Larry Jermaine McCool, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-1303

Larry Jermaine McCool, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 26, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-12-3234

Larry McCool, Stillwater, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his petition on the ground
that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that his claims are barred by State v.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). We affirm.

2
FACTS
In January 2012, a confidential reliable informant (CRI) reported to the Violent
Offender Task Force that appellant Larry Jermaine McCool was distributing crack cocaine
from a residence and using a Cadillac Deville to transport it. Officers obtained a search
warrant for the residence and the Cadillac. Investigators seized a large quantity of crack
cocaine from the residence and 24 grams of crack cocaine from the Cadillac , and McCool
was arrested. During a custodial interview of McC ool, the investigator activated a
handheld digital audio -recording device before advising McCool of his Miranda rights.
The investigator observed a red light come on and stopped the recording at the end of the
interview. During this interview, McCool rep ortedly confessed to possessing crack
cocaine. But t he interview recording was not available at trial allegedly due to an
equipment malfunction.
The state charged McCool with first-degree controlled-substance sale, and a jury
convicted him. In 2014, McCool challenged his conviction in a direct appeal to this court,
arguing that the district court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained
from a warranted vehicle search; (2) denied him his right to a fair trial by denying his request
for an in camera review of the CRI’s identity; (3) abused its discretion by denying his request
for a continuance to hire substitute counsel; and (4) abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a mistrial or to reopen the Rasmussen hearing based on new information. State v.
McCool, No. A13-2128, 2014 WL 6608923, at *1-9 (Minn. App. Nov. 24, 2014). In pro se
supplemental and reply briefs, McCool raised three issues. Id. We affirmed his conviction
in an unpublished opinion. Id. at *9.

3
In 2017, McCool petitioned for postconviction relief , asserting that (1) he was
entitled to an in camera review of the CRI’s identity because the CRI was a material witness
and (2) he was never given a Miranda advisory. The postconviction court denied McCool’s
petition, reasoning that his claims are barred by Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
McCool contends that the district court erred by denying his petition for
postconviction relief. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for abuse
of discretion. Quick v. State, 692 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Minn. 2005).
On appeal, McCool asserts that (1) not knowing the CRI’s identity violated his Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights and his Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights, thereby
denying him a complete defense and a fair trial and (2) his Miranda rights were violated
because the state failed to prove that he knowingly waived them.
A person convicted of a crime is entitled to one review, but issues that have already
been fully and fairly litigated should not be re-litigated on subsequent appeals or petitions.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. There are two exceptions to the Knaffla rule: (1) “a
postconviction court may hear and consider a claim that was previously known but not
raised if the claim is so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time
of the direct appeal” and (2) “when fairness so requires and the petitioner did not
deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Greer v. State, 673
N.W.2d 151, 155 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).

4
McCool’s first argument is that he is entitled to an in camera review of the CRI’s
identity. In denying postconviction relief, t he postconviction court stated that McCool
sought disclosure of the CRI’s identity in pretrial motions. See McCool, 2014 WL 6608923,
at *1-2. On direct appeal, McCool challenged the district court’s ruling that the CRI’s identity
need not be disclosed. Therefore, the postconviction court concluded that his CRI claim was
fully and fairly litigated and is barred by Knaffla. 243 N.W.2d at 741.
McCool contends that his CRI issue is not Knaffla barred because a Knaffla
exception applies —arguing that the CRI was a material witness and he could not have
raised the issue on direct appeal because he had not raise d it at trial. But as t he
postconviction court stated, the first Knaffla exception does not apply because McCool’s
CRI claims were raised on appeal and rejected. See McCool, 2014 WL 6608923, at *5-6.
The postconviction court also determined that the second Knaffla exception does not apply
because the factual issues surrounding the CRI claims were fully and fairly litigated. We
agree.
McCool’s second argument is that his Miranda rights were violated because he was
not read the Miranda advisory, he did not receive an attorney when he requested one, and
he did not confess in the custodial interview. Again, the postconviction court determined
that the factual issues underlying those claims were fully and fairly litigated at b oth trial
and on direct appeal. The postconviction court noted that this court, on direct appeal,
affirmed the district court’s denial o f McCool’s motion for a mistrial stemming from the
Miranda issues. We agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that McCool’s
Miranda claims were fully and fairly litigated.

5
McCool maintains that his Miranda claims are not Knaffla barred because he raised
a Scales issue on direct appeal—not a Miranda issue.1 But in denying postconviction relief,
the postconviction court stated:
However it is labeled, the core of the issue turn[ed] on whether
the custodial interview was recorded, and whether the
investigator’s report of the interview is reliable. In analyzing
the alleged Scales violation, the Court of Appeals determined
that the unavailability of the record [of] a custodial interview
was not prejudicial to the accused.

The postconviction court also noted that, at trial, McCool did not dispute that a Miranda
warning had been given or that he waived his Miranda rights.
The postconviction court concluded that neither Knaffla exception applies to the
Miranda issue because McCool was attempting to re -litigate issues that were fairly and
fully decided at trial and on appeal. We agree. The postconviction court properly exercised
its discretion by denying McCool’s postconviction petition.
Affirmed.

1 The facts underlying an alleged Scales or Miranda violation are interrelated. The Scales
requirement mandates that law enforcement record all custodial interviews at a place of
detention to prevent “factual disputes about the existence and content of Miranda warnings
and any ensuing waiver of rights. ” State v. Inman , 692 N.W.2d 76, 80 , 81 n.4 (Minn.
2005). But if the accused does not d ispute that a Miranda warning was given, or that the
accused waived his or her right to remain silent, “the lack of a recording creates no
prejudice to the accused.” Id. at 81.