Mohamad Safraz Haniff, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1249

Mohamad Safraz Haniff, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 29, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Ross, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-14-3693

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Deanna N. Natoli, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
After police learned that Mohamad Haniff reportedly sexually groped his ten-year-
old niece’s breast area and buttocks, without reading him a Miranda advisory they took
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him into a room of his home, questioned him repeatedly, told him they believed the
accusations, and pressed him at least 30 times to confess. He eventually did. Because a
reasonable person in Haniff’s shoes would have perceived that he was in police custody to
the degree associated with formal arrest, the statements that police extracted from him
without a Miranda warning should have been suppressed. And because the district court
found that Haniff did not fully understand his Miranda rights when they were finally
provided to him, his later statement to an investigator also should have been suppressed.
We therefore reverse Haniff’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
Five Eagan police officers went to a home in October 2014 responding to a reported
domestic disturbance. The home was being shared by extended family members, including
Mohamad Haniff, who had arrived from Guyana five months earlier. Police learned that
the disturbance arose when ten- year-old A.S. disclosed that Haniff, who is her uncle, had
touched her breast area and buttocks.
Officers Brian Rezny and Logan Anderson asked Haniff to speak with them outside
on the driveway, while other officers spoke with other family members inside. Haniff said
that he had been living at the home for several months but that he intended to stay the night
at an apartment because of the dispute. Other officers joined in the discussion outside the
house with Haniff , whom the officers had difficulty understanding because of Haniff’s
apparently “broken English.” One officer questioned Haniff about A.S.’s allegations, and
Haniff said that he had inadvertently touched A.S.’s thigh as he tripped. An officer took
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Haniff’s identification card and radioed the dispatcher, requesting a check on Haniff while
Haniff remained close by answering other officers’ questions.
Officers repeatedly challenged Haniff’s account. One demanded, “Look at me when
you’re talking; every time I ask you a question you look down at the ground.” An officer
challenged, “Is the ten- year-old a liar?” The various officers barraged Haniff with
statements and questions to elicit his confession: “Why would she say this?” “It’s been my
experience that children don’t lie about this stuff.” “We just need you to tell us the truth so
we can get you the appropriate help.” “We’re not saying that you’re a bad guy.” “Things
happen.” “I know that you want to tell me something.” “If I go in there, is she going to tell
me that you touched her breast, or her nipples?” “I can tell on your face right now . . . that
you’re holding something back.” “What is she going to say when we talk to her?” “What
is it that you want to get off your chest?” “Is there anything else that you want to tell us?”
“I’m just asking for your complete honesty about what happened.” “What is it that you
want to confess?” “Sometimes people have urges that they just can’t help, and I’m thinking
in this situation that’s maybe kind of what happened.” “I believe that you probably did
something inappropriate and I’m asking for your honesty about what happened.” “That’s
not the story I’m getting.” “Where else did you touch her?” “Did you ask her to have sex
with you?” “She had no motivation to lie.” “I’m just asking for complete honesty here.”
“We’re trained to observe [body language], and you’re not being truthful with us.” “I’m
telling you flat out that it’s going to feel better to get it off your chest, come clean with the
truth, and tell us what’s going on so we can get you the help that you need.” “I don’t think
you’re being honest.” “She’s not lying about this; we all know that.” “We just want to
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know what your motivation is, if you’re sorry about doing it.” “How many times did you
touch her on the outside of her clothes up on top?” “How many times did you try to go
underneath her shirt?” “I believe her.” “There’s lots of people that do this stuff.” “Honestly,
I’m going to take her side at this point unless you have something more to tell us.” “Do
you have a problem? Is this a medical issue with you?” “We’re trying to figure out your
motivation for this.” “I want some answers.” “How would a ten-year-old know about sex?”
