In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Jerome M. Kraskey

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1243

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Jerome M. Kraskey

Filed January 16, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-17-237

Kurt M. Anderson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atto rney, John L. Kirwin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Ju dge; Worke, Judge; and
Toussaint, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Jerome Kraskey appeals from th e Hennepin County District Court’s order
civilly committing him as a “person who is mentally ill” and from its denial of his motion
for amended findings or a new trial. He argues that we should overrule our previous
decision in In re Civil Commitment of Williams , 735 N.W2d 727, 731- 33 (Minn. App.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
2007), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2007), or, in the alternative, that we should find
Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7 (2016), to be unconstitutional. Appellant also argues that,
should we not overrule Williams or find Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7, to be
unconstitutional, we should reverse the referee and the district court for having considered
unreliable hearsay and because the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence
that appellant satisfied the be havioral criteria for commitment. Further, appellant argues
that the district court improperly reviewed the referee’s findings contained in the civil-
commitment order. Finally, appellant argues that a preexisting guardianship rendered his
civil commitment unnecessary. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2016, appellant suffered a traumatic brain injury with cognitive impairment,
resulting in a “substantial psychiatric disord er of his thought, mood, perception, and
memory, which grossly impairs his judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality and
ability to reason or understand.” The diagnosis is not in dispute.
Following the initial hospitalization for his injury, appellant received treatment in
three facilities. He was discharged from the third facility, apparently for refusing to remain
there. After his discharge, appellant stru ggled to find a stable living situation and
eventually ended up homeless and living in his car at a truck stop. Appellant’s mother and
brother were named his guardians shortly after his brain injury. The guardians do not have
a conservatorship and, despite attempts, ha ve not been able to arrange funding for a
placement for appellant because appellant will not cooperate with them regarding financial
arrangements.

3
While living at the truck stop, appellant had two encounters with law enforcement
that led to his hospitalization. On Februa ry 24, 2017, appellant called law enforcement
from the truck stop, complaining that people were making a hostile gesture at him. When
law enforcement investigated, th ey found appellant to be verbally combative. Officers
arranged for an ambulance to drive appellant to Mercy Hospital for an evaluation. When
appellant arrived at the hospital, medical staff found him to be argumentative and agitated,
but he eventually calmed down. He also ha d an alcohol concentration of 0.115. The
hospital staff thought that appe llant’s traumatic brain injury led to his inability to control
his verbal outbursts and impaired his memory. The hospital discharged him, finding
outpatient care to be appropriate. On March 6, 2017, appellant was again brought to Mercy
Hospital. Law enforcement stated to medical staff that appellant had been threatening to
kill people with a knife at the truck stop and was physically aggressive toward the police.
At the hospital, appellant was intoxicated and, according to medical records, was
“uncooperative, agitated, and belligerent[,] calling staff members vulgar names and stating
that he was going to kill everyone.” Appellant was given a sedative to calm his aggression
toward staff members. Appellant told hospital staff that he “carried a knife for protection
against others and his son.”
On March 7, 2017, appellant was pl aced on a 72-hour hold and transferred from
Mercy Hospital to inpatient care at Mercy Ho spital’s Unity Campus (Unity Hospital).
While there, he was agitated at times, but calm at other times. Unity Hospital staff
determined that a petition for appellant’s judicial commitment as a mentally ill person
should be filed. On March 8, a mental health therapist, employed by Mercy Hospital, filed

