State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1270

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Lee Carter,
Appellant.

Filed July 9, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-16-1498

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hy dukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pu blic Defender, Renée Bergeron, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from his third-degree assault co nviction, appellant William Lee Carter
argues that the district court (1) erred in de nying appellant’s request for a self-defense
instruction, (2) committed prej udicial error by permitting the state to impeach appellant
with his prior felony convictions, and (3) denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2016, appellant was housed as an inmate in a segr egated living unit at
the Oak Park Heights correctional facility. That morning, appellant entered a communal
“day space” area and approached J.B., another inmate in the unit. After a brief discussion,
appellant advanced upon J.B. w ith his fists in the air. J.B. took several steps backwards
until his back was against the wall. Appellant and J.B. threw punche s at each other and
appellant pushed J.B. against the wall, picked him up, and slammed J.B., headfirst, to the
cement floor. J.B.’s body went limp and he lost consciousness. Appellant then got on top
of J.B. and delivered 25 closed-fist punches to J.B.’s head while he was unconscious.
Appellant stopped hitting J.B. when J.B. began seizing and convulsing on the floor.
Prison officials transported J.B. to the hos pital, where medical personnel performed
emergency surgery. J.B. had “quite a few fract ures of the bones on the side of his face,”
including “pretty much everything outside of the skull including the bones around the eye,
his cheek bone, and the bones connected to th e skull.” Appellant was moved to another

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unit for detention. Appellant told a corrections officer that he realized he “over did things,”
and believed he “blacked out” during the assault.
The state charged appellant with third-de gree assault, substantial bodily harm, a
felony. The case was tried to a jury in May 2017. Appellant represented himself, with
advisory counsel. Appellant testified in his own defense and stated that while he
remembered speaking to J.B. the morning of the assault, he “[didn’t] remember anything
after that,” including the fight. The jury found appellant guilty. The district court imposed
a 13-month prison sentence, consecutive to the time appellant was serving at the time of
the offense. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
for a self-defense jury instruction.
Appellant claims that the district court erred by declining to instruct the jury on the
defense of self-defense. A defendant has the right to present a complete defense. State v.
Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 463 (Minn. 1999). While a defendant may assert his theory of the
case at trial, a district court “has discretion not to instruct the jury on the theory” if no
evidence supports the theory. State v. Vazquez, 644 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Minn. App. 2002). To
merit a new trial, a defendant must show that he was entitled to the jury instruction and that
the district court’s failure to give the instruction was not harmless. State v. Pendleton, 567
N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. 1997). “If the defense was not prejudiced by a refusal to issue an
instruction, there is no reversible error.” State v. Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 509 (Minn.
2005). The district court is afforded “consid erable latitude” when selecting language in

4
jury instructions and when “determining the propriety of a specific instruction.” Alholm v.
Wilt, 394 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1986). We revi ew a district court’s decision to give a
particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 361
(Minn. 2011), and we review the jury instructions as a whole to determine if they accurately
state the law in a manner that is understandable to the jury, State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d
269, 274 (Minn. 2014).
Minnesota law permits the use of reasona ble force against another in certain
circumstances, such as when force is used “in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense
against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2016). The elements of self-defense
are:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of . . . bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibi lity of retreat to avoid the
danger.
State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. App. 2017) (citation omitted). A defendant
asserting self-defense bears the burden of producing evidence to support that claim. State
v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 207 (Minn. 2006).
We determine that appellant failed to produce evidence supporting his self-defense
claim with respect to the third and fourth elements. A ppellant failed to demonstrate that
he had reasonable grounds to believe he was in imminent danger of bodily harm. “[A]
person may act in self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary and
uses only the level of force reasonably necessary to prevent the bodily harm feared.” State