“How many times did you touch her on her butt?” “Do you realize that you’re not the first
person I’ve talked to who does this stuff?” “We want the entire truth.” “I can tell that you’re
about ready to cry and I know that you’re embarrassed and I know that you’re ashamed;
but part of getting rid of the embarrassment and the shame is talking about it and coming
clean.” “I don’t think that you’re a bad guy. We just gotta get this stuff figured out.” “Why
would she tell us that?” “If I go in there, where is she going to tell me that [you were when]
you touched her breast? . . . Where is she gonna say that that happened?” “You’re not fully
telling us the truth. What is the full truth?” “There’s no way a 10- year-old girl can make
up that kind of stuff.” These represent only some of the officers’ questions.
After more than 20 minutes of the officers’ cascading questions, Haniff finally
began to cry and said that he touched A.S.’s breast a single time. Officer David Streefland
directed Haniff to show the officers the room where the acts occurred. After they all went
inside and into the room, the officers’ questioning continued. “What’s been happening over
the last couple of months? If you’re going to lie to me, I don’t want to hear it.” “I’m not
intimidating to you right now, am I?” “How many times did you touch her in the bedroom;
she tells us it happened multiple times.” “I’m asking for your reasoning and why; if you’re
5
attracted to little kids that’s fine, that’s understandable.” “We’d like to hear your side of
the story.” “How many times did you touch her breasts, and her buttocks, in this room?” “I
appreciate you telling us partial truths, but we want the whole truth, if you don’t mind.”
“This is your opportunity to tell us why you did what you did.” “We’re trying to get down
to the bottom of this; and we have her story, and we believe her story, so I’m asking for
your reasoning, and why.” “I told you, you’re not the only person I’ve ever talked to that
has done this. . . . This is a common occurrence; this happens quite a bit, but we need to
learn from this.” “Your head’s hung low; I know that there’s more that you want to tell us.
Just get the burden off your chest.” “This is your opportunity to come clean.”
Finally, after more questioning in the room , Haniff began to confess to the
allegations and offer details to still more questioning and pressure. After 48 minutes of
sustained questioning, the officers placed Haniff under arrest and took him to the police
station. Detective William Cytryszewski advised Haniff of his Miranda rights. Haniff said
he did not understand, and the detective read them again, line by line. The detective
interrogated Haniff further, and Haniff confessed further to the same conduct.
The state charged Haniff with second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Haniff moved
the district court to suppress all of his incriminating statements. The district court denied
his motion, and Officers Rezny, Streefland, and Cytryszewski testified to his statements at
trial. The jury found Haniff guilty. He sought postconviction relief again challenging the
admission of his statements, and the district court denied his postconviction petition.
Haniff appeals.

6
D E C I S I O N
Haniff argues that he was improperly convicted in part because the state relied on
statements he made while he was being interrogated without having been advised of his
Miranda rights. “Statements made by a suspect during a ‘custodial interrogation’ are
admissible only if the statement[s] [were] preceded by a Miranda warning.” State v.
Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010); see also Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S.
436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). The state concedes that Haniff was interrogated
before anyone advised him of his Miranda rights, so our answer hangs on whether the
pre-arrest interrogation became custodial. The district court concluded that the answer is
no. We review a district court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding
an interrogation for clear error, and we independently review a district court’s legal
conclusions regarding custody. State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011).
We have no difficulty concluding that Haniff was in custody durin g the officers’
interrogation. “An interrogation is custodial if, based on all the surrounding circumstances,
a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police
custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491
(quotation omitted). Some factors that suggest that a suspect was in custody to the degree
associated with formal arrest include police interviewing the suspect at the police station;
an officer telling the individual that he is the prime suspect; officers restraining the
suspect’s freedom; the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; the presence
of multiple officers; and a gun pointing at the suspect. Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 11. On the other
hand, some factors that tend to suggest that a suspect was not in custody to the degree
7
associated with formal arrest include police questioning the suspect in his home; police
expressly informing the suspect that he is not under arrest; the suspect’s leaving the police
station without hindrance; the brevity of questioning; the suspect’s ability to leave at any
time; the existence of a nonthreatening environment; and the suspect’s ability to make
phone calls. Id.
