In re the Marriage of: Samuel Thomas Shea Greenwood, petitioner, Respondent,
The holding in the court’s own words
But because the district court’s findings in this case are sufficien t to support modification under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv), we conclude that the dist rict court did not ab use its discretion by modifying custody.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Hansen v. Todnem 908 N.W.2d 592
- Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow 427 N.W.2d 203
- Marriage of Medvedovski v. Medvedovski 903 N.W.2d 646
- 897 N.W.2d 4 not in our corpus
- State on Behalf of Gunderson v. Preuss 336 N.W.2d 546
- Marriage of Grein v. Grein 364 N.W.2d 383
- In re the Marriage of: Denise Louise Spanier v. Terence Urban Spanier 852 N.W.2d 284
- Vangsness v. Vangsness 607 N.W.2d 468
- Marriage of Lilleboe v. Lilleboe 453 N.W.2d 721
- Marriage of Goldman v. Greenwood 748 N.W.2d 279
- Marriage of Ross v. Ross 477 N.W.2d 753
- Dalbec v. W.P.W. 653 N.W.2d 804
- Sharp v. Bilbro 614 N.W.2d 260
- Marriage of Eckman v. Eckman 410 N.W.2d 385
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1206
In re the Marriage of: Samuel Thomas Shea Greenwood, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Kari Ann Greenwood,
Appellant.
Filed June 25, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge
Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-FA-08-46
Matthew K. Steffes, JoAnn D. Wolf, Miche lle L.A. Kelsey, Kelsey Law Office, P.A.,
Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)
Sean Linnan, Linnan Law Firm, L.L.C., Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district co urt’s order modifying custody, arguing
that the district court applie d an incorrect standard, made erroneous findings, erred in
determining that it is in the children’s best interests to modify custody, and failed to balance
the harms posed by a modification of custody. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant-mother Kari Ann Greenwood a nd respondent-father Samuel Thomas
Shea Greenwood have three minor children together, an 11-year-old son and two 16-year-
old sons. In 2008, mother and father divorced. The parties agreed to joint legal and joint
physical custody and equal parenting time. In 2011, the district court issued a parenting-
time schedule allocating each pare nt two weeknights and alternating weekends with the
children.
In June 2016, father moved for sole le gal and physical custody of the children.
Father included an affidavit alleging that mother had used cocaine and marijuana and that
the children had witnessed erratic and intoxicat ed behavior by mother and her boyfriend,
T.R. The district court awarded father te mporary sole legal and physical custody and
ordered chemical testing of mother and restrictions on the children’s contact with T.R. A
hair sample was collected from mother on July 1, 2016, and tested positive for marijuana
and cocaine.
An evidentiary hearing was held in April 2017. Mother and father testified, as well
as T.R. and T.R.’s mother. The district co urt found that mother and T.R. used drugs
together after T.R. relapsed from a period of sobriety. The district court found that mother
told father that T.R. had threatened her safe ty to the point she had to leave her home due
to threats escalating into violence and that T.R. becomes paranoid and violent when using
drugs. The district court found that the youngest son witnessed arguments and an incident
of domestic violence between T.R. and mother. The district court found that this caused
the youngest son to be fearful of T.R., and he does not wish to spend time with mother
3
when T.R. is present. The district court found that the older sons refuse to spend time with
mother because of her relationship with T.R.
The district court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to modify
custody, citing the danger posed to the child ren by mother’s relationship with T.R. The
district court awarded father sole physical custody and awarded the parties joint legal
custody, with father having the final deci sion-making authority in the event of a
disagreement. Mother was awarded parenting time with the older sons “as she can arrange
with them” and parenting time with the youngest son one da y per week and every other
weekend.
Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“District courts have broa d discretion on matters of cu stody and parenting time.”
