of fact or
evidentiary ruling” was being ch allenged. On the one hand, the prior special rule could
suggest that the general rule that replaced it had the same intended meaning, especially

4 We note that the task force comment states that the housing-court rules in the rules of
general practice were based on “4th Dist. R. 13 and the Housing Court Temporary Rules,
Rule 17.” This appears to be a typographical error on the part of the ta sk force, as Spec.
R. Pract., Fourth Jud. Dist. 17 was entitled “Atto rney Fees in Actions Involving Minors,”
and Spec. R. Pract., Fourth Jud. Dist . 18 was entitled “Housing Calendar Project
Temporary Rule.”

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because there are no task-force comment s discussing any intended change. See Molde v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 781 N.W.2d 36, 40-43 (Minn. 2010) (noting that change in statutory
phrasing brought about by reco dification did not indicate a change in meaning); see also
United States v. Rodgers , 461 U.S. 677, 708, 103 S. Ct. 2132, 2150 (1983) (noting that
when a statute’s language is changed “without comment or explanation,” the change is not
intended to change the statute’s meani ng). On the other hand, the language did change,
which could suggest an inte nded change in meaning. See J.L. Manta, Inc. v. Braun , 393
N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn. 1986) (“[A] change in the language of the statute is usually
presumed to effect a change in meaning . . . .”).
Although the history is not dispositive, taking the language, procedural context, and
purpose of Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611 together, we conclude that the rule does not require a
party seeking review of a housing-court referee’s recommendation to obtain a transcript as
a condition of obtaining review. Thus, the district court erred by concluding that Sela was
in default for failing to do so.
We hasten to add, however, that rule 61 1(a) makes clear that the judge’s review
“shall be based upon the record established before the referee.” A reviewing judge may
determine that the scope of the review is lim ited to issues that can be determined by
reference to the available record. Cf. Duluth Herald & News Tribune v. Plymouth Optical
Co., 286 Minn. 495, 498, 176 N. W.2d 552, 555 (1970) (refusing to dismiss appeal for
failure to obtain a transcript, but limiting review to conclusions of law); In re Marriage of
Bender, 671 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. App. 2003) (“While the lack of a transcript does not
automatically require dismissal of an entire appeal, lack of a transcript does limit the scope

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of appellate review to whether the district c ourt’s conclusions of law are supported by its
findings of fact.”). A party seeking district court review thus de cides not to obtain a
transcript at the party’s own peril because the scope of review may be limited, particularly
when the issues are not well established by written filings. Also, while the reviewing court
may give the party additional time to obtain a transcript, it is not required to do so. See
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611(c) (“For good cause the reviewing judge may extend any of the
time periods described in this Rule 611(c).”).
D E C I S I O N
The district court erred in holding that Sela defaulted on its requests for review by
failing to obtain a transcript because Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 611 does not make obtaining a
transcript a condition of obtaining review. We therefore reverse and remand to the district
court to reinstate the requests for review of the expungement orders.
Reversed and remanded.