5
v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014). Generally, “whether a defendant’s use of
force was reasonable is a fact question and, like all factual disputes, should be decided by
the fact-finder.” State v. Soukup , 656 N.W.2d 424, 431 (Mi nn. App. 2003) (citing Jack
Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co ., 304 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 1981)).
However, “when the evidence in the record is undisputed and lead s a rational fact-finder
to a single conclusion, the issue becomes a question of law.” Id.
Such is the case here. The district court determined that the evidence did not support
a self-defense instruction becau se a reasonable juror could not find that the use of force
was reasonable. We agree. Appellant testified that he could not recall the altercation and
the only reliable evidence was the testimony from the state’s witnesses and the video
camera. The video evidence s hows that appellant backed J.B. into a wall, lifted him off
the ground, threw him to the concrete floor h eadfirst, and, after J.B. lost consciousness,
punched him 25 times in the head until he began seizing and convulsing on the floor. Based
on this evidence, the district court did not a buse its discretion by re fusing to instruct the
jury on self-defense where appellant failed to satisfy hi s burden of production on the
reasonableness factor.
We further determine that appellant failed to demonstrate the absence of a
reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger. The “castle doctrine,” as this element is
known, is founded on the principle that the home is a person’s “sanctuary,” “safest place,”
and “critical for the protection of the family.” Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258-59. It is limited
in application to “a house, an apartment or part of a structure where [one] lives and where
others are ordinarily excluded—the antithesis of which is routine access to or use of an

6
area by strangers.” Id. at 259 (quotation omitted). The common area of the segregated
living unit does not qualify as appellant’s “home” because other inmates had equal access
to the space and appellant did not have the authority to exclude others from using it.
Because appellant failed to meet his burden of production with respect to two of the
four self-defense factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to give the requested instruction.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to
impeach appellant with his prior felony convictions.
Appellant argues that the district court a bused its discretion by ruling, over his
objection, that the state could impeach him with evidence of three prior convictions in the
event that he testified. This court reviews a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of
a witness by prior conviction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Williams, 771
N.W.2d 514, 518 (Minn. 2009). Whether the probative valu e of a prior conviction
outweighs the prejudicial effect is within the discretion of the district court. State v.
Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1985). A reviewing court will not reverse a district
court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 209.
A district court may admit evidence of a defendant’s prior fe lony convictions for
impeachment purposes if “the probative valu e of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). We consider five factors in our analysis of
the admissibility of a prior conviction:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater
the similarity, the greater the reason for not pe rmitting use of

7
the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s
testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.
State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Minn. 1978).
The state sought to introdu ce evidence of appellant’s pr ior convictions of felony
threats of violence in 2007, unlawful possession of a machine gun or short-barreled shotgun
in 2007, and felony criminal sexual conduc t in 2011. Appellant objected on the ground
that the evidence was overly prejudicial. Th e district court performed the multi-factor
Jones test and ruled that each of the prior convictions could be admitted for impeachment
purposes in the event appellant testified. We discern no abuse of discretion by the district
court in reaching this conclusion.
a. Impeachment Value of the Prior Crimes
The district court determined that the fi rst factor weighed in favor of admission
because the prior convictions allowed the jury to see appellant as a whole person “and thus
better to judge the truth of [his] testimony.” Appellant argues that his prior convictions
had no impeachment value because they were irrelevant to his truthfulness. We disagree.
The admission of prior convictions to impeach a testifying witness aids the jury because it
allows the jury “to see the ‘whole person’ and thus to judge be tter the truth of his
testimony.” State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. 1979) (citation omitted); see
also State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011) (stating that “general lack of respect
for the law,” rather than the nature of the conviction itself, informs the fact-finder about a
witness’s credibility). “[T]he fact that a prior conviction did not directly involve truth or
falsity does not mean it has no impeachment value.” State v. Grassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67

