Clayton Teslow, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1196

Clayton Teslow,
Relator,

vs.

Mag Mechanical, LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 14, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 35533284-3

Clayton Teslow, Circle Pines, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Mag Mechanical, LLC, New Hope, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, r elator challenges an unemployment -law judge ’s (ULJ)
decision that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for
misconduct, arguing that the evidence does not support the ULJ’s factual findings that he
stole tools and mail from his employer and failed to report an absence. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2014, p ro se relator Clayton Teslow started working as a truck driver for
respondent Mag Mech anical, LLC. In addition to his driving responsibilities , Teslow
managed the checkout process for employees using Mag-owned tools pursuant to a policy
he helped write. Under that policy, employees could borrow company -owned tools for
personal use. But to do so, employees were required to ask a supervisor and record the
tool’s serial number. If an employee took a tool without following the procedure, it was
considered to be theft.
Teslow was arrested on March 26, 2017, on a charge of domestic assault. On March
27, between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., Teslow called Mag and left a message stating that he would
be late that day. Someone from Mag listened to the voice message around 7:00 a.m. and
“scheduled accordingly .” Around the same time, a woman who lived with Te slow
contacted a Mag employee and reported that Teslow was in jail because he had threatened
her with a knife and stated that Teslow had stolen Mag-owned tools and company mail in
order to get revenge for Mag having underpaid him due to alleged timecard errors.

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Mag sent two employees to Teslow’s home to investigate. Inside Teslow’s open
garage and behind his house, they found at least 12 Mag-owned specialty tools with Mag-
serial numbers, including, among others, a retractable saw, a circular saw, a quarter-inch
impactor, two batteries, an infrared thermometer, and a side grinder, the wholesale value
of which totaled around $750. The Mag employees also found an envelope addressed to
Mag that contained an accounts-payable letter. Mag discharged Teslow that day.
Teslow applied for unemployment benefits with the Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED determined Teslow to be
ineligible, and Teslow appealed. Teslow and Mag’s chief financial officer (CFO) testified
at a hearing with the ULJ . The ULJ found that Mag discharged Teslow for committing
three acts: (1) failing to report his absence on March 27 because he said only that he would
be late, not absent, (2) stealing tools from Mag that totaled around $750, and (3) stealing
an accounts-payable letter from Mag. Based on those acts, the ULJ concluded that Teslow
is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for employment
misconduct. Teslow requested reconsideration; the ULJ affirmed. Thi s certiorari appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
Upon review of an unemployment -benefits decision, we may affirm or remand for
further proceedings, or we may reverse the ULJ’s decision if its “findings, inferences,
conclusion, or decision are: . . . made upon unlawful procedure . . . [or] unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2017). An employee who is discharged by an employer for employment

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misconduct is ineligible to receive benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2016);
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 34 3 (Minn. App. 2006). “Employment
misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the
job that displays clearly: (1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer
has the right to reasonably expect of the employee; or (2) a substantial lack of concern for
the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (Supp. 2017). Whether an employee
committed employ ment misconduct is a mixed question of law and fact. Skarhus, 721
N.W.2d at 344. “Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of fact.”
Id. But whether the employee’s act constitutes employment misconduct is a question of
law that we review de novo. Id.
I.
Teslow does not challenge the ULJ’s legal conclusions that the acts of stealing and
failing to report an absence constitute employment misconduct under Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 6(a) (2016). Teslow instead argues that he was “unjustly terminated and
that [Mag] failed to show any evidence to show different.” 1 We treat Teslow’s argument
as an assertion that the ULJ’s factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record. Substantial evidence is “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more
than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its

1 In his informal letter brief, Teslow does not cite to any statute, caselaw, or record
evidence; he simply restates facts from the hearing and conclude s that he was unjustly
terminated.