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a petition for appellant’s civil commitment. Dr. Krista Peterson was appointed by the
district court to examine appellant. Her March 15 report su pported appellant’s
commitment. She found appell ant to suffer from a substantial psychiatric disorder.
Appellant was noted to have erratic speech , agitated mood, paranoia, and “misperception
of others’ actions.” Dr. Peterson opined that (1) appellant’s disorder grossly impaired his
judgment, evidenced by his “sle eping in his car” and being “uncooperative with police”;
(2) appellant had grossly impa ired behavior, evidenced by his being impulsive and his
threats to kill people with a knife; and (3) appellant’s disorder grossly impaired his capacity
to recognize reality because he had “no insight into his behaviors, reason for
hospitalization, or impairments related to [traumatic brain injury].”
There was a hearing on the commitment petition before a referee on March 17.
Appellant objected to four ex hibits, consisting of appellant’s records from Community
Outreach for Psychiatric Emergencies (COPE), his medical records from Mercy and Unity
Hospitals, and his medical records from Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC). His
objection was not to the use of those records “as evidence of the direct observations,
opinions, and diagnoses of the treatment teams at these respec tive facilities[,]” but to the
hearsay statements contained in the records.
The records from COPE detail appellant’s behavior at the times his mother and
brother called to request assistance from th e organization. The records from Mercy and
Unity Hospitals describe appellant’s medical state, his behavior towards hospital staff, and,
based largely on hearsay statements contained in the records, appellant’s behavior that led
to his contacts with law enforcement in late February and early March. The records from

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HCMC described appellant’s traumatic brain in jury and his mental state since the injury,
including other people’s descriptions concer ning appellant’s behavior (including a report
that, at one point, law enforcement were ca lled to respond to appellant’s banging on
neighborhood doors). The referee admitted the records, “with the exception of any hearsay
that the [c]ourt finds is not reliable.” The referee admitted as reliable hearsay evidence
references to appellant’s outside-of-hospita l conduct as reported by law enforcement to
hospital and emergency medical staff, indicati ng that appellant was carrying a knife to
“protect” himself from strangers and that he was threatening to kill people.
Appellant, appellant’s mother, and Dr. Pete rson all testified at the hearing. The
referee made detailed findings in an order which was then signed by a district court judge.
The referee found, and the district court ad opted, that appellant’s illness could not be
adequately treated by voluntary inpatient or outpatient care, appointment of a guardian or
conservator, or a conditional release. It furt her found that there were no less restrictive
alternatives, because there was no evidence that an appropriate facility was available.
Appellant moved under Minn. St at. § 484.70, subd. 7(d) (2016 ), and Minn. R. Civ. P. 52
and 59 for judicial review, amended findings, dismissal of the case, or in the alternative for
a new trial.
The district court heard appellant’s posttrial motions on June 5, 2017. The district
court reviewed its commitment order and found that the medical reco rds stated that law
enforcement brought appellant to the hospital from a truck stop after he had threatened
others with a knife and exhibited other types of paranoid behavior. The district court found
hearsay statements from law enfo rcement concerning this behavior to be reliable hearsay

6
under Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Ac t. 15 “because hospital staff observed and
reported similar behavior while [appellant] was in the hospital pending this commitment”
and that,
[w]hile the officer’s statements by themselves may not have
been reliable hearsay because the statements contain
information from unknown sources whose ability to relate the
information is unknown to the [c]ourt, when the observed
behaviors are corroborated by hospital behavior, the [c]ourt is
justified in attributing greater reliability to the officer’s
statements.

The district court concluded that the refere e’s findings were suppor ted by the record and
that the order previously adopted by the district court was not clearly erroneous. It denied
appellant’s motion for amended findings or a new trial.
1
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that we should ove rrule our previous decision in Williams
concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil-co mmitment proceedings or, in
the alternative, that we should find Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7, to be unconstitutional.
Appellant alternatively argues that the referee and the district court improperly considered
unreliable hearsay when making the commitment determination and that there was no clear
and convincing evidence that appellant satisfied the behavioral criteria for commitment.
Further, appellant argues that the district court applied the wrong standard when it reviewed
the referee’s findings in ruling on appellant’s posttrial motions. Finally, appellant argues

1 These motions were heard and decided by the same district court judge who had adopted
the referee’s recommended order.

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that the preexisting guardianship of him esta blished by his mother and brother rendered
civil commitment unnecessary.
We decline to overrule Williams.