8
(Minn. 1993). Moreover, the ru les of evidence sanction the us e of felonies “not directly
related to truth or falsity for purposes of impeachment, and thus necessarily recognizes that
a prior conviction, though not specifically involving veracity, is nevertheless probative of
credibility.” Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d at 708. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that appellant’s prior convictions had impe achment value because they
allowed the jury to view appellant as a whole person.
b. Date of Conviction and Defendant’s Subsequent History
Under the second factor, a prior conviction is admissible if the conviction occurred
within ten years of the offense for which the defendant is currently on trial. Minn. R. Evid.
609(b). Appellant’s convictions occurred in 2007 and in 2011. The district court
determined that this factor weighed in fa vor of admissibility be cause the convictions
“establish a general pattern of lawlessness.” On appeal, appellant argues that the
convictions are stale and sh ould not have been admitted for impeachment purposes.
Generally, “recent convictions [a re considered] to have more probative value than older
ones. . . .” State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007). However, “if a witness is
convicted again or sent back to prison, then the witness’s ‘history of lawlessness’ enhances
an otherwise ‘stale’ conviction’s probative value.” State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 627
(Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 700 (2013); see also Davis , 735 N.W.2d at 680
(“[R]ecent convictions can enhance the pr obative value of older convictions by placing
them within a pattern of lawlessness, indicating that the relevance of the older convictions
has not faded with time.”). Appellant has been continuously incarcerated since his most
recent conviction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the

9
conditions established a general pattern of lawlessness, which was not diminished because
appellant was incarcerated during the intervening years. This factor weighs in favor of
admission.
c. Similarity of the Past Crime to the Charged Crime
We have held that “if the prior conviction is similar to the charged crime, there is a
heightened danger that the jury will use the evidence not only for impeachment purposes,
but also substantively.” Grassler, 505 N.W.2d at 67. However, the potential for the jury
to misuse the prior conviction is substantially reduced if the past crimes are sufficiently
different from the crime charged. State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586-87 (Minn. 1998).
There is little similarity be tween appellant’s past crimes, threats of violence, unlawful
possession of a machine gun or short-barreled shotgun, and criminal sexual conduct, and
the crime charged in this case, third-degree assa ult. Therefore, the prejudicial concern is
lessened and this factor weighs in favor of admission.
d. Importance of Defendant’s Testimony and Centrality of Credibility
Minnesota courts often consider the fourth and fifth Jones factors together. State v.
Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 655 (Minn. 2006). “If credibility is a central issue in the case,
the fourth and fifth Jones factors weigh in favor of admission of the prior convictions.” Id.
Credibility is generally a critica l issue in the case if “the i ssue for the jury narrows to a
choice between defendant’s credibility and that of one other person. . . .” Ihnot, 575
N.W.2d at 587. Appellant argues that cred ibility “wasn’t really an issue” because he
“blacked out” during the assault and could not remember the altercation. But as we
recognized in State v. Leutschaft, “credibility is a broader concept than truthfulness versus

10
lying” and encompasses broader aspects of th e events in question such as a witness’s
“faulty recall.” 759 N.W.2d 414, 422 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17,
2009). The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that these factors were
neutral or weighed in favor of admission because the prior convictions permitted the jury
to consider “the whole story” of appellant’s credibility.
We determine, based upon our review of the Jones factors, that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by ruling that the state could impeach appellant with his three prior
felony convictions in the event he testified at trial.
III. Appellant’s speedy-trial rights were not violated.
Appellant argues that his speedy-trial right s were violated. The United States and
Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal de fendant a right to a speedy trial. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In Minnesota, “trial is to commence within 60
days from the date of the demand unless good cause is shown . . . why the defendant should
not be brought to trial within that period.” State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 29-30 (Minn.
App. 2011) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011); see also Minn. R.
Crim. P. 11.09(b). We use a four-factor balanc ing test to determine whether a delay in a
case violated the speedy-trial right and consider “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason
for the delay; (3) whether the defendant assert ed his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4)
whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish , 590 N.W.2d 311, 315
(Minn. 1999) (citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972)). “None of
these factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of
the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are re lated factors and must be considered together

