Ashley Rae Crapser, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1238

Ashley Rae Crapser, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Drake Wayne Smith,
Appellant.

Filed April 9, 2018
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-17-3336

Ashley R. Crapser, St. Michael, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Drake W. Smith, Sartell, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s issuance of a harassment restraining order
(HRO) on behalf of respondent and denial of appellant’s motion to vacate that HRO. We
affirm.
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FACTS
On July 7, 2017, resp ondent Ashley Rae Crapse r petitioned for an HRO against
appellant Drake Wayne Smith. The petition alleged that Smith had been Crapser’s
boyfriend more than eight years earlier and that Smith had recently “[p]ersonally dropped
off letters at [her] home,” “repeatedly texted [her] after being told to stop,” and repeatedly
contacted Crapser through “facebook messages and posted inappropriately about [ her] on
facebook.” The petition further alleged that Crapser believed Smith would continue to
harass her “because he has been told on many occasions to stop, he will write in the letters
that he knows he isn’t supposed to contact [her], but still does and because of information
shared from his family about potential mental health [issues] that he refuses to get h elp
for.” The district court granted Crapser an ex parte HRO against Smith. Smith requested
a hearing.
On July 21, 2017, the district court held a hearing on Crapser’s HRO petition.
During the hearing, the district court explained to Smith that he could have a contested
hearing and that if he chose to do so , he and Crapser would have the “right to call
witnesses,” the “right to ask them questions,” and the right to testify at the hearing. The
district court also explained:
If you’re here because yo u disagree with some of the
allegations in the petition, but you don’t care whether a
harassment restraining order is issued against you, I can issue
an order that indicates you deny the allegations but you have
no objection to the issuance of the restrain ing order; and the
Court doesn’t make any findings of harassment.

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The district court noted that if Smith agreed to an HRO, that HRO would “be enforced like
any other harassment restraining order” and that if he “had contact with Ms. Crapser in any
way, [he] could be charged with a misdemeanor.”
Smith denied Crapser’s harassment allegations and stated, “ [I]f it makes her feel
comfortable that for this to be implemented, that’s fine to me. I would at least request to
keep this information confidential.” Smith inquired whether he could use family mediation
to “get it dropped” or otherwise avoid the HRO being on his “record.” The district court
explained that family media tion was not an option, that because this was not a criminal
case, the HRO itself was not on his criminal record , and that the court file regarding
Crapser’s HRO petition is a public record and the district court would need “a substantial
reason” to seal it.
The district court asked Smith if he wanted “to agree to the issuance of an order with
no findings of harassment with the conditions that [he] have no contact with [Crapser].”
Smith again disputed an allegation in the HRO petition, and the district court asked him if
he wanted to contest the allegations. Smith responded, “No. Keep it going. ” Crapser
interrupted and asked the district court if the HRO would be on Smith’s “record” if he did
not have a contested hearing. The district court clarified that Smith would have to be
convicted of violating the HRO for there to be anything on his criminal record regarding
the HRO, but that the HRO filings were part of the court system’s records. Smith asked if
it would be possible to seal the HRO filings and the district court responded that it did not
“know that that’ s possible” and that Smith “should assume that it would just be pu blic
information.” The district court again asked Smith if he wanted to have a contested hearing
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or agree to the HRO without a finding of harassment. Smith responded, “Yeah, that’s fine,
but I just wanted it to go down as I denied these allegations.” The district court confirmed,
“The order will specifically say that you deny the allegations and the Court makes no
finding of harassment.”
After the district court asked Smith whether he wou ld have a legitimate reason to
be within a mile of Crapser’s residence, Smith stated that he “type[d] up [his] own
statement of a timeline and everything as well” and asked the district court whether he
would be able to submit that document. The district court replied that if Smith wanted to
have a contested hearing he would have “the right to testify and try to offer any evidence
[he] want[ed].” The district court again asked Smith if he “want[ed] to have a contested
hearing” or “want[ed] to agree to the issuance of the order that says [he] den[ies] the
allegations in the petition.” Smith responded, “I want to do that, but I’ll agree for her” and
“I’ll agree for her.” The district court explained the contents of the proposed HRO,
including that Smith de nied the allegations of Crapser’s petition, that Smith had no
objection to the issuance of the HRO, and that the court would not make a finding of
harassment. Smith and Crapser agreed that this was their understanding of the HRO.
The district court granted Crapser a two -year HRO against Smith , stating that
“[Smith] denies the allegations of the Petition but has no objection to the issuance of a
Restraining Order. The court makes no findings of harassment.” Three days later, Smith
requested an “order f or Dismissal” of the HRO, arguing that “there were no findings of
harassment and [he] now object[ed] to the issuance of a restraining order on file/in effect
without proper cause or reason for it to be implemented against him.” Th e district court
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held a hearing and denied Smith’s motion, reasoning that because Smith had agreed to the
HRO at the prior hearing, the district court did not make any factual findings of harassment
and its order notes that Smith denied the allegations . The district court also emphasized
that it had explained to Smith more than three times that he did not have to agree to the
HRO and could have a contested hearing. Smith appeals.1
D E C I S I O N
In his pro se brief, Smith appears to make the following three main arguments:
(1) there was insufficient evidentiary support for the grant of an HRO, (2) his agreement
to the HRO was not voluntary , and (3) Crapser’s HRO petition contains defamatory
statements. Smith’s brief does not set forth clear legal argument or authority in support of
his requests for appellate relief.
“Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys . . . .” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). “An
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argum ent or
authorities in [an] appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere ins pection.” State v. Modern Recycling, Inc. , 558
N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted). We have reviewed the record in