Appellant first argues that this panel should overrule Williams, where we interpreted
Minn. Stat. § 253.B.08, subd. 7, to permit th e admission of relevant and reliable hearsay
as evidence in civil-commitment proceedings. Williams, 735 N.W2d at 731-33. Appellant
argues that Williams was incorrectly decided. “The interpretation of a statute is a question
of law that we review de novo.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn.
2016).
Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis encourages us to “adhere to former decisions
in order that there might be stability in the law,” Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 617 N.W.2d
401, 406 (Minn. 2000), and we “only overrule our precedent if provided with a compelling
reason to do so.” Ariola v. City of Stillwater , 889 N.W.2d 340, 356 (Minn. App. 2017),
review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2017) (quotation omitted). More specifically, we may
determine that the doctrine does not apply where “the reasons underlying the particular rule
no longer exist or the rule no longer conf orms to changed conditions of society.” Doe v.
Lutheran High Sch. of Greater Minneapolis , 702 N.W.2d 322, 330 (Minn. App. 2005),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
Appellant moved to have this issue considered by the court of appeals en banc. We
denied that motion, because a panel of this court may overrule the decisions of another
panel when “provided with a compelling reason to do so. . . . The reasons for departing
from former decisions [must] greatly outweigh reasons for adhering to them.” Ariola, 889

8
N.W.2d at 356 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 480A.08,
subd. 3(c)(2) (2016) (indicating that the c ourt of appeals may pu blish decisions that
“overrule a previous Court of Appeals’ decision not reviewed by the Supreme Court”).
We decline to overrule Williams. Our decision in Williams interpreting Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.08, subd. 7, has stood for ten years. “The doctrine of stare decisis has special force
in the area of statutory interpretation because the Legislature is free to alter what we have
done.” Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, 843 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. 2014). Here, Minn.
Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7, has not been amended in the numerous legislative sessions taking
place since Williams was decided.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7, is not unco nstitutional as violating due process or
equal protection.

Appellant argues in the alternative that, if Williams correctly interpreted Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.08, subd. 7, then the statute is unc onstitutional under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. “The constitutionality of a statute
is a question of law that we review de novo.” SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821
(Minn. 2007). “Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional and, as we have said in the
past, our power to declare a statute unconstitutional must be exercised with extreme caution
and only when absolu tely necessary.” Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 600 N.W.2d
720, 722 (Minn. 1999). “The challenger of the constitutional validity of a statute must
meet the very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is
unconstitutional.” Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn.
2000). “A person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied has no standing to

9
challenge that statute on the ground that it might conceivably be applied to others.” State
v. Mireles, 619 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Feb. 15, 2001).
Appellant makes two main arguments that the statute is unconstitutional: first, that
the statute violates due process generally; and second, that the statute deprives respondents
in judicial commitment proceedings of equal protection of the laws.2
We addressed in Williams the question of whether Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7,
concerning the admission of hearsay evidence in a civil-commitment hearing, violates an
individual’s due process rights. Williams, 735 N.W2d at 731-33. We recognized in
Williams that “the trustworthiness of evidence is the primar y concern of the rules of
evidence generally and of the he arsay rule particularly. The purpose of the hearsay rule
with its various exceptions is to prevent unr eliable evidence from infecting fairness of
process.” Id. at 732. We determined that a dist rict court’s “thoughtful preview” of
evidence “satisfies the concern about trus tworthiness of [hear say] evidence.” Id. I n
Williams, we commended the district court for receiving “relevant evidence, weigh[ing] it,
and mak[ing] findings supported by the record.” Id. The challenged hearsay in that case
had “threshold indicia of reliability for admission” and Williams was unable to show that
the challenged evidence was “false or unreliable.” Id.

2 Appellant also argues that Minn. Stat. § 253 B.08, subd. 7, is unconstitutional because it
both abrogates the requirement of clear- and-convincing evid ence in commitment
proceedings and shifts the burden of production to dist rict-court respondents in
commitment cases. Because Minnesota law requires the use of the clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard in commitment cases, In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App.
2003), and unambiguously puts the burden of pr oduction on the petitioner, we reject this
argument.

