In the Matter of: Kari Dale Hickey, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1184

In the Matter of:
Kari Dale Hickey, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Dirk Anthony Hummel,
Appellant.

Filed June 25, 2018
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-16-2676

Jevon C. Bindman, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Richard R. Caldecott, Caldecott & Forro, P.L.C., White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Michael A. Feist, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Worke,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this domestic -abuse dispute, appellant argues that the district court (1 ) lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to distribute real and personal p roperty, (2) was biased against

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appellant, and (3) erred in awarding respondent cleaning costs and attorney fees to be paid
from appellant’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ real property . We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Kari Dale Hickey obtained an ex parte order for protection (OFP)
against appellant Dirk Anthony Hummel, and Hummel requested a hearing. At the hearing,
the parties agreed to resolve issues outside the scope of the domestic -abuse act, including
disposing of personal property and having their jointly owned house listed for sale with a
real-estate agent. Hummel was given an option to buy the property after a broker price
opinion was obtained, provided that he did so expeditiously.
The terms of the parties’ agreement were stated on the record and incorporated into
the district court’s August 23, 2016 order. The order gave Hummel ten days to exercise
his option to buy . During the hearing and in the order, the district court cautioned the
parties that delay or refusal to si gn the listing agreement with the agreed -upon real-estate
agent would result in sanctions being imposed. Hummel did not exercise his option to buy,
and on October 14, 2016, a hearing was held due to Hummel’s refusal to sign the listing
agreement. The court ordered both parties to immediately meet with the real -estate agent
to sign the listing agreement, and they did so.
After the parties signed the listing agreement, the real-estate agent received multiple
offers for the property, the highest of which was a cash offer that exceeded the listing price.
Hickey signed the purchase agreement and was ready to close on the sale , but Hummel
refused to sign. On November 18, 2016, the district court issued an order to show cause

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why Hickey’s motion to require H ummel to sign the purchase agreement should not be
granted, and on December 6, 2016, the district court held a hearing on the motion.
Neither Hummel nor his attorney appeared at the hearing, and neither of them
requested a continuance or informed the cou rt that they would not appear. On December
12, 2016, the district court issued an order finding that Hummel’s “conduct in this matter
is contemptuous of this court and its authority at a minimum by his willful and deliberate
frustration of the homestead sales process after signing a listing agreement that by its terms
required [him] to cooperate with the marketing and sale of the property.” The district court
ordered that Hickey was allowed to sell the property with only her signature on the deed
and awarded Hickey $5,000 in conduct -based attorney fees as a lien against Hummel’s
share of the sale proceeds.
Due to Hummel filing for personal bankruptcy, the December 12, 2016 order was
automatically stayed. Because Hummel refused to voluntarily agree to have the stay lifted,
Hickey brought a motion in bankruptcy court to lift the stay and allow the sale of the house
to proceed. The day before the motion hearing, after Hickey had incurred $5,210.75 in
attorney fees and court costs, Hummel agreed to have the stay lifted.
On May 19, 2017, the district court held a hearing on Hickey’s motion for an award
of attorney fees and distribution of the sale proceeds. Following the hearing, Hummel
submitted a proposed order stating only that the matter was commenced pursuant to Minn.
Stat. ch. 518B, the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction , and, consequently,
Hickey’s motions are denied. In a written order filed May 30, 2017, the district court found
“[t]hat in light of [Hummel’s ] ongoing contemptuous a nd obstructionist behavior

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throughout these proceedings, it is reasonable and appropriate that [Hummel] pay for the
costs [Hickey] incurred in resolving the matter and obtaining the highest possible sale price
on the homestead” and “[t]hat the attorney’s fees requested . . . are reasonable.” The district
court ordered that the sale proceeds be distributed equally to the parties after the following
deductions from Hummel’s share: $1,195.52 for cleaning costs incurred by Hickey when
a cleaning company helped prepare the house for sale; $5,710.75 for attorney fees incurred
by Hickey; and $750 to Hickey “for house cleaning work performed by her and her friend
to get five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) escrowed at closing restored to the net sum to be
distributed between the parties.”
Hummel appealed to this court, seeking to challenge the August 23, October 14,
November 18, and December 12, 2016, and the May 30, 2017 orders. This court dismissed
the appeal from the August 23 and October 14, 2016 orders as untimely and ordered that
the balance of the appeal shall proceed.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Hummel argues that the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction to dispose
of personal and real property in a domestic-abuse proceeding, and, therefore, the November
18, and December 12, 2016, and the May 30, 2017 orders are void. Once the time to appeal
a district court order expires, the order becomes final even if it is wrong. Johnson v.
Johnson, 902 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. App. 2017) (citing Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 275
Minn. 365, 370-71, 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1966) (stating that “[e]ven though the decision
of the [district] court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it

