State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1215

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Blake Andrew Dearmond,
Appellant.

Filed April 30, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-16-2386

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Blake Andrew DeArmond1 appeals from his convictions for two counts
of aiding and abetting first-degree a ggravated robbery, arguing that his Alford guilty plea
is invalid because the record does not sufficiently demonstrate his agreement that the state’s
evidence was sufficient for a jury to find him guilty. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant was charged with two counts of aiding and abetting first-degree
aggravated robbery using a firearm under Mi nn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2014) with
reference to Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2014) and Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 5(a)
(2014).2 The charges were based on the allegation that appellant and another male, B.W.,
approached a male and female in St. Cloud. B.W. “tased”3 the male, and appellant pointed
what appeared to be a silver revolver at th e female and demanded her purse. The victims
relented and surrendered their belongings. Law enforcement apprehended appellant and
B.W. shortly after the incident. Appellant told law enforcement that he possessed a gun,

1 The case caption in the district court iden tifies this appellant as “Blake Andrew
Dearmond” and that name is used in the caption on appeal. However, the appellant’s brief
identifies his last name as “DeArmond.” The caption on appeal must match the caption
used in the district court’s decision, see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01, but we use
“DeArmond” in the body of this opinion.

2 Appellant was also charged with aiding and abetting possession of ammunition or a
firearm by a person with a prior violent-crime conviction. That count was dismissed.

3 We understand the references in the record to a “taser” to mean the use of an electric-
stunning device, regardless of brand name.

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and police recovered a silver pellet gun matchi ng the witnesses’ desc riptions of the gun
held by one of the men who had robbed them. B.W. had property on his person belonging
to the victims. Both victims identified appellant and B.W. as the persons who robbed them.
Appellant pleaded guilty to both counts of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery
in exchange for the st ate’s agreement to an executed se ntence of 71 months in prison,
characterized to the district court as a “slight durational departure” from the sentencing
guidelines.4 At the plea hearing, the state ques tioned appellant in detail regarding the
factual basis for his plea. The state asked appellant if he was with B.W. on the evening of
the offense. Appellant responded that he had been with B.W., but said that he was not with
him at the time of the offense. The state described the factual allegations in the complaint
to appellant, who responded that he understood the allegations, but maintained that he was
not involved. Appellant acknowledged that he fit the description the victims gave of one
robber, and admitted that the pellet gun in his possession also matched the description given
by the victims. Appellant acknowledged that B.W. pleaded guilty to the same two aiding-
and-abetting-robbery charges, and that B.W. would presumably testify that appellant was
involved in the robbery if the case went to trial.
The state asked appellant whether, if the ca se went to trial and appellant presented
his “version” that he was not present during the offense, and the state “presented all of the

4 The district court sentenced appellant to 71 months on both count s, according to the
sentencing worksheets in the record on appeal. The presumptive sentence for count 1 was
a prison commitment of between 67 months and 93 months, with a midrange of 78 months.
The presumptive sentencing range on count 2 was from 84 months to 117 months, with a
midrange of 98 months. Accordingly, the se ntence on count 1 was a guidelines sentence
and the sentence on count 2 was a downward durational departure.

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evidence [discussed] with you, as well as any other peripheral matters in the disclosure, the
jury would find you guilty of both of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt?” Appellant
responded, “Yes.” The state then asked him, “[T]hat’s why you’re taking the deal. Is that
what I am understanding correctly?” Appellant again responded in the affirmative.
Before asking the district court to accept the plea, the state asked some additional
questions to “clarify.” The state identified the first element it had to prove for aggravated
robbery, “that property was taken from both of [the victims] in their presence or from their
person.” It asked if appellant understood that, and if he would agree that is what happened.
Appellant replied “yes.” It then asked appellant if he and B.W. did not have permission to
take the property, whether they used force to take the property, whether the way appellant
used the pellet gun would constitute a danger ous weapon as it was capable of producing
death or great bodily harm, a nd whether the male victim suffe red an injury when he was
tased. Appellant responded “yes” to all of these questions.
The state then asked appellant, “And you agree you’re guilty of that aspect of aiding
and abetting. Both of you were acting together to take property from two victims together.
Correct?” Appellant responded, “If it was brough t to trial then it woul d end up that way.
Yes.” Immediately thereafter, the state aske d, “You’re saying the jury would believe it
beyond a reasonable doubt?” Appellant replied, “yes.” The state later asked appellant if
he understood what aiding and abetting was and whether appellant agreed that the state
“could” prove appellant was acting in concert with another individual beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. Appellant said “yes” to both questions.