10
Here, as in Williams, the district court carefully re viewed the referee’s findings to
determine that the statements by law enforcement contained in appellant’s medical records
were corroborated and were reliable hearsay. The district court acknowledged that these
statements would be unreliable without the corroboration. The district court discharged its
duty under Williams to ensure that the hearsay ev idence was reliable and relevant.
Appellant’s due-process rights were not violated by the admission of reliable, corroborated
hearsay in his civil-commitment hearing under Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7.
Appellant next argues that Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, su bd. 7, is unconstitutional
because it deprives respondents in commitment proceedings, including appellant, of equal
protection of the laws. He contends that the statute treats ci vil-commitment litigants
differently than other types of civil and criminal litigants by abrogating the hearsay rule.
The threshold question in an equal-prot ection analysis is whether “similarly
situated” individuals are being treated differently. State v. Cox , 798 N.W.2d 517, 521
(Minn. 2011).
[W]e have routinely rejected equal-protection claims when a
party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to
those whom they contend are be ing treated differently. . . .
[C]ontrolling law is clear that the Equal Protection Clause does
not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental
decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all
relevant respects alike.

Id. at 521-22 (quotations and citations omitted). The “f ocus” of this threshold
determination then, is whether two groups are alike “in all relevant respects.” Id. at 522.
It is clear to us that civil-commitment respondents are not similarly situated to other
civil or criminal litigants. In Williams, we highlighted a significant difference between

11
civil-commitment proceedings and criminal pr oceedings: that the Confrontation Clause
does not apply to civil-commitment proceedings. Williams, 735 N.W.2d at 732; s ee also
Allen v. Illinois , 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (holding there is no privilege against self-
incrimination in proceedings under a state sexually dangerous persons act because civil-
commitment proceedings are not “criminal” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment);
State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct. of Ramsey Cty., 205 Minn. 545, 556-57, 287 N.W. 297,
303 (1939) (holding there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil-commitment
proceedings). Further, the Mi nnesota Rules of Civil Proc edure provide that civil-
commitment hearings are not subject to all of the rules. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01 directs us
to Appendix A of the rules, whic h lists proceedings that are not subject to all of the rules
of procedure and includes civil-commitment hearings. And, Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 1
(2016), provides for a number of procedures applicable to a civil-commitment proceeding
that differ significantly from other civil litiga tion. Appellant does not appear to contend
that all the various exceptions to the Rules of Civil Procedure identified in Appendix A to
those rules offend equal protection. The very fact of the exceptions suggests a recognition
that the proceedings excepted from the rules are not “in all relevant respects” like other
cases. Because respondents in commitment case s in the district court are not similarly
situated to other types of civil litigants or to criminal litigants, appellant cannot demonstrate
that respondents in commitment cases are deprived of equal protection rights by the district
court’s application of Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7, to civil-commitment hearings.

12
The referee and the district court properly considered reliable hearsay evidence when
making the commitment determination, and the record contains clear and convincing
evidence that appellant satisfied the behavioral criteria for commitment.

Appellant argues in the alternative that, if we do not find Minn . Stat. § 253B.08,
subd. 7, to be unconstitutional, then the hearsay considered by the referee and the district
court was not reliable, and there was not cl ear and convincing evidence that appellant
satisfied the behavioral criteria for civil commitment.
Appellant argues that the referee abused its discretion in considering unreliable
hearsay because it “did not state an adequate basis for crediting multiple and unattributed
levels of hearsay evidence, and erred in admitting that evidence.”
“The decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the district court’s
discretion and will be reversed only if the court has clearly abused its discretion.” In re
Civil Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7, permits th e admission of relevant hearsay evidence. See
also Williams, 735 N.W.2d at 732-33 (determining that when a district court thoughtfully
considered hearsay evidence to find it reliable and relevant, appellant’s due-process rights
were not violated and the district court properly admitted the evidence).
Appellant challenges the referee’s crediti ng of the hearsay regarding appellant’s
threatening behavior at the truck stop. He argues that, in applying the clear-and-convincing
evidentiary standard, evidence that he carried a knife fo r protection does not “adequately
corroborate[] an assertion that [appellant] threatened anyone with the use of a knife.”
The referee found that appellant was “a ngry” and “verbally aggressive” toward
hospital staff during his first visit following an interaction with law enforcement in late

