State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1293

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Thomas Larold Meyer,
Appellant.

Filed June 25, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-15-955

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Thomas Meyer challenges his conviction of drivin g while impaired
(DWI), arguing the district court erred in refu sing to suppress the results of a warrantless
blood draw. Because exigent circumstances made the warran tless search reasonable, we
affirm.

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FACTS
On March 7, 2015, Meyer flipped his pick up and was ejected onto the side of the
road. A bystander called 911 at approximately 8:32 p.m., and, shortly thereafter, Morrison
County Sheriff’s Deputy Bill Vanden Avond an d Upsala Fire and Rescue (UFR) arrived
on the scene. When Deputy Vanden Avond ch ecked to see if Meye r was conscious, he
detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Meyer.
Approximately 20 minutes later, Deputy Ha sten Warnberg arrived on the scene.
While Meyer was moved to a UFR ambulance, Deputy Warnberg and Deputy Vanden
Avond canvased the area and found a bottle of whiskey and a bottle of soda that smelled
like a whiskey mixed drink. Warnberg then sent another deputy to obtain a preliminary
breath test (PBT) from Meyer, but Meyer refused to give a breath sample.
A few minutes later, a Gold Cross ground ambulance arrived to transport Meyer to
St. Cloud Hospital. However, after evaluating Meyer, Gold Cross determined that an airlift
should be used instead. De puty Warnberg assisted the he licopter in landing safely, and
Meyer was airlifted from the scene of the crash at approximately 9:15 p.m.
Once the decision was made to airlift Me yer, the Morrison County Sheriff’s Office
contacted the St. Cloud Police Department, as king the department to send an officer “to
the hospital [to] read [the] implied consen t and try to obtain a blood draw,” because
deputies are “not supposed to le ave the county while [they ar e] working,” and because it
would have taken Deputy Warnberg approximately 45 minutes to get from the scene of the
crash to the hospital. At 9:22 p.m., St. Cloud Police Officer Trent Fischer was dispatched
to the hospital. En route, Officer Fischer spoke with Deputy Warnbe rg and learned that

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Meyer (1) had crashed his car, (2) admitted to drinking, (3) was conscious at the scene, and
(4) had refused to provide a PBT.
Officer Fischer arrived at the hospital at around 9:30 p.m., but was unable to meet
with Meyer for approximately 45 minutes be cause Meyer was undergoing a CT scan.
Shortly before 10:15 p.m., Officer Fischer entered Meyer’s hospital room and told Meyer
that he “was there on behalf of Morrison Co unty Sheriff’s Department and was going to
read him the implied-consent advisory.” Meyer raised his right arm to acknowledge
Officer Fischer’s presence. At 10:15 p.m ., Officer Fischer began reading the implied-
consent advisory. He stopped, however, when he reached the “Do you understand what
I’ve just explained?” question because Meyer did not verbally respond. Officer Fischer
then asked Meyer to blink if he could hear and understand; again Meyer did not respond.
After Meyer did not acknowle dge the implied-consent advisory, Officer Fischer left
Meyer’s room to consult by phone with Deputy Warnberg and Officer Fischer’s supervisor.
Ultimately, it was decided to proceed with a warrantless bl ood draw, and Officer Fischer
asked a hospital staff member to extract a sample of Meyer’s blood. At 10:35 p.m., a lab
technician drew a sample that, when tested, indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.31.
Meyer was charged with two counts of DWI: one for driv ing while under the
influence of alcohol and one for having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as
measured within two hours of driving. Meyer moved to suppress the results of the
warrantless blood draw, and a contested omnibus hearing was held.
Deputy Warnberg and Officer Fischer tes tified at the hearing. Deputy Warnberg
testified that he never tried to read the impl ied-consent advisory to Meyer at the scene of
the crash because there was “not enough time from the time that Upsala personnel [were]

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working on Mr. Meyer to the time that Gold Cr oss arrived.” Deputy Warnberg said he
never attempted to get a search warrant for Meyer’s blood at the scene “[b]ecause from the
time of call to the time [he] was on scene from the time [he] cleared, [they] were closing
in on the two-hour window.” Deputy Warnberg testified that it would have taken 25 to 30
minutes to drive back to his office and another 30 to 60 minutes to draft the warrant, obtain
a judge’s signature, and transmit the warrant to Officer Fischer.
Officer Fischer testified that he never a ttempted to obtain a warrant “based on the
time factor and the request from Morrison County to . . . obtain the blood.” Officer Fischer
testified that to obtain a warrant, he “would have had to write the warrant out and then have
it reviewed by a county attorney and then respond to the on-call judge’s residence, have it
signed, and then respond back to the hospital.” Officer Fische r testified that this process
generally took 45 to 120 minutes.
The district court denied Meyer’s motion to suppress. Meyer subsequently agreed
to stipulate to the state’s case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court
found Meyer guilty of having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher as measured within
two hours of operating a motor vehicle and dismissed the other charge.
Meyer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Meyer argues the district court erred in concluding that exigent circumstances
justified a warrantless blood draw. When the facts are undisputed, we review the existence
of exigent circumstances de novo. See State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn. 2015).
The United States and Minnesota Constitu tions prohi bit unreasonable searches.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless search of a person,