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is still final after the time for appeal has expired”); see Hanson v. Hanson , 379 N.W.2d
230, 232 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that a property division in a dissolution action
becomes final and cannot be modified once the time to appeal expires). As this court
explained in its September 19, 2017 order, the distric t court’s August 23, 2016 order
granting Hickey’s petition for a restraining order and incorporating the parties’ stipulation
to dispose of their real and personal property was a final order, and the appeal from that
order was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after the service of written notice
of its filing.
The November 18 and December 12, 2016, and the May 30, 2017 orders relate to
enforcement of the August 23 order. A district court has the authority to enforce its own
order. Ladwig v. Chatters, 623 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Minn. App. 2001). And an order may
not be collaterally attacked as unenforceable for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction unless
the absence of jurisdiction is clear on the face of the record. Davis v. Danielson , 558
N.W.2d 286, 287 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997) . Because no
lack of jurisdiction is clear on the face of this record, Hummel’s argument that the three
enforcement orders are void because the district court did not have jurisdiction to dispose
of personal and real property in the August 23 order is an impermissible collateral attack
on the August 23 order.
II.
Hummel argues that the district court was biased against him. I n reviewing claims
of judicial bias, an appellate court considers whether the district court “considered
arguments and motions made by both sides, ruled in favor of a complaining [party] on any

6
issue, and took actions to minimize prejudice to the defendant .” Hannon v. State , 752
N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008).
Hummel quotes a statement by the district court from the July 5, 2016 transcript,
claiming that the district court admonished the parties, “particularly” him. The quotation,
however, does not include the complete exchange between the parties and the district court;
it omits Hickey’s response to the district court’s question. After Hickey responded, the
court asked Hummel for his response. The full quot ation shows that the district court’s
admonishment was equally addressed to both parties. The complete exchange wa s as
follows:
THE COURT: Okay. They both have to cooperate in the
signing of any listing agreements if they’re both on title.
I’m not going to look favorably on anybody that says,
I’m n ot signing it, or we have to struggle to get it signed.
Whoever is not signing is going to get sanctioned by the Court.
Okay? Everybody understand that one?
HICKEY: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Sir?
HUMMEL: Yes.

Hummel also complains that the distri ct court adopted Hickey’s proposed orders.
Neither Hummel nor his attorney appeared at the December 6, 2016 hearing. A t the May
19, 2017 hearing, Hummel’s attorney appeared and , after the district court noted that
Hummel had not submitted a written objec tion to Hickey’s motion, Hummel’s attorney
only requested that the district court “rely on Minnesota law.” Finally, the only time that
Hummel provided the court with a proposed order was after the May 19, 2017 hearing
when Hummel provided a proposed order stating that the court lacked subject -matter

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jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the district court’s adoption of Hickey’s proposed
orders does not indicate bias.
Hummel also argues that the one -sided outcome demonstrates bias by the district
court. But the August 23 order incorporated the parties’ stipulation to evenly divide the
equity in the home, and it was only Hummel’s failure to abide by the stipulated order that
caused any differences between how the parties were treated.
III.
Hummel argue s that the district court’s findings on the home’s condition are
erroneous because the court’s findings incorporated Hickey’s proposed findings. “The
verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed findings and conclusions of law is not reversible
error per se.” County of Dakota v. Blackwell , 809 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted). This court will not reverse the district court’s findings of facts unless
they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999). Record
evidence supports the district court’s findings on the home’s condition. Also, the record
shows that the $750 awarded to respondent was for work that she and a friend performed
so that $5,000 that had been escrowed at closing could be released to be distributed to the
parties, which demonstrates that the work was beneficial to both parties. The district court
did not err in awarding Hickey cleaning costs.
Motions for attorney -fees sanctions are collateral to the merits of the underlying
action. Kellar v. Von Holtum, 605 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 2000). The goal of sanctions
“is not to punish the offender or to shift fees, but to deter bad faith litigation.” Id. at 701.

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Hummel repeatedly refused to cooperate with selling the house. Initially, he did not
sign the listing agreement, and then he refused to sign the purchase agreement. He refused
to voluntarily lift the bankruptcy court’s stay until after Hickey incurred more than $5,000
in attorney fees and costs to have it lifted.
Hummel argues that the district court’s attorney -fee award did not comply with
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 119.02, which requires that a motion for attorney fees be accompanied
by an affidavit of an attorney of record . Hickey’s motion for attorney fees was
accompanied by Hickey’s affidavit, in which she stated that she incurred (1) $5,210.75 for
bankruptcy court attorney fees and had only been able to pay $1,000 of that amount and
(2) $1,500 for attorney fees to bring the motion. The district court determined that the
attorney fees r equested were reasonable and awarded the bankruptcy attorney $4,210.75
and the attorney who brought the motion $1,500. The court stated that it was exercising
its “authority to sanction those who frivolously obstructed proceedings and breached a
settlement agreement.”
Even if rule 119.02 applies to attorney fees awarded as a sanction, the supreme court
has stated that rule 119.02 “is not intended to limit the court’s discretion, but is intended to
encourage streamlined handling of fee applications and to facilitate filing of appropriate
support to permit consideration of this issue.” Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 826 (Minn.
1999) (quotation omitted). When the district court is “familiar with the history of the case
and has access to the parties’ financial information, it may waive the requirements of Rule
119.” Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees.
Affirmed.