13
February 2017. During his early March hospital visit following a second interaction with
law enforcement, the referee found that a ppellant was “uncooperative, agitated, and
belligerent,” drunk, and that he was “calli ng staff members vulgar names and stating he
was going to kill everyone.” The referee also found that a clinical counsellor at Mercy
Hospital spoke with law enforcement over the phone regarding appellant’s behavior at the
truck stop on March 6. It furt her found that law enforcement said that they had ongoing
contact with appellant, and that he had a knife and was making threats at the truck stop on
two occasions. The referee also found that appellant told hospital staff that he carried a
knife for protection. And, the referee found the hospital staff’s account of appellant’s in-
hospital behavior to be credible, and found th at their description of their communications
with law enforcement was also credible. While the referee did not explicitly identify why
he found this hearsay evidence credible, the referee’s findings are supported by the record.
A reading of the referee’s findings indicate s that the referee ma de factual findings
regarding appellant’s in-hospital behavior before he found the hearsay evidence to be
reliable, and thus appears to have taken into consideration appellant’s in-hospital behavior
and statements in determining that the hearsay evidence of his out-of-hospital behavior was
reliable. The referee appears to have complied with Williams by properly determining that
the hearsay evidence was relevant and reliable before considering it.
Further, the district court reviewed the referee’s findings in its own order after
appellant’s post-trial motions. It found that law enforcement’s statements to hospital staff,
which “by themselves may not have been reliable,” were corroborated by appellant’s
observed in-hospital behavior and statemen ts about appellant’s aggression and his

14
admission to carrying a knife. The district court stated th at the “context of the entire
medical record” permits any “facial unreliability” to “disappear[].” The district court also
found that there was no strong , facially apparent reason to doubt the reliability of the
hearsay evidence. The challenged hearsay is statements from law enforcement to medical
staff regarding the behavior of a patient in that staff’s care. That hearsay was corroborated
by appellant’s own statements to medical staff. Those stat ements on their own support
appellant’s civil commitment. Neither the re feree nor the district court abused their
discretion in finding the challenged hearsay evidence to be reliable.
Appellant further argues that there was not clear and convincing evidence that
appellant satisfied the behavioral criteria for commitment. On appeal, we will not reverse
a district court’s “findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” In re Commitment of
Janckila, 657 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. App. 2003). “We review de novo whether there is
clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the di strict court’s conclusion that
appellant meets the standards for commitment.” Thulin, 660 N.W.2d at 144. Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.02, subd. 13 (2016), defines a mentally ill person as
any person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recogniz e reality, or to reason or
understand . . . and it is more probable than not that the person
will suffer substantial harm , significant psychiatric
deterioration or debilitation, or serious illness, unless
appropriate treatment and services are provided.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13. The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the statute
as requiring that “the substantial likelihood of physical harm must be demonstrated by . . .

15
a recent attempt or threat to harm self or others.” In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621, 623
(Minn. 1995) (emphasis omitted). Mere speculation or allegations are not enough to justify
commitment; the commitment must be supported by clear a nd convincing evidence. See
id. at 623-24. And our case law indicates th at a person can satisfy the substantial-
likelihood-of-harm standard by acting in a way that may provoke others into an attack.
See, e.g., In re Gonzalez , 456 N.W.2d 724, 729 (Minn. A pp. 1990) (finding an appellant
committable when he “pose[d] a likelihood of harm to himself by his conduct which may
outrage others and result in an attack on him”); In re Burmeister, 391 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Minn.
App. 1986) (holding that the commitment statut e “requires only that an individual pose a
threat of harm to others or himself”) (emphasis omitted).
The record supports the district court’s factual findings. Here, the referee found that
appellant “has a traumatic brain injury with cognitive impairment which is a substantial
psychiatric disorder.” And both the referee and the district court found that appellant
carried a knife and made threats to kill people. There is record evidence that supports these
findings.
We next consider whether the clear-and-co nvincing-evidence standard was met.
The referee found appellant to be “a brain-damaged individual who is paranoid, delusional,
disorganized, and seeing threats where none exist, whose judgment is significantly
impaired, who is isolated and living a marginal existence, and who is carrying a knife and
threatening to kill people,” and that appellant “creates a substantial likelihood that he will
provoke violence or engage in it himself with the result that someone will suffer physical
harm.” The record supports the referee’s findings of fact that appellant displayed behavior