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entirety.” Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d
457, 466 (Minn. 2002). We review the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable
to the decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ.
Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 344. We will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings if the evidence
substantially sustains them. Id.
We first address the ULJ’s factual finding that Teslow did not report his absence on
March 27 after getting arrested for assault. Teslow maintains that he called and left a voice
message informing Mag that he would be absent. But in the hearing before the ULJ, Mag’s
CFO testified that Teslow called and left a voice message between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on
March 27, informing Mag that he would be late, not absent. The CFO also testified that he
listened to the voice message between 6:00 and 7:00 a .m. on March 27 and reported to
management that Teslow would be late. Teslow testified that, although he was almost
certain that he said he would be absent, “[he] may have said late because [he] was originally
scheduled for court at nine in the morning, so [he] may have thought late.”
The ULJ found that it was “more credible that Teslow only told MAG that he would
be late on March 27, 2017.” The ULJ provided two reasons for why it credited the CFO’s
testimony: Teslow testified that “he believed that he would have a hearing [on the assault
arrest] during the morning of March 27, 2017” and Mag’s CFO testified that he listened to
the voice message informing Mag that Teslow would be late and reported that information
to management. We defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations when the ULJ sets forth
a valid reason for crediting or discrediting testimony that may significantly impact the
ultimate decision. Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn.

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App. 2007); see also Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2016) (providing that where
“credibility of a witness testifying in a hearing has a significant effect on the outcome of a
decision, the unemployment law judge must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting
that testimony”). Giving deference to the ULJ’s credibility determinations, we conclude
that substantial evidence in the record supports the finding that Teslow did not report his
absence.
Second, we address the ULJ’s factual finding that Teslow stole tools from Mag and
that Mag employees found the tools on Teslow’s property on March 27. Teslow does not
dispute that he took the tools; he instead maintains that the tools could not have been a
basis for firing him because Mag did not discover that they were stolen until March 28, one
day after he had been fired. We disagree. Mag’s CFO testified that Mag employees found
the tools on the same day that the woman who lived with Teslow reported that he had been
arrested, which was on March 27. The CFO further testified that Teslow did not follow
the checkout policy and that it is considered theft if an employee does not follow the policy.
In the order of affirmation, the ULJ determined that it was more credible that Mag
“saw the tools in Teslow’s open garage on March 27, 2017,” which “occurred the day after
Teslow was arrested for domestic abuse.” The ULJ reasoned that it would “make[] sense
that the alleged victim would report the stolen tools to [Mag] at her earliest opportunity
which was the Monday following the alleged abuse.” Giving deference to the ULJ’s
credibility determinations, we conclude that the record supports the finding that Teslow
stole tools and that Mag discovered the tools on March 27.

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Third, we address the ULJ’s factual finding that Teslow stole an accounts -payable
letter from Mag. At the hearing, Teslow testified that he had “no idea about the letter,” but
if “anything, it was an accident.” Mag’s CFO, however, testified that a woman who lived
with Teslow reported that he stole mail because he felt that Mag had denied him holiday
pay on a recent paycheck. The CFO testified further that two Mag employees found an
accounts-payable letter inside Teslow’s garage. In addition, t he CFO stated that Teslow
did not have a business reason to possess the letter and that Mag was three weeks late
making a payment because it did not have the letter.
The ULJ reasoned that it was “more credible, and therefore more probable, that
Teslow took an accounts payable letter from MAG and did not have a business reason to
have it ” because “the victim of the alleged domestic assault . . . informed [Mag] that
Teslow . . . stole the items in retaliation for [Mag] denying him holiday pay.” Giving
deference to the ULJ’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the record supports the
finding that Teslow stole an accounts-payable letter.
II.
Although Teslow has n ot challenged the ULJ’s legal determination that these acts
constitute misconduct, and although pro se litigants are “held to the same standard s as
attorneys,” Heinsch v. Lot 27, Block 1 For’s Beach , 399 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. App.
1987), we will address it briefly in order to provide a complete analysis to a pro se relator.
See Kasson State Bank v. Haugen , 410 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that
courts have a duty to allow “reasonable accommodation” to pro se litigants so long as there
is no prejudice to the adverse party).

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We have determined that, under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a)(1), an employee’s
act of stealing from an employer amounts to disqualifying misconduct. Skarhus, 721
N.W.2d at 344. In Skarhus, we determined on the record before us that an employee who
had signed a policy statement indicating that she understood that dishonesty and theft
constituted grounds for dismissal engaged in employment misconduct when she took food
without paying for it. 721 N.W.2d at 344 (citing Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2004)).
Here, the ULJ determined that Teslow’s acts of stealing tools, stealing an accounts-
payable letter, and failing to report an absence each constituted employment misconduct,
reasoning that “[Teslow’s] conduct was intentional and displayed clearly a serious
violation of the standards of behavior that [Mag] had the right to reasonably expect of
[him].” We conclude that the record before us establishes that Teslow engaged in
employment misconduct. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a); Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at
344. Therefore, the ULJ did not err in determining that Teslow is ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.