While these factors are instructive, none is singularly dispositive. Thompson, 788
N.W.2d at 491. Several of the factors suggest that Haniff was in custody. The officers told
him many times that they “knew” he was guilty, Haniff made incriminating statements
during the interview, and multiple officers surrounded him and questioned him for a long
period. But not all of the factors suggest custody. At least one factor—the questioning
occurring in or near the home where Haniff was staying rather than at the police station —
suggests that Haniff was not in custody. A preponderance of these factors tips against the
district court’s conclusion that Haniff was not in custody during the questioning. But the
most significant factor leading us to reverse arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984). See State v. Champion,
533 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. 1995) (“We follow the custody test adopted in Berkemer.”).
We find especially compelling the officers’ long, relentless pressuring of Haniff for
a confession along with their repeated insistence that he was guilty . Berkemer teaches
courts to ask whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe that
“questioning [would] continue until he provide[ d] his interrogators the answers they
[sought].” See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438, 104 S. Ct. at 3149. Haniff denied or refused to
answer the officers’ accusations against him at least 30 times, and during this lengthy
8
period the officers continued to surround and accuse him of lying. Over and over and over
they assured him that they believed his accuser and disbelieved him and that he must admit
his offense. Every denial was followed by another question or statement and then yet
another question or statement bulldozing Haniff toward a confession. Then they took him
into the house and continued the same treatment, with at least three different officers in the
group joining in at different times. In this circumstance, any reasonable person in Haniff’s
shoes would be convinced that the officers would not relent from their group interrogation
until they got the confession they insisted upon. This, the Berkemer Court instructs, is
tantamount to a formal arrest, constituting custody for purposes of Miranda.
Although the district court found that the officers never told Haniff that they
considered him to be a suspect, the audio recording of the interrogation undermines the
finding. We will disturb a district court’s factual finding only when we are left with the
firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made, Vue, 797 N.W.2d at 12, and on
this point, we conclude that a mistake has been made. It is true that the officers never used
the term “prime suspect,” but Haniff knew he was their only suspect in the single-offender
accusation. And the officers did more than inform him that they suspected that he
committed the crime; they told him repeatedly they were certain he committed the crime.
This factor is relevant because people presumably understand that police take formal
custody of their prime suspects. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S. Ct.
1526, 1530 (1994); State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1998). The interrogation
recording leaves no doubt that the officers said unequivocally that they believed that Haniff
9
had sexually abused A.S. We therefore reverse the district court’s finding that Haniff was
not told that he was a suspect.
We also agree with Haniff that the district court erroneously concluded that the
location of the interrogation weighed against a finding of custody. The supreme court
observed that the fact that an interrogation occurs inside a defendant’s home does not
suggest that the interrogation is noncustodial when the home is a crime scene under
investigation. State v. Heden, 719 N.W.2d 689, 695–96 (Minn. 2006). The officers here
took Haniff into the home where he had been staying and into the girl’s bedroom
specifically because it was the location of the alleged illegal touching. Officer Streefland
testified that, after he arrived and spoke with A.S.’s father, the disturbance call became an
“investigation for criminal sexual conduct.” We conclude that the home, and particularly
the room where the officers took Haniff to continue their interrogation, was a crime scene
under investigation. The location of the interrogation therefore does not weigh against a
finding of custody.
Based on the circumstances as a whole, we hold that a reasonable person in Haniff’s
situation would believe that he was in custody to the degree associated with formal arrest
before he admitted to inappropriately touching A.S. Because Haniff was subjected to
custodial interrogation before any officer advised him of his Miranda rights, his unadvised
admissions and statements in the driveway and bedroom should have been suppressed.
That Haniff was subjected to custodial interrogation before being advised of his
Miranda rights does not automatically render inadmissible his later statements made to
Detective Cytryszewski at the police department after the detective detailed the Miranda
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warning for Haniff. Haniff had argued to the district court that the later statements should
also be suppressed under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) ; United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S.