16
that may reasonably be construe d either to place him at a ri sk of harm from others, or
indicate that he may harm others. For example, the court examiner testified that if appellant
were to offend the wrong person leading to a physical assau lt, it could result in his death
due to his recent brain injury. Appellant ma de death threats to hospital staff, and he
threatened individuals at th e truck stop while in possession of a knife. These factual
findings suffice to satisfy the clear-and-co nvincing-evidence standard concerning
appellant’s risk of causing substantial harm to himself or to others.
The district court properly reviewed its own civil-commitment order.

Appellant next argues that the distri ct court improperly reviewed its civil
commitment order, which adopte d the referee’s findings. Following the commitment
hearing, appellant moved the district court to review the referee’ s findings under Minn.
Stat. § 484.70, subd. 7(c)-(e) (2016), and for amended findings or a ne w trial under rules
52.02 and 59.01. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court incorrectly applied the
“clearly erroneous” standard when it reviewed the referee’s findings and order when
considering appellant’s posttrial motion.
Whether the district court applied the co rrect standard of review when reviewing
the referee’s findings contained in its own order seems to us to be of little consequence.
The essence of appellant’s posttrial motion was a request for amended findings pursuant to
rule 52.02 or for a new trial pursuant to rule 59.01, and the district court responded to those
motions by denying them in a carefully reasoned and thoughtful order. It is from this order
that appellant takes this appeal.

17
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to amend findings or for a new trial
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Zander v. Zander , 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn.
App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006). Here, the district court thoroughly
analyzed the record and the re feree’s findings. It properly gave some deference to the
referee as the initial factfinder. As discussed above, the referee’s factual findings in support
of civil commitment are supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a ppellant’s motion for amended
findings or for a new trial.
The district court did not err in finding th at the preexisting guardianship does not
render civil commitment unnecessary.

Appellant argues that the preexisting guar dianship established over him by his
mother and brother is sufficient to meet hi s treatment needs and necessarily amounts to a
less restrictive alternative to commitment. He argues that the district court should therefore
have dismissed the petition. “U nless it is clearly erroneous, we must affirm the [district]
court’s finding that there was no suitable less restrictive treatment alternative.” In re King,
476 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn. App. 1991); see Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (2016) (listing
dismissal of petition and appointment of a guardian or conservator as reasonable alternative
dispositions to judicial commitment).
Appellant’s mother and br other became appellant’s temporary guardians when
appellant suffered his brain injury. They later became his permanent guardians. The
referee found that appellant’s guardians had been unable to find a new placement for
appellant because appellant refused to cooperate with their efforts. The referee found that,

18
because they are not conservato rs, they have “no control” ove r his finances. And, when
the district court reviewed the referee’s findings, it found that “[i]t is clear that guardianship
is not sufficient because, despite that level of supervision, [appellant] required emergency
hospitalization and sedation.”
Appellant argues that his guardians have enough control over his financial affairs to
take care of him without a judicial commitmen t. He correctly argues that Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-313 (c)(2)-(5), (7) (2016), gives guardians the ability to provide for a ward’s “care,
comfort, and maintenance need s” either by using government benefits or funds from the
ward’s estate, and to apply or contract for non-necessities on behalf of the ward. However,
despite the control that appellant’s guardians do have, the district court found that this
control was not sufficient to find appellant a sa fe placement or to control his behavior to
prevent it from leading to altercations w ith law enforcement and hospitalization.
Appellant’s past behavior indicates that he had trouble remaining in a rehabilitation facility
which he was free to leave. There is no reco rd evidence that a suitable facility will take
appellant without a civil-commitment order. We defer to the district court’s finding that
there is no reasonable alternative to comm itment consistent with appellant’s overall
treatment needs. The referee and district c ourt’s finding that there is no less restrictive
alternative to civil commitment is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.