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including the person’s blood, is unreaso nable unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d at 675. One su ch exception is exigent
circumstances. Id. “The exigent circum stances exception to the warrant requirement
applies when the exigencies of the situation make the ne eds of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted).
“[T]he natural and gradual dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream, in and of
itself, does not constitute an exigency in every drunk-driv ing case”; rather, “whether
exigent circumstances ex ist must be decided in each ca se, based on the totality of the
circumstances.” Stavish, 868 N.W.2d at 676. Looking at the totality of the circumstances,
we must determine whether “l aw enforcement ‘can reasonabl y obtain a warrant before a
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.’”
Id. (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 152, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013)).
Meyer argues law enforcement could re asonably have obtained a warrant here
“given the multiple officers involved and th e ample time to obtain a warrant.” More
specifically, Meyer argues that from the time he was airlifted from the scene, 72 minutes
remained during which either Deputy Warnbe rg, Officer Fischer, or another St. Cloud
Police Officer could have obtained a warrant.
In our view, this case is analogous to Stavish. Like in this case, in Stavish, law
enforcement received a report of car crash and the officer in charge of the investigation
arrived approximately 20 minutes later. 868 N .W.2d at 673. The defendant was
transported to a hospital, and an officer was dispatched to that hospital to attempt to obtain
a blood sample for alcohol-concentration testing. Id. As in this case, the officer in question

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did not obtain a warrant or consent for the search, but rather instructed hospital personnel
to obtain a sample. Id. At the time the sample was drawn in Stavish, “70 minutes remained
in the 2-hour window for obtaining a blood sample.” Id.
Before trial, Stavish moved to suppress th e results of the alcohol-concentration test.
Id. That motion was granted, but this court re versed the district court, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. Id. at 672. In doing so, the court noted that the
relevant circumstances included: “that law enforcement had reason to believe that [the
defendant], who allegedly admitt ed to being the driver, had consumed alcohol, and that
alcohol contributed to the accident;” that “it was important to draw [the defendant’s] blood
within 2 hours of the accident to ensure the reliability a nd admissibility of the alcohol
concentration evidence;” and that “[the de fendant’s] medical c ondition and need for
treatment rendered his future availability for a blood draw uncertain,” because it was
unknown “how long [the defendant] was likely to remain at the same hospital.” Id. at 677-
78. Notably, the court specifically considered and rejected the argu ment that there were
not exigent circumstances given the amount of time (70 minutes) left within the two-hour
period between when the crash occurred and when the defendant’s blood was drawn. Id.
at 679-80.
We see analogous circumstances in this case. Here, as in Stavish, law enforcement
had reason to believe that Meyer had consumed alcohol and that alcohol contributed to the
accident. It was also important to draw Meyer’s blood within two hours of the accident to
ensure the reliability and admissibility of th e alcohol-concentrati on evidence. Finally,
although there was no indication Meyer woul d be moved from one hospital to another,
Officer Fischer had to wait 45 minutes to meet with Meyer because Meyer was undergoing

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a CT scan. This reasonably could have crea ted concerns that, if a blood draw was not
imminently performed, Meyer might again have become unavailable.
We also reject Meyer’s suggestion that Deputy Warnberg could have begun working
on a warrant application as soon as Meyer was airlifted from the scene. Deputy Warnberg’s
responsibilities at the scene were not limited to his interactions with Meyer and assisting
in landing the helicopter; he was also respon sible for canvasing th e area for evidence.
Furthermore, Deputy Warnberg testified that he would have had to return to his office to
type up the warrant application, that no administrative personnel were on duty to help, and
that there was no one else to assist him. Meyer argues that Deputy Warnberg could have
dictated the warrant application to his sergeant while driving back to the office. However,
even if the sergeant was available to take dictation, we are reluctant to hold that the United
States or Minnesota Constitutions requires officers to dictat e legal documents while they
are driving in order to avoid having alcohol- concentration test results suppressed. As a
result, we conclude that the district court di d not err in refusing to suppress the results of
the blood test.
Affirmed.