11
with such other circumstance s as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 19
(Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). A claim that the right to a speedy trial was violated is a
constitutional question reviewed de novo. Id.
a. Length of Delay
“The length of the delay is to some exte nt a triggering mechan ism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the
other factors that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. “A
defendant must be tried as soon as possible after entry of a plea other than guilty. On
demand of any party after entry of such plea, the trial must start within 60 days unless the
court finds good cause for a later trial date.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). A delay of more
than 60 days from the date of the speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial and
triggers a review of the remaining three factors. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16. The state
concedes that the trial began more than 60 days after appellant’s speedy-trial demand,
triggering appellate review of the remaining Barker factors.
b. Reason for Delay
The “key question” under this factor is whether the government or the defendant is
“more to blame” for the delay. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quotation omitted). In this case,
while both the state and appellant bear some responsibility for the trial delays, the delays
weigh more heavily against the state.
On the first day of the scheduled trial date in December 2016, the state requested a
continuance of the trial date due to witn ess unavailability. Appellant agreed to the
continuance request and invoked his speedy-trial rights. The trial court granted the state’s

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continuance request and set a trial date for January 2017. The parties appeared in January
for the scheduled jury trial. At that time, appellant discharged his public defender and
sought a continuance to prepare himself for trial as a self-represented litigant. The district
court granted the request over the state’s obj ection and continued the trial to February.
Two days later, the state requested a continua nce due to the unavaila bility of its medical
witness. The district court granted the re quest and rescheduled the trial for March.
Appellant did not object. In March, the dist rict court explained that other cases took
priority over appellant’s case and moved the tr ial to the court’s April calendar. In April,
the state sought a continuance because the prosecutor was unavailable. The case ultimately
proceeded to trial in May 2017.
Although both the state and appellant reque sted continuances, the delays are more
attributable to the state. However, we note th at some of the delays, such as those caused
by witness unavailability and co ngestion of the court’s ca lendar, were not deliberate
attempts at delay by the state. See Hahn , 799 N.W.2d at 30 (n oting that “delays are
assigned different weights in assessing whethe r a defendant’s speedy- trial right has been
violated” and deliberate attempts weigh heav ily against the state while “overcrowded
courts” are weighed “less heavily”). On balance, this factor weighs in favor of appellant.
c. Assertion of Right
A defendant’s assertion of his speedy-trial right “is en titled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.” Barker, 407
U.S. at 531-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93. Because appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial,
this factor weighs in his favor.

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d. Prejudice Caused by the Delays
We assess prejudice “in the light of th e interests of defendants which the speedy
trial right was designed to protect,” namely “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(ii) to minimize anxiety and co ncern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that
the defense will be impaired.” Id. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. When, as here, a defendant is
incarcerated during the delay on an unrelated charge, only the possibility of prejudicing the
defense is relevant. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318. Prejudice is “obvious” if a witness dies
or disappears during the delay, or if defens e witnesses “are unable to recall accurately
events of the distant past.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. These concerns are
not present here. Appellant did not call any witnesses, and testified that he “blacked out”
and could not remember the altercation. The delay in time is not responsible for appellant’s
faulty recollections and did not prejudice th e presentation of his defense. Moreover,
because appellant was incarcerated on another matter, he did not suffer prejudice due to
oppressive pretrial incarceration for the charged assault.
In light of all the Barker factors, we determine that appellant was not deprived of
his speedy-trial right. While the reason for the delay tips slightly in appellant’s favor, the
evidence does not suggest that the state in tentionally delayed the trial to frustrate
appellant’s speedy-trial rights. Moreover, the final factor—prejudice—weighs heavily
against appellant because the delay did not impair his ability to present a defense. Because
the delays did not harm appellant’s defense and he did not suffer pretrial incarceration, we
discern no speedy-trial violation. See, e.g., State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn.
1989) (stating that “[t]he only prejudice atte sted to . . . was the stress, anxiety and

14
inconvenience experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial” and concluding that
defendants were not denied right to speedy trial). On balanc e, we conclude that the state
did not violate appellant’s speedy-trial right.
Affirmed.