State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1282

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael John Wind,
Appellant.

Filed May 29, 2018
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-16-3233

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Davi d P. Frank, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant Michael John Wind argues that the district court abused its discretion

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by admitting evidence that he gave a false name to police nine months after the alleged
offense. Because appellant’s arguments go to the weight of the c onsciousness-of-guilt
evidence rather than its admissibility, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 4, 2016, appellant was charge d with third-degree criminal sexual
conduct for an incident that occurred on March 28. A warrant for appellant’s arrest was
issued on October 6. On December 23, a police officer spotted appellant in a public library.
The officer believed there was an active warra nt for his arrest. An assisting officer
approached appellant and asked for his name. Appellant responded with a name other than
his own. Believing he provided a false name, police arrested appellant.
Respondent State of Minnesota filed a motion in limine to admit the library
encounter as consciousness-of-g uilt evidence and appellant obj ected. The district court
heard arguments on the motion before trial and ruled that the evidence would only be
admitted as consciousness-of-guilt evidence on rebuttal if appellant testified that the
March 28 incident was consensual. Appellant testified that the incident was consensual
and the district court provided a limiting instruction before allowing the responding officer
to testify about the library encounter on December 23.
The jury found appellant guilty. The district court imposed an aggravated sentence
of 124 months but granted the parties’ joint motion for a downward-dispositional departure
and stayed the sentence for 20 years. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden
of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby
prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted). Where
an error does not implicate a constitutiona l right, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that a new trial is warranted because the error substantially influenced the
jury’s verdict. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009).
Appellant argues that a proper nexus did not exist between the library encounter and
the crime charged and thus the district court erred in admitting the consciousness-of-guilt
evidence. We disagree.
A defendant’s conduct suggesting that he is aware of his guilt is relevant evidence.
See State v. McTague , 190 Minn. 449, 453, 252 N.W. 446, 448 (1934). Specifically,
providing a false name to police “is a circumstance to be considered—not as a presumption
of guilt, but as something for the jury—as suggestive of a consciousness of guilt.” Id. That
a defendant may have other motives for his conduct does not render that conduct
inadmissible but is rather an addi tional consideration for the jury. State v. Hagen , 391
N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 1986).
Appellant cites State v. McDaniel , 777 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 2010), to support his
argument that a nexus must exist between the crime charged and the consciousness-of-guilt
conduct. The appellant in McDaniel relied on Ricks v. Commonweath , 573 S.E.2d 266,
269 (Va. Ct. App. 2002), to support the argument that the consciousness-of-guilt evidence

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was inadmissible because he did not know he was a suspect and thus no evidence connected
the crime charged to the consciousness-of-guilt evidence. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d at 747.
But the McDaniel court did not adopt the holding from Ricks; rather, McDaniel simply
holds that a defendant’s reasons to flee polic e “go to the weight of the evidence—not its
admissibility.” Id.
Here, evidence admitted on rebuttal that appellant gave police a false name prior to
arrest is relevant as consciousness of guilt. That appellant may not have been aware of the
charge or warrant prior to providing a false name goes to the weight of the consciousness-
of-guilt evidence rather than its admissibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the evidence.
Affirmed.