In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. T. H., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1257

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. T. H., Child.

Filed February 5, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-17-522

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney , Jean Burdorf, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant is charged with the unintentional felony murder of her father. The district
court designated her case as an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) prosecution. Appellant
argues that the district court erred because th e EJJ designation is base d on a finding that
EJJ status will provide more time for rehabi litative services, and ev idence was presented
suggesting that appellant could make rehabilitative progress within the timeframe available
under a standard juvenile disposition. We affirm.
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FACTS
In January 2017, when she was 14 years old, appellant C. T. H. allegedly stabbed
her father in the chest after a heated argumen t over school attendance. The father died
from his injury. Appellant was charged with second-degree unintentional felony murder.
The state moved for an EJJ designation, which “extends jurisdiction over a young
person to age twenty-one and permits the court to impose both a juvenile disposition and a
criminal sentence.” In re Welfare of B.N.S., 647 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn. App. 2002). The
district court ordered an EJJ study and ps ychological evaluation for appellant. The EJJ
study, which contained an examination of relevant public-safety factors, recommended an
EJJ designation. The psychological ev aluation rendered no opi n i o n a s t o t h e
appropriateness of an EJJ designation, but recommended “long-term placement to address
[appellant’s] mental health, academic, behavioral, and family needs.” The evaluation noted
that appellant was “at high risk for future violence.”
Between April and June of 2017, hearings were held to determine the
appropriateness of an EJJ designation. The state did not call witnesses, but offered exhibits,
including the EJJ study and psychological eval uation. Appellant offered exhibits and
called numerous witnesses.
In August 2017, the district court issued an order designating appellant’s case as an
EJJ prosecution. The court concluded that the state had shown by clear and convincing
evidence that an EJJ designation serves public safety. This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
If a juvenile is alleged to have committed a felony, and the juvenile was between
the ages of 14 and 17 at the time of the offense, the state may request that the district court
designate the proceeding as an EJJ prosecution. Minn. Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 1(3) (2016).
At a hearing, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that an EJJ designation
serves public safety. Id., subd. 2 (2016). If such a showing is made, the district court must
designate the case as an EJJ prosecution. Id. In determining whethe r public safety is
served, the district court must consider the following factors:
(1) the seriousness of the al leged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the ch ild in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’s programming history, including the child’s past
willingness to participate me aningfully in available
programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available
in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id.; Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4 (2016).
In considering the aforementioned factors, the district court must “give greater
weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delinquency
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than to the other factors.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. If a proceeding is designated
as EJJ, and the juvenile pleads guilty or is found guilty, then the juvenile is given both a
juvenile disposition and a stayed adult criminal sentence. Minn. Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 4
(2016). Further, “EJJ designation extends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction until the juvenile
reaches 21 years of age, as opposed to the usual limit of 19 years.” In re Welfare of D.M.D.,
Jr., 607 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Minn. 2000); see Minn. Stat. § 260B.193, subd. 5(b) (2016).
We review, for clear error, a district court’s finding “that the prosecutor proved by clear
and convincing evidence that p ublic safety would be served by” an EJJ designation.
D.M.D., 607 N.W.2d at 437. Here, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err.
The district court made findi ngs on each of the relevant factors. The court found
that factor one, concerning the seriousness of the alleged offense, strongly weighed in favor
of an EJJ designation. The court characte rized the offense as “an escalating conflict
resulting in death.” Regarding factor two, concerning appellant’s culpability, the court
noted that appellant was a sole perpetrator. See In the Matter of the Welfare of S.J.T., 736
N.W.2d 341, 354 (Minn. A pp. 2007) (concluding that di strict court’s finding that
culpability factor weighed in favor of certif ication was not erroneous where the offender
was sole perpetrator), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2007). However, the court also noted
that there was evidence of prior trauma suffered by appellant and evidence suggesting that
the victim, appellant’s father, may have been the aggressor in the fa tal altercation. The
court did not render a definitive determinatio n on whether the culp ability factor weighed
in favor of an EJJ designation.
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Regarding factor three, concerning appellant’s prior record of delinquency, the court
noted appellant’s previous charges for violen t behavior, but considered the factor as
“neutral” because the ch arges were resolved as misdemea nors. Regarding factor four,
concerning past programming, the court noted appellant’s struggles with programming and
“significant programming needs,” which exce ed “what can be acco mplished in the time
remaining in the straight juvenile system.” The court found that appellant was at a high
risk to reoffend.
On factor five, concerning the adequ acy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile system, the court not ed the benefits of “more time” in meeting
appellant’s rehabilitative needs. The court also discussed the public-s afety benefits of a
potential adult sentence should rehabilitative e fforts fail. Lastly, the district court
addressed factor six, concerning available dispositional options. The court noted that there
was only one program for appellant available at that time, a program for girls known as
FOCUS. However, the court recognized th at additional programmi ng options might be
available in the future and that an EJJ designation would provide more time for that
potential programming.
The record supports the district court’s fi ndings on the EJJ factors. Although the
court did not find that all of the factors weig hed strongly in favor of an EJJ designation,
the court properly addressed the factors as they relate to public safety. The court noted the
seriousness of the alleged crime and that appellant was at a high risk to reoffend. The court
did not find that any of the factors favored a denial of an EJJ designation. We cannot
conclude that the district court clearly erred in its consideration of the factors.
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Appellant asserts that the district court designated the case as EJJ because EJJ would
“provide an additional two years of supervision for trauma-informed care services needing
considerable amounts of time.” Appellant a sserts that this was error because evidence
showed that rehabilitative progress could be made within the timeframe available under a
standard juvenile disposition. Appellant’s argument is lacking for two reasons.
First, the district court, in determining th at public safety would be served, did not
merely rely upon the additional time for rehabilitation available under an EJJ designation.
The court also noted the public-safety benef its of a potential adult sentence should
programming fail to rehabilitate appellant. Appellant asserts that the programming
available under a standard juvenile disposition is sufficient. But the success of any future
rehabilitative efforts remains unclear. As the di strict court noted in its order, appellant
successfully completed a juvenile intervention program just weeks before the alleged crime
at issue. This indicates that future juvenile programming may be ineffective and supports
the district court’s determination that a potential adult sentence better ensures public safety.
Second, although appellant points to testimony indicating that rehabilitative
progress could be made within the timefra me available under a standard juvenile
disposition, appellant fails to point to evid ence indicating that ad ditional time available
under an EJJ designation will not be beneficial for both rehabilitative efforts and public
safety. The record indicates that appellant has a “high need” for rehabilitative services and
requires “long-term placement.”
Appellant points to B.N.S., where we reversed an EJJ designation, to support the
proposition that more time for supervision is an insuffici ent basis for an EJJ designation.
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But the facts here are distinguis hable. The alleged offense in B.N.S. was burglary, not
murder. 647 N.W.2d at 41. Further, in B.N.S., “[t]he district court failed to address at the
hearing or in its written order whether there [was] clear and convincing evidence that public
safety [would] be served by the EJJ designation.” Id. at 44. Here, the district court noted
the applicable evidentiary burden and found that the state had met that burden. Moreover,
the court took public safety into account, noting both the seriousness of the offense and
that appellant posed a high risk of reoffending.
Appellant argues that the district cour t “applied the wrong legal standard” and
“substituted its own opinion of what would be in appellant’s best interests.” We disagree.
The district court thoroughly examined the relevant factor s and reached an appropriate
conclusion based on the evidence presented.
Affirmed.