Hansen v. Todnem , 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). On appeal, “[o]ur review is
limited to whether the district court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported
by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Id. (quotation omitted). We defer to
the district court’s findings of fact unless th ey are clearly erroneous, and we defer to the
district court’s credibility assessments. Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988). A finding of fact is cl early erroneous if we are “lef t with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Medvedovski v. Medvedovski, 903 N.W.2d 646,
649 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Before modifying custody, a district court must find that the statutory requirements
set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2016) are satisfied. See Crowley v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d
4
288, 294 (Minn. 2017) (indicating that spec ific findings on the factors within section
518.18 confirms compliance with the statute). A district court may modify a prior custody
order if it finds that (1) the circumstances of the child or the parties have changed;
(2) modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child; (3) the child’s present
environment “endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development”; and (4) the harm likely to be caused by the modification is
outweighed by its advantages to the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv); State ex rel.
Gunderson v. Preuss, 336 N.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Minn. 1983). The party seeking a custody
modification bears the burden of establishing these factors, and the district court must make
specific findings addressing each. Crowley, 897 N.W.2d at 294. It is reversible error if
the district court fails to make specifi c findings under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). See id.
(reversing and remanding where district court “failed to make each of the factual findings
required by section 518.18”); Gunderson, 336 N.W.2d at 547-48 (reversing and remanding
a modification order that only made a best-interests determination).
Mother argues that the distri ct court only applied the be st-interests factors in its
modification order and that “[t]his is not the appropriate standard and, even if it was, it was
not properly applied.” The district court’s order explicitly addressed the best-interests
factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2016 ), but did not separately address the other
elements of Minn. Stat. § 518.18. However, remand for additional findings is not necessary
when a district court otherwise made “subs tantially sufficient” findings to support
modification under the statute. Grein v. Grein, 364 N.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Minn. 1985). In
5
this case, the district court’s findings, as in cluded within the best-i nterests analysis, are
sufficient to support the modification under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv).
A. Change in circumstances
To warrant custody modification, the change in circumstances must have occurred
since the original custody order; “it cannot be a continuation of conditions existing prior to
the order.” Spanier v. Spanier , 852 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Min n. App. 2014) (quotation
omitted). The district court acknowledged that mother and father had previously
coparented and communicated “f airly well,” but things chan ged when mother moved in
with T.R. The district court found that mother’s relationship with her children has suffered
because of her relationship with T.R. The older sons do not want to spend time with
mother, and the youngest son will only spend time with her if T.R. is not present. These
findings are sufficient to constitute an implicit finding of a change in circumstances since
the original custody order was established.
B. Best interests of the children
Mother argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the best interests of
the children favor modification. 1 She challenges many of the district court’s findings
within the best-interests anal ysis, arguing that the record supports the following findings
in lieu of the district court’s findings: (1) the children did not express a preference in
custody; (2) the change in the relationships and parenting time between mother and the
1 Mother cited and analyzed an earlier version of Minn. St at. § 518.17. In 2015, the
Minnesota legislature amended the best-interests factors. See 2015 Minn. Laws ch. 30, art.
1, § 3, at 271-72. The district court consid ered and applied the current version of the
statute.
6
older sons was the fault of fa ther, who permitted them to ig nore the parenting schedule;
(3) the youngest son has a close bond with T.R. ; (4) mother’s return to the school district
solved any concerns the older sons may have had with visiting her; (5) father had no
concerns about mother and T.R.’s current chemical health; (6) father has a history of drug
use; (7) father wanted the district court “t o reinstate [mother’s] ri ghts”; (8) none of the
children witnessed domestic abus e because no abuse occurred; and (9) mother is able to
maintain a healthy relationship with her children while maintaining a separate relationship
with T.R.
Before modifying custody, the district court must find that a modification is
necessary to serve the children’s best interests. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). In assessing the
children’s best interests, the district court is required to consider and evaluate all relevant
factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). The “law leaves scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. Ap p. 2000). A party challenging
the district court’s findings of fact on the be st-interests factors “must show that despite
viewing [the] evidence in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings . . . , the
record still requires the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Id. at 474.
“That the record might support findings other than those made by the [district] court does
not show that the court’s findings are defective.” Id.