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The district court asked appellant’s couns el if he wished to question appellant
further, and counsel declined. The district court took judicial notice of the state’s complaint
and found that there was a sufficient factual basis for appellant’s guilty pleas. It convicted
appellant of two counts of aiding and abe tting aggravated robbery with a firearm and
sentenced appellant to two concurrent 71-month executed prison sentences, in conformity
with the plea agreement.
This appeal, challenging the validity of appellant’s Alford plea, followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea under North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970). He argues that his plea is
invalid because he did not agree that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict him
beyond a reasonable doubt, and only agreed that a jury “could” convict on this evidence.
“Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that we review de novo.”
State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). An invalid guilt y plea may be
withdrawn after sentencing. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). “To be
valid, a guilty plea must be intelligen t, voluntary, and accurate.” State v. Iverson , 664
N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003). “Accuracy requires that the plea be supported by a proper
factual basis, that there must be sufficient fa cts on the record to support a conclusion that
defendant’s conduct falls with in the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
An Alford plea permits a defendant who maintains actual innocence to plead guilty
in order to take advantage of a plea agreemen t when the defendant agrees that there is

6
sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty at trial. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S.
Ct. at 167; State v. Goulette , 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977). The accuracy
requirement in the context of an Alford guilty plea is met if the plea is based on (1) a factual
basis as established by “evidence discussed w ith the defendant on th e record at the plea
hearing” and (2) the defendant’s agreement “that evid ence the [s]tate is likely to offer at
trial is sufficient to convict.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Concerning the first requirement, “carefu l scrutiny of the factual basis for the
[Alford] plea is necessary” because of the “inhe rent conflict in pleading guilty while
maintaining innocence.” Id. at 648-49. Evidence establishing a factual basis may come
through questioning the defend ant about the eviden ce likely to be presented at trial and
about the defendant’s underlying conduct. Id. at 649. Concerning the second requirement,
and in order to prevent a defe ndant from pleading gu ilty to an offense more serious than
the evidence would support, the defendant must acknowledge that the state’s evidence is
sufficient to convict. Id. The best practice is for a defendant to “specifically acknowledge
on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the [s]tate would likely offer against him
is sufficient for a jury, applyi ng a reasonable doubt standard, to find the defendant guilty
of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” Id.
The factual-basis requirement, coupled wi th a defendant’s ag reement that the
evidence is sufficient to convict, gives a district court the “basis to independently conclude
that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to
which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his clai ms of innocence.” Id. (emphasis in
original). So long as a proper factual basis exists and the defendant agrees the evidence is

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sufficient to convict, an Alford guilty plea satisfies the accu racy requirement, despite the
absence of a sworn admission to th e elements of the offense. Id. The independent
conclusion the district court should reach is “m erely that [it] must assure itself that the
accuracy standard is satisfied.” State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn. App. 2015).
Here, appellant argues that his Alford plea is inaccurate because he did not agree
that the state’s evidence was su fficient to allow a jury to find him guilty of aiding and
abetting aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant supports this assertion
with reference to a portion of the transcript in which the state asked him “you agree I could
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt if you went to trial?” (Emphasis added.) Appellant
claims that this single ambiguous question and answer during the lengthy plea discussion
likens this case to State v. Theis in that appellant only acknowledged the risk that he “could”
be convicted of a crime, and not that a jury would find him guilty of the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 742 N.W.2d at 650.
In Theis, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that, “[i]n the context of an Alford
plea, where a defendant maintains his innocen ce, the defendant’s acknowledgement that
there is a risk that he could be convicted does not meet the standard for accuracy.” Id.
There, the defendant’s colloquy included only an acknowledgement there was a “risk” he
would be found guilty. Id. This case is easily distinguishable from Theis. Here, in addition
to the isolated ambiguous question and answ er on which appellant bases his argument,
concerning whether the state “could” prove his guilt, appellant acknowledged several times
that the evidence was su fficient for a jury to find him gu ilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s own narrative response to the question of whether he agreed that he was guilty

8
was, “If it was brought to trial then it would end up that way.” Appellant agreed that a
jury, presented with the evidence discussed at the plea hearing, would find him “guilty of
both of [the] charges beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The record supports the district court’s finding that a sufficient factual basis
supports appellant’s plea. Accordingly, appellant’s Alford guilty plea is valid. See Matakis
v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Minn. 2015) (a defendant’s acknowledgement that he “could”
be found guilty of an offe nse was sufficient for an Alford plea when a reading of the
transcript indicated he had “also” agreed that a jury “would” have sufficient evidence to
find him guilty).
Affirmed.