1 Crapser did not file a brief, and this court ordered the appeal to proceed under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if a respondent fails to file a brief, the case shall be
determined on the merits).
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light of Smith’s arguments and do not discern obvious prejudicial error. Nonetheless, we
briefly address Smith’s arguments.
Evidentiary Basis for HRO
Smith contends that the HRO is invalid because it is based only on his agreement to
the issuance of the HRO, and not on “evidence of harassing and adverse effecting behaviors
from [him]” towards Crapser. Smith denies the allegations of the HRO petition and argues
that Crapser failed to provide any verification of the harassing behavior alleged in the
petition.
Because Smith consented to the HRO, the district court made “no findings of
harassment.” As t he district court noted, it s order granting the HRO therefore did not
represent the judgment of the court that the alleged harassment had occurred. It merely
represented Smith’s agreement that an HRO would issue.
When a judgment is based solely on the ag reement and consent of the parties, the
judgment is “not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and does not purport
to represent the judgment of the court, but merely records the pre-existing agreement of the
parties.” Hentschel v. Smith , 278 Minn. 86, 96, 153 N.W.2d 199, 2 06 (1967) (quotation
omitted). Given Smith’s agreement to the issuance of an HRO without any findings
regarding the underlying harassment allegations, evidentiary support for the allegations
was unnecessary, and insufficient evidentiary support is not a basis for this court to grant
relief.
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Involuntary Agreement
Smith argues that the HRO is invalid because he was “receiving pressure from
[Crapser], her attending family . . ., the court system, [ and the] adverse effects [Crapser]
has on [him] while in person to put her best interests before his . . . own.” Smith contends
that he moved to dismiss the HRO because he realized that his “personal record of the false
defaming allegations of a mental illness, stalking, threateni ng behavior, phone calls, and
uninvited visits, would only be removed from the record if the case was dismissed.”
The district court may set aside a judgment that is based solely on the agreement of
the parties for “fraud, mistake, or the absence of real consent.” Hollenkamp v. Peters, 410
N.W.2d 427, 429 (Minn. App. 1987). Smith’s statements at the HRO hearing indicate that
he agreed to the HRO because he believed Crapser wanted it. Smith stated that “if it makes
[Crapser] feel comfortable . . . for [the HRO] to be implemented, that’s fine to me.” And
when asked whether he “want[ed] to have a contested hearing” or “want[ed] to agree to the
issuance of the order that says [he] den[ied] the allegations in the petition,” Smith
responded “I want to do that, but I’ll agree for her” and “I’ll agree for her.”
Smith does not allege, and the record does not suggest, that Crapser, her family, or
the district court coerced Smith into agreeing to the HRO. In fact, Smith does not point to
any evidence in the record that Crapser even encouraged him to agree to the HRO . The
fact that Smith’s agreement to the HRO was partly motivated by his belief that Crapser
wanted an HRO does not render his agreement involuntary.
Moreover, the record of the HRO hearing indicates that Smith’s decision to agree
to the HRO was informed. The district court extensively discussed Smith’s options with
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him on the record, including the option of a contested hearing where each side would have
the right to call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and testify. The district court
explained t hat if he agreed to an HRO, the HRO would “be enforced like any other
harassment restraining order” and that if he “had contact with Ms. Crapser in any way, [he]
could be charged with a m isdemeanor.” Smith replied that he understood. When Smith
disputed specific allegations and asked that evidence be admitted into the record, the
district court asked Smith if he would prefer to have a contested hearing. The district court
continued to discuss the agreed-upon HRO only after confirming that Smith did not w ant
to have a contested hearing.
Although Smith expressed some concerns about whether the HRO would be on his
“record,” the district court clarified that it would not be part of his cri minal record unless
he violated it, that the c ourt file regarding the HRO was a public record, and that it was
unlikely that the district court would seal the HRO filings. And the district court f ully
explained the contents of the proposed HRO, including that it would state that Smith denied
the allegations of Crapser’s petition, that Smith had no objection to the issuance of the
HRO, and that the court would not make a finding of harassment. Smith stated that this
was his understanding of the proposed HRO and that he agreed with it.
In sum, the record simply does not support Smith’s claim that his agreement to the
HRO was involuntary. Smith’s allegation that he personally felt pressure from Crapser,
her family, and the court system to agree to the H RO does not amount to the “absence of
real consent” required to set aside the HRO. See Hollenkamp, 410 N.W.2d at 429.
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Defamatory Statements
Smith contends that the allegation in Crapser’s HRO petition that he will continue
to harass her because he has a mental illness is a “defaming rumor” that has not been
verified by a medical professional, and that because the HRO was granted , the allegation
will “go on the court file on [his] background.” However, the presence of that unverified
allegation in Crapser’s HRO petition does not invalidate the resulting HRO, which is the
subject of this appeal. Once again, the district court’s HRO was based on Smith’s
agreement, not on factual findings regarding the allegations in the HRO petition. The
accuracy of any of those allegations is therefore irrelevant in this appeal.
To the extent that Smith suggests that he has a defamation claim based on the
allegation, such a claim is outside the scope of our review of the district court’s issuance
of the HRO and denial of Smith’s motion to dismiss the HRO. To the extent that Smith
suggests this court should seal the record containing Crapser’s HRO petition, this court is
an error-correcting court and cannot consider such action for the first time on appea l. See
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must generally
consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the
[district] court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)).
In conclusion, Smith does not present a basis for this court to grant relief from the
underlying HRO.
Affirmed.