The record contains suffici ent evidence to support the district court’s findings and
its determination that it is in the children’s best interests to modify custody. Both mother
and father acknowledged that the older sons had not been attending mother’s parenting
7
time and that her relationship with T.R. was a source of tension between the sons and
mother. Likewise, the record includes testimony that the youngest son witnessed a verbal
and physical altercation between mother and T.R. and that afterward he did not wish to see
T.R. and appeared frightened of him. Father testified that he did not believe that mother
was presently using drugs, but he believed his children had been in danger in mother’s care
when she was in a relationship with T.R. While the evidence in this case may have
supported findings contrary to those made by the district court, we are not left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
C. Endangerment
“A finding of present endangerment must be based on the particular facts of each
case.” Lilleboe v. Lilleboe , 453 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. Ap p. 1990). The concept of
endangerment is “unusually imprecise.” Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 285
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted ). But it includes “a signi ficant degree of danger” to
emotional health or development. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv); Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d
753, 756 (Minn. App. 1991). “[I]n order to establish danger to a child’s welfare, a parent’s
conduct must be shown to result in an actual adverse effect on the child.” In re Weber, 653
N.W.2d 804, 811 (Minn. App. 2002). “Fear of the custodial parent and her spouse is . . . a
recognized sign of present endangerment.” Lilleboe, 453 N.W.2d at 724. The modification
statute does not require a parent to wait until harm has actually occurred, if the environment
creates a serious risk of harm. See Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn. App.
2000) (upholding modification where the child would be harmed if left in mother’s care),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).
8
The district court found that mother’s re lationship with T.R. “does not provide the
children with a safe and healthy environment.” The district court fo und that mother and
T.R. have chemical-health issues that “affect the safety of [mother’s] children” and mother
is not “able to provide healthy ongoing care for the children.” The district court found that
mother’s relationship with T.R. “makes for an unhealthy ongoing relationship between the
minor children and [mother]” and “[a]ny tim e the children would spend with [mother]
should she include [T.R.] would not benefit [the children] but would be a detriment.” The
district court’s findings substantially suppo rt a conclusion that mother’s environment
endangers the children’s physical or emotional health.
Mother argues that the endangerment requi rement was not satisfied because there
was no evidence of domestic abuse, as defined by Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act. See
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) (2016) (defining domestic abuse as, among other things,
physical harm or bodily injury or infliction of fear of immi nent physical harm or bodily
injury). Mother cites no authority requiri ng a finding of domestic abuse to prove
endangerment, and Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) does not require one. Regardless, the
district court found that the youngest son witnessed violence between T.R. and mother, and
the record is sufficient to support that finding.
D. Balance of the harm and advantages
Mother argues that the district court erred by suggesting that the harm likely to be
caused by a change in custody is outweighed by the advantages to the children.
The district court did not specifically address this factor. However, the district court
found that father “provides a healthy environment for the minor children, while it is tenuous
9
that the environment and time spen t with [mother] is beneficial.” The district court also
found that “[t]he children at this time are benefited from maximizing their time with
[father] and limiting their time w ith [mother] when [T.R.] is present.” These findings
substantially support a conclusion that th e benefits of modification outweigh the
detriments, and the record supports such findings. See Eckman v. Eckman , 410 N.W.2d
385, 389 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that the district court did not reversibly err in failing
to make a specific finding on this statutory factor because the “bal ancing test in this
particular case is implicit in both the court’s findings regarding [the child’s] best interests
and endangerment of his emotional health and development”). Mo ther and T.R. each
testified about their interests in moving the relationship forward, perhaps to marriage, and
that T.R. was living with mother during the hearing. This is in direct conflict with the
children’s expressed desire to avoid a relationship with T.R.
We caution district courts against filing orders modifying custody which include
only their analysis of the best-interests factors. The failure to make findings on all factors
under Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d), w ill ordinarily require reversal . But because the district
court’s findings in this case are sufficien t to support modification under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(d)(iv), we conclude that the dist rict court did not ab use its discretion by
modifying custody.
Affirmed.