532, 539, 67 S. Ct. 1394, 1398 (1947) . The district court expressly declined to address
Haniff’s poisonous-tree argument because it held that the pre-Miranda statements did not
require the Miranda advisory. Haniff did not raise that argument in his postconviction
petition, relying instead on his argument that his statement to Detective Cytryszewski
should be suppressed because he never validly waived his Miran da rights before talking
with the detective.
On appeal, Haniff again does not challenge the adm issibility of his statement to
Detective Cytryszewski based on any alleged taint carried over from the improper, earlier
interrogation, which would have triggered an analysis under the Supreme Court’s
developing standard (not under the fruit-of -the-poisonous-tree doctrine). See Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312–14, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1294–96 (1985) (rejecting application of
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine under Wong Sun when analyzing the admissibility of
a later Miranda-warned confession following an initial failure by police to administer the
warning before an earlier statement); see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 614–16,
124 S. Ct. 2601, 261 2 (2004) (plurality) (reaffirming Elstad but holding postwarning
statements inadmissible and failing to garner a majority of justices agreeing on any single
standard by which to judge admissibility in two-stage interrogations). Haniff argues instead
that his police-department statement should have been suppressed because he never validly
waived his Miranda rights when he spoke to the detective.
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Haniff’s challenge to the admissibility of his statement to the detective has merit. A
suspect may waive his Fifth Am endment right against compelled self -incrimination and
his right to counsel only if his waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Miranda, 384
U.S. 436 at 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602 at 1612. The state has the burden to prove that the
defendant’s waiver was valid. State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Minn. 2015). The state
usually carries this burden by showing that police gave the Miranda warning, the defendant
said that he understood the warning, and the defendant gave a statement. Id. The state made
the showing here, but the district court expressly found that “there is still reason to believe
that [Haniff] did not truly understand every aspect” of the Miranda warning. The state has
not challenged that finding as being clearly erroneous, and so we rely on it for our analysis.
The district court’s factual finding that Haniff did not fully understand his Miranda
rights is fatal to its conclusion that he validly waived those rights. The district court
reasoned that Haniff’s waiver was valid despite his lack of understanding because the court
could not “conceive of what additional steps Detective Cytryszewski could have taken to
ensure a valid waiver of [Haniff’s] rights.” Haniff lists several additional steps the detective
could have taken, but we need not consider them because the district court’s analysis misses
the mark. The validity of a Miranda-rights waiver does not depend on the thoroughness of
the officer’s effort to help the defendant understand those rights. One cannot waive a right
he does not understand, no matter how painstakingly the officer has tried to make the right
understood. The district court was not satisfied that the state proved that Haniff understood
his Miranda rights, and for that reason it had no factual basis to conclude that the state
carried its burden to establish that he validly waived those rights before he confessed to
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Detective Cytryszewski. Haniff’s statement to the detective, like his statements to the
officers, should have been suppressed as inadmissible evidence.
When evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights is
admitted at trial, we must reverse the conviction unless the state establishes that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn.
2009). An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict was surely
unattributable to the error. Id. The only evidence against Haniff apart from his confessions
was A.S.’s statements, either in the form of her testimony at trial or as relayed by Officer
Streefland and a social worker who interviewed her. It is true, as the state argues, that
A.S.’s testimony could be sufficient to support a guilty verdict. But the state has not
convinced us that this sufficient evidence is so compelling that the admission of Haniff’s
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A “defendant’s own confession is
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him,” and
it is likely to have a “profound impact” on the jury. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
296, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1257 (1991) (quotation omitted). Three police officers testified that
Haniff had confessed to sexually abusing A.S., and the prosecutor highlighted the
admissions in her closing argument. Because the jury’s verdict was not surely
unattributable to the erroneous admission of Haniff’s statements, we reverse Haniff